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Abstract 
What explains the shift towards greater direct public oversight of financial markets in 
international financial regulation that has characterized the response to the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2010? Over this period, the main international financial regulatory 
bodies have abandoned the market-based mechanisms that had informed their 
approach towards the regulation of different financial domains in the years before the 
crisis and significantly expanded the perimeter of state-based regulation. However, the 
extent and the timing of this shift cannot be regarded only as the by-product of the crisis, 
nor they can be explained by the existing interpretations of the political determinants of 
international regulatory policies. This study builds upon existing state-centric 
explanations of international regulatory policies, but it goes beyond these works by 
exploring how the preferences of the most influential countries in response to the crisis 
have been influenced by variations in the degree of public salience of different financial 
domains. More specifically, this study argues that the lasting increase in the public 
salience of financial regulatory policies in the US and different European countries since 
the last quarter of 2008 has created strong incentives for elected officials in these 
countries to challenge the market-based approach that had emerged in the decade and 
half before the crisis and to directly interfere in the international regulatory agenda. In 
order to explain this shift, this study will analyse the evolution in the international 
governance of three sets of markets and institutions that have occupied an important 
position in the international regulatory agenda in recent years: 1) OTC derivatives; 2) 
rating agencies; 3) hedge funds. Besides making an empirical contribution to the 
literature on the politics of international financial regulation, this study also contributes 
theoretically to this literature by deepening our understanding of the nexus between 
international regulatory coordination and domestic public opinion. 
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Introduction 
 
In Brief: Public Opinion and the International Regulatory Response to the Global 
Financial Crisis 
This study will investigate the political sources of an historical shift in the governance of 
international financial markets that has been set in motion in response to the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2010. Over this period, the main international financial regulatory 
bodies have abandoned the reliance on market-based mechanisms that had informed 
their approach towards regulating different financial domains in the years before the 
crisis. These same international institutions have instead drafted international measures 
putting regulation of these markets and institutions firmly under the hand of public 
authorities. As a result, the international regulatory response to the crisis led to a 
significant expansion in the perimeter of state-based regulation. What explains this shift 
towards greater direct public oversight of financial markets in international financial 
regulation since the outbreak of the global financial crisis of 2007-2010? 
In order to answer this question, this study will analyse the evolution in the international 
governance of three sets of markets and institutions that have occupied an important 
position in the international regulatory agenda in recent years: 1) OTC derivatives; 2) 
rating agencies; 3) hedge funds. This study will identify the primary determinant of the 
shift in the international approach towards the governance of these three sectors and 
institutions in a shift in the international preferences of the countries that dominate the 
international regulatory agenda, that is the US and Europe. However, it will complement 
existing pluralist, historical institutionalist, and constructivist explanations of state 
preferences in international financial regulation by exploring the impact that variations in 
the degree of public salience of different financial domains have in altering the domestic 
bases of international regulatory politics.  
This analysis will make two main contributions to the existing academic literature. The 
first contribution is an empirical one. This study provides the first political analysis of the 
evolution of international regulatory cooperation vis-à-vis CRAs, hedge funds and 
derivatives in the period between the mid-1990s until the end of 2011. Different studies 
have explored the turn towards market-based regulation in the years before the crisis, 
including individual assessments of each of these three sectors. More recently, a 
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growing body of work has started to explain the same changes in their regulation 
brought by the crisis. However, none of the existing IPE analyses matches this study in 
scope, which spans three sectors during both the pre- and post-crisis period. 
Second, this study makes a theoretical contribution to broader literature that has, since 
the work of Kapstein on the Basel Agreement, investigated the political determinants of 
international financial regulatory policies.1 More specifically, it will contribute to this 
literature by deepening our theoretical understanding of the nexus between international 
regulatory coordination and domestic public opinion. The impact that the general public’s 
degree of attention towards the governance of different issues has over the policymaking 
process has been widely debated within the broader political science literature. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to place the level of public 
attention towards a determined financial domain at the centre of the analysis of 
international regulatory cooperation in finance.  
This analysis will conclude that variations in the degree of salience of different financial 
domains in the most powerful countries played an important role in determining the 
patterns of international regulatory cooperation in the governance of OTC derivatives, 
rating agencies, and hedge funds before the crisis. More specifically, while the low 
salience of financial regulation represented a key enabling condition for the emergence 
of market-based governance arrangements before the crisis, the lasting increase in the 
salience of regulatory policies since the last quarter of 2008 had the effect of creating 
strong incentives for elected officials to reverse this approach.  
	   
The Research Question: Understanding the International Regulatory Response to the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2010 
The global financial crisis that originated in the summer of 2007 from the US subprime 
mortgage markets and escalated in 2008 to a full-fledged transatlantic banking crisis 
was an historic event whose consequences and ramifications span across a large 
number of areas of the global agenda. One of the most visible and debated 
consequences of the crisis can be found in the reforms this event has triggered in the 
governance of global financial markets. The crisis has set the stage for a period of 
unprecedented activity in the reform of international financial regulation. This period has 
been characterized by the introduction of numerous new international regulatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Kapstein 1989. 
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initiatives as well as by different institutional innovations, such as the creation of the 
Financial Stability Board.  
One important post-crisis change in the governance of international financial markets is 
the way the policies adopted by the some of the main international regulatory 
institutions, such as the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), Basel Committee, and the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), have extended the reach 
of direct regulatory intervention in addressing the regulatory gaps revealed by the market 
turmoil.  
This shift is clearly visible in the approach adopted by these international institutions 
towards the governance of three of the markets and institutions that have been debated 
since the outbreak of the crisis: 1) OTC derivatives, 2) rating agencies; and 3) hedge 
funds. The global financial crisis of 2007-2010 was not the first episode of market 
instability that has led the international regulatory community to discuss the regulatory 
status of these three financial sectors. However at different moments between 1994 and 
2007, the FSF, Basel Committee, and IOSCO have opposed measures to bring OTC 
derivatives, hedge funds, and rating agencies within the perimeter of direct regulatory 
oversight. Instead, their approach to governing these three innovative market sectors 
relied extensively on the capacity of markets to self-regulate. This approach gave a 
public policy role to industry-driven self-regulatory measures and designated market 
discipline as the primary mechanism to constrain excessively risky behaviour and to 
monitor and enforce compliance with international standards.  
The reliance on market-based measures that characterized the governance of these 
three markets and institutions is consistent with a broader shift in the approach of the 
international regulatory community since the late-1990s that has been widely 
documented by numerous authors within the IPE literature.2 While most scholars have 
characterized this trend as a structural change in the international regulation of financial 
markets, Lou Pauly argued forcefully in 2003 that the delegation of regulatory authority 
to private market actors in the global economy remained a fleeting phenomenon. 
According to Pauly, public authority would likely reassert control over what they had 
delegated to private actors in the case of a financial crisis or a phenomenon seriously 
delegitimizing market mechanisms.3  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Underhill & Zhang 2008; Rethel & Sinclair 2012; Foot & Walter 2010; Tsingou 2004. 
3 Pauly 2003. 
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The kind of reassertion of state-based regulation that Pauly envisioned has clearly taken 
place since the outbreak of to the 2007-2010 global financial crisis. The crisis has set the 
stage for one of the most significant turning points in public-private divide in the 
regulation of finance since the 1930s. International regulatory bodies have over this 
period come to endorse measures giving public regulatory officials the responsibility to 
set and enforce rules governing markets and institutions, including OTC derivatives, 
rating agencies, and hedge funds, that had deliberately left outside public regulatory 
oversight in the period preceding the crisis.  
However, this shift cannot be regarded solely as the by-product of the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2010. Both the scope and the timing of this shift in the international 
approach towards the regulation of OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds 
support this conclusion. First, the expansion in the perimeter of public regulation has 
involved both industries that were among the main culprits of the crisis, such as 
derivatives markets and rating agencies, but also ones that played a rather peripheral 
role, such as hedge funds. This aspect is even more puzzling when we consider how the 
market-based approach that dominated the international regulation of hedge funds 
before the crisis emerged in response to the collapse of LTCM, a crisis that exposed the 
systemic risks associated with their activities more directly than the 2007-2010 global 
financial crisis.  Second, the initial international regulatory response in 2007 and 2008 
reinforced rather than undermined the market-based approach that had emerged before 
the crisis. During this initial period international institutions such as the FSF repeatedly 
turned to the same derivative dealers, rating agencies, and hedge funds and demanded 
self-regulatory improvements to their regulatory status. Only since the last quarter of 
2008, international regulatory bodies have committed to bring derivatives markets, 
hedge funds, and rating agencies under the direct purview of regulatory authorities. 
What then explains the shift in international financial regulation since the financial crisis 
towards greater direct public oversight of financial markets that has happened since the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis of 2007-2010?  	  
   
The Literature 
The previous section has suggested that the shift in the international approach towards 
the regulation of OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds that followed the 
crisis cannot be regarded as uniquely the product of this historical event. This study will 
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review the main theoretical explanations of international financial regulation presented in 
IPE literature and argue that these theories cannot adequately explain the reassertion of 
direct regulatory oversight over international financial markets that the crisis set in 
motion.  
Many pre-crisis functionalist analyses (reviewed in Section 2.2) developed in the years 
before the crisis have described the international shift towards a greater reliance on 
market-based mechanisms in the governance of financial markets as driven by structural 
transformations such as the process of financial globalization and financial innovation. 
The international regulatory response to the crisis has challenged this view and 
expanded the regulatory oversight over a number of markets and institutions that before 
the crisis had been left outside of the perimeter of public regulation. Moreover, this 
expansion in the perimeter of public regulation has also involved sectors that had played 
a peripheral role in the context of the crisis. From this perspective, the scope of the 
international regulatory change since the crisis is difficult to reconcile with those 
functionalist explanations considering regulatory policies as driven by the attempt to 
respond to specific market failures. 
Realist analyses of financial regulatory politics have identified the primary determinant of 
the international regulatory agenda in the relative market power of the different countries 
controlling the main international regulatory institutions. In particular, the greater reliance 
on market-based mechanisms before the crisis has been attributed to US authorities’ 
predominant role in shaping the international agenda and their interest in letting their 
firms dominate world markets free from burdensome regulatory measures. State power 
has continued to be an important determinant of the international regulatory response to 
the global financial crisis. However, rather than a relative decline in the power of those 
countries that had in the past supported market-based based measures, the change in 
the international agenda has followed a shift in the preferences of these same countries. 
In particular, US policymakers have since the beginning of the crisis supported 
reasserting more direct regulation of the markets dominated by their own firms.  
Third, explaining this shift in state preferences remains a challenge not only for those 
realist theories of international regulatory change that have focused on the distribution of 
market power, but also for those works that have derived state preferences from their 
respective domestic systems. In particular, historical institutionalist scholars have 
derived state preferences towards international financial regulatory policies in the years 
before the crisis from the different role and structure of the financial systems in different 
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“varieties of capitalism”. These studies are important to highlight how the main divide 
over the regulation of these sectors has not been running along the Atlantic but rather 
cutting across Europe, between coordinated-market economies and liberal-market 
economies. However, it remains difficult to reconcile the sudden turn in the international 
regulatory approach since the end of 2008 with the focus on the incremental 
adjustments and path dependency that characterize historical institutionalist analyses.  
Fourth, an alternative explanation of change in state preferences towards international 
issues is provided by pluralist analyses of international regulatory politics. These have 
traced the main determinant shaping international agreements to the competition among 
interest groups and other societal actors. Many works applying this insight to the 
financial regulatory domain have focused on the preferences of financial industry groups 
and their growing capacity to capture the regulatory process at the national level as well 
as the transnational level where transnational financial industry associations have 
become privileged interlocutors of international regulatory bodies. However, while much 
of this literature had described the influence of financial industry as akin to that of a 
power elite unlikely to lose important regulatory battles, much of the changes introduced 
during the global financial crisis have occurred despite, rather than because of, financial 
industry preferences. 
Finally, constructivist scholars have provided another important explanation of 
preferences on international regulatory issues. From a constructivist perspective, the 
pre-crisis delegation of regulatory responsibilities to private market actors reflected the 
influence within the international regulatory community of an ideational consensus 
stressing the efficient and rational nature of financial markets. It also echoed the need to 
remove the impediments that might produce inefficient and illiquid markets, starting with 
intrusive regulatory interference in the markets. Different analyses of post-crisis 
regulatory policies have argued that the crisis has set in motion a rethinking about 
markets’ capacity to self-regulate and of the pre-crisis ideational consensus. However, 
the existing constructivist literature suggests that ideational shifts tend to be slow moving 
in its impact over international regulatory policies. This literature describes policymakers 
as reacting to crisis by re-adjusting their ideational toolkit in only relatively minor ways. 
The conceptualization of ideational change that informs constructivist scholars is 
therefore incompatible with the timing of the shift in the international regulatory agenda. 
Given the limitations of these theoretical approaches in providing a satisfactory account 
of the timing and extent of the shift in international approach towards the regulation of 
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financial markets, this analysis will present a theoretical framework whose analysis 
centers on an element that existing theories of financial regulatory change have largely 
neglected: the degree of attention that the general public pays towards different financial 
domains.   
 
The Explanatory Variable: Public Salience 
 The implications of general public attention levels towards a particular issue – so-called 
‘issue salience’ – have been at the center of an important scholarly debate within the 
political science literature. This literature initially focused on the impact that the salience 
of different issues has over the outcome of electoral competitions.4 More recent studies 
have investigated its impact over the governance of a number of policy domains, both at 
the domestic and international levels, such as budgetary policy, corporate governance 
regulation, security issues, and regional integration.5  
However, most analyses of financial regulation at the domestic and international level 
have regarded the policymaking process through which financial rules are designed and 
implemented as immune or only mildly constrained by public opinion. In particular, the 
complexity of financial regulatory policies and their frequently indirect impact over 
stakeholders outside of finance limits the general public’s capacity and incentives to pay 
attention to financial regulatory developments and to invest time and resources to 
understand where their interests lie.  
The impact of public opinion over financial regulatory policies is often described as even 
less significant in the case of policies negotiated at the international level. The 
discussions occurring within international regulatory bodies such as the Basel 
Committee or IOSCO are frequently described as being fleshed out in a non-transparent 
environment that hinder the capacity of the public to keep track of them.6 Elected 
politicians seeking to maximize their probability of reelection by appeasing the public 
opinion do not negotiate these agreements. Instead, they are mostly drafted by 
independent regulatory agencies that are not embedded in the executive hierarchy and 
thus not subject to direct political pressures.7  Unlike international trade agreements 
negotiated within the WTO, international financial standards are better conceived as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Edwards III, Mitchell, & Welch 1995; Fournier, Blais, Nadeau, Gidengil, & Nevitte 2003; Krosnick 1990; Damore 2004; 
RePass 1971; Belanger & Meguid 2008; Mayer & Tiberj 2004. 
5 Culpepper 2011; Franklin & Wlezien 1997; Kai Oppermann & Viehrig 2011; Soroka & Wlezien 2005. 
6 Underhill 1995. 
7 Singer 2007. 
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“soft law”, since they mostly do not require any formal ratification from domestic 
legislative assemblies.  As a result, the international regulatory process has often been 
described as influenced by the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic regulatory 
agencies and the financial industry under their purview, presented as part of the same 
“policy community”.8 
Other works have acknowledge that the low degree of public attention surrounding 
national and international financial regulatory policies can be altered by shocks such as 
financial crises, which may significantly increase the level of attention that the public 
pays towards financial regulatory policies. While during normal times the process of 
international regulatory cooperation occurs largely insulated from domestic pressures, 
financial crises or similar ‘shocks’ may increase the constraints that regulators 
participating to the work of international bodies face from their political masters and from 
their respective domestic political systems.9 At the same time, these works disagree on 
the mechanisms through which public opinion comes to influence international financial 
regulatory policies. While for Singer crises may create bureaucratic incentives for 
regulators to take action in order to appease their political masters, Oatley and Nabors 
argue that elected politicians rather than regulators are likely to play a direct role in 
shaping the content of national and international regulatory policies after crises. In other 
words, the extent of the general public’s influence over international regulatory policies 
and the mechanisms through which this influence is exercised remain either unclear or 
unresolved in the existing literature.	  
This study will build upon the existing analyses of the domestic bases of international 
financial regulatory cooperation and deepen the understanding of the determinants and 
dynamics through which public opinion comes to shape international financial regulatory 
policies. It will do so by incorporating the contribution of the literature on issue salience. 
This study will investigate how different degrees and lengths of general public attention 
towards the financial domain following a crisis will affect the design of international 
regulatory policies by altering the preferences of elected officials and the likelihood these 
will delegate defer to regulatory agencies or other experts.  
In particular, this study will explore the following hypothesis. When a crisis does not lead 
to a long-lasting increase in the level of public attention, issue salience will create strong 
incentives for the financial industry groups directly affected by the crisis to design self-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Lall 2011; Tsingou 2007; Underhill 1995; Underhill & Zhang 2008. 
9 Oatley & Nabors 1998; Kapstein 1994; Singer 2007. 
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regulatory measures in order to de-politicize the governance of that area, while elected 
politicians will not face strong incentives to challenge these arrangements. But a shock 
that triggers a significant and long-lasting increase in the level of public attention towards 
a financial domain is likely to create strong electoral incentives for elected politicians to 
pressure regulators or directly intervene by introducing formal regulatory frameworks, 
even when these run against the preferences of the domestic financial industry groups.  
This kind of long-lasting increase in the salience of financial regulation is likely to occur 
only when the impact of the shock is not internalized by the same financial institutions 
affected by the shock, as is the case for bailouts or a crisis requiring the deployment of 
taxpayers’ money in support of financial institutions. The degree of salience is not 
directly related to the severity of the crisis or role that the specific sector has in 
originating the crisis. From this perspective, the likelihood that a crisis will generate a 
market-based regulatory regime or a more direct regulatory framework is not dependent 
on the severity of the regulatory failures uncovered by the crisis. Rather, it depends on 
the extent to which the crisis raises the public salience of that financial domain in the 
countries that dominate the international regulatory policymaking, an argument first 
presented by Culpepper in his analysis of corporate governance regulation.10 
 
Case Selection and Methodology 
In order to empirically explore the capacity of this hypothesis to explain determinants of 
the shift in the international approach set in motion by the crisis, this study will engage in 
qualitative case-oriented research. Instead of analyzing a large population of cases as is 
typical of quantitative research, this study will seek to acquire in-depth knowledge of a 
limited number of relevant financial areas. The three cases analyzed in this study are 1) 
the international regulation of OTC derivatives, 2) the international regulation of credit 
rating agencies, and 3) the international regulation of hedge funds.  
These three markets and institutions have been selected on the basis of a number of 
factors. First, the three sectors have been the focus of different analyses within the IPE 
of finance literature which provided the empirical backbone for different theories of 
financial regulatory change.11 The presence of a literature that has already analyzed 
these cases facilitates the task of comparing and contrasting the interpretations provided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Culpepper 2011. 
11 For derivatives, see Helleiner 2010; Morgan 2010; Tsingou 2006; for rating agencies see Bruner & Abdelal 2005; 
Sinclair 2005. On hedge funds, see Fioretos 2010; Quaglia 2011; Woll 2011. 
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by alternative theoretical explanations with the one advanced in this study. Second, the 
three sectors represent some of the most dynamic and fast-growing segments in the 
financial markets over the last two decades. Third, and most importantly, the evolution of 
the international regimes governing these three markets and institutions and the ways in 
which they allocated regulatory functions between public and private actors before and 
after the crisis exemplify well the kind of shift in the international public-private triggered 
by the 2007-2010 global financial crisis that this study seeks to explain.  
Different authors have criticized this ‘case selection on the dependent variable’; that is, 
selecting cases based on their outcomes and then analyzing the causes of these 
outcomes.12 However, this approach is justified in this case given this study’s interest in 
shedding light on an historical shift in the governance of international financial markets 
triggered by the global financial crisis of 2007-2010. 
This study will infer the level of public salience of OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and 
hedge funds from the amount of media reporting on these sectors.13 The strengths and 
weaknesses of this approach will be discussed in Chapter 3. While other academic 
works have used the results of the analysis of media coverage as one of many variables 
included into regression analyses,14 this study will not seek to explicitly derive any causal 
inference from the quantitative results of the media analysis. Instead, they will guide 
qualitative analyses of the three case studies. In particular, the media analysis of issue 
salience in this chapter will function to identify the “turning points” in the public salience 
of different financial domains, as well as to highlight noticeable differences in the level of 
public attention across the different cases and across national contexts. 
The regulation of the three sectors and markets will be analyzed through what George 
and Bennett call the method of “structured focused comparison”, asking several cases 
the same set of questions that reflect the research objective.15 In particular, this study 
will engage first and foremost in within-case analyses, comparing and contrasting the 
‘causal recipes’16 that have led international regulatory institutions to adopt different 
approaches before and after the global financial crisis. Cross-case analyses will also be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In particular, one of the risks of selecting on the dependent variable is to increase the number of positive cases where 
the outcome of interest occurs. See J. Mahoney & Goertz 2006, p. 239. 
13 Knecht & Weatherford 2006, p. 713; Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, & Lebon 2009; Culpepper 2011; B. D. 
Jones & Baumrgartner 2005; Epstein & Segal 2000; Miller & Krosnick 2000; Page, Shapiro, & Dempsey 1987. 
14 See for instance Baumgartner et al. 2009. For an exception, see Culpepper 2011. 
15 As these authors argued, “[t]he method is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the 
research objective and that these questions are asked for each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, 
thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is “focused” in 
that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined”. George & Bennett 2005, p. 67. 
16 Ragin 2008, p.23; J. Mahoney & Goertz 2006.  
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conducted in order to identify similarities and differences across the conditions that 
determine different regulatory approaches. 
The analysis of the cases will rely on process tracing to empirically assess the conditions 
that have shaped the international regulation of these sectors. Goldstone defines 
process tracing as “analyzing a case into a sequence (or several concatenating 
sequences) of events and showing how those events are plausibly linked given the 
interests and situations faced by groups or individual actors”. 17  Process tracing 
represents the most common approach for within-case analyses of regulation assessing 
the qualitative characteristics of different actors’ activity, the strategy adopted to achieve 
their goals, and to evaluate their influence in shaping the content of policies.18 In the 
context of this study, process tracing will be employed primarily to assess the evolution 
in the regulatory policies and in the preferences and mobilization of different actors 
across different levels of salience.  
What are the sources used in this study to infer causal patterns and to test different 
theoretical explanations? The position of different regulatory agencies, elected politicians, 
and interest groups will be extracted from a variety of primary and secondary sources. 
The preferences of elected politicians will be extracted primarily from their voting 
behavior, as well as through public speeches, press releases, and statements to the 
press. The preferences of regulatory agencies will be extracted from their regulatory 
proposals submitted for public consultations, the position expressed in front of legislative 
assemblies (e.g. Congressional hearings where regulators are regularly required to 
report), as well as public speeches from senior regulators. Interest groups’ positions will 
be extracted primarily from their submissions to public consultations, such as those from 
the European Commission and from the SEC and CFTC in the US, as well as from the 
public statements of interest groups representatives, such as in the case of their 
appearances before Congressional hearings. Press releases regularly released by these 
groups to express their positions on the most pressing regulatory issues will also be 
used to derive these groups’ preferences. The financial press will represent an important 
source of secondary sources to assess the mobilization strategies and the expressed 
preferences of different actors. Indeed, it is possible that some of the preferences 
presented by regulators or interest groups through public speeches may reflect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Goldstone 2008, p. 47. 
18 Mahoney 2010; Dur 2008; Klüver 2011; Woll 2008.  
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“‘strategic’ rather than ‘true’ policy positions”.19 However, as Klüwer argues, “this should 
not be problematic because it is plausible to assume that there is no systematic variation 
in strategically over- or understating preferences across all interest groups, so that the 
revealed policy position can be taken as a proxy for the true policy position.”20 
 
The Findings 
The empirical investigation of these three cases will provide some important insights 
towards explaining the market-based approach that dominated the international 
regulatory agenda before the crisis. In particular, the evidence will contest the notion 
advanced before the crisis by a number of academics and regulators that the emergence 
of market-based governance mechanisms reflected a functionalist response to evolution 
in the structure of the financial markets. Instead, this study will discuss how the 
emergence of international market-based governance mechanisms during this period 
reflected the preferences of those countries that exercised the greatest influence over 
the international regulatory agenda.  
From this perspective, the evidence presented in this study provides some empirical 
support to those IPE theories that have highlighted the dominance of US regulators in 
international regulatory bodies, their ideas regarding the limits of traditional regulatory 
approaches, and the close coordination with their domestic financial industry. These 
factors combined in creating a powerful configuration in support of market-based 
regulatory mechanisms in a number of areas.  
However, this study will complement these existing theoretical analyses of the pre-crisis 
period by arguing that the environment of “quiet politics”21 that characterized most 
financial regulatory debates in the US - the country dominating the international 
regulatory agenda - represented a key enabling condition. In particular, the lack of 
sustained public attention towards financial regulation in the US weakened the 
incentives for the US Congress to support more direct regulatory approaches opposed 
by their domestic financial industry, while increasing the incentives to defer to federal 
regulators and the financial industry agencies. These have over this period rather 
consistently formed a common front in support of market-based solutions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Klüver 2011, p. 490. 
20 Klüver 2011, p. 490. 
21 Culpepper 2011. 
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At the same time, the degree of salience does not seem to be sufficient to explain one 
important exception to the self-regulatory model that dominated over this period: the 
decision by Congress to directly regulate rating agencies in 2006. While the bankruptcy 
of Enron has increased the salience of the sector in the US more than previous 
episodes, other factors such as the failure of regulators and the industry to negotiate a 
viable market-based alternative and the lack of competitive concerns are important to 
explain this rare expansion in the perimeter of regulation during this period.	  
These domestic foundations of the international market-based regime have been 
undermined by the global crisis of 2007-2010. This crisis had the effect not only of 
revealing substantial market and regulatory failures in the eyes of the regulatory 
community and experts, but also of increasing in a sustained way the public salience of 
financial policies salience in the US and Europe. The high salience of financial regulation 
since the second half of 2008 has made financial regulation one of the key issues within 
the US Congressional agenda. 
Different members of Congress have over this period taken advantage of the changed 
political climate to re-introduce legislative proposals first presented during earlier 
Congressional sessions. While these proposals had not received significant support 
before the crisis, the increased the level of public attention has reinforced the 
momentum in favor of extending the regulatory net over different markets and 
institutions. However, the impact of the crisis in turning financial regulation into a “high 
salience issue” area has not been limited to the US. In Europe, the heightened public 
salience of financial regulation had the impact of enhancing the activism of those 
Continental European governments that in the past had been more critical of market-
based regulatory approaches. Moreover, the greater degree of public attention also had 
an impact within the main veto-player in Europe, that is the UK degree of salience have 
a significant impact over the influence and behavior of the financial industry. More 
specifically, the changed domestic environment made it more difficult for the British 
government to maintain its traditional support for light touch regulation of the City of 
London.  
In a nutshell, the unprecedented level of public attention towards financial regulatory 
issues triggered by the crisis has created strong electoral incentives for the same 
domestic elected policymakers in the US and Europe who had in the past supported 
market-based regulatory mechanisms to reverse their conduct and support the 
introduction of visible measures to increase the regulatory oversight of financial markets. 
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This change has also directly affected the international level at which politicians dictate 
the agenda of transnational technocratic bodies, defining their agendas and assigning 
stringent deadlines. These discussions are increasingly happening within the context of 
the G20. 
This focus on the level of issue salience for financial regulatory policies and the impact in 
shaping the incentives of elected politicians is important to explain the two patterns in 
the international regulatory response presented above. First, the fact that financial 
regulation remained a low salience area in the first stages of the crisis is important to 
explain the continuation of the same market-based regulatory approach emerged before 
the crisis that characterized the initial international regulatory response to the crisis. 
Second, the fact that the crisis has eventually raised the attention of the public towards 
finance in general is important to explain why the regulatory response in the US and 
elsewhere also reversed the market-based regulatory status of sectors that had not 
played a central role in causing the crisis.  
This theoretical explanation of international regulatory politics must be regarded as 
complementary rather than as an alternative to the main interpretations presented in the 
IPE literature. Like other domestic analysis of international regulatory politics,22 this 
framework primarily seeks to explore the origins of the preferences expressed by 
different national representatives on international regulatory issues. It does not explain 
whose preferences will dominate in the international regulatory agenda. It thus needs to 
be complemented by realist theories that have explored the relevance of relative market 
power in allowing that allow national preferences to be translated in the international 
agenda.23 For example a shock that increases the level of salience in a peripheral 
country is by itself unlikely to move the international regulatory agenda towards greater 
public oversight of that sector. An example of this dynamic can be found in the 
regulatory response towards the East Asian financial crisis. While this crisis significantly 
politicized the debate over the regulation of hedge funds and other financial sectors in 
the countries most affected by the crisis, the low salience of financial regulation in the 
“core countries”, in particular the US, was far more consequential in determining the 
international regulatory response to that crisis.  
This study will not question the focus on market-power as the primary source of state 
influence over the international agenda that characterize most state-centric analyses of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Fioretos 2010; Oatley & Nabors 1998; Singer 2007; Kapstein 1994. 
23 Drezner 2007; Fioretos 2010. 
	   15 
international financial regulatory policies. Instead, the major contribution of this 
theoretical explanation is to explain country preferences on international regulatory 
issues, levels of public salience remains only one of the factors explaining the national 
position on a given issue. During periods of low salience, public opinion is likely to be 
inconsequential in shaping the position of national representatives. Instead, the position 
of regulatory agencies remain far more likely to be driven by interest group preferences 
or by dominant ideas. However, during periods of sustained high salience, the need to 
appease the general public will be a far more significant factor shaping the behavior of 
officials responding to electoral incentives, trumping other elements identified by the 
literature.  
The impact of different degrees of salience on the electoral incentives of politicians 
analyzed in this study is not the only mechanism through which the public opinion 
shapes regulatory policies. On the contrary, different degree of salience have a 
significant impact over the influence and behavior of the financial industry, other societal 
actors, as well as of bureaucracies such as regulatory agencies. Although these actors  
do not directly respond to electoral incentives, they will be forced to react to the changed 
environment that characterize the politics of financial regulation during periods of high or 
low salience. While these elements will be analyzed within the three cases presented in 
this study, the argument presented in this study focuses on the impact that salience has 
over the electoral incentives of officials as this represents the most direct way in which 




Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 will introduce the dependent variable in this study, that is, the way in which the 
international regulatory community has relied on market-based versus direct public 
regulatory approaches to govern these OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge 
funds before and after the crisis. This chapter will detail the evolution in the approach 
adopted by the main international regulatory institutions (FSF/IOSCO/Basel Committee) 
towards the regulation of OTC derivatives markets, hedge funds, and rating agencies in 
the period between the mid-1990s and the end of 2011.   
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After having set the dependent variable of this study, Chapter 2 will review the main IPE 
theories of financial regulatory change in order to determine to what extent the empirical 
evidence introduced in the first chapter conforms with the expectations of these 
theoretical approaches. This chapter will conclude that while these theoretical 
contributions have come a long way in explaining the pre-crisis trend, they are unable to 
fully explain the scope and timing that characterize the reversal of this trend set in 
motion by the global financial crisis. 
Chapter 3 will present a complementary theoretical framework to explain the evolution of 
the public-private divide in the international regulation of finance that focuses on the 
degree of attention paid by the public in the most powerful countries towards a certain 
financial regulatory domain. The analysis of the media coverage of OTC derivatives, 
rating agencies, and hedge funds in this chapter will provide early support for the 
working hypothesis.  The analysis will demonstrate how the resilience of the industry-
driven regime that informed the governance of these markets and institutions before the 
crisis coincided with a period of what Culpepper calls “quiet politics” in the major 
jurisdictions, interrupted by different shocks that failed to raise the salience of these 
domains in a long-lasting way. The departure of the market-based regime after late 2008 
then coincided with a period of heightened and sustained public attention towards the 
markets and institutions, including even sectors such as hedge funds that had not been 
responsible for the 2007-2010 crisis.  
The impact this heightened public salience had over the preferences and conduct of 
elected officials at the domestic level – the intervening variable analyzed in this study - 
will be analyzed in three in-depth case-study analyses of the regulation of OTC 
derivatives (Chapter 4), rating agencies (Chapter 5), and hedge funds (Chapter 6). The 
three chapters will follow a similar structure. First, each chapter will investigate the 
causal dynamics that have sustained an international market-based regime in the 
governance of these three markets and institutions before the crisis. Second, the 
determinants of the reversal of this international approach since the beginning of the 
crisis will be explained. These chapters will trace the evolution of the international 
regulatory regime in the political dynamics occurring within the US and Europe.  
As discussed more extensively in Chapter 2, the focus on these two jurisdictions is 
justified by the size of their securities markets. As acknowledged by different authors, 
this market power has conferred on to US and European regulatory authorities a 
significant influence over the international regulatory negotiations in the policy domains 
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analyzed in this study.24 While relatively common in the IPE literature, the comparison of 
the regulatory process in the US with the one in the EU can raise some problems from 
an analytical standpoint given that the former is a state and the latter is not. However, as 
Bach and Newman argue, this problem can be avoided by “compar[ing] processes 
that—while distinct—can be treated as analytic equivalents, provided the comparison is 
appropriately contextualized”. 25  In particular, this analysis will remain actor-centric, 
analyzing the conduct of stakeholders with functionally equivalent roles in the US and 
EU, while overlooking the different institutional context. 
While these chapters will investigate the sources of the shift in the international public-
private development in each of the three sectors, the Conclusion (Chapter 7) will look 
across these cases. This chapter will summarize the evidence presented in this study 
regarding the role of public salience in influencing the patterns of international financial 
regulatory cooperation before and after the global financial crisis. Moreover, this chapter 
will also discuss the implications of this study for the broader literature on the politics of 
international financial regulation. First, this chapter will discuss the implications of this 
study for the literature that has investigated on the domestic political foundations of 
international regulatory cooperation. While building upon this analytical tradition, the 
evidence presented in this study reveals how sustained increases in the level of public 
salience have the effect of altering the domestic bases of international financial 
regulatory cooperation in ways that differ from existing accounts of international 
regulatory politics, with elected politicians playing a prime role both at the national and 
international level.  
Second, this chapter will discuss how the degree of public salience of regulatory policies 
also influences the conditional scope of some of the other factors identified by the 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2. In particular, the evidence presented in this study 
suggests that the autonomy of international regulatory institutions, as well as the 
influence of financial industry groups, are both in part dependent on the level of public 
salience.    
Third, this chapter will argue that the analysis of the emergence and decline of the 
market-based approach towards the regulation of finance has some implications for the 
broader literature on global governance beyond finance. Different studies within this 
literature have in recent years investigated the emergence of “private authorities” in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Drezner 2007; Fioretos 2010; Posner 2009. 
25 Newman & Bach 2004. 
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global economy26, or a “privatization of regulation in the world economy”27, or the rise of 
“transnational private governance”.28  
While most of these analyses tend to describe this trend as a structural shift in the 
governance of the global economy, the analysis of the reassertion of a more state-based 
form of regulation in the governance of international financial markets challenges this 
view. Instead, this analysis provides empirical support to the argument made by 
Culpepper regarding the importance of a certain degree of inattentiveness from the 
public as a condition for the resilience of informal or industry-based governance 
arrangements.29  Unlike Culpepper, this analysis will however demonstrate how the 
degree of salience in the key jurisdictions will affect the strength of industry-based 
governance arrangements not only at the national level, but also at the international 
level. 
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Chapter 1. The Evolution of the Public-
Private Divide in the International Regulation 
of Finance  
 
 
1.1 Plan of the Chapter 
This chapter will explore how the responsibility to regulate and oversee international 
financial markets is divided between public regulatory agencies and private market 
actors, discussing in particular the impact of the global financial crisis that erupted in the 
summer of 2007. Focusing on the extensive reforms coordinated at the international 
level in the regulation of OTC derivatives, credit rating agencies, and hedge funds this 
chapter will argue that the crisis has halted the shift in the public-private divide that took 
place during fifteen years or so prior to the crisis. During this period, international 
regulatory bodies such as the FSF, IOSCO, the Basel Committee, and the political forum 
such as the G7 and G20 opposed measures to bring OTC derivatives markets, credit 
rating agencies, and hedge funds within the perimeter of public regulatory oversight. 
Instead, these institutions delegated important regulatory functions to private market 
actors, granting a public policy role to industry-driven, self-regulatory measures, and 
using regulatory policies to harness “market discipline”.  
This shift did not occur as a functionalist reaction to the emergence of the market turmoil 
in 2007 and the discovery of regulatory failures. On the contrary, international regulatory 
bodies initially designed a regulatory response largely based on soliciting self-regulatory 
improvements for the three institutions and markets studied here. Only, since the last 
quarter of 2008 did the international regulatory community and the G20 begin to 
negotiate a series of international regulatory agreements to bring these markets and 
institutions under their regulatory oversight and have taken the task of monitoring and 
enforcing financial standards implementation, which had previously been left to the 
market discipline, upon themselves .   
This chapter is primarily descriptive in nature. It describes the patterns of change in the 
international financial regulatory regime that represent the main dependent variable that 
will be explained from a theoretical standpoint in the next chapters. 
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This chapter will be structured as follows. In order to understand the significance of the 
post-2007 changes in the public-private divide in the governance of international 
financial markets, Section 1.2 will briefly analyze this issue from an historical 
perspective. Section 1.3 will focus on the regulatory paradigm that dominated the 
international regulatory agenda in the decade and half preceding the crisis. This chapter 
will later introduce the changes triggered by the crisis in the international regulation of 
OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds. Section 1.4 will then discuss how 
the initial international regulatory response to the crisis relied on the same market-based 
approaches that had dominated the period before the crisis. Section 1.5 will discuss the 
reversal of this approach in the second stage of the regulatory response to the crisis. 
 
1.2 The Public-Private Divide from an Historical Perspective 
From an historical perspective, the emergence of the notion that sovereign states bear 
the primary responsibility to regulate and oversee financial markets is a relatively recent 
development. Historically, the first rules bringing order to international transactions 
originated in the so-called lex mercatoria, the customs of merchants who were the first to 
provide credit within and across the borders of the emerging nation-states. These were 
enforced through the threat of ostracism from the merchant community and of boycotting 
of all future trade.1  
During its ascent towards becoming most important financial center in the world, the City 
of London was regulated through highly independent and self-governing corporatist 
institutions, such as the London Stock Exchange and the Corporation of Lloyds, which 
represented the interests of the markets at the same time as playing a regulatory 
function. 2  Traders’ honor was the glue sustaining these self-regulatory institutions, 
“based on trust and shame among men who shared a code of honor they had learnt at 
the same schools.”3 But self-regulatory arrangements also governed other corners of the 
financial system such as commercial bank clearinghouses, payments and securities 
settlement systems, and interbank deposit markets.4 
The influence of private financial actors over the regulation of international financial 
markets reached its height during with the “first wave of globalization” at end of the XIXth 
and early XXth century. As Braithwaite and Drahos argue, “in the nineteenth century the 
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house of Rothschild was more powerful than most states. By the end of the century JP 
Morgan had become more powerful, an influence it retained for the first decades of the 
20th century.” As these authors put it, “the height of merchant bank power preceded not 
only the globalization of regulation, but the rise of state regulation from 1934.”5  
It is only during the Great Depression that followed the Wall Street crash of 1929 that the 
governments of most industrialized countries widened their intervention in the regulation 
of finance. During this period, the US government and the governments of the other 
financial centers started to place restrictions on the freedom of financial market 
participants, as symbolized by the famous Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 which restricting 
the freedom of US banks to operate in the securities markets. Also during this period, 
governments started to strengthen their capacity to regulate financial markets by 
creating new domestic regulatory institutions. For instance, the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 created the US Securities and Exchange Commission in order to oversee self-
regulatory organizations, like the existing stock exchanges.6 
These reforms represented a watershed in the public-private divide, as different 
governments started to more directly attempt to prevent the disruptive effects witnessed 
during the Wall Street crash of 1929. Nonetheless, private financial actors were not 
completely stripped away of their regulatory functions. According to Moran, the 
reconstruction of the financial systems in the United States and the United Kingdom after 
the Wall Street Crash of 1929 relied on “meso-corporatist” arrangements. Under this 
model, financial regulators granted an extensive network of stock exchanges and other 
self-regulatory organizations the license to govern themselves through a “charter” 
defining their duties and rights, thus transforming private, voluntary associations into 
authoritative bodies.7  For instance, in the US regulation of securities markets has 
continued to rely to a significant extent on self-regulatory organizations (SROs) such as 
FINRA and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, charged with broad 
regulatory authorities, including rulemaking, examination, and enforcement authority.8 
Also in England, the regulatory framework governing the City of London prior to the 
creation of the Financial Services Authority relied extensively on industry-self-regulation 
and informal “gentleman’s agreements’ between financial institutions and the Bank of 
England and on a series of Self-Regulatory Organizations under the oversight of the 
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Securities and Investments Board.9 
However, the significant role played by self-regulatory organizations, especially in the 
Securities Markets, did not obfuscate the fact that, as Tsingou argues, after the 1929 
Great Crash and for the rest of the twentieth century “there was some clarity with 
regards to public and private functions, with regulation and supervision firmly in the 
hands of public authorities.”10 
 
1.3 Before the Crisis: The New Paradigm in the Regulation of Finance 
While the policies of the Great Depression era have triggered a shift of the public-private 
divide towards a great role for public actors, the opposite turn took place during the 
fifteen years or so preceding the financial crisis of 2007-10. This period represented a 
partial ‘return to the past’, as private rule-making by the financial market actors became 
considered as the privileged regulatory solution in the international regulation of several 
financial markets and institutions.11  
While historically private rulemaking had been the norm in the regulation of sectors such 
as securities markets and stock exchanges, in the years preceding the crisis self-
regulatory initiatives were institutionalized in a larger number of financial sectors. This 
trend was particularly evident in three of the most dynamic and fastest growing markets 
and institutions over this period: OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds.  
Industry self-regulatory initiatives from the main derivatives dealers gathered within 
groups such as the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), Futures 
Industry Association (FIA), the Emerging Markets Traders Association, the Derivatives 
Policy Group (DPG), and a private organization/think tanks such as the G30 have 
developed the legal base underpinning the growing volumes of transactions outside of 
regulated exchanges, also known as “over the counter” (OTC) markets.12 After the 
collapse of the US hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 (LTCM), self-
regulatory measures adopted by hedge fund groups and by their bank counterparties 
parts have become the most important regulatory mechanism to reduce the leverage 
employed by hedge funds and the risk they posed to their counterparties. Groups such 
as the Managed Funds Association, Alternative Investment Funds Associations, and 
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Hedge Fund Working Group have over the years taken the lead in developing self-
regulatory mechanisms for hedge fund managers, while their bank counterparties have 
coalesced into the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group. In the case of rating 
agencies, while the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 put an end to the self-
regulatory status of the industry in the United States, the activities of credit rating 
agencies in Europe and elsewhere continued to remain self-regulated in the other 
countries, despite the global presence acquired by these actors. 
These initiatives differed from previous episodes of private-rule making in two key ways. 
Unlike the self-regulatory initiatives in place since the 1930s in countries such as the UK 
and US, the industry-driven initiatives governing OTC derivatives, hedge funds, and 
rating agencies acquired a transnational dimension.13 Underpinning this shift of self-
regulation from a national to transnational dimension was the emergence at the global 
level of a restricted number of transnational financial industry associations composed of 
internationally oriented firms or high-profile individuals capable of drafting voluntary self-
regulatory initiatives whose scope transcended national boundaries.14 Second, unlike the 
examples of private rule-making in governing global financial markets that characterized 
both the “first wave of globalization” that preceded the First World War and the Great 
Depression that led to the rise of state regulation, the revived importance of self-
regulation in the “second wave of globalization” has taken place in an environment 
governed by international regulatory institutions.15  
Since the end of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in the early 1970s, the 
greater internationalization of the activities of financial market actors has led regulatory 
authorities from the industrialized countries to coordinate their regulatory policies 
through trans-governmental regulatory networks. International regulatory cooperation 
first emerged in the banking sector. The international spillovers associated with the 
collapse in 1974 of Bankhaus Herstatt in Germany and of the Franklin National Bank in 
the US led the G10 central bank Governors to set up the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (Basel Committee). 16  The establishment of the Basel Committee was 
followed by the creation in 1983 of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions. This organization emerged from an inter-American association of 
securities regulators and quickly expanded its membership to include the most important 
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securities regulatory authorities.17  Over the years a plethora of trans-governmental 
networks of regulators organized along sectoral lines have emerged in response to 
different episodes of financial instability. In 1999, in an attempt to bring order to these 
institutions, the G7 created the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), an institution bringing 
together the main standard-setting bodies, international financial institutions, and 
national policymakers involved in financial regulatory policies.18 While the FSF and 
international standard-setting bodies have remained primarily a transnational network of 
regulators from industrialized economies and their decisions have maintained the 
characteristics of soft laws, they have nonetheless played an important role in 
influencing regulatory policies implemented in a number of countries beyond their 
membership. It is therefore important to consider how the resurgence of private 
rulemaking since the mid-1990s has been influenced by a series of policies that these 
international institutions adopted during this period. 	  
First, in the period preceding the crisis, international regulatory authorities had in some 
cases refrained from recommending direct regulation of some innovative markets and 
instruments, including hedge funds, rating agencies, and OTC derivatives. When 
different episodes of financial instability in the 1990s and early 2000s put OTC 
derivatives markets, hedge funds, and credit rating agencies on the international 
regulatory agenda, the recommendations released by international network of regulators 
did not seek to put the responsibility to regulate and supervise these markets and 
institutions in the hands of public regulatory authorities. Moreover, the role of 
international regulatory institutions in favoring the emergence of self-regulatory 
mechanisms was not limited to scaling back the public regulatory intervention and 
leaving a regulatory vacuum that could be filled by industry-driven initiatives. While the 
international initiatives described above have not pushed regulators to directly oversee 
and regulate these markets, their recommendations sought to leverage the self-
regulatory skills by the same financial actors targeted by the regulation to achieve their 
public policy goals. 
After several corporate scandals in 1994 involving the use of derivatives traded 
bilaterally (or over-the-counter), the recommendations released by the Basel Committee 
and IOSCO endorsed only  very limited regulator involvement over the parts of the 
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market outside regulated exchanges.19  The guidelines drafted by the Basel Committee 
and IOSCO sought to assist national authorities in promoting the development of sound 
risk management practices for market actors involved in OTC derivatives transactions, 
encouraging self-regulatory organizations to ensure their members met management 
control objectives, and influence the acceptance of best practices by non-regulated 
market participants.20  
A similar outcome characterized the regulation of hedge funds and credit rating 
agencies. When hedge funds entered the regulatory agenda after the collapse of the 
US-based fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, the Financial Stability Forum 
discussed but ultimately rejected proposals to directly regulate and supervise these 
entities. The FSF instead endorsed an “indirect” approach to the regulation of hedge 
funds, based on the principle that the task of monitoring hedge funds’ activities should 
not be performed by regulators, but rather by hedge funds’ investors and prime-brokers, 
which were described as having stronger incentives to monitor hedge funds’ positions 
and greater resources than those available to regulators. The recommendations 
released by the FSF thus focused on strengthening information disclosure of hedge 
funds’ activities to their private counterparties, rather than privately reporting this 
information to the supervisory authorities. 21  In order to promote stronger risk 
management by hedge funds, the FSF has repeatedly called upon the hedge fund 
industry to draft a set of sound practices to improve risk management, internal controls, 
and disclose relevant information to their counterparties. The same approach has also 
informed the recommendations presented by the FSF on the regulation of hedge funds 
in 2007.22  
Finally, a similar reliance on market-based regulatory solutions also informed the 
international approach towards the regulation of rating agencies, which entered the 
international regulatory agenda with the collapse of Enron in 2001. In response to this 
scandal, in 2004 IOSCO drafted a set of best practices to strengthen the capacity of 
rating agencies to manage the conflicts of interest involved in the rating business and 
improve the quality of their ratings. However, instead of openly recommending that 
national regulatory authorities take responsibility for enforcing compliance with these 
rules, these recommendations were addressed to the same rating agencies they sought 
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to regulate. For instance, IOSCO relied on the voluntary incorporation of these principles 
by rating agencies into their own internal self-regulatory schemes. As enforcement, 
IOSCO demanded that rating agencies explain any deviations from the schemes to allow 
the ratings users to monitor the implementation of these international best practices and 
punish non-complying agencies.23 
In sum, the contribution of international regulatory institutions to the resurgence of self-
regulation during the pre-crisis period went beyond the decisions not to bring  derivatives 
markets, hedge funds, and rating agencies under the direct public oversight. During this 
period, the international standards presented by the main international regulatory bodies 
sought to harness the “invisible hand” of markets in support of their public policy 
objectives. They leveraged the self-regulatory skills of the market actors targeted by the 
regulation, as well as the capacity of their private counterparties to monitor their conduct 
and penalize excessive risk-taking without the need for supervisor intervention, 
endorsing industry-driven codes of conduct and demanding financial firms to improve 
information disclosure to their counterparties in order to help market actors to distinguish 
the well-managed institutions from the more risky ones.24 
This use of the visible hand of regulation to harness the “invisible hand” of markets in 
support of public policy objectives is consistent with a broader shift in the regulatory 
approach over this period. For instance, studies of the evolution of the international 
capital requirement regime for banking institutions have documented how traditional 
command and control policies seeking to ensure the behavior of banks conformed to 
standardized norms ceded ground to regulatory policies seeking to promote their self-
regulatory capabilities and encourage financial innovation by the same institutions.25  
The first 1988 Basel Capital Agreement established a rigid relationship between banks’ 
exposures and the amount of reserve capital they were required to put aside. The Basel 
II Agreement, completed in 2004, allowed the most sophisticated banks to use their own 
data and risk-management schemes to self-determine their risk exposure and the 
amount of reserve capital they had to retain. Supervisors were instead given the task of 
approving the internal operations of these institutions contingent on meeting certain 
requirements regarding their internal procedures.26 Strulik argued that a reorientation of 
regulatory strategies have been observable since the early 1990s, when “qualitative 
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regulatory practices [emerged], which additionally concentrate on the banks' internal 
requirements for risk measurement, assessment and control”.27    
The elevation of “market discipline” within the Basel II Agreement as a “third pillar” 
besides capital requirements and supervisory policies reflects the more prominent role 
granted over this period to market pressures as a monitoring and enforcement 
mechanism in international regulatory policies.28 Disclosure requirements have been a 
central piece in financial regulatory policy tool kit in since the first half of the XXth 
century. However, in the fifteen years preceding the crisis, their role has gone beyond 
the prevention of frauds and abuses in securities markets towards prudential regulatory 
policies seeking to bolster financial stability. 29  In addition to the role of private 
counterparties in monitoring the implementation of regulatory standards, international 
regulatory initiatives came to rely on the capacity of markets to monitor changes in a 
financial firms’ activities, not only by incorporating market-based measures of value and 
risk (e.g. security prices, private ratings, interest rate spreads, or secondary prices of 
debt, credit ratings) into regulatory policies to replace standardized regulatory 
requirements.30  
Indeed, important policymakers, such as the former General Manager of the Bank for 
International Settlements Andrew Crockett, have argued that a ‘paradigm shift’ occurred 
over this period in the approach taken by financial regulators, who increasingly 
attempted ‘to work with, rather than against, the grain of market forces’ in their approach 
to the regulation of financial markets.31  The former Chairman of the Basel Committee 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa talked instead of the emergence of “market-friendly 
regulation.”32 These labels summarize the shift in the content and purpose of regulatory 
intervention during this period well. Rather than ending the use of “visible hand” 
regulation to monitor international financial markets by directly dictating the proper 
conduct of financial firms, public regulatory authorities have granted a greater degree of 
flexibility to their operations and have actively leveraged the “invisible hand” of market 
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forces in support of their policy objectives.33 The Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben 
Bernanke described this approach a few months before the outbreak of the crisis as 
follows:  
“That market-based approach is regulation by the invisible hand, 
as opposed to the very visible hand of direct government 
regulation and enforcement. The invisible-hand approach to 
regulation aims to align the incentives of market participants with 
the objectives of the regulator, thereby harnessing the same 
powerful forces that allow markets to work so efficiently. In the 
financial arena, this approach often creates incentives for 
market participants to monitor and control financial firms’ risk-
taking behavior—that is, to exert market discipline—thereby 
reducing the need for direct oversight by the government.”34 
From this perspective, it would be misleading to regard this shift in the public-private 
divide in the period before the crisis as evidence of a shift in power away from states 
towards market actors or as an example of deregulation. Indeed, as the case studies in 
this study will discuss more in details (Chapter 4-6), the resurgence of market-based 
regulatory mechanisms was partially the by-product of the actions taken by international 
regulatory institutions which in the period preceding the crisis have come to repeatedly 
endorse instead industry-driven initiatives. 
  
1.4 The Initial Regulatory Response to the Crisis: Continuity with Market-based 
Regulation 
While the increased delegation of regulatory responsibilities to private market actors 
attracted increasing interest from policymakers and academics in the years preceding 
the crisis, few scholars and practitioners tended to describe this shift as a rising trend in 
international financial market regulation. The possibility that this trend could be reversed 
in the future was only rarely discussed. One exception was Lou Pauly who argued 
forcefully in 2003 that the delegation of regulatory authority to private market actors in 
the global economy remained a fleeting phenomenon. According to Pauly, public 
authority would likely reassert control over what they had delegated to private actors in 
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the case of a financial crisis or a phenomenon seriously delegitimizing market 
mechanisms.35  
This possibility has manifested itself during the global financial crisis that emerged in the 
summer of 2007 from the US subprime mortgage markets and escalated in 2008 to a 
full-fledged transatlantic banking crisis.36 However, it is important to recognize that this 
shift along the public-private divide took place only gradually. The initial regulatory 
reaction from the main international regulatory bodies, in particular the FSF and IOSCO, 
did not challenge the pre-crisis regulatory approach towards the regulation of OTC 
derivatives, credit rating agencies, and hedge funds and its focus on self-regulation and 
market-discipline as primary regulatory mechanisms. 
In the case of OTC derivatives markets, the initial international response coordinated by 
the FSF in April 2008 highlighted a set of deficiencies revealed by the crisis in the 
operational infrastructure for over-the counter derivatives markets. However, 
international regulators did not abandon the emphasis on industry-driven solutions that 
had emerged before the crisis and these recommendations were directed respectively to 
“market participants” and to the “financial industry”, rather than to the same regulatory 
authorities. 37 During its initial crisis-related report in April 2008, the FSF limited the role 
of public authorities to “encourag[ing] market participants to act promptly to ensure that 
the settlement, legal and operational infrastructure for over-the-counter derivatives is 
sound.”38 Similarly, in a follow-up report published in October 2008, the FSF envisioned 
the role of authorities as “maintaining momentum in developing and implementing the 
recommended actions effectively and in full”.39 During the same period, some of the 
regulatory authorities in US and Europe also sought to solicit such self-regulatory 
response by meeting periodically with the main derivatives markets participants in a 
series of closed-door meetings to communicate their regulatory expectations. They also 
formalized this approach by creating the “OTC Derivatives Regulators’ Forum” in 
September 2009, which had among its goals to “encourage strong and open 
communication within the regulatory community and with the industry”.40  
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Derivatives market actors acted quickly to take steps to deliver the improvements in the 
operational infrastructures of the markets demanded by the FSF. In 2008, they 
committed to implementing self-regulatory measures to enhance the processing of 
derivatives traded over-the-counter, to expand automation of credit derivatives trade 
processing, to reduce OTC trade confirmation backlogs, and to increase the use of 
central counterparties. The solidity of these self-regulatory improvements has been 
tested repeatedly since the second half of 2008 when numerous episodes triggered the 
settlement of credit derivatives contracts. A report published in March 2009 by the 
Senior Supervisors Group, a group comprising senior financial supervisors from US, 
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the UK, found that the management 
of credit default swaps during the financial crisis had been orderly and that it was not a 
major disruption. The report praised the success of industry-based mechanisms in 
allowing credit derivatives to be unraveled or “netted off” in the aftermath of these credit 
events.41  
In the case of credit rating agencies, the initial international regulatory response 
continued the past practice of relying on self-regulatory steps taken by the same rating 
agencies. The immediate acknowledgment of how rating agencies had severely 
underestimated the risks attached to mortgage backed securities and other structured 
finance products led IOSCO to amend its “Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit 
Rating Agencies” in 2008.42 However, like the first set of best practices drafted in 2004, 
the revised Code of Conduct remained non-binding, relying on ratings agencies to 
voluntarily incorporate its recommendations into their individual codes of conduct, 
Moreover, this initiative continued to promote compliance by having users of the ratings 
agencies impose proper discipline. Indeed a review published by IOSCO in March 2009 
“found that a larger proportion of the CRAs reviewed were aware of the IOSCO CRA 
Code, and [had] taken steps to incorporate its provisions into their codes of conduct, 
than when they were previously surveyed for IOSCO’s first implementation review in 
2007.”43 
Despite the success of the IOSCO in convincing rating agencies to adopt its Code of 
Conduct on a self-regulatory basis, IOSCO has gradually sought to strengthen the 
capacity of its members to monitor the compliance of regulatory agencies this set of 
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principles. The development of a “common monitoring module” to assist supervisors in 
monitoring compliance with its Code of Conduct44 was followed by the establishment of a 
college of regulators to facilitate the monitoring and surveillance of rating agencies 
operating in multiple jurisdictions. 45  IOSCO also created a permanent “Standing 
Committee on Credit Rating Agencies” to “regularly discuss, evaluate and consider 
regulatory and policy initiatives vis-à-vis CRA activities and oversight” and to “facilitate 
regular dialogue between securities regulators and the CRA industry itself.”46 
Finally, in the case of hedge funds, the outbreak of the crisis did not initially undermine 
the support for industry-driven codes of best practices and market-based regulatory 
solutions that had characterized the regulation of hedge funds since the collapse of 
Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. When the FSF met for the first time since the 
beginning of the crisis on 25-26 September 2007, it stated that “the hedge fund sector 
has not been the primary source of recent market turmoil” and welcomed the industry-
driven self-regulatory initiatives developed by hedge fund groups at the eve of the 
crisis. 47  Concerns regarding the regulatory status of hedge funds reached the 
international agenda for the first time in the middle of the crisis at the G20 Washington 
Summit in November 2008. However, G20 leaders also reached out to the same hedge 
fund bodies that had already developed codes of best practices, asking them to “bring 
forward proposals for a set of unified best practices.” The role of public authorities as 
envisioned by the G20 was limited to “assess[ing] the adequacy of these proposals”.48  
Similarly to the past, the call from the G20 at the Washington summit to the hedge fund 
associations to “bring forward proposals for a set of unified best practices” triggered a 
reaction from major hedge funds groups. They committed to fostering convergence 
between different industry best practices and delivering a set of harmonized Principles of 
Best Practices for Hedge Fund Managers to the FSB on 24 June 2009.49   
In sum, despite acknowledging the significant regulatory shortcomings in the three areas 
analyzed, the initial international regulatory response continued to rely on the 
adjustments by the same private market actors.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 IOSCO 2008d; IOSCO 2008c.    
45 IOSCO 2009c; IOSCO 2009d.  
46 IOSCO 2009c. 
47 FSF 2007a. 
48 G20 2008.  
49 AIMA 2009b. 
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1.5 The Second Stage of the International Regulatory Response to the Crisis 
Starting in the last quarter of 2008, successive initiatives from the same international 
regulatory institutions have progressively given public regulatory authorities the 
responsibility to directly oversee OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds and 
to set the rules governing these markets. This section will review the changes in the 
regulation of these three sectors in order. 
 
1.5.1 OTC Derivatives 
While the role of public authorities envisioned by the FSF throughout 2008 in the 
regulation of derivatives remained confined to steering the industry-driven initiatives 
using carrots and sticks, this has progressively shifted. A turning point in the 
international agenda regarding the private-public divide in the regulation of derivatives 
occurred only one month later with the greater G20 leader involvement. When the G20 
met for the first time at the leaders’ level in November 2008, they called for “a review of 
the scope of financial regulation, with a special emphasis on institutions, instruments, 
and markets that are currently unregulated, along with ensuring that all systemically-
important institutions are appropriately regulated”.50 Unlike the two FSF reports, the G20 
addressed its recommendations primarily to “supervisors and regulators” who “should:  
speed efforts to reduce the systemic risks of CDS and over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives transactions; insist that market participants support exchange traded or 
electronic trading platforms for CDS contracts; expand OTC derivatives market 
transparency; and ensure that the infrastructure for OTC derivatives can support growing 
volumes.”51  
Up until the G20 intervention, regulators had seen their role as simply that of 
“encouraging” the shift of derivative markets from predominantly OTC bilateral 
transactions to more centralized clearinghouses or trading platforms under the oversight 
of financial regulators and subject to binding regulatory requirements. The G20 Working 
Group in March 2009 called upon regulators to “enhance incentives as needed for the 
use of central counterparties to clear OTC credit derivatives.” Some of its suggested 
measures included increasing the capital charges for transactions not cleared through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 G20 2008. 
51 G20 2008. 
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central counterparties.52 The G20 Working Group 1 also expanded the role of public 
authorities to the oversight of same central counterparties, which “should be subject to 
transparent and effective oversight by prudential supervisors and other relevant 
authorities, including central banks, and meet high standards in terms of risk 
management, operational arrangements, default procedures, fair access and 
transparency.”53  
The following G20 summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009 was even more categorical. 
It demanded that all standardized OTC derivative contracts be centrally cleared and 
traded on exchanges “by end-2012 at the latest”, that all OTC contracts report to trade 
repositories, and that non-centrally cleared contracts be subject to higher capital 
requirements. 54  
In response to this initiative, in October 2010 the FSB released a report detailing an 
extensive set of recommendations to meet the objectives set by the G20. Out of the 21 
recommendations presented by the FSB to strengthen the regulation of the sector, only 
the four recommendations presented to increase the level of standardization in 
derivatives markets actively relied on markets. In line with the pre-crisis regulatory 
paradigm, the FSB has continued to work with the major OTC derivatives market 
participants by “demanding implementation milestones for achieving greater 
standardization” and for “increasing volumes of centrally cleared transactions”.55  The 
newly created FSB OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group has taken on this task.56  
However, the vast majority of the regulatory initiatives coordinated by the FSB have 
been directed towards public regulatory authorities. The FSB also called for a more 
extensive role for regulators in moving derivatives towards central clearing 
(Recommendations 6-12). The FSB presented recommendation for regulators to 
“determine which products should be subject to a mandatory clearing obligation,” to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 G20 Working Group 1 2009, p. xvi. In the same document, G20 sherpas also stated that tegulators “should also 
encourage the financial industry to standardize contracts and to use data repository for the remaining non-standardized 
contracts and promote fair and open access to central counterparty services”. 
53 G20 Working Group 1 2009, p.32. 
54 G20 2009b. 
55 FSB 2010. 
56 Indeed, in October 2010 the FSB still demanded public authorities to “work with market participants” to increase 
standardisation of OTC derivatives products’ contractual terms” (Recommendation 1) and operational processes 
(Recommendation 2), and invited the OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group to “continue to secure ambitious commitments 
from the major OTC derivatives market participants”. These commitments included demanding “implementation 
milestones for achieving greater standardisation and, as an interim measure until mandatory clearing requirements are 
fully implemented, increasing volumes of centrally cleared transactions”. See FSB 2010.  One year later in October 2011, 
the FSB reported that the “coordinated industry action led by the OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group (ODSG) has been 
the main driver of increased standardisation through a series of quantitative and qualitative commitments” and that 
“authorities expect the industry to continue to increase standardisation of OTC derivatives products”. See FSB 2011, p.3. 
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subject the same CCPs “to robust and consistently applied supervision and oversight on 
the basis of regulatory standards,” and to also impose prudential requirements on non-
banking institutions that engage in non-centrally cleared contracts. The FSB also called 
regulators for subjecting trade repositories “to robust and consistently applied 
supervision, oversight and regulatory standards” (Recommendation 15), and to require 
all “market participants to report all OTC derivatives transactions, both centrally-cleared 
and non-centrally cleared, accurately and in a timely manner to trade repositories” 
(Recommendation 18).  The FSB envisioned a more limited role the for public authorities 
in promoting trading on exchanges (Recommendations 13-14), requesting that they 
explore the benefits and costs of such moves and of requiring public transparency of all 
trades.  
The task of designing international standards to achieve these objectives has been 
taken on not only by the FSB but also by other international standard-setting institutions 
such as IOSCO, the Basel Committee, the Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems (CPSS), and the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) (see 
Table 1 for a summary of these international initiatives). 
 
Table 1 - International Standards in the regulation of derivatives markets since 
2010 (adapted by the FSB Report on “OTC Derivatives Market Reforms”)57 
International Institution Commitment Action Date 
CGFS Central 
Clearing 
Report on the macro-financial 
implications of alternative 
configurations for access to CCP in 
OTC derivatives markets58 
November 2011 
BCBS and CPSS Central 
Clearing 
Revision of the BCBS Supervisory 
guidance for managing settlement 
risk in foreign exchange 
transactions  
Expected by end of 
2011 
IOSCO Central clearing Report on international standards to 
address coordination of central 
clearing requirements with respect 
to products and participants59 
January 2012 





Principles for financial market 
infrastructures, including derivatives 
CCPs and trade repositories60 
Consultative Report 
published in March 
2011 
BCBS, IOSCO, CPSS, 
CGFS Working Group 
Central clearing International standards on 
margining for non-centrally cleared 
Consultative report 
by June 2012 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 FSB 2011. 
58 CGFS 2011. 
59 IOSCO 2012. 
60 CPSS & IOSCO 2011. 




Report on trading of OTC 
derivatives61 
February 2011 
IOSCO Exchange and 
electronic 
platform trading 
Stock-taking on the use of multi-
dealer and single dealer trading 
platforms for OTC derivatives 
December 2011 
CPSS and IOSCO Reporting to 
trade 
repositories 
Report on OTC derivatives data 
reporting and aggregating 
requirements62 
January 2012 






Development and implementation of 
framework for effective cooperation 
and coordination on oversight 
arrangements and information 
sharing among the relevant 
authorities for individual trade 
repositories and systemically 




Regulatory capital adequacy rules 
for capitalization of both trade and 
default fund exposures to CCPs63 
Second consultation 
– November 2011 
ODSG Roadmap of 
industry 
initiatives 
Strategic Roadmap March 2011 
IOSCO Commodity 
derivatives 
Report on principles for the 
regulation and supervision of 
commodity derivatives markets64 
September 2011 
 
International regulatory institutions have also taken steps to monitor implementation at 
the domestic level of these international commitments. Two broadly equivalent 
regulatory frameworks have been introduced in the US and in Europe to directly regulate 
OTC derivatives markets: the Chapter VII of the Dodd-Frank Act and the European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation proposed by the European Commission (EMIR).65 
Both these regulations have expanded the official regulatory clout over a broad range of 
derivatives beyond the credit derivatives at the core of the crisis, including interest rate, 
credit, equity, commodity, and FX swaps. Moreover, both regulatory frameworks have 
sought to regulate all the derivatives and other major market actors involved in the 
derivatives markets, including major non-financial end-users.66 The direct regulatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 IOSCO 2011c. 
62 CPSS & IOSCO 2012. 
63 BCBS 2011. 
64 IOSCO 2011a. 
65 For a detailed review of these and other national regulations of the derivatives sector CFTC & SEC 2012; FSB 2011.  
66 Title VII of Dodd-Frank provided regulators with rulemaking authorities over the banks that operate as dealers in the 
derivatives markets as well as over other market actors such as hedge funds maintaining a “substantial position” in major 
categories of swaps or whose position would have “serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the United States 
banking system or financial markets” (defined as “major swap participants”). Also EMIR is characterized by a similar 
scope of actors covered, which include all types of financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, asset management 
companies, pension funds, and hedge funds), some non-financial institutions in the case their non-hedging OTC 
derivatives positions exceed a certain threshold. 
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requirements imposed upon these market actors in the US and EU have been 
summarized in Table 2.67  
	  
Table 2 – Regulation of OTC Derivatives Markets in the US and in the EU (as of 
end of 2011)68 
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67 Dodd-Frank required registered clearinghouses to register with a regulator, to designate a chief compliance officer, and 
to comply with different disclosure and data collection requirements to provide regulators with the information needed to 
monitor the markets, as well as rules to mitigate conflicts of interest in connection with swap dealers that may have a debt 
or equity investment in the clearinghouse. Also trade repositories were required to register with regulators, and to comply 
with standards set by regulators regarding antitrust considerations, governance arrangements, conflicts of interest, 
procedures concerning the collection and maintenance of data, the establishment of systems to analyze data, procedures 
to share data with regulators. Exchanges and swap execution facilities have been required to register and comply with 
recordkeeping and recording requirements, as well as to ensure the publication of trading information, antitrust 
requirements and rules to prevent the conflict of interests, financial resources system safeguards, and requirements 
regarding the designation of chief compliance officers. 
68 This table categorize the different measures according to the degree of public regulatory interference. On the left end of 
the table (self-regulation) are identified those regulatory tasks that continue to be performed by industry actors outside of 
a state-based regulatory frameworks.  Moving towards the right, this table shows those areas where the legislation 
continues to rely on self-regulatory improvements (“delegated self-regulation”) or it seeks to foster market discipline by 
introducing disclosure requirements (“regulation by information”). On the right end of the spectrum the table identifies 
those areas where the legislation has come to directly govern the internal organization of firms operating in the OTC 
derivatives markets (“internal standards”), or directly defined what market activities are admissible (“regulating market 
outcomes”). 
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the review of MIFID 






Other G20 members are following in the footsteps of the US and Europe in implementing 
the international commitments negotiated within the G20. At the Pittsburgh Summit, G20 
leaders demanded that “the FSB and its relevant members […] assess regularly 
implementation” of the commitments regarding derivatives regulation.69 A FSB OTC 
Derivatives Working Group was created by April 2010 with the task of monitoring the 
implementation of the international commitments and to develop reporting metrics to 
assess the level of implementation (Recommendation 20).70 The first initial progress 
report was published by the FSB in March 2011, followed by a second report in October 
of the same year. In this report, the FSB announced that the OTC Derivatives Working 
Group would “continue to actively monitor developments across jurisdictions and flag 
where these may be leading to opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.”71  
 
1.5.2 Rating Agencies 
International initiatives have also gradually shifted the responsibility to regulate credit 
rating agencies to public regulatory authorities. While the initiatives taken by IOSCO 
during the first stage of the regulatory response to the crisis sought to strengthen the 
capacity of public authorities to monitor the self-regulatory action taken by rating 
agencies, IOSCO did not recommend placing public authorities in charge of directly 
regulating rating agencies and sanctioning non-compliance. This approach was openly 
criticized at the international level by the G20. The G20 Working Group on “Enhancing 
Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency” that was convened after the 
Washington Summit presented in March 2009 an explicit criticism of the self-regulatory 
status of credit rating agencies: “a self-regulatory framework does not appear sufficient 
to ensure compliance with the IOSCO Code … Effective supervision requires 
surveillance of CRAs' activities and, where necessary, enforcement of rules applying to 
CRAs”.72 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 G20 2009b. 
70 FSB 2010. 
71 FSB 2011, p.4. 
72 G20 Working Group 1 2009. The G20 Working Group 1 recommended that that “Leaders complement their commitment 
on the registration of credit rating agencies with one to enhance enforcement, by empowering regulators with the ability to 
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G20 leaders took another step towards increasing the involvement of financial regulators 
in the regulation of rating agencies at the Washington Summit in November 2008. There, 
they requested credit rating agencies that provide public ratings to be registered.73 The 
implications of this commitment were better specified at the London Summit on 2 April 
2009. Here G20 leaders stated that “all rating agencies whose ratings are used for 
regulatory purposes to be subject to a regulatory oversight regime that includes 
registration” and that “national authorities will enforce compliance and require changes 
to a rating agency’s practices and procedures for managing conflicts of interest and 
assuring the transparency and quality of the rating process.”74  The significance of this 
shift in the public-private divide was acknowledged also by IOSCO, which stated in May 
2010 that “a consensus emerged that the IOSCO CRA Code, as an industry code that 
promoted CRAs to implement internal controls and processes designed to give effect to 
the IOSCO CRA Principles, should be supplemented with regulation of CRAs by national 
competent authorities.”75  
The US Congress introduced a public regulatory framework for rating agencies in 2006 
with its approval of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act. This act required rating 
agencies to be registered with the SEC as “Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations” and be subject to its regulatory oversight if they wanted their ratings to be 
used for regulatory purposes in the US. The European Commission introduced 
equivalent regulation in 2008, which it revised in 2011. European regulation required 
rating agencies operating in Europe to register with the relevant European authority and 
by requiring that only rating agencies subject to this oversight could be used by firms 
based in the EU for regulatory purposes (see Table 3 for a comparison of the US and 
EU legislation).76 Moreover, the G20 agreement triggered the introduction of similar 
regulatory frameworks in Europe, Japan, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Hong Kong 
that placed the responsibility to regulate rating agencies in the hands of public 
regulators.77   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
require changes to a CRA’s practices and procedures for managing conflicts of interest at credit rating agencies and 
assuring the transparency and quality of the rating process”. 
73  G20 2008. 
74 G20 leaders’ also addressed the issue of the use of ratings in regulation stating that “the Basel Committee should take 
forward its review on the role of external ratings in prudential regulation and determine whether there are any adverse 
incentives that need to be addressed”. See G20 2009a. 
75 IOSCO 2010b, p.10. 
76 European Commission 2009h;  European Commission 2011f. 
77 FSB 2009a; FSB 2009b. 
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Table 3 - Regulation of Rating Agencies in the US and Europe (as of end of 2011) 
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Like in the case of derivatives, international regulatory institutions have also expanded 
their role into monitoring these domestic regulatory frameworks’ consistency with the 
international commitments. Responding to a request from the G20,78 the Technical 
Committee of IOSCO has included the task of evaluating the compatibility of the different 
regulatory initiatives introduced at the domestic level with its own international principles 
in the mandate for the Standing Committee on Rating Agencies.79 In May 2010, the 
Standing Committee on Rating Agencies published a report (updated in February 2011) 
to review “how provisions in the various emerging CRA government regulations are 
designed to implement and promote the objectives in the four IOSCO CRA Principles” 
and to help regulators in “addressing potential conflicts that may arise from the differing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 G20 2009a. The G20 Leaders at the London summit had stated that the regulatory oversight regimes designed by their 
members “should be consistent with the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals”, and it demanded IOSCO to “coordinate 
full compliance”.  
79 IOSCO 2010b; 
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regulatory requirements imposed by different jurisdictions upon globally operating 
CRAs.80  
 
1.5.3 Hedge Funds 
The long-standing international support for self-regulation in hedge funds came to an 
end at the beginning of 2009. While in the past industry-driven initiatives were successful 
in deflecting the threat of more stringent regulation, this time the self-regulatory initiatives 
presented by the hedge fund industry in response to the call from the G20 generated 
only lukewarm reactions from the international regulatory community. Securities 
regulators gathered within IOSCO have raised doubts about the effectiveness of industry 
codes of best practices as a substitute for direct regulation. First, IOSCO argued that the 
adoption by hedge fund managers of these industry codes of best practices had 
remained low, as demonstrated by a survey showing that only less than 10% of British 
hedge fund managers were prepared to sign up to the standards drafted by the HFWG,81 
and there has been no demand by investors of these hedge funds to adopt the 
standards. Second, IOSCO denounced the variety of different industry standards 
covering different issues and the lack of a globally consistent solution. Third, IOSCO 
argued that there were “still open questions regarding the enforceability of such codes 
either by regulators or industry associations”.82  
The consultation report presented by IOSCO in March 2009 on the regulation of hedge 
fund industry departed from the international approach that dominated before the crisis 
in recommending the registration/authorization of hedge fund managers, as well as 
requiring these actors to comply with different regulatory requirements. 83  The G20 
leaders also endorsed this approach. Their communiqué at London Summit on April 
2009 announced an agreement ‘to extend regulation and oversight to all systemically 
important financial institutions, instruments and markets. This will include, for the first 
time, systemically important hedge funds’.84 Also the “Declaration on Strengthening the 
Financial System” better specified this commitment by stating that “hedge funds or their 
managers will be registered and will be required to disclose appropriate information on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 To further this goal, IOSCO has also established a dialogue with the same rating agencies to examine “emerging issues 
and any implementation problems from the industry’s perspective” and, in particular, “whether differences in the 
implementation of national and regional regulatory frameworks based on the IOSCO Principles and Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for CRAs present compliance problems or arbitrage opportunities”. See IOSCO 2011b; FSB 2009b. 
81 Kinetic Partners 2008. 
82 IOSCO 2009b, p.7. 
83 IOSCO 2009a, p.33. 
84 G20 2009c. 
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an ongoing basis to supervisors or regulators, including on their leverage, necessary for 
assessment of the systemic risks that they pose individually or collectively.”85 
Mandatory registration and enhanced disclosure of information to the authority to assess 
the risks posed by hedge funds also informed the final recommendations released 
shortly after by IOSCO in June 2009. Moreover, IOSCO went beyond the G20 
declaration in specifying ongoing regulatory requirements to which the registered hedge 
fund managers should be required to obey.   IOSCO recommended that its members 
introduce regulatory requirements related to the organizational and operational 
standards followed by hedge fund managers (e.g. independent risk management 
function, compliance function, use of independent custodians to protect client monies 
and assets), the conflicts of interest (e.g. remuneration for hedge fund managers), and 
disclosure to investors. IOSCO has also published an agreed template to assist public 
authorities in collecting and sharing hedge fund information useful in assessing possible 
systemic risks arising from the sector.86 
The commitment by the G20 leaders at the London summit to extend regulation and 
oversight for the first time to hedge funds was followed by the introduction of different 
regulatory frameworks at the domestic level. In the US, this objective was pursued 
through the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010, included in the 
Title VI of the Dodd-Frank Act signed into law in the summer of 2010. In Europe,  the 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) was introduced to regulate the 
hedge funds manager.87 Both pieces of regulation required hedge fund managers to 
register with regulatory authorities as well as to comply with a number of regulatory 
requirement, although their scope differed quite significantly in the two jurisdictions (for a 
summary, see Table 4).88 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 G20 2009a. 
86 IOSCO 2010a. 
87 European Commission 2011a. 
88  The Private Fund Act removed the so-called “private adviser” exemption that had traditionally allowed hedge fund 
managers to register with the SEC and be subject to the regular scrutiny by this institution. The registration requirement 
was made mandatory for those fund advisers with assets under management above $100 million. Similarly, also the AIFM 
Directive required all the fund managers with a portfolio of assets under management higher than 100 million Euro (raised 
to 500 million in the case of unleveraged portfolio) to be subject to registration with the competent authorities.  
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Table 4 - Regulation of Hedge Funds in the US and Europe (as of end of 2011) 
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The design of these regulatory frameworks in the US, Europe, and other countries was 
followed by the FSB announcement in September 2009 that “To further facilitate global 
coordination on hedge fund regulation, IOSCO plans to monitor the progress in domestic 
regulation of the hedge fund sector and review how they align with the IOSCO 
principles”89.  IOSCO has also taken steps to facilitate the work of regulatory authorities 




This chapter has analyzed the way in which international regulatory guidelines have 
directed the allocation of the responsibilities to regulate OTC derivatives, rating 
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agencies, and hedge funds between public regulatory agencies and private market 
actors. This analysis has highlighted how the global financial crisis that erupted in the 
summer of 2007 began a significant shift in the main international financial regulatory 
institutions’ approach.  
In the years before the crisis the FSF, IOSCO, and Basel Committee purposefully left 
OTC derivatives markets, hedge fund managers, and rating agencies outside of the 
direct oversight of public regulatory agencies. Beginning in late 2008, the commitments 
made at the international level within transgovernmental regulatory bodies such as the 
FSF/B and IOSCO, or at leaders forums such as the G20 have departed from the 
approach adopted by the same institutions before the crisis. New regulatory measures 
have promoted the direct regulation of derivatives, hedge funds, and rating agencies by 
recommending that the responsibility to regulate and oversee these three markets and 
institutions be placed firmly in the hands of public regulatory authorities. In addition to 
coordinating international measures to directly regulate OTC derivatives, hedge funds, 
and rating agencies, the same international regulatory bodies have also taken an active 
role in monitoring the consistency of domestic regulatory initiatives with these 
international commitments 
The degree of change should not be overstated. A more in depth analysis of the 
regulatory policies introduced in the US and Europe to implement the international 
commitments reveals that the decisions to bring derivative dealers, rating agencies, and 
hedge fund managers under the direct oversight of public authorities coexists with a 
continuous reliance on different market-based mechanisms. Only in a few circumstances 
have the new regulatory frameworks have extended the reach of regulatory intervention 
as far as interfering in the structure of derivatives markets, hedge funds and rating 
agencies. In other words, while the crisis’ severity has drawn comparisons with the Wall 
Street Crash of 1929, the impact of the regulatory response over the public-private 
divide is less extensive. Nonetheless, the expansion in the perimeter of financial market 
actors whose activities fall within the perimeter of public regulation is certainly a 
significant shift in the governance of international financial markets. 
At the same time, this shift in the public-private divide cannot be regarded as simply a 
mechanical reaction to the global financial crisis of 2007-2010 and the regulatory failures 
the crisis revealed. Two patterns of the shift described in this chapter are inconsistent 
with this interpretation: its scope and its timing. First, when we analyze the scope of the 
regulatory response, it appears that the change in the approach of international 
	   47 
regulatory institutions not only affected both market actors that were among the main 
culprits of the crisis, such as derivatives markets and rating agencies, but also actors 
that played a rather peripheral role such as hedge funds. This aspect is even more 
puzzling when we consider how the market-based approach that dominated the 
international regulation of hedge funds before the crisis emerged in response to a crisis 
that more directly exposed the systemic risks associated with their activities, that is, the 
collapse of LTCM.  
Second, when we analyze the timing of this shift in the international public-private divide, 
we see that the outbreak of the crisis in the summer of 2007 initially reinforced rather 
than undermined the market-based approach that had emerged before the crisis. The 
initial response by international institutions such as the FSF repeatedly turned to the 
same market-actors and demanded self-regulatory improvements. It is only in a second 
moment, and primarily as a result of the demands coming from the G20, that the 
international regulatory response to the crisis acquired  a commitment towards directly 
regulating derivatives markets, hedge funds, and rating agencies. 
In order to set the stage for an explanation of these patterns in the international 
regulatory response to the crisis, the next chapter will review the contribution of main 
theories on the politics of international financial regulation in the IPE literature.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
  
 
2.1 Plan of the Chapter 
How is it possible to explain the turn in the public-private divide that characterized the 
international regulatory agreements introduced since the beginning of the financial crisis 
to bring OTC derivatives, hedge funds, and rating agencies under direct regulatory 
oversight? In order to begin to answer this question, this chapter will turn first to the IPE 
literature on the politics of international financial regulation. The growth of international 
regulatory cooperation since the 1970s has led to the emergence of a significant body of 
academic work investigating the political drivers behind this process.1  
The central question that has driven this literature seeks to determine the conditions 
under which national authorities succeed or fail in coordinating their financial regulatory 
policies at the international level. However, in the decade before the crisis, a number of 
authors also highlighted a qualitative change in the way in the way international 
regulatory agreements allocate the responsibility to regulate markets between public 
regulatory agencies and private market actors. They sought to explain from a theoretical 
standpoint the greater reliance on private-rulemaking and market-based mechanisms in 
the governance of international financial markets. These works have in particular 
focused on the two main “poster-children” of this turn: the Basel II agreement, which 
increased regulators’ reliance on the self-regulatory capacity of individual financial 
institutions and the rising status of the International Accounting Standard Body, a private 
standard-setting body in the accounting realm.2 However, a number of works have also 
explored the markets and institutions analyzed in this study.3  
The significance of the global financial crisis of 2007 and its impact on the international 
regulatory architecture have provided new impetus to this academic literature. Since the 
beginning of the crisis, different works have started to investigate the politics of the 
international regulatory response to the global financial crisis. These include studies of 
derivatives regulation,4 hedge funds,5 and rating agencies6 although these studies have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a review of this literature see Helleiner & Pagliari 2011. 
2 Buthe & Mattli 2011; Perry & Nolke 2006; Tsingou 2008. 
3 Eichengreen 2003; Sinclair 2005; Tsingou 2003. 
4 Helleiner and Pagliari 2009b; Helleiner 2010; Clapp & Helleiner 2012. 
5 Fioretos 2010; Quaglia 2011; Woll 2011. 
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focused primarily on the regulation of single sectors rather trying to draw lessons by 
looking across them. 
This chapter will review the contribution of this range of IPE literature to explain from a 
theoretical standpoint what factors represent the primary determinant of the division of 
responsibilities between public regulators and private market actors in the regulation of 
financial markets.  By analyzing both pre-crisis and post-crisis regulatory developments 
literature, it is possible to distill five competing theoretical explanations to explain how 
international regulatory institutions will allocate regulatory responsibilities between public 
and private actors: 
- Functionalist explanations regard the structural characteristics of financial markets 
as the primary determinant of how international regulatory policies will divide 
regulatory functions between public and private actors. In particular, one strand of 
functionalist arguments reviewed in this section attributes the dominance of market-
based regulatory mechanisms before the crisis to the constraints posed upon 
regulators’ capacity to regulate finance by structural changes in the financial 
markets such as the processes of financial globalization and financial innovation. 
Other functionalist analyses in this section instead consider the technical nature of 
financial markets as constraining the kind of regulatory change. (Section 2.2). 
- Realist explanations identify in the relative market power of different states as the 
primary determinant of how international regulatory policies will allocate regulatory 
functions between public and private actors. In particular, the works belonging to 
this tradition have attributed the dominance of market-based regulatory mechanisms 
before the crisis to US predominant influence in international financial negotiations 
(Section 2.3). 
- Historical institutionalist explanations identify in the institutional characteristics 
associated with different ‘varieties of capitalism’ as the primary determinant of 
whether countries will support market-based or more direct types of regulation. In 
particular, the works belonging to this tradition will attribute the emergence of 
market-based international regulatory regimes before the crisis to the dominance of 
liberal market-economies over international regulatory debates (Section 2.4). 
- Pluralist explanations identify the preferences and relative influence of different 
interest groups as the primary determinant of how international regulatory policies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Quaglia 2009. 
	   50 
will divide regulatory functions between public and private actors. In particular, the 
works belonging to this tradition attribute the dominance of market-based regulatory 
mechanisms before the crisis to the dominance of financial industry groups 
mobilizing on a national and transnational basis vis-à-vis other societal actors and 
their capacity to systematically infuse the international regulatory process with their 
own preferences  (Section 2.5).  
- Constructivist explanations identify in the dominant ideas as the primary determinant 
of how international regulatory policies will divide regulatory functions between 
public and private actors. In particular, the works belonging to this tradition attribute 
the dominance of market-based regulatory mechanisms before the crisis to the 
emergence of an ideational consensus within the international regulatory community 
around the efficiency of markets (Section 2.6). 
Table 5 summarizes the main theoretical expectations of each approach and their 
shortcomings in explaining the changes triggered by the crisis. 
Besides reviewing the main claims of this literature, this chapter will discuss to what 
extent these theoretical perspectives are capable of explaining the shift in the public-
private divide that has been set in motion by the financial crisis in the international 
regulation of derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds. In particular, this chapter will 
explore to what extent these theories can explain the empirical evidence presented in 
the previous chapter.  
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Table 5 - Theoretical Expectations of the Literature 
Theoretical 
paradigm Main determinant of the public-private divide 
How would the theory 
predict reassertion of public 
oversight? 
How has the crisis 
challenged this thesis? 
Functionalism Financial Globalization and 
innovation. Constraints these 
processes pose upon 
regulators’ capacity to 
regulate specific issue areas.  
Structural changes in financial 
markets, such as reversal of 
the process of financial 
globalization and innovation 
 
Crisis revealing significant 
shortcomings in market-based 
regulatory solutions 
A reassertion of public 
regulatory oversight has 
occurred in those areas that 
before the crisis were 
described as most complex 
and dynamic, and in sectors 
that were not the culprit for the 
crisis.  
 
Realism  Distribution of relative state 
power 
Change in the inter-state 
balance of power away from 
those countries that maintain 
a vested interest in a market-
based regulatory approach 
Crisis did not change the 
balance of power between 
countries, but rather altered 
the preferences of the leading 
countries. 
 
Dominant powers pursuing 
regulation detrimental to the 
competitive position of their 




Varieties of capitalisms.   Evolution in the national 
models of capitalism  
Timing of change in 
preferences of liberal market-
economies that have 
abandoned support for 
market-based regulation. 
 
US promoting more intrusive 
regulation of derivatives than 
EU 
Pluralism Preferences of Financial 
industry group and 
competitive dynamics  
Inter-industry competitive 
struggles prevent emergence 
of self-regulation.   
Greater influence of interest 
groups outside the financial 
industry  
A reassertion of public 
regulatory oversight has gone 
against the preferences 
expressed by financial industry 
groups and by some non-
financial groups.  
Constructivism Dominant ideas regarding 
the state-market relations  
Widespread ideational shift 
within the international 
regulatory community 
Timing of the change 
(ideational shifts occur over 
the medium-term) 
 
The conclusion of this chapter (Section 2.7) will maintain that while these theoretical 
explanations have gone a long way in identifying the primary forces influencing the 
market-based regulatory regime governing these three markets and institutions prior to 
the crisis, they fail to adequately explain the shifting patterns in international regulation 
triggered by the financial crisis of 2007-10 analyzed in the previous chapter. 	  
 
2.2 Functionalist Explanations 
A rather variegated group of authors within the IPE literature has identified the primary 
determinant of changes in the patterns of international financial regulatory cooperation in 
the characteristics of financial markets and the way these have evolved over time. More 
specifically, different authors have argued that the expansion of “private authorities” can 
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be regarded as a response to epochal changes in the global economy such as the twin 
processes of financial globalization and technological change.	  
One of the earliest formulations of this argument can be attributed to Susan Strange. In 
her influential book “The Retreat of the State”, Strange acknowledges that in a wide 
range of segments of the world economy “what were once domains of authority 
exclusive to state authority are now being shared with other loci or sources of authority.”7 
According to Strange, the origin of the shift in the location of the authority to regulate 
markets are to be found in a structural transformation that occurred with the increasing 
globalization of markets, which had previously constrained the capacity and/or 
willingness of states to regulate them.  
Cutler, Haufler, and Porter in their collective study on the rise of ‘private authority’ in 
international affairs identify three overlapping trends as potential explanations of this 
phenomenon: the expansion of market forces, globalization in general, and the pace of 
technological change.8 According to these authors these three overlapping trends have 
constrained the capacity of states to cope with the demands for governance solutions for 
emerging international issues. They argue that “as states voluntarily abandon some of 
the functions that we traditionally associate with public authorities due to the force of 
liberal ideology, globalization, or the lack of state capacity to manage current issues, 
those functions that are needed for smoothly operating markets may be given to or taken 
up by firms”.9  
Miles Khaler and David Lake argue in their analysis of global economic governance that 
“globalization constrains the array of policy instruments available to states. This 
consequence of globalization is particularly important in explaining shifts of governance 
across the public-private divide. Regulation or standards governance by national political 
authorities may become less effective in a global economy. Capital can too easily evade 
national regulations. Incompatible national standards become barriers to trade, raising 
consumer prices and engendering discord between firms and states.”10 
While the focus of these works is not confined to the realm of finance, other authors 
have drawn upon these insights to explain how the evolution of international financial 
regulation has been influenced by historical trends of financial globalization and financial 
innovation.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Strange 1996, p.82. 
8 Cutler, Haufler, & Porter 1999a. 
9 Cutler, Haufler, & Porter 1999b, p.4. 
10 Khaler and Lake 2003, p. 426. 
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First, several authors have highlighted how the globalization of financial markets that 
was set in motion by the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system has undermined the 
capacity of national regulators to individually control domestic banks whose activities 
extend across jurisdictions. Moreover, given that financial activity is more capable of 
escaping national regulation and moving across jurisdictions than other areas of the 
global economy, states are wary of introducing regulatory policies that may encourage 
regulatory arbitrage through the threat of capital outflows towards laxer jurisdictions or to 
harm their competitiveness in attracting investment.11 Different authors have argued that 
the risks of regulatory arbitrage and of a race to the bottom can be mitigated through the 
international harmonization of regulatory policies.12 However, this remains a difficult 
process. Tsingou has therefore argued that “a look at the way the financial system 
currently operates shows that the more transnational the activity, the less it is likely to 
rely on traditional forms of regulation (that is, nationally based and public), thus giving 
way to self-regulatory practices.”13 
Second, financial globalization and technological changes brought by the digital 
revolution since the 1970s have also created constraints to the operation of public 
regulators by increasing the volume and speed of transactions occurring daily in the 
financial markets. Their financial resources and the personnel employed in financial 
regulatory bodies have failed to keep pace with the increase in the size and scope of the 
financial markets they are supposed to supervise and regulate. Phil Cerny argued that 
the “dramatic innovations in communications and information technology have led to 
huge transnational capital flows and complex patterns of two-way cross-border price 
sensitivity which dwarf the monitoring and controlling capabilities as well as the public 
financial resources of states, thereby making pre-existing nation-state-based patterns 
and systems of regulation and intervention less effective.”14  
Third, several authors have highlighted how innovations in communication and 
information technologies have increased the level of complexity in the financial markets, 
transforming finance into a “knowledge intensive” sector.15 This innovative capacity of 
markets has gained prominence in recent years with the explosion in the ‘securitization’ 
of traditional operations such as bank loans and mortgages into negotiable securities, 
the creation of ‘off-balance sheet’ instruments, and the design of complex and tailored 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Andrews 1994; Cerny 1996; Cerny 2002; Gill & Law 1989.  
12 Kapstein 1994. 
13 Tsingou 2003, p. 4. 
14 Cerny 2002, p. 210; Cerny 1994; Cerny 1996. 
15 Strulik 2007; Porter 2003. 
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instruments, especially in the derivatives markets. Studies of the evolution of the 
financial sector throughout the XXth century have documented how the increase in the 
complexity of finance since the 1980s has coincided with finance becoming a high-skill 
high-wage industry compared to other industries.16 The greater asymmetry between 
salaries of regulators and those of the financial industry has constrained the capacity of 
regulators to attract and retain qualified personnel who can be lured into moving to the 
private sector. 
Moreover, different authors have argued that the increasingly knowledge-intensive 
nature of financial regulatory policies have posed constraints upon the capacity of public 
regulatory agencies to govern markets that are not exclusively monetary but also 
“cognitive”. 17  Cerny and others have argued that the pace of innovation and the 
increased knowledge-intensive nature in today’s financial markets have increased the 
information asymmetry between public regulators and the financial industry, placing 
financial regulators are at a great cognitive disadvantage compared to the industry they 
are supposed to regulate.18  
Beyond heightening information asymmetries, Strulik argues that these developments in 
financial markets have increasingly confronted regulators with situations of “ambiguous 
ignorance […] which cannot be quantified on the basis of experience and with the help of 
probability calculations.” 19  As ambiguous ignorance becomes more relevant and it 
becomes more difficult to understand cause/effect relationships, imposing simple rules 
such as quantitative norms and controlling conformity for them is described as 
inadequate.20 
Moreover, the same twin processes of financial globalization and technological 
developments which limit the capacity of financial regulators to govern financial markets 
have also been presented as creating incentives for these actors to seek out alternative, 
more flexible, and less resource-intensive forms of regulation. Several political scientists, 
economists, and theorists of regulation have theorized that under certain conditions 
granting regulatory authority to private market actors may be more “efficient” than solely 
relying on public authorities. According to Cutler, Haufler and Porter, endowing private 
actors with authority could mitigate the costs associated with information and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Philippon & Reshe 2009. 
17 Strulik 2006; Porter 1999b. 
18 Cerny 1994; Hoenig 1996. 
19 Strulik 2006, p.4. 
20 Kette 2009; Strulik 2006. 
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uncertainty, costs directly associated with negotiation, and enforcement costs.21 They 
argued that “the state is likely to continue to enjoy a decisive advantage in governance 
where transactions are characterized by large scale risks or where they involve multiple 
industries or issue areas.” However, the advantages that states have relative to firms are 
substantially reduced when transactions are “restricted to private firms operating in 
single industries,” in the case of policies designed “at the international level, where there 
is no centralized political authority and interstate cooperation remains difficult,”22 as well 
as in “areas where technology is complex or information plays a significant role”. 23 For 
instance, the rise of rating agencies as “private authorities” in the global economy has 
been explained as the product of their greater efficiency in monitoring and assessing 
borrowers.24  
Different authors have therefore theorized how public authorities regulators have to stay 
abreast of market developments in an increasingly knowledge-intensive and dynamic 
industry is to leverage the expertise and resources of private market actors and to shift 
to them part of the task of regulating and supervising markets.  
For instance, Walter Mattli has argued that “high economic costs attributable to a 
mismatch between limited public capabilities and expansive private sector needs have 
led to a much greater involvement of market actors in transnational standardization, in 
effect moving a key site of standards governance horizontally from the transnational 
public domain to the private sphere.”25 According to Mattli, this has taken the form of 
either market players bypassing intergovernmental standard-setting bodies or an act of 
delegation by governments of regulatory authority to private sector transnational 
standards organizations which “typically have greater resources and technical 
sophistication, as well as a better feel for market needs, than public official and thus may 
be in a better position to produce complex international standards in a timely and cost-
effective way.” 26 Several authors have argued that public authorities are more likely to 
delegate regulatory responsibilities to private market actors in those areas where the 
latter have greater “regulatory capacity” than traditional public regulatory bodies, such as 
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in areas characterized by increasing technological complexity, rapid change or in areas 
of novel economic activity.27  
Finance certainly fits this description. Changes in the content of financial regulation and 
its greater reliance on market-based regulatory mechanisms have been described as the 
acknowledgment that traditional hierarchical forms of regulation that set strict and 
detailed quantitative requirements had become inadequate for the financial system’s 
accelerated innovation dynamic that arose over the last few decades.28 For instance, 
Kette argues: “As the private knowledge (e.g. of market participants) differs from the 
‘regulatory knowledge’ the regulators are forced to incorporate private expertise in order 
to develop rules that can deal with the complexity of the financial system. Otherwise, the 
aim of a stable financial system would hardly be achievable.”29 Tsingou has argued that 
while public authorities lag behind in terms of technical capabilities and expertise and 
therefore cannot regulate nor oversee effectively complex financial activities, “the 
complexity and speed of financial innovation has put banks in a privileged position as 
knowledge holders.” She concludes that as a result of this asymmetry of knowledge, 
public regulatory authorities have shifted the focus of their intervention from regulation to 
supervision: “this has left financial institutions in charge of making their own rules, or 
rather creating their own flexible standards, and public authorities in charge of market-
based supervision, increasingly reliant on private sector know-how and transparent 
practices.”30 
In sum, according to these explanations, the delegation of regulatory and supervisory 
responsibilities to private market actors that gained traction in the regulation of OTC 
derivatives, hedge funds, and rating agencies before the crisis could be described as 
regulators’ attempt to leverage private market actors’ resources to supplement their 
capacity to effectively govern these markets and institutions. Indeed, OTC derivatives 
have been regarded as among the most complex and innovative financial products. The 
complexity and volume in the trading strategies of hedge funds dwarfs those of other 
investment vehicles such as pension funds. Finally, the task of assessing the default risk 
for corporate bonds and structured products is regarded as a particularly complex and 
knowledge-intensive business that over the years banks and other financial institutions 
have delegated to specialized rating agencies. 
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Moreover, the view that developments in financial markets had rendered traditional 
approaches to the regulation and supervision of financial markets unworkable has also 
been expressed by some of the most influential regulatory authorities in the decade 
preceding the crisis. In particular, since the mid-1990s, several members of the Federal 
Reserve have made this case. For instance, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City Thomas Hoenig argued in 1996 that “in light of the changes in financial 
markets … simply extending the traditional regulatory approach to achieve the goals of 
financial regulation may be too difficult and costly”, while “private sectors maintained 
significantly more resources—both human and financial—than the regulators for keeping 
pace with the changes in financial.”31 The Governor of the Federal Reserve Laurence 
Meyer also argued in 1999 that the “renaissance in appreciation of the contribution of 
market discipline” in the regulation of the banking sector “undoubtedly reflects a growing 
awareness that recent developments in banking and financial markets have made 
regulatory standards less effective and supervision more challenging, that it may be 
simply impossible to adapt regulatory standards and supervisory practices fast enough 
to keep pace with market developments.”32 In another study published in 2000, the 
Federal Reserve also argued: “The accent on market discipline and transparency has 
been prompted in large part by changes reshaping banking. With consolidation, 
convergence, globalization, and the rapid pace of financial innovation, more-effective 
market discipline is a preferred alternative to large-scale expansion of supervision and 
regulation as a means of limiting risk-taking by large, complex financial institutions with 
substantial banking activities.”33 The head of the Federal Reserve during this period Alan 
Greenspan summarized this view well, stating that ‘regulators can still pretend to provide 
oversight, but their capabilities are much diminished and declining’. He claims that at the 
Federal Reserve, he and his colleagues ‘increasingly judged that we would have to rely 
on counterparty surveillance to do the heavy lifting’.34 
However, the interpretation that regulatory agencies’ weakened capacity and resources 
caused greater reliance on market-based mechanisms before the crisis faces significant 
challenges from the analysis of the international regulatory changes that have followed 
the crisis. The twin processes of financial globalization and innovation at the core of this 
thesis are usually regarded as structural features of contemporary financial markets that 
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are unlikely to be reversed or weakened by episodes of financial instability. The financial 
crisis has neither “turned the clock back” on the structure of financial markets nor 
provoked a significant retreat of financial globalization. Therefore, arguments based on 
the structural transformations in the financial markets would expect financial regulatory 
authorities to continue to delegate significant responsibilities for addressing the gaps in 
the international financial regulation that the crisis highlighted to the same financial 
industry, especially in those areas that are regarded as more dynamic and knowledge 
intensive. This thesis cannot then easily explain the reassertion of regulatory 
responsibilities over market actors and activities regarded as among the most complex 
and dynamic such as in the case of hedge funds and derivatives. 
An alternative functionalist explanation would present the departure from the market-
based measures that had emerged before the crisis as driven by the acknowledgement 
of the inadequacies of these arrangements in solving specific regulatory changes. From 
this perspective, one of the impacts of the financial crisis should have been to provide 
new information regarding the effectiveness of the market-based measures that 
emerged before the crisis. However, this argument does not seem tenable in light of the 
evidence presented in the previous chapter.  
The case of hedge funds provides evidence of the success of the self-regulatory 
measures introduced in the years before the crisis in reducing leverage in the hedge 
fund industry and mitigating the risks that hedge funds posed upon banking system. In 
fact, this time around, the collapse of an unprecedented number of hedge funds during 
the crisis had no significant impact on the stability of banks that provide them with 
leverage. This is even more puzzling when we consider that the market-based regime 
governing hedge funds had emerged in the aftermath of a more severe hedge fund 
crisis, that is, the collapse of LTCM. 
Moreover, international regulatory institutions’ change in attitude cannot be regarded as 
a response to the failure of market-actors in meeting their requests for self-regulatory 
improvements. As argued in the previous chapter, international regulatory institutions 
praised the self-regulatory steps taken by the derivative dealers to improve the 
settlement of credit derivatives during the crisis, 35  as well as the self-regulatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Senior Supervisors Group 2009. 
	   59 
implementation by the main rating agencies of the recommendations presented by 
IOSCO.36 
Porter has presented an alternative functionalist approach to explain the patterns of 
international financial regulation. Going beyond traditional functionalist approaches, 
Porter has highlighted the nature of finance as a “technical system” and the impact that 
the technical demands of the systems have had in shaping the conduct of the actors 
involved in the development of financial regulatory policies. 37  Porter particularly 
highlights how the nature of finance as a technical system restricts the portfolio of policy 
solutions policymakers considered feasible because it injects a significant degree of path 
dependency when developing international regulatory policies and it encourages the 
development of incremental adjustments. 
According to Porter, the international regulatory response to the East Asian crisis clearly 
demonstrated the legacy of finance’s technical nature. Rather than starting from scratch 
in considering how to respond to the regulatory failures highlighted by the crisis, the 
international response was shaped by a prior history of technical collaboration and it 
relied extensively on institutions and standards that had been developed in the past. 38 
Unlike the functionalist argument reviewed above, this argument does not imply that the 
knowledge-intensive nature of financial markets would preclude a reassertion of greater 
public regulation. However, according to Porter, the technical nature of financial markets 
would shape and limit the patterns of re-regulation. As Porter argues, “change in 
transnational regulatory arrangements is likely only to involve an incremental 
strengthening of the existing disaggregated arrangements, despite the massive failure of 
the financial system that the crisis revealed”.39  
Porter’s argument on the legacy of technical cooperation is important for explaining the 
continuity in the approach adopted by international regulatory institutions in responding 
to the global financial crisis. IOSCO’s initial response to rating agencies’ failure to 
correctly assess the creditworthiness of structured finance product has been to amend 
its existing Code of Conduct while preserving its self-regulatory nature. The initial 
initiatives coordinated by the FSF to strengthen the operation infrastructures of 
derivatives markets have built upon cooperation patterns established by the Federal 
Reserve of New York with the main derivative dealers in 2005. Finally, the initial 
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response by the G20 to strengthen the regulation of hedge funds has also consisted of 
calling upon hedge fund associations to devise voluntary codes of best practices, 
similarly to the approach endorsed by the G7 and FSF in the wake of the crisis. 
At the same time, Porter’s functionalist view is less capable of explaining the direction 
change that has occurred in the international agenda since the last quarter of 2008 and 
the same institution’s decision to endorse the need to bring these market and institutions 
under public authorities’ direct regulatory oversight. 
  
2.3 Realist explanations 
Some of the functionalist arguments presented above maintains that that the 
globalization of economic activities has compromised state authorities’ grip on financial 
market governance. An important school of thought has contested this view. Realist 
explanations have described the emergence of self-regulatory mechanisms in the 
governance of international finance and other areas of the global economy as the 
outcome of an explicit or implicit delegation of regulatory responsibilities from the leading 
states, which remain ready in a moment of crisis to seize back the authority they had 
ceded. 40  For instance, Louis Pauly argues that national authorities deliberately 
“obfuscate their final authority in financial markets” in order to render opaque their 
political responsibility.”41  
From the perspective of these works, a primary determinant of the division of regulatory 
responsibilities between private market actors and public regulatory agencies remain the 
different states’ relative leverage and preferences for international financial regulatory 
policies.  
Numerous works that have built upon the realist tradition of international political 
economy have explained the shape of international regulatory regimes in terms of the 
preferences of countries that dominate international regulatory negotiations.42  According 
to this literature, the primary determinant of the leverage that states are able to exercise 
on the international agenda is the “market power” they derive from the size of their 
domestic markets. The literature has highlighted how countries with the largest domestic 
markets are able to secure compliance from other countries for their preferred regulatory 
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approaches by explicitly threatening to close their markets to foreign firms.43 Larger 
states also threaten to forestall more ambitious international agreements by simply not 
participating to these international regulatory initiatives, what Wood calls “spoiling 
behaviour.”44  Moreover, unilateral regulatory initiatives in hegemonic countries have 
been described as having international implications because they strengthen other 
countries’ incentives to match these regulatory policies through the unleashing of 
competitive pressures that change the balance of interests within other countries.45  
Building on this notion of power as “market power”, most analysis of the international 
financial arena have identified the US as the “hegemon” shaping the patterns of change 
in the financial regulatory regime. These studies have detailed their capacity to promote 
the strengthening of international financial regulation in those areas where it benefited 
most its interests, such as the Basel I negotiations, while hindering progress in areas 
posing fewer negative externalities, such as securities market regulation.46   
This is also the true in the regulation of the three markets and institutions analysed in 
this work. The US is the home of a greater concentration of derivative dealers than in 
any other country,47 of more than two thirds of the global hedge fund management 
industry,48 and of the two rating agencies that dominate the international market for 
ratings.49 The size of the American financial industry has granted US policymakers a 
unique influence over the evolution of the international regulatory regimes governing 
these markets. Indeed, the cases analysed in this study will reveal how the endorsement 
of market-based solutions from international regulatory bodies such as IOSCO (in the 
case of derivatives and rating agencies) and the FSF (in the case of hedge funds) 
frequently built directly upon the approach endorsed domestically by US regulatory 
authorities. Moreover, the lack of support by US authorities during this period for more 
heavy-handed forms of regulation coming in particular from Continental European and 
East Asian regulatory authorities, particularly in the case of hedge funds, has effectively 
allowed US authorities to forestall the emergence of stringent international agreements 
to regulate these markets and institutions by effectively acting as a veto player.  
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The global financial crisis has been described as accelerating what many perceive to be 
a power shift in global finance away from the US. Not only has the crisis damaged 
American “market power” deriving from the predominance of US financial firms, but, 
more significantly, has damaged American “soft power” stemming from New York’s 
reputation as a financial center and has undermined the credibility of several pillars of 
the Anglo-American financial regulatory model. 50  At the same time, the crisis has 
bolstered international activism from policymakers, such as those European countries 
that had in the past criticized market-based regulatory solutions.  
In the years before the crisis, different authors have argued that the combined financial 
space of European countries and increased institutional capacity at the EU level would 
allow the EU to increasingly challenge US dominance in international regulatory politics. 
According to Posner, the US hegemony in international financial regulation had been 
replaced by a “Euro-American regulatory condominium” in financial politics.51 Along the 
same lines, Drezner has argued that changes in the international regulatory agenda 
required the combined agreement of the US and the EU.52 During the crisis, leaders of 
Continental European countries such as the French President Sarkozy and the German 
Chancellor Merkel have openly criticized the support for self-regulation that had 
emerged before the crisis and publicly stated that Europe would not hesitate to act 
unilaterally if the US and other countries did not commit to implementing stringent 
reforms.53 
However, the empirical analysis of the regulation of OTC derivatives, hedge funds, and 
rating agencies does not provide support to the notion that the shift away from the 
market-based approach of these markets derives from a decline in the leverage of the 
countries that championed this approach before the crisis. As Helleiner argued, it was 
first and foremost US regulatory authorities that led the way in reasserting public control 
over the regulation of derivatives, while Europe clearly lagged behind.54 In the case of 
rating agencies, Europe clearly promoted an international agreement over mandatory 
registration of rating agencies but did not meet any resistance from the US on this since 
rating agencies had been facing this kind of requirement in the US since 2006. In the 
case of hedge funds, Continental European countries effectively pushed the inclusion of 
the regulation of these institutions into the international agenda. However, the wording 
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adopted by international institutions did not go beyond what already agreed domestically 
by US authorities who had independently come to endorse the extension of public 
regulatory oversight. As Fioretos argues, the acceptance of direct regulation of the 
hedge fund industry by the US authorities is particularly puzzling from the perspective of 
market-power theories given the US hedge fund industry’s growth over the years.55 
According to Fioretos, “since the relative market power of the four countries most directly 
involved in international negotiations over hedge fund regulation – the United States, 
Britain, Germany and France – were more or less constant during the late 1990s and the 
2000s, if not increasingly in favor of the former two that had long opposed regulation, 
market power is not a variable that can fully capture why the nature of international 
agreements evolved so significantly in the decade after the Asia financial crisis of 
1997”.56 
This does not imply that the relative influence of different countries highlighted by realist 
scholars is not a crucial characteristic of international financial regulatory agreements. 
On the contrary, the evidence presented in this study provides strong empirical support 
to the notion that the most powerful state’s preferences are the main driver of the shift in 
the international agenda. This conclusion is derived from the policies agreed upon within 
the G20 and other international bodies. Their position regarding how to allocate 
regulatory functions between public and private actors has consistently represented the 
least common denominator between the policy approach previously agreed on 
independently at the domestic level by US and EU authorities. For instance, the 
endorsement for the mandatory registration of rating agencies and hedge fund 
managers and for the mandatory central clearing of derivatives by the FSB and IOSCO 
followed, rather than preceded, the endorsement of these measures at the domestic 
level in Europe and in the US.  
In other words, the public-private divide in the international regulation of derivatives, 
hedge funds, and rating agencies is still determined by what Posner calls the “Euro-
American Regulatory Condominium.”57 The shift in the public-private divide triggered by 
the crisis is best described not of as change in the balance of influence among different 
countries, but rather as the product of a change in the preferences of those countries 
that continue to dominate the international policymaking process.  
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At the same time, this shift in the preferences cannot be easily by those realist analyses 
focusing uniquely on the relative distribution of market power among countries. The 
preferences brought to the international level from different countries during the crisis 
does not conform with what we could expect by deriving them from where different 
countries stand on the global hierarchy of financial powers. From this systemic 
perspective, we would expect those countries whose firms dominate the world markets 
to have an incentive to narrow down stringent international regulatory agreements that 
could pose a significant burden on their domestic firms and undermined their competitive 
advantage.  However, as discussed above, the crisis has been followed by a shift in the 
position of the US which has come to champion an international agreement to directly 
regulate derivatives markets. This occurred despite the major costs of this solution would 
have been bore from US-based derivatives dealers. Similarly, by looking at relative 
market power, we would expect countries that are significantly exposed to foreign 
financial firms to support more stringent forms of regulation over self-regulatory solutions 
in order to avoid granting authority for regulating their markets to firms located in foreign 
country. However the analysis in this study reveals how in the years before the crisis 
Europe has decided not to follow the US in directly regulating rating agencies despite the 
dominance of US agencies within European securities markets. More generally, realist 
theories analyzing the relative distribution of market power cannot easily explain the 
reversal in the position of US and Europe during the crisis as this event has not triggered 
a radical shift in relative market power.  
  
2.4 Varieties of Capitalism 
When faced with the problem of explaining the origin and changes in state preferences, 
most state-centric analyses have complemented the realist focus on market power with 
the analysis of domestic politics. For instance, one of the most prominent authors in 
realist IPE literature, Robert Gilpin, has acknowledged that ‘it has become increasingly 
clear that the role of domestic economies and the differences among these economies 
has become a significant determinant of international economic affairs’.58  
Furthermore, Drezner’s prominent realist interpretation of global governance has turned 
towards the domestic level in order to derive the origin of preferences. According to 
Drezner, states will pursue international arrangements that correspond as closely as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Gilpin 2001, p. 148. Cited by Fioretos 2010. 
	   65 
possible to their preexisting national regulatory framework to limit adjustment costs.59 
When trying to explain variations in country preferences, Drezner argues that national 
institutional arrangements will vary significantly from country to country depending on 
their different levels of “national economic development.” 60  For instance, Drezner 
illustrates how the main divide over the design of a “new international regulatory 
architecture” that followed the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 ran between 
industrialized economies and developing countries, with the developing countries calling 
for more stringent regulation of international capital flows.61 However, Drezner notes how 
state preferences can also diverge across countries with similar levels of development 
due to differences in the “national economic histories and the embedded institutional 
structures that determine and are determined by these histories”.62  
In particular, Drezner builds upon the concept first introduced by Peter Hall and David 
Soskice of “varieties of capitalism.”63 These authors identified key differences in the 
interaction of firms and the way in which they resolved their coordination problems 
across two ideal types of national economic systems: liberal market economies and 
coordinated market economies. In the first group of countries, firms coordinated their 
activities primarily via “hierarchies and competitive market arrangements,” while most 
market relationships remained at arm’s-length. On the contrary, in coordinated market 
economies, “firms depend[ed] more heavily on non-market relationships to coordinate 
their endeavors with other actors.”64 These differences characterize a number of aspects 
of the national economy such as the market for corporate governance, the internal 
structure of firms, the system of industrial relations, the relationship between employers 
and trade unions, the system of setting wages, the education and training systems, as 
well as inter-company relations. For Hall and Soskice, the US and Germany represented 
the most typical instance of respectively liberal market economy and coordinated market 
economies. According to Drezner, these differences in the national economic models will 
also inform the preferences of different countries over international economic issues. For 
instance, Drezner argues that the European Union’s position promoting environmental 
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and social regulation reflects the coordinated market institutions that characterize 
Continental European countries.65 
While according to Drezner the respective varieties of capitalism can explain the broader 
attitude of governments towards global economic governance issues, a number of 
scholars have in recent years applied the built upon the insights of the “Varieties of 
Capitalism” literature to explain conflict in the development of international financial 
rules. As Hall and Soskice had acknowledged in their work, the role of the financial 
system and its impact on the market for corporate governance represents one of the key 
elements that differentiated liberal market economies and coordinated market 
economies. Since their pioneering work, other authors have highlighted the key 
differences in the structure, as well as the economic and social role of finance in different 
varieties of capitalism.66 While capital markets play a key role in allocating resources in 
liberal market economies, they have remained a relatively small part of coordinated-
market economies’ financial systems. In coordinated market-economies, bank funding 
has remained the primary source of capital and the centrality of banks in these markets 
is also heightened by the tight connections and shareholdings between banks and large 
manufacturing firms. 
Different authors have argued that these characteristics also explain these countries’ 
preferences for how international regulatory policies should allocate regulatory 
responsibilities between governments and markets. More specifically, liberal market-
economies are described as more likely to favor market-based regulatory mechanisms 
and the inclusion of market-based measures of value and risk in regulation.   
Fioretos has presented a more refined version of this argument, exploring the impact 
that the institutional context had in shaping the patterns of interest group preferences 
and mobilization. According to Fioretos, the centrality of securities markets in the US and 
UK national financial systems has led to the emergence of broad coalitions within the 
financial sector supporting a deregulated financial system at home.67 The same kind of 
coalition has not emerged in coordinated market economies like Germany’s. Instead, in 
these countries banks and manufacturing firms have often perceived the rise of capital 
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markets as a threat to the position and to the model designed to encourage long-term 
financing for the manufacturing sector.68 
In line with this literature’s insights, several studies have used the different role that the 
financial sector plays in their respective varieties of capitalism and the resulting patterns 
of interest groups mobilization to explain numerous disagreements that informed the pre-
crisis international regulatory agenda. For instance, the US and Germany have over 
these years clashed on a number of issues such as the inclusion of credit rating 
agencies within the Basel II negotiations,69 the regulation of hedge funds,70 and the 
adoption of fair value accounting versus historical cost accounting. 71  From the 
perspective of these authors the primary source of the reliance on market-based 
measures in the years before the crisis can be found in the dominance of liberal market-
economies such as the US and UK. 
But how can these theoretical approaches explain the international evolution in the 
governance of OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds analysed in this 
study? First of all, these studies are important to acknowledge how the main divide over 
the regulation of these sectors has not been running along the Atlantic but rather cutting 
across Europe. As Fioretos argues, “unlike Drezner’s theory of international market 
regulation which predicts that the primary cleavage in global negotiations over hedge 
funds would be one between the US and the EU, a theory of state preferences anchored 
in historical institutionalism expects that there will be a cleavage between liberal and 
coordinated market economies within the EU and that such a cleavage will persist in 
global regulatory negotiations”.72 	  
The existing literature as well as the cases below reveal how this unity has often failed to 
emerge in the period before the crisis, when in different circumstances British authorities 
have opposed the calls for more stringent regulatory measures by Continental European 
countries. The informal practice within the European Council of deciding by consensus 
on international regulatory issues ensured that the British government had a veto also 
the regulation of OTC derivatives, hedge funds, and rating agencies also at the 
European level, thus preventing the European Union to act as a unitary actor and 
exercising its potential joint market power vis-à-vis the US.73 Instead, British authorities 
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have in areas such as the regulation of hedge funds formed a common front with their 
US counterparts in international regulatory negotiations. Besides the deployment of 
market power, the greater familiarity and expertise with these markets has made it 
possible for British and American regulators to occupy central positions in the drafting of 
international regulatory initiatives over this period.74 	  
However, this approach faces greater difficulties in shedding light over the shift in 
international approach away from market-based regulation and towards more direct 
regulation set in motion by the crisis. As argued in the previous section, this cannot be 
regarded as the product of a decrease in the relative influence of liberal-market 
economies in setting the international stage.	  
Unlike the realist approaches based on market-power, historical institutionalists theories 
are better equipped to explain the shift in the preferences of countries. As Fioretos 
argues in his study, country preferences regarding regulatory issues are not static. On 
the contrary, they evolve gradually overtime along the evolution in their respective 
models of capitalism and the constellation of interests that relies on the continuation of 
this specific set of institutions in order to sustain their competitive advantages. 	  
However, historical institutionalist explanations present this change as occurring 
gradually and in an incremental fashion. The fact that the institutional context is regarded 
by historical institutionalists as “analytically prior to material interests” 75  of different 
economic groups, which as a result are descrived by historical institutionalists as 
consistent also after a major crisis.76 This “thick” institutional context creates “positive 
feedback effects that push economic groups to actively support incremental processes 
of change over radical reforms and thus to contribute to significant continuity in diverse 
forms of governance”.77 From this perspective, the impact of crises such as the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2010 is not to transform the preferences of major economic 
groups but rather to “transform the ability of long-standing advocates of reform to have 
their agendas more broadly accepted”.78 
For instance, Fioretos explains the shift from market-based regulation to direct regulation 
of hedge funds as the product of a slow and incremental realignment in the US national 
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model of capitalism over more than a decade. However, this interpretation faces two 
important limitations when it comes to explaining the shift in the international agenda 
triggered by the crisis.  
The first is the timing and extent of this shift. As argued above, the initial international 
regulatory response to the crisis from the major international regulatory institutions has 
built upon the pre-existing market-based regulatory models and adjusted them in an 
incremental fashion as predicted by historical institutionalist scholars. However these 
works cannot easily explain the sudden turn towards the endorsement of direct direct 
regulation that occurred in a relative short time from the last quarter of 2008. The pace of 
this significant change is not well suited to the focus on incremental adjustments that 
characterized analysis of national models of capitalisms. Moreover, a similar shift in the 
US approach from market-based regulation to direct regulation has not been limited to 
the case of hedge funds as described by Fioretos. In reality, the fact that it has extended 
to other areas such as derivatives suggests a common cause. This insight is supported 
by the fact that during the same period an analogue shift involved the position of some 
European countries towards the regulation of these sectors, as well as the regulation of 
rating agencies. 
Secondly, when we compare the expressed preferences of authorities from the US and 
European countries for regulating these three sectors, they do not fit well with the notion 
of liberal market-economies consistently promoting more market-based approaches. For 
instance, European policymakers supported a self-regulatory approach towards the 
regulation of rating agencies in the years before the crisis even after US authorities had 
adopted direct regulation of the sector. Similarly, US authorities have promoted a more 
stringent and extensive regulation of OTC derivatives during the crisis. In a nutshell, 
elements different from the respective models of capitalism seems to have informed the 
preferences of US and EU authorities towards the regulation of financial markets over 
the period analyzed in this study. 
 
2.5 Pluralist Explanations 
Another popular interpretation of the greater emphasis on market-based forms of 
regulation in the governance of international financial markets before the crisis is the 
preferences of financial industry groups and in their capacity to “capture” the 
transnational regulatory process. While the historical institutionalist analyses reviewed 
	   70 
above regarded the institutional context as analytically prior to the preferences of interest 
groups, pluralist interpretations have used the preferences of the financial industry 
groups and other interest groups as seeking to maximize their economic utility and 
regarded domestic institutions as shaped by these groups.   
In recent years, several studies have sought to explain evolutions in the global 
regulatory regime by analyzing the struggle among competing societal actors seeking to 
influence the content of global regulatory arrangements. 79  Other areas of financial 
policymaking such as exchange rate policy80 or monetary integration81 have focused on 
a variety of societal actors competing to shape international public policies. However, 
most analyses of the politics of international financial regulation have argued that the 
complexity of financial regulatory policies and their more indirect and less obvious costs 
and benefits significantly restrict the range of domestic societal actors engaged in policy 
debates about international financial regulation. The only societal actors that consistently 
take an active interest in international financial regulatory debates are financial market 
participants directly targeted by the regulation for whom the distributional consequences 
of international regulations are more immediate.  
The predominance of financial industry groups is bolstered by the resources that these 
groups can deploy for lobbying or for financing electoral campaigns.82 Other authors 
have highlighted how the influence of  financial industry groups is further bolstered by 
the nature of the institutional context in which regulatory policies are developed – and in 
particular the so-called ‘revolving doors’ phenomenon,83 as well as the same structure of 
contemporary capitalistic economies84. Different authors have borrowed the concept of 
“regulatory capture” from “public choice theory” to describe the privileged position that 
financial industry groups occupy in the development of financial regulation.85   
Indeed, while most arguments regarding the capacity of the financial industry to capture 
regulation have been developed to explain the development of regulatory policies at the 
domestic level,86 different IPE authors have extended this concept to the international 
arena, and have in some cases talked about “transnational regulatory capture.” For 
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some authors, these sources of influence have traditionally been described as permitting 
the financial industry to shape the content of international regulatory initiatives only 
indirectly, that is, by shaping the position of national regulatory authorities on 
international issues, in a sort of two-level game (this view will be reviewed more 
extensively in the next chapter).87 However, a number of IPE scholars have argued that 
the financial industry has increased its capacity to directly shape the international 
regulatory regime by directly interacting with transnational regulatory bodies. 88  In 
particular, different analyses of the making of the Basel II agreement have focused on 
the interaction between banking groups and members of the committee, and the 
capacity of the former to systematically shape the policies of the latter. In a recent 
incarnation of this argument, Lall argued that “large international banks, were able to 
systemically manipulate the provisions of Basel II and Basel III to their advantage, 
extracting rents and maximizing profits at the expense of other stakeholders.” 89 
Moreover, rather than promoting the interest of the banking industry from a specific 
country, Lall and others have argued that the Basel II agreement promoted “the interests 
not of particular countries on the Basel Committee, but of large international banks 
regardless of their national origin”90 
Different factors allow the financial industry to shape the agenda and regulatory 
measures introduced by international regulatory institutions. Tony Porter analyzed a 
change in the organizational patterns of the financial industry. Besides the increased 
engagement of national financial industry associations with international regulatory 
issues, a few transnational private financial associations with a truly global membership 
have emerged.91 This trend is particularly visible in the evolution of banking industry 
mobilization for shaping international rules. During the negotiations that led to the 1988 
Basel Agreement banks exercised an “indirect” influence over the agreement by 
lobbying their domestic regulators. In the case of 2004 Basel II agreement, the largest 
internationally-oriented banks began to present their views collectively at the 
transnational level through the Institute of International Finance (IIF), an industry 
association representing the world’s largest international financial institutions.92 Mugge 
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argues that a similar transformation has also occurred at the European level, where the 
larger internationally oriented firms have created pan-EU trade associations.93 
The emergence of industry associations with international reach has enhanced the 
influence of financial industry groups from different countries to tame international 
competitive struggles. These groups are also able to directly interact with international 
regulatory institutions and to take advantage of the consultation processes launched in 
recent years by international financial regulatory bodies in order to reach out to different 
to different stakeholders. Different works have argued that the same informal and 
opaque nature of the institutional context within which regulators and financial industry 
groups interacts at the at the international level enhances financial industry group’s 
capacity to capture the policymaking process.94 
Going beyond the formal institutional context, other authors have drawn from the 
literature on policy networks95 to analyze the personal interactions and connections 
between members of international regulatory bodies and international financial groups. 
According to Lall, this web of personal relationships has granted the financial industry 
groups a crucial “first-mover advantage,” allowing financial industry groups to influence 
the work of international regulatory institutions at the earliest stage of the regulatory 
process, before other groups are able to mobilize. 96   From a more sociological 
perspective, Tsingou notices that the government officials and financial industry that 
dominate the transnational governance of financial markets are mostly educated in an 
Anglo-American context, have experience in both the public and private sector, interact 
regularly both in formalized and informal settings, and share similar beliefs and common 
goals. 97  Authors coming from very different theoretical perspectives have therefore 
argued that the close relationship between regulators and financial industry participants 
in the making of international financial rules justified abandoning “sterile” distinctions 
between ‘public’ and ‘private’ actors and seeing these actors as part of the same 
“transnational policy community” as Tsingou put it. Others, like historical materialist 
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scholars, describe the relationships as expressions of the same transnational class that 
represents the political organization of transnational capitalism.98 
Moreover, besides infusing international regulatory bodies’ agendas with their 
preferences, other authors have highlighted a second mechanism through which 
financial industry groups are capable of directly influencing the public-private divide, that 
is, by acting as “rule-makers.” The development of voluntary codes of “best practices,” 
“industry guidelines,” and other self-regulatory measures have enhanced financial 
industry groups’ capacity to directly shift the public-private divide by altering the 
international regulatory status quo and demonstrating to regulators the industry’s 
capacity to police itself.99 For this reason, Fuchs describes the capacity to self-regulate 
as a form of “structural power” in the hands of business groups.100 
In sum, from the perspective of the “regulatory capture” thesis, the capacity of financial 
groups to influence the agenda of international regulatory institutions by lobbying at the 
national and international level and to alter the status quo by means of implementing 
self-regulatory measures represent the central determinant of the public-private divide in 
the governance of international financial markets. Indeed, this perspective is particularly 
appealing to explain the turn towards greater reliance on market-based measures that 
characterized the period before the crisis. In fact, in principle financial firms want to 
minimize the interference of public regulatory authorities over their activities and are 
ready to lobby in favor of market-based forms of regulation that impose minor costs upon 
their activities and give them greater flexibility.  
The case studies analyzed in this study provide strong empirical support for this view by 
revealing how derivative dealers from groups such as the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Associations (ISDA), hedge funds groups such as the Managed Funds 
Association (MFA) and Alternative Investment Management Associations (AIMA), and 
rating agencies lobbied extensively in the period preceding the crisis to keep the 
regulation of OTC derivatives, hedge funds, and rating agencies outside of the scrutiny 
of public authorities, and  bolstered these demands by introducing different self-
regulatory measures.101   
While the lobbying of financial industry groups at the national and the transnational level 
in support of market-based measures and their capacity to bolster their lobbying with 
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self-regulatory measures provide an important explanation of the pre-crisis pattern of 
delegating regulatory functions to the private-sector, how can the theoretical approach 
explain the significant shift along the public-private divide triggered by the financial 
crisis? 
This outcome is puzzling for regulatory capture theories. The large majority of the 
authors discussed above have described the financial industry as akin to a dominant 
class, “power elite”, 102  or an “oligarchy” 103  whose dominance is not likely to be 
challenged by other groups at the domestic or transnational level. These authors 
therefore discounted the possibility that regulators might openly challenge their 
preferences. Some authors that explored the regulatory response to the crisis have 
argued that this position has not been undermined and that financial industry groups 
have continued to play a key role in limiting the extent of the regulatory response to the 
crisis.104  
However, the empirical evidence presented in this study reveals how the beefed up 
lobbying efforts of derivative dealers groups, rating agencies, hedge fund associations 
were not sufficient to prevent the international regulatory institutions’ endorsement of 
measures to bring these markets and institutions under direct regulatory oversight, an 
approach that these industry groups had opposed before the crisis. 
One potential explanation would point towards the weakening in the resources financial 
industry associations deployed towards lobbying policymakers as the crisis has 
weakened the position of their member firms. However, the data does not support this 
case. The data collected by the Centre for Responsive Politics reveals how the crisis 
significantly increased resources directed towards lobbying Congress on securities and 
investment issues, with financial institutions representing the major contributors. 
 
Figure 1 - Lobbying on "Securities/Investment" per year - US Congress105 
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In 2010, the International Derivatives and Swaps Association mobilized $2,406,000, an 
amount eight times greater than the resources employed to lobby Congress in 1998 at 
the time the Congress decided to exempt derivatives from the overview of federal 
regulatory agencies.106 US rating agencies spent almost $2.7 million on lobbying in the 
first 9 months of 2009 alone.107 The crisis does not seem to have forestalled another key 
resource in the hands of financial firms, that is the revolving doors between regulators 
and financial industry.108  
 
Figure 2 – Revolving doors in Lobbying US Congress on Securities/Investment 
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For instance, the main hedge fund associations have boosted their lobbying efforts hiring 
senior public officials, central bankers, and Congressmen, such Portuguese central 
banker Antonio Borges, who became the head of the HFSB, and the Congressman 
Richard Baker, who became at the beginning of 2008 the new head of the MFA. The 
former chairman of the SEC Harvey Pitt and former Commissioner Roel Campos 
became directors at a major US hedge fund.109 Two former member of Congress (Sen. 
Lauch Faircloth and Rep. Vic Fazio) have joined the ranks of rating agencies to lobby 
regulators and Congress during the crisis.110   
Another factor identified by regulatory capture theorists as potentially limiting the 
capacity of financial industry groups to keep their regulation outside of the public 
umbrella is the presence of intra-industry conflict. Mugge has argued that in those cases 
where different regulatory solutions along the public-private divide impose asymmetrical 
costs upon different firms, groups disadvantaged by the existing transnational private 
regulation may call on public authorities, thus leading to a move away from self-
regulation towards more direct state regulatory oversight. 111 Helleiner in his analysis of 
derivatives regulation has argued that the support for market-based regulation that had 
informed the position of derivative dealers was challenged during the crisis by 
institutional investors as well as by exchanges.112 Disagreements between managers 
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and investors and between rating agencies and investors have also characterized the 
debate over the regulation of hedge funds and rating agencies before and throughout 
the crisis.  
However, as Helleiner also notes, this resurgence of intra-firm struggles has not 
undermined the capacity of derivative dealers, rating agencies, and hedge funds to 
design self-regulatory policies required by the international regulatory community. As 
argued above, the same international regulatory community has in different 
circumstances acknowledged the success of these self-regulatory initiatives in meeting 
the requests advanced by the international regulatory community at the outset of the 
crisis.113 
Finally, an alternative explanation of the weakened influence of the financial industry 
groups in shaping the regulatory reforms introduced after the crisis points towards the 
emergence of countervailing coalitions from outside the financial industry groups. Indeed 
Mattli and Woods have argued that crises produce a ‘demonstration effect’ which 
revealed the distributional implications of poor regulation and its political stakes, making 
it more likely that a broader segment of interest groups besides the financial industry will 
mobilize.114  In fact, the work of Helleiner and Clapp on the regulation of commodity 
derivatives,115 and the survey of the responses to financial regulatory consultations in the 
US, Europe and at the international level conducted by Pagliari and Young reveals that 
the regulatory response to the crisis has triggered a greater mobilization interest groups 
from outside the financial industry. 
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Trade Unions 0.31 2.02 +548  
Consumer Protection 1.48 1.00 -32.41  
Research Institutions 4.40 3.29 -25.07  
NGOs 2.26 8.77 +288.73  






However, as the case studies will discuss in more detail, this mobilization of non-
financial groups has not necessarily constituted a countervailing force to the preference 
of financial industry groups for the continuation of the self-regulatory approach. On the 
contrary, the vast majority of non-financial business groups and financial groups beyond 
dealers, rating agencies, and hedge funds that have responded to the regulatory 
consultations launched by the European Commission or participated to Congressional 
hearings has opposed the introduction of measures to directly regulate hedge funds and 
rating agencies in Europe.  
In order to explain this variation in the capacity of financial industry groups to insert their 
preferences into the international regulatory agenda, the findings in this study will 
challenge a central assumption of the “regulatory capture” literature. Most analyses 
falling under this rubric maintain that the capacity of financial industry groups to shape 
regulatory policies remains determined primarily by factors endogenous to the financial 
sector or to the broader configuration of interest groups, such as the preferences of 
different groups, the resources they can deploy in the policymaking process, and the 
depth of intra-industry struggles. These works assume that regulators or public 
authorities will systematically respond to the requests of the most powerful groups. On 
the contrary, the analysis developed in the case studies will highlight how the crisis has 
significantly altered the receptiveness of regulators and elected politicians to the 
preferences of the financial industry. This element is important to explain how the 
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capacity of derivative dealers, rating agencies, and hedge funds groups to secure their 
preferences has weakened despite the fact that they have increased the resources 
deployed in the policymaking process and formed alliances with a broader range of 
interest groups within and outside the financial sector.  While the empirical evidence 
presented in this study does not question the general point made by regulatory capture 
theories regarding the extraordinary influence of financial industry groups in the design 
of regulatory policies, at the same time it calls for a more contingent conceptualization of 
the capacity of the financial groups to “capture” the policymaking process, based on the 
incentives policymakers face. 
  
2.6 Constructivist Explanations 
Constructivist literature provides a fifth and final explanation for the change of in the 
public-private divide. From a constructivist perspective, the division of regulatory 
responsibilities among public regulators and private market actors is influenced by the 
dominant ideas among policymakers regarding the desirability of market mechanisms 
vis-à-vis the public intervention in the regulation of financial markets.  
This set of beliefs has varied across time with the changes in the prevalent ideological 
paradigm. For instance, while the rise of Keynesianism provided a justification for a more 
active involvement of state actors in the management of the economy, the ascent of 
neoliberalism as a political doctrine since the 1970s created an intellectual climate 
favorable to a governmental retreat from activities that were described as handled more 
efficiently by private market actors.117 Constructivist authors have analyzed how this 
intellectual sea change affected the attitudes of governments and international 
organization towards the governance of international financial markets, focusing in 
particular on the issue of capital account liberalization.118  
Ideas are also an important driver of change in international prudential financial 
regulation. For instance, Walter and Foot have theorized the emergence of a new norm 
in global financial regulation beginning in the 1990s. Besides promoting financial stability 
and reducing competitive inequalities among nations, a third emerging core norm in the 
international agenda was that financial stability could be best pursued through increasing 
reliance on market-based regulation, both within individual financial institutions and in 
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the overall financial markets. 119 
The intellectual bedrock for this ideational shift in the approach to the regulation of 
financial markets was represented by the idea that market participants were generally 
rational in their assessments, so that prices would tend towards a rational equilibrium.120 
This assumption also had significant implications for the regulatory approach, creating a 
strong rationale for regulators to seek to leverage market forces in regulating and 
overseeing complex financial products and activities. As the Turner Review presented by 
the UK Financial Services Authority during the crisis stated, from the notion that markets 
were efficient and rational derived the assumption that “the risk characteristics of 
financial markets can be inferred from mathematical analysis, delivering robust 
quantitative measures of trading risk.”121 Regulators could have therefore enhanced 
financial stability by replacing rigid output requirements with measures allowing financial 
institutions to take advantage of financial institutions’ increasingly sophisticated methods 
of modeling, monitoring and managing risks.122  
Moreover, the same assumption of market efficiency and rationality also fueled the belief 
that, provided with the proper information and incentives, private counterparties would 
penalize a financial institution taking excessive risks without the need for the intervention 
of supervisors by, for instance, influencing the cost of funding its activities or by varying 
the volume of business undertaken with that financial institution. 123  This discipline 
imposed by market forces was described as “forward-looking and inherently flexible and 
adaptive … continuous, impersonal and non-bureaucratic,” in contrast with the discipline 
imposed by regulators described as “rule-based, episodic, bureaucratic and slow to 
change.” 124  Regulators should have leveraged market discipline by creating an 
environment conducive for private counterparties to perform this monitoring and steering 
function. This objective could be achieved, for example, by prompting financial 
intermediaries to publicly reveal various types of information.125 Moreover, since market 
prices were conceived as “good indicators of rationally evaluated economic value,”126 
different academics and regulators called for making use of this information conveyed by 
markets (e.g. securities prices, credit ratings, CDS spreads) to supplement traditional 
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supervisory tools and identify financial firms’ risk exposures, as well as for “hard-wiring” 
them into regulatory policies to replace standardized regulatory requirements.127  
Most importantly, the assumption that financial markets are efficient and rational created 
a strong predisposition towards scaling back the use of the visible hand in correcting 
market failures. The direct intervention of regulators in the financial markets was seen as 
introducing a distortion in the functioning of markets by creating moral hazard, inducing 
market actors to reduce their due diligence and relax their risk-management standards, 
and stifling innovation. As the Turner review put it, from the efficient market hypothesis 
derived the notion that financial innovation was “by definition beneficial” and contributed 
to strengthening financial stability since “market competition would winnow out any 
innovations which did not deliver value added.”128 There would then be no need for 
regulators to judge and regulate innovative instruments, such as structured finance and 
credit derivatives, particularly in wholesale markets where customers were seen as 
“sophisticated” and therefore not in need of protection. On the contrary, as the Turner 
Review argued, the assumption that the financial markets are efficient and rational 
derived the notion that “a key goal of financial market regulation is to remove the 
impediments which might produce inefficient and illiquid markets.”129 
As the Figure 3 illustrates, since the mid-1990s, financial economics literature has 
devoted increasing attention to the importance of market discipline in financial 
regulation.  
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Figure 3 - "Market Discipline" in the Literature on Financial Regulation130  
 
 
However, debates about how financial markets could be leveraged in support of financial 
regulatory policies have not been confined to the academic community. Instead, Rochet 
has argued that the notion that market discipline could be used to assist supervisory 
authorities in their work became a “mantra” over this period within the financial 
regulatory community.131 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the US Federal Reserve represented the most 
important advocate of market-based regulatory mechanisms, encouraging the 
incorporation of banks’ internal risk-assessment schemes into the Basel II agreement132 
and supporting market-based approaches for regulating hedge funds and OTC 
derivatives in the late 1990s.133 Several authors have argued that the Federal Reserve’s 
support for market-based regulatory mechanisms was highly influenced by ideological 
considerations rather than simply being an example of capture. For instance, Tsingou 
has argued that the Federal Reserve “did not just accept self-regulation but believed in 
it.”134 Similarly, Foot and Walter have argued that while the position of the US regulatory 
during the negotiations of the first Basel Accord was influenced by the need to reconcile 
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the rising threats to the US bank competitiveness and financial sector stability,135 Basel II 
was launched and negotiated during a period of continuing high bank profitability and 
stability, during which regulators did not respond to credible threats to their autonomy 
from the US Congress. According to Foot and Walter, the position of the Fed “was driven 
by a growing concern that the existing bank capital framework was ill-suited to the risks 
entailed by modern banking, and by an ideological presumption that market actors were 
better positioned than regulators to manage risk.”136 
Several authors have highlighted how Alan Greenspan’s charismatic leadership 
influenced this position.137 Greenspan, who headed of the Federal Reserve from 1987 to 
2006, has been perceived as “much more ideologically predisposed towards market 
solutions than his predecessor Paul Volcker.”138 Consistent with his self-professed faith 
in free markets,139 in several public speeches Greenspan highlighted his distrust for 
regulation and his beliefs in the capacity of financial markets to develop increasingly 
sophisticated methods to monitor and manage risks. For instance, Greenspan argued in 
1997: “As we move into a new century, the market-stabilizing private regulatory forces 
should gradually displace many cumbersome, increasingly ineffective governments 
structures. This is a likely outcome since governments, by their nature, cannot adjust 
sufficiently quickly to a changing environment, which too often veers in unforeseen 
directions.”140 According to Greenspan, the support for greater reliance on self-regulation 
through internal bank controls and external monitoring by third-party creditors was also 
supported most Fed officials.141 In fact, very similar positions have consistently been 
expressed by other senior members of the Federal Reserve such as Fed Vice Chair 
Donald Kohn, 142  Vice President of the Federal Reserve of Kansas City Thomas 
Hoenig, 143  Governor Laurance Meyer, 144  research staff, 145  even Ben Bernanke - 
Greenspan’s successor at the helm of the Federal Reserve. Only a few months before 
the outbreak of the crisis in 2007, Bernanke gave a speech titled “Financial Regulation 
and the Invisible Hand” where he argued that leaving the burden of ensuring the safety 
of a bank uniquely in the hands of public authorities with no support from market forces 
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would have been dangerous as regulators may lack the political will or financial 
resources complete their mission. Supplementing regulatory oversight and direct 
regulation with a substantial amount of market discipline could – according to Bernanke - 
support regulators in achieving their goals. Bernanke argued at the wake of the crisis 
that both in the case of commercial banks and in the case of hedge funds, “market-
based regulation has proven an effective supplement to (or substitute for) conventional 
command-and-control approaches.”146  
This ideological bias towards the benefits of self-regulation in the years before the crisis 
has also been discovered ex-post in senior regulators from other regulatory institutions 
such as the UK FSA147 and the US SEC. The chairman of the SEC Mary Schapiro 
argued in 2010: “everybody a few years ago got caught up in the idea that the markets 
are self-correcting and self-disciplined, and that the people in Wall Street will do a better 
job protecting the financial system that the regulators would. We do think the SEC go 
diverted by that philosophy.”148 
Beyond the influence in shaping the position of key policymakers, the changed 
ideological landscape also enhanced the trust placed in the expertise of the financial 
industry and increased its political legitimacy.149 Different authors have theorized how 
the influence of corporate actors over the policymaking process also rests on the 
dominant beliefs on the superiority of the private sector way of operating.150 Tsingou 
argues that with rare exceptions, policymakers in Western countries regarded business 
actors as having the right or obligation to voice their opinion on political issues and 
considered their opinions as valuable.151  
In sum, from a constructivist perspective, the growing tendency in the period before the 
crisis to delegate regulatory functions to the private sector could be attributed to the 
emergence of a widespread normative consensus about the rationality and efficiency of 
markets, which strengthened the legitimacy of market-based mechanisms while 
delegitimizing more intrusive forms of regulatory intervention.   
However, how can we use this perspective to explain the significant reassertion of public 
control over the regulation of activities that were left to private market actors in response 
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to the crisis? From a constructivist perspective, this significant change in the public-
private divide could be the product an equally significant ideational change.  
Different constructivist authors have long held that crises are exactly the moment when 
dominant norms about the role of the state and the definition of the public and private 
domains are called into question. 152  The financial crisis of 2007-10 has certainly 
triggered a significant learning process by clearly demonstrating the limitations of 
markets as regulatory mechanisms. As Foot and Walter argue, “the rising prominence of 
the third norm of self-regulation suffered a serious setback in US regulatory and political 
circles as it did elsewhere.”153 
First, as the FSA acknowledged in the Turner Review, the crisis has revealed the 
limitations of methodologies and techniques used by market actors to infer future risk 
from previous patterns. The short horizon observed by market actors in their decisions, 
their underestimation of small probability high impact events as well as systemic risk 
places doubt on the desirability of relying on financial firms’ self-regulating skills in 
regulatory policies. 154  Second, the crisis also demonstrated how in previous years 
markets prices and market pressures had failed to detect the build up of risk-taking and, 
as the Turner review argues, they “may have played positively harmful roles.”155 This 
failure laid the basis for a critique of the extent to which regulatory authorities should rely 
on market discipline to mitigate the incentives of financial institutions to engage in 
excessive risk-taking. Third, important regulatory authorities have openly criticized 
recent patterns of financial innovation and the consequent expansion in the size of the 
financial services industry as not necessarily benefitting the real economy, thus 
contradicting the pre-crisis assumption that financial innovation was by definition 
beneficial.156  
Also some of the same authorities that had the most influence in charting the pre-crisis 
regulatory paradigm have publicly acknowledged the fallacies of the ideological building 
that underpinned the delegation of regulatory responsibilities to the private sector. 
Speaking in front of a Congressional panel, Alan Greenspan argued that the credit crisis 
has exposed a "flaw” in the ideology underlying his support for leaving derivatives 
markets outside of the government regulatory oversight. Greenspan argued that trust in 
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the capacity banks and other institutions’ self-interest to bolster financial stability was 
misplaced and that "those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending 
institutions to protect shareholders' equity (myself especially) are in a state of shocked 
disbelief."157 Also the Chairman of the UK FSA Lord Turner conceded in front of the UK 
Parliament that “before the current crisis prompted a rethink of regulation, FSA staff had 
not considered whether banks’ business models were sufficiently robust because the 
watchdog had left that to industry and did not consider that its job.”158 
According to Foot and Walter, the international regulatory community’s critical re-
examination of the self-regulation norm that had emerged before the pre-crisis has also 
influenced the regulatory response to the crisis. For Helleiner, an ideational shift has 
also occurred in the views of leading figures in the private financial industry that argued 
during the crisis that more stringent regulation was in the long-term material interest of 
the derivatives industry given crisis’ economic costs.159 
However, this interpretation ascribing the shift in the international regulatory agenda to 
an ideational shift regarding the benefits of market mechanisms within the international 
regulatory community faces some important limitations. First, on a methodological 
ground, it is challenging to empirically determine the extent of this ideational shift and the 
extent to which the change in the position of important regulatory authorities and the 
support for greater public intervention during the crisis reflect an ideational change rather 
than a response to outer pressures. For instance, only three years after his famous mea 
culpa in front of Congress, Alan Greenspan criticized the Dodd-Frank Act for creating the 
“largest regulatory-induced market distortion” in the US since the imposition of wage and 
price controls in the early 1970s and reaffirmed the advantage of relying on the invisible 
hand of markets over the use of regulation. According to Greenspan, while regulators 
could “never get more than a glimpse at the internal workings of the simplest of modern 
financial systems” while on the contrary the “invisible hand” “with notably rare exceptions 
(2008, for example)… has created relatively stable exchange rates, interest rates, 
prices, and wage rates.”160  
Second, this hypothesis seems to clash with the timing of the decision by the 
international regulatory bodies to extend their regulatory oversight to derivatives 
markets, hedge funds, and rating agencies. As described in the previous chapter, the 
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approach informing the international regulatory response to the crisis initially continued 
to rely on market-based measures consistent with the pre-crisis regulatory paradigm, 
before suddenly reversing this approach and extending the official regulatory oversight 
over OTC derivatives markets, hedge funds, and rating agencies since the last quarter of 
2008. In the case of hedge funds, the reversal of the position of the G20 from the 
support of an industry-driven mechanism at the London Summit in November 2008 to an 
open criticism at the next summit in March 2009 occurred in only 5 months.  
This rather sudden reversal in the course of action cannot be easily be explained as the 
product of an ideational change, since, as some constructivist literature has argued, 
ideas tend to be “sticky” and a more wide-ranging ideational changes are likely to 
manifest themselves only over the medium-term. As the recent literature on ideational 
change has pointed out, in the short term authorities are more likely to respond to a 
shock by constructing actions based on their pre-constructed ideas to fit the changing 
circumstances, what Carstensen calls “bricolage.”161  
A prominent example of the resilience of ideas in the face of crisis can be found in the 
literature documenting how the support among central bankers for the Gold Standards 
and the use of monetary policy to defend this international regime from domestic 
priorities was not undermined by shocks such as the World War I and the onset of the 
Great Depression.162 Therefore, even if the crisis did trigger a deep and widespread 
rethinking within the international regulatory community on the role of market and 
market-based mechanisms and an ideational shift away from the paradigm did emerge 
in the years before the crisis, the effects of such an ideational turn are more likely to 
materialize in full only over the medium-term rather than in the middle of the crisis. 
Third, and most importantly, the strength and scope of the ideational consensus around 
the benefits of self-regulation and market-based mechanisms that emerged before the 
crisis within academia and the regulatory community are debatable. Indeed, significant 
disagreements about the capacity of market mechanisms to replace or supplement 
traditional forms of regulation remained within the financial economics literature, which 
increasingly praised the benefits of market-based regulatory mechanism but never gave 
its unconditional endorsement.163 
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Moreover the regulatory paradigm building upon the EMH was contested not only within 
the academics community, but also within the regulatory community. While the Federal 
Reserve certainly performed the role of “norm-entrepreneur” in encouraging the diffusion 
of market-based regulatory measures, other regulatory agencies within the US did not 
share the same kind of ideological support for such an approach. For instance, in the 
case of Basel II, the ideologically-charged support by the Federal Reserve for allowing 
banks to use internal risk-assessment schemes to calculate the reserve capital banks 
were supposed to hold was not fully shared by other US regulatory agencies. Both the 
FDIC and the OCC expressed serious reservations about the incorporation of these 
mechanisms in the regulatory framework.164 Foot and Walter argue that while the Fed 
“largely won its battle to put market-based regulation at the heart of the Basel 
framework,” the other regulatory agencies  “were able to fight a rearguard action in the 
subsequent battle over domestic implementation.”165 Similarly, the CFTC headed by 
Brooksley Born put itself on a collision course with the Federal Reserve and the SEC in 
1999 by denouncing the opacity of the OTC derivatives markets and argued in favor of 
bringing these markets under the oversight of federal regulators.166  
The support for market-based forms of regulation was even weaker outside of the United 
States in Continental European countries and East Asia. The predominant interpretation 
of the East Asian financial crisis that emerged in most emerging countries pointed 
towards the danger of being exposed to the vagaries of financial markets, and regulatory 
authorities from these countries often demanded for the introduction of more stringent 
regulations of financial markets.167 The cases in this study will highlight how a similar 
skepticism characterized the approach of French and German representatives in this 
area, with the UK and US representatives remaining those most vehement supporters of 
market-based regulatory solutions. 
In sum, contrary to what important regulatory authorities such as the FSA argued during 
the crisis, the norm stressing the efficiency of financial markets and the benefits of 
market-based mechanisms remained highly contested before the crisis. Therefore, 
instead of assuming a pre-crisis rise of a “global” norm and its sudden demise during the 
crisis, a more plausible interpretation of the rather sudden change brought by the crisis 
in the public-private divide is a shift in the relative position between those actors that 
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before the crisis had supported the introduction of market-based mechanisms and those 
who had opposed them. This position is partially shared by Foot and Walter, who have 
argued that since the beginning of the crisis, the weakening of market-based regulation 
norms “has further strengthened the position of critics such as Sheila Bair and 
necessitated a retreat by the Fed.”168 The empirical evidence presented in the case-
studies below will reveal how the crisis has weakened the position of those actors that 
had been the main advocate of a self-regulatory approach in the design of the 
international regulatory regime governing derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds, 
particularly the Federal Reserve. However, the cases will also reveal how the conduct of 
those actors that have instead acquired a more prominent role in setting the regulatory 
response to the crisis, such as US Congress and more broadly elected officials in US 
and Europe, have responded to a very different set of incentives than the ones theorized 
by the constructivist literature.  
	   
2.7 Conclusion 
The literature reviewed in this chapter has gone a long way in identifying the main forces 
that drove the emergence of a market-based regulatory paradigm in the fifteen years 
prior to the crisis and the reassertion of public control over a number of financial sectors 
in response to the crisis. However, these theoretical explanations do not seem to be fully 
capable of adequately explaining the patterns that have characterize the evolution of the 
public-private divide in the international regulation of OTC derivatives, hedge funds, and 
rating agencies in Europe and in the US.  
The crisis has not led to a reversal of the twin processes of financial globalization and 
financial innovation that have been presented by some scholars as at the origin of the 
greater reliance on market-based measures before the crisis. In contrast with other 
functionalist explanations, the extent of the regulatory failures revealed by the crisis are 
not directly correlated with the scope and timing of the regulatory response. Realist 
theories based on market power seem to be inadequate to explain the shift in the 
preferences of the most powerful countries away from the support of self-regulation and 
market discipline. Historically institutionalist works have regarded the institutional context 
and the respective varieties of capitalism as evolving only incrementally, and are better 
equipped to explain incremental changes than the kind of sudden shift in the 
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international agenda. Pluralist theories of international financial regulation have 
described financial industry groups as playing an overwhelming influence over the 
policymaking process. These theories cannot easily explain how the measures to 
directly bring hedge fund managers, rating agencies, and derivative markets under the 
direct public oversight have occurred despite the opposition of the main financial industry 
groups. Finally, while the crisis has certainly triggered a reevaluation of the faith in 
market efficiency and its implications for regulatory policies, this can explain neither the 
timing of the shift in the approach of the international regulatory community, nor the 
uneven patterns that brought upon this shift.   
In order to explain the evolution of the public-private divide in the international regulation 
of derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds, the next chapter outlines a 
complementary explanation which will center around the analysis of an element that has 
been largely neglected by the literature reviewed in this chapter, that is, the level of 
public attention directed towards different regulatory issues.
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3.1 Plan of the chapter 
This chapter will present a complementary explanation of the politics of international 
financial regulation. It will highlight the importance that the degree of attention paid by 
the public towards different financial domains has in shaping state preferences towards 
financial regulatory policies. Existing explanations of the politics of international financial 
regulatory change have failed to adequately analyse the importance of public opinion. 
Different scholars argued that the high complexity of financial regulatory issues and their 
indirect and opaque impact over actors outside financial groups directly targeted by the 
regulatory policy constrain the amount of attention the general pays towards financial 
regulation.1  
The public’s capacity to understand financial regulatory policies is further constrained in 
the case of internationally coordinated policies. International institutions such as the 
Basel Committee and IOSCO are further removed from domestic scrutiny and are often 
described as secretive.2 Moreover, the membership of these institutions and the key 
actors driving the international financial cooperation process are independent regulatory 
agencies not embedded in the executive hierarchy and thus not subject to direct political 
pressures, rather than elected politicians seeking to maximize their probability of 
reelection by appeasing the public opinion.3 As a result, numerous analyses have not 
regarded public opinion as a meaningful constraint on the development of international 
financial regulatory policies. These works have instead drawn upon the literature on 
“policy communities”, analysing the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic 
regulatory agencies and the financial industry under their purview.4 
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Other works have instead taken the nature of regulators as bureaucrats nested in 
different domestic contexts more seriously, and modelled the way in which the domestic 
political environment shapes the patterns of international cooperation differently.5 These 
studies on the domestic bases of international financial regulation have acknowledged 
that public opinion may come to play an important role in shaping international regulatory 
policies in the aftermath of a financial crisis or other shock that suddenly brings finance 
into mainstream media.  
However these works have presented different accounts of this kind of impact. For 
instance, Singer argues that a crisis may create incentives for regulators to coordinate 
regulatory policies at the international level in order to restore confidence in the financial 
markets and appease their political masters.6 For Oatley and Nabors instead a crisis will 
trigger a response from politicians that will promote new international regulatory policies, 
or try to alter the existing ones, when this will help them to reconcile the competing 
demands by different groups and voters.7 In other words, the existing literature has 
presented conflicting accounts for how different kinds of crisis will generate a response 
from regulators or their political masters.  
This section will build upon the literature on the domestic foundations of international 
regulatory policies by exploring the contribution of the literature on “issue salience”. 
These works (reviewed in Section 3.2 and 3.3) have explored the impact that varying 
degrees of public attention to a certain issue area have over the behaviour and 
preferences of different actors, as well what factors could trigger a shift in the degree of 
salience. While this literature has been applied to investigate a variety of international 
domains such as security politics or regional integration, this is to the best of my 
knowledge the first work extending the contribution of this literature to the making of 
international financial regulation. Section 3.4 and 3.5 will present a model that identifies 
in the degree of public attention towards a specific financial domain as a key determinant 
of how that country will delegate regulatory functions to market actors or not. This 
section will theorize on the impact different degrees of issue salience will have over the 
preferences of elected politicians (the intervening variable analyzed in this study). 
Finally, the final part of this chapter (Section 3.6) will assess empirically how the level of 
public attention towards financial regulation, as well as towards derivatives markets, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Kapstein 1994; Oatley & Nabors 1998; Singer 2007; Fioretos 2010. 
6 Singer 2004. 
7 Oatley & Nabors 1998, p. 45. 
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hedge funds, and rating agencies evolved in the years before and during the global 
financial crisis.   
 
 
3.2 The Impact of Public Salience on the Policymaking Process 
The issue of salience for specific policy domain could be defined as the importance that 
the general public will assign to a specific issue compared to other issues on the political 
agenda.8  
This concept has been developed primarily within the electoral studies literature, where 
a significant body of scholarly works has since the 1960s investigated the impact that the 
salience of different issues has in conditioning voting behaviour.9 These works typically 
build on the insight from the cognitive studies regarding the capacity of voters to process 
only a small amount of information when making decisions. Since the cognitive 
capacities of voters are limited, they only pay attention to a limited range of issues when 
deciding for whom to vote and will employ cognitive short cuts to select information for 
making these decisions.10 They will not spend time and resources to process information 
on themes that they do not regard as salient, nor they will assess the capacity of 
different candidates to handle these issues.11  
From this perspective, electoral competitions are not presented as the battle between 
different positions on the same issues. Rather, they are shaped as the struggle between 
parties seeking to emphasize the issues that would benefit them the most.12 As Hayes 
argues: “in a political campaign, little is more fundamental to a candidate’s success than 
controlling the election’s issue agenda.”13  A wide range of studies have investigated the 
struggle between political elites to shape voters’ perception of the relevance of political 
problems,14 candidate strategy seeking to increase attention to advantageous issues,15 
and their interaction with the media in the agenda-setting strategies of candidates.16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Oppermann & Viehrig 2009; Wlezien 2005; Kollman 1998. 
9 Edwards III et al. 1995; Fournier et al. 2003; Krosnick 1990; Damore 2004; RePass 1971; Belanger & Meguid 2008; 
Mayer & Tiberj 2004. 
10 Simon 1985; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky 1982. 
11 Damore 2004. 
12 Budge & Farlie 1983. 
13 Hayes 2008. 
14 Erbring, Goldenberg, & Miller 1980; McCombs 1993. 
15 Hayes 2008; Simon 2002. 
16 Hayes 2008. 
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In the past, numerous political scientists have also extended these insights beyond the 
analysis of electoral competition to investigate the impact that the relative salience of 
different issues has over the broader policymaking process beyond the electoral 
process. In particular, Wlezien has theorized that the public constantly functions as a 
“thermostat”, taking notice of what policymakers do and responding to these policy 
decisions by signaling its preferences for “more” or “less” spending or policy 
intervention.17 In particular, it is possible to identify three ways in which the attention paid 
by public towards a certain policy domain is likely to influence the outcome of policies 
that have relevant for the literature on financial regulation. 
First, in those policy domains where the public notices and reacts, elected policymakers 
that are interested in remaining in office will face stronger pressures to fall in line with the 
electorate’s preferences outside of elections for fear of being sanctioned.18 Different 
studies, particularly within the American political science literature, have provided 
empirical support to the argument that the congruence between policy outcomes and 
public preferences tend to be higher on issues that are highly salient for the public than 
on non-salient issues.19 Furthermore, members of Congress20 and the US President tend 
to represent their constituencies differently on salient and non-salient issues.21 Indeed, 
different views remain regarding the extent of public attention that can constrain 
domestic policymaking leeway that governments enjoy in choosing between different 
policies. While for some authors public opinion simply defines a “region of acceptability” 
that limits politically feasible options,22 for other authors the attempt of elected politicians 
to gain an advantage at the polls by enacting policies favored by the public may have a 
more significant influence over policy decisions.23  
Second, the level of attention that the public pays towards a certain issue will also be a 
crucial determinant of whether elected politicians will decide to get directly involved in 
the governance of a certain area or whether they will delegate to bureaucrats and 
experts. According to Gormley, politicians seeking reelection are more likely to engage 
substantially in highly salient and non-complex issues whose impacts citizens are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Wlezien 1995; Soroka & Wlezien 2005. 
18 Soroka & Wlezien 2005; Page & Shapiro 1983; Oppermann & Viehrig 2009; Wlezien 2004. Moreover, policy decisions 
that are unpopular towards the broader public are likely to erode the political capital of a government and president and 
weaken its prospects to conduct its agendas.  According to Knecht and Weatherford, this also affect “lame-duck 
presidents” or politicians not seeking a reelection, which may still be interested in enhancing their public support or set the 
stage for their “heir”. See Knecht & Weatherford 2006. 
19 Page & Shapiro 1983. 
20 Erikson 1978; Hill & Hurley 1999. 
21 Cohen 1997; Hill & Hurley 1998. 
22 Russett 1990, p.110, cited by Knecht & Weatherford 2006. 
23 Page & Shapiro 1992. For a review see Knecht & Weatherford 2006, p. 707. 
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expected to be capable of understanding.24 In these areas, bureaucrats and interest 
groups are expected to play a lesser role. On the contrary, policymaking in areas that 
are highly technical and that lack salience are unlikely to attract significant public 
attention, thus generating low incentives for the political leadership to influence the 
direction of policies. In these areas, business groups, bureaucrats, and a few key 
politicians are likely to play an active role in the development and implementation of 
policies, a configuration described by Gormley as “board room” politics.25 The balance 
between politicians and experts is more uncertain in those areas that are both highly 
salient and highly complex.  These areas are described by Eshbaugh-Soha as 
presenting “conflicting incentives for political leadership, as they need for both 
accountability and expertise are present.” 26  In these cases, according to Gormley, 
politicians will seek to reconcile these conflicting incentives by providing procedural 
rather than substantive solutions.  
Different levels of issue salience are also likely to affect the conduct of the same 
bureaucrats and how they will relate to their political masters. Gormley puts forward the 
hypothesis that bureaucrats are most responsive to elected officials and likely to be most 
active on highly salient policies, since changes in the oversight and the budget are more 
likely when politicians are highly engaged in an issue.27      
Finally, the attention of the public towards a certain policy area may have an “indirect 
effect”28 over public policies by influencing the relative influence of different interest 
groups. Interest group theorists have suggested that, in modern democracies, the 
political system often favours well-organized business and professional groups, while the 
organization of more diffuse interests is likely to be weakened by collective action 
problems.29 While this insight has acquired strong empirical support over the years, 
different studies have showed how the nature of competition among interest groups, 
their lobbying strategies, and ultimately who wins and loses are significantly affected 
when the public pays attention to that area. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Gormley 1986. Further deepening this analysis in the US context, the analysis of the activism by 
the US President and Congress conducted by Eshbaugh-Soha reveals how these actors will have a strong incentive to 
engage in issues that are salient, and choose policies that are are easy to explain to the public, avoiding to engage in the 
technical details of a policy. Unlike the President, Congressmen are more likely to hold committee hearings on policies 
that are more complex, independently from their level of salience. 
25 Gormley 1986. 
26 Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, p. 226; See Provost 2010. 
27 Gormley 1986. 
28 Risse-Kappen 1991, p. 511. 
29 Olson 1965; Schattschneider 1960. 
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Policy areas that remain largely outside public scrutiny are described as favouring the 
emergence of an environment where only a few interest groups lobby policymakers and 
where the insiders are capable to advance their interests with only limited opposition.30 
On the contrary, a greater salience has been presented as favouring the mobilization of 
a wider variety of interest groups, including business groups, trade unions, and NGOs, 
while weakening the influence of any individual group.31 A high degree of salience has 
often been described as tilting the balance of influence between those interest groups 
seeking to preserve the status quo, and those seeking to challenge it.32 Baumgartner et 
al. argued that market incumbents seeking to defend the status quo “benefit from 
keeping an issue out of the public eye and limited to as small a group as possible”. 33 
Culpepper has argued that under conditions of low issue salience, business insiders are 
in a superior position thanks to their “access to superior weapons for battles that take 
place away from the public spotlight,” primarily their expertise and privileged access to 
policymakers.34 On the contrary, a greater degree of public scrutiny favours those sides 
seeking to challenge the status quo, which benefit from the attention of the public “in 
order to create enough momentum to overcome the friction in the policy process.”35  
Finally, the salience of a given issue will also affect the advocacy strategy adopted by 
different groups. As Victor argues, “an interest group will assess how knowledgeable the 
public is on an issue before selecting a lobbying tactic.” 36 Low issue salience areas have 
been associated primarily with “direct” lobbying tactics (or “insider lobbying”) occurring 
through close consultation with regulatory agency officials and rank and file members of 
legislative assembles and their staff, disseminating research, and relying extensively on 
substantive expertise.37 Instead, Kollman and others demonstrated how in the case of 
high issue salience areas, groups are more likely to engage in “outside lobbying”, that is, 
tactics seeking to influence the general public’s views. 38  Since a high degree of public 
attention on a certain issue will make it difficult for policy-makers to listen to the 
demands of interest groups whose preferences go against public opinion,39 these will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 C. Mahoney 2007; Klüver 2011. 
31 C. Mahoney 2007 p.40. A high level of salience is also likely to decrease the influence of any individual interest groups. 
Mahoney argues that “if a topic is of interest to large proportion of the public, policymakers should be less likely to take the 
advice of a single advocate regardless of the actual scope of the issue”. Mahoney 2007, p.40. 
32 Baumgartner et al. 2009; Klüver 2011. 
33 Baumgartner et al. 2009, p. 126. 
34 Culpepper 2011, p.4. 
35 Baumgartner et al. 2009, p. 120. 
36 Victor 2007, p. 831. 
37 Gais & Walker 1991, p. 103; Baumgartner et al. 2009. 
38 Kollman 1998. See also Victor 2007, p. 831; Hojnacki & Kimball 1999.  
39 Klüver 2011. See also Risse-Kappen 1991, p. 511; Victor 2007, p. 831; Risse-Kappen 1991. 
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have an incentive to frame the public debate in a way that ties their interests to the 
general interests.40   Other authors have argued that in the case of high issue salience, 
interest groups will have a greater incentive to build coalitions with other interest 
groups41 or to engage in “forum-shopping” seeking to shift the policymaking process into 
an environment that would favour their strengths. For instance, Culpepper argues that 
during periods of high salience, business groups may shift their attention and efforts to 
shape policies towards the implementation phase or to issues of judicial interpretation, 
especially in those cases when they regard public scrutiny as only temporary.42  
 
3.3 The Issue Attention Cycle 
The previous section showed how high levels of salience have an important influence 
over the policymaking process by shaping the engagement of elected politicians into the 
governance of that area, the role and discretion of bureaucrats, as well as the relative 
influence and advocating strategies that different groups seeking to lobby policymakers 
follow. But how widespread are these implications? 
As the literature on public opinion has demonstrated, only a restricted number of policy 
areas are salient at a given time. During normal times, the general public usually focuses 
its attention on ‘bread and butter’ issues such as unemployment and inflation, while 
paying little attention to issues like foreign trade, foreign aid, nuclear arms control, 
international trade and monetary policy, environmental protection, and international 
issues more generally that seem remote to the electorate. According to Wleizen, in those 
policy domains where information is less readily available, ‘public responsiveness is 
likely to be less specific; in some domains the public may be entirely unresponsive to 
policy”.43  
Knecht and Weaterford argue that the public tends to be less responsive to so-called 
“non-crises”, that is, events that remain on the political agenda for decades and have no 
definitive conclusion.  While public awareness of these issues can be stimulated from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Culpepper 2011, p. 49. 
41 Kluver argues that “depending on the relative size of their lobbying coalitions, salience has a positive or negative impact 
on the probability of interest groups being successful in their lobbying attempts”. More specifically, she argues that the 
larger coalitions will benefit more from a greater level of issue salience as the new interest groups entering the legislative 
debate are more likely to join the dominant coalition and increase its relative strength. Klüver 2011, p. 488. 
42 Culpepper argues that when the level of salience increases “business organizations should expect to do better by 
conserving resources spend on legislative battle they are likely to lose, unless they have lots of allies. Instead they ability 
to wield disproportionate influence – and so not to have to rely on allies – goes up if they can ride out the storm of public 
attention and shift to a technical battle over bureaucratic regulations that is uninsteresting to newspaper readers.” 
Culpepper 2011, p.190. 
43 Wlezien 1995, p. 984. 
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time to time, non-crises “seldom gain the public’s attention immediately, nor do they hold 
it beyond the period of the government’s most visible action.”44 In the case of issues 
such as financial regulation, as well as other areas, the public’s attentiveness is further 
hindered by the complexity of the issue. According to Knecht and Weatherford, in the 
case of complex issues “the public is likely to sense that a problem exists but lack the 
desire or capacity to develop an informed opinion.”45 Culpepper has also argued that it 
remains difficult for the media to translate complex issues into concepts that will hold the 
attention of news consumers. According to Culpepper, “the combination of low salience 
and high complexity means that both journalists and political entrepreneurs have 
difficulty convincing the general public to pay attention to an issue”.46  
In these areas that are characterized by low salience and high complexity, the impact of 
public opinion on policies remain “latent and inconsequential”,47  while policymakers 
retain considerable latitude in the selection of policies implemented.48 On the contrary, 
areas that are characterized by a low salience such as security and foreign policy are 
likely to be dominated by special interests or “power elites”, which are frequently 
described as capable of steering public opinion in their direction through the 
dissemination of information and over-ride or manufacture public perception.49  
However, the salience of an issue should not be regarded as static. Different studies 
have highlighted systematic different in the public salience of the same issue across 
countries, as well as within countries across subnational governments.50 What could 
cause an issue area that is usually non-salient to attract a significant attention from the 
public? 
While a large range of policies usually remain outside of the spotlight, these can rise to 
one of the main priorities on general public’s agenda as a result of “crises”. Oppermann 
and Viehrig describe crises as events conveying “a sense of urgency, threat to basic 
values and novelty conveyed by them”, and which are therefore likely to give an issue of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Knecht & Weatherford 2006, p. 709. 
45 Knecht & Weatherford 2006, p.710. 
46 Culpepper contrasts this with other areas such as the regulation of the car industry, which according to Culpepper 
“remain more straightforward and easily grasped, even for those who are not mechanics”.  Culpepper 2011, p.8. 
47 Oppermann & Viehrig 2009, p. 926. See also Knecht & Weatherford 2006. 
48 Rosenau 1961. 
49 Herman & Chomsky 1988; Margolis & Mauser 1989. 
50 As Soroka and Wleizen argue, “Whether due to different institutions, policy processes or political culture, both public 
reactions to public policy and policy makers’ responses to public preferences may vary across both policy domains and 
across countries (and within countries across subnational governments)”. Soroka & Wlezien 2005, p. 686. For instance, 
defense issues tend to have a higher issue salience in the US and in the UK than in other countries. See Eichenberg & 
Stoll 2003. Similarly, research on the process of European integration has demonstrated different levels of public attention 
toward the same issue. See Franklin & Wlezien 1997. 
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high news value for journalists and publishers. 51  Moreover, events that have the 
characteristics of “crises” are more likely to generate public salience when the public 
considers this event as bringing some tangible repercussions on the daily lives of 
citizens For instance, Oppermann and Viehrig argue that “foreign and security policy 
should on average be more salient in countries which generally tend to be strongly 
engaged in international affairs by virtue of their geopolitical position or an 
internationalist foreign policy outlook than in countries which are less exposed to 
international events”.52 
While these works have discussed the greater salience of a non-crisis issue as 
determined primarily by some exogenous events, other scholars have argued that the 
level of issue salience can be endogenous to the same policymaking process, influenced 
by country-specific factors such as “coalition-building processes”53 or the patterns of 
“domestic elite dissent.” 54  Other studies have highlighted how interest groups and 
political entrepreneurs may strategically seek to raise the issue salience of an issue 
area. 55  These actors may spend considerable resources seeking to raise public 
awareness around an issue and to influence public opinion to favor their position. 56 
While actors disadvantaged by the status quo are more likely seek to increase the level 
of public attention, those seeking to defend the status quo will have an incentive to limit 
the visibility of the policymaking process surrounding a certain issue in order to keep its 
policymaking out of the public eye and to limit the number of groups engaged.57  
Indeed, exogenous and endogenous determinants of salience are likely to act in tandem. 
On the one hand, policy entrepreneurs are likely to take advantage of crises to 
strengthen their arguments regarding the seriousness of a problem. On the other hand, 
crises may not be enough to raise the salience of an issue in the absence of policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Oppermann & Viehrig 2009, p. 929; Knecht & Weatherford 2006. 
52 For instance, Oppermann and Viehrig argues that the issue of international terrorism reached a greater level of issue 
salience in the UK vis-à-vis other European countries as a result of the London bombings of 7 July 2005 but also given 
Britain’s role as the main ally of the US in Iraq. On the contrary, the Kosovo war generated a greater level of public 
salience in Germany as a result of the intense domestic debate that the war fuelled within the newly elected government. 
Oppermann & Viehrig 2009, p. 930. 
53 Risse-Kappen 1991. 
54 Oppermann & Viehrig 2009, p. 938. From this perspective, these authors argue that greater increases in the level of 
issue salience are more likely to be found in majoritarian political systems that favour more confrontational patterns of 
debate among the elites than in consensus-oriented political systems Oppermann & Viehrig 2009, p. 930. See also 
Lijphart 1999. 
55 Kollman 1998; Wilson 1980; Baumgartner et al. 2009, p.121. 
56 Holyoke 2011. According to Baumgartner et al. this strategy is more likely to be pursued by those policy advocates 
“who are disadvantaged by the dimensions of conflict associated with the status quo may benefit from broadening the 
scope of attention to an issue”. Baumgartner et al. 2009, p.121. 
57 As Knecht and Weatherford argue, in the area of foreign policy presidents often seek to obscure decision making and to 
mark policy commitments in order to avoid public scrutiny: “covert action, for instance, is often a valuable resource for 
presidents in that it provides a means of accomplishing foreign policy goals outside the strictures of legislative review and 
electoral accountability”. Knecht & Weatherford 2006, p. 712. 
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entrepreneurs. As Baumgartner et al. argue: “if efforts to change the definition of an 
issue or to attract the attention of allies in government were not already in the works, 
crises or focal events might pass by without any policy change. Such crises do offer 
opportunities for the advocates of change, and if they are ready to seize on them, then 
major change becomes far more likely.”58 
In sum, while most policy areas are characterized by low salience, the general public 
may occasionally take interest in them as a result of exogenous shocks or the 
endogenous work of policy entrepreneurs.  
However, increased public attention is not infinite, and different authors have theorised 
the existence of an “issue attention cycle”. As Downs argued in his study of 
environmental politics, “problems suddenly leaps into prominence, remains there for a 
short time, and then - though still largely unresolved - gradually fades from the center of 
public attention.”59 Knecht and Weatherford argue along the same lines that the pattern 
of attention to such issues follows “a stylized cycle in which the public exhibits ‘‘alarmed 
discovery’’ at the introduction of a new issue, resulting in a high level of attention and 
public demands for government to ‘‘do something’’ about the problem. Peak 
attentiveness is not sustained long, however, as the public becomes disillusioned or 
bored with the problem, and concern focuses elsewhere.”60  
In the case of areas that develop more slowly, the public will only pay attention to the 
policy selected, but will largely ignore both the process preceding this selection as well 
as the implementation process that will follow the policy decision. In this case, 
policymakers will enjoy greater autonomy during implementation.61 In the case of crises, 
“the public’s attention builds steadily, the relative importance of public opinion will be at 
its peak during the later stages, such as the implementation phase, when policymakers 
will need to pay attention to the demand of the public and “sacrifice strategic 
effectiveness to pacify a highly attentive domestic audience.”62   
To sum up, this section has briefly reviewed the literature on issue salience and 
highlighted two aspects that are directly relevant to the literature on international 
financial regulation. First, the level of public attention towards an issue remains a crucial 
determinant not only of who will win the elections, but also of the politics surrounding the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Baumgartner et al. 2009, p.122. 
59 Downs 1972, p. 38. 
60 Downs 1972; Knecht & Weatherford 2006, p. 710. 
61 Knecht & Weatherford 2006, p. 712. 
62 Knecht & Weatherford 2006, p. 712. 
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regulation of different areas, influencing the incentives and influences of politicians, 
bureaucrats, and key interest groups. Second, while only a minority of issues attracts 
consistent attention from the public, those areas that are traditionally described as low-
salience areas can gain the spotlight as a result of exogenous crises or the agency of 
different actors. 	  
 
3.4 Financial Regulation as a Low Salience Area  
Building on the insights from issue salience literature reviewed in the previous section, 
this section will present a model of domestic financial regulatory politics seeking to 
explain how financial regulatory policies allocate regulatory responsibilities between 
public and private actors. This section will also discuss how elected officials’ preferences 
and mobilization vary according to three different levels of public attention towards 
financial regulation (default state; temporary increase in salience; long-lasting increase 
in salience). This section will discuss the “default state” in which financial regulatory 
politics take place. 
Authors that have analysed the politics of financial regulation have not regarded public 
opinion as a meaningful constraint on the development of different domestic and 
international regulatory policies. During normal times, the complexity of regulatory 
policies and the frequently indirect impact they have over stakeholders outside the 
financial industry place a structural constraint on the general public’s capacity to 
understand and pay attention to financial regulatory debates. As a result, most financial 
regulatory debates remain almost completely outside of the mainstream media.  
This opaqueness has had some very direct implications on the politics of financial 
regulation that have long been recognized by the literature. For instance, in line with the 
view informing much of regulatory capture literature, the low salience of financial 
regulatory policies enhances the financial industry’s privileged position in the 
policymaking process by limiting outside scrutiny and hindering the creation of active 
countervailing forces from other societal actors.  
Existing literature has placed significant attention on financial industry actors’ influence 
over politicians stemming from the financial resources they can mobilize to finance 
campaigns or to lobby politicians. However, different authors have acknowledged that 
the financial industry’s influence is greatest when it directly interacts with regulators 
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instead of openly lobbying elected policymakers. 63   Different analyses of financial 
regulatory policymaking have detailed the emergence of relatively closed policy 
communities between financial sector private interests and autonomous regulatory 
authorities that share similar skills, training, and knowledge.64 Indeed, several authors 
have argued that financial industry groups are the most important interlocutor of 
independent regulatory agencies in the design of regulatory policies, while policy 
concerns from other interest groups usually do not features in the close dialogue 
between regulators and financial industry groups.65 While public consultations have 
become a central component of the policymaking process in financial regulation, the 
technical nature of these issues had the effect of confining the debate to those actors 
with sufficient technical expertise and incentives, a group therefore mostly made up of 
financial services providers.66   
Under conditions of low salience, market incumbent’s privileged position strongly favours 
preserving the status quo for several reasons. First, groups that are incumbents in a 
determined market will prefer to preserve their autonomy from the interference of public 
authorities and prefer self-regulatory and other market-based solutions to overly 
prescriptive, and costly, forms of regulation. An important exception may derive from 
conflicts on regulation within the industry, a condition that will not be analyzed in this 
model, which assumes that the financial industry is capable of preserving its unity in 
support of lighter regulation.67  
A second factor favoring the preservation of self-regulation is regulators’ bureaucratic 
incentives. Different studies of international financial regulation have regarded regulators 
not as simply vehicles for the preferences of the legislatures but rather as actors with an 
independent set of preferences deriving from their position of bureaucrats within 
government.68 According to Singer, regulators will seek to preserve their positional 
power by balancing requests from their political masters and the financial industry with 
measures capable of ensuring the financial system’s competitiveness and stability.  
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However, regulatory authorities do not equally weigh these two competing pressures. 
Instead, during non-crisis times, regulators face strong bureaucratic incentives to second 
the financial industry’s preferences for market-based regulatory measures. If regulators 
had imposed more stringent regulatory policies excessively burdening the domestic 
financial industry, elected politicians may have directly intervened. 
Most importantly, the low salience of financial regulation during normal times will have 
an impact over elected officials’ incentives. This aspect will be the central focus of this 
analytical framework. 
According to Thomas Oatley and Robert Nabors, politicians will propose new regulatory 
policies, or try to alter the existing ones, when this will help them to reconcile competing 
demands from different interest groups, particularly the financial industry and voters.69 
However, during normal times, low public attention means that voters will not pay 
significant attention to their elected representatives’ stance on financial regulatory 
policies. As a result, under these circumstances, elected officials will face no strong 
incentives for taking actions that may go against the financial industry’s preferences. 
After all, the financial industry is an important political constituency in many jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, support for zealous reform would expose politicians to accusations of over-
interfering in the economy. As Culpepper puts it, “politicians do not want a risk messing 
up the economy unless there is a big political reward for doing so,” nor they do want “to 
disrupt the economy on whose performance they remain dependent for re-election.” 70  
A second element limiting the incentives of elected politicians to get involved in financial 
regulatory policies is their degree of complexity. The low salience of financial regulation 
will limit the incentives for politicians motivated by electoral concerns to develop the 
expertise required to engage in financial regulatory debates. Instead, the combination of 
low salience and high complexity increases the likelihood that politicians will defer to 
experts when making policy decisions.71 As Culpepper argues in the area of corporate 
governance, “political parties have few incentives to invest in the development of 
expertise and the promotion of reforms, so long as these questions are of low political 
salience. Neither voters nor the media care, which means it is not rational for politicians 
to thwart the political initiatives of managers. Politicians do not generally have the 
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stomach for a fight that will generate little in the way of electoral rewards.”72  Culpepper 
argues that this position is independent from the amount of money that financial firms 
will spend on campaign. In fact, “when the public is not paying attention to issues, 
politicians will defer to business interests anyway, faced with business arguments that 
state intervention could adversely affect the economy.”73   
While Culpepper highlights the incentives for politicians to defer to business interests, 
financial regulation’s low salience and high complexity have also favoured the delegation 
of responsibility for setting and monitoring the implementation of financial regulations to 
independent regulatory agencies not embedded in the executive hierarchy and thus not 
subject to direct political pressure.74   Indeed, most accounts of financial regulatory 
politics have described politicians as largely uninvolved in the work of international 
coordination that is undertaken by regulatory agencies. The insulation of regulatory 
authorities from the dynamics of electoral politics is further reinforced by the fact that 
international regulatory standards remain ‘soft law’ and do not require ratification from 
domestic legislatures. While elected politicians may occasionally interfere in regulators’ 
activity, their involvement in international regulatory debates is described as episodic, 
indirect, and frequently directed towards appeasing the demands of powerful financial 
industry groups rather than those of voters. 
As a result, during normal times, the low salience and high complexity of financial 
regulatory policies deters elected politicians from challenging the status quo. This does 
not exclude a restricted number of elected officials that have a particular expertise and a 
stake in financial regulatory policies who act as policy entrepreneurs and seek to 
introduce more extensive regulatory policies. However, the characteristics of financial 
regulatory policies discussed in this section make it more difficult for these proposals to 
gather the required support among other elected officials. 
 
3.5 Crises and their Impact on the Salience of Financial Regulation 
While periods of “quiet politics” do not create significant incentives for regulators and 
elected politicians to challenge dominant financial industry groups’ preferences for  
maintaining self-regulation during normal years, these incentives may be altered by a 
financial crisis or corporate scandal. Most models of financial regulatory policymaking 
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take an exogenous shock as the most common factor capable of bringing an area that 
was previously under the radar to the attention of the public by highlighting market and 
regulatory failures, conflicts of interest, and other areas that demand the policymakers’ 
attention.  
According to functionalist approaches, crises that reveal a certain regulatory failure spur 
demand for regulatory change. A crisis will generally increase media coverage and 
public awareness a certain financial area. As discussed in more details later, the media’s 
increase in coverage is not always correlated with the severity of the crisis. 
While voters are usually unaware of financial regulatory debates, their interest could 
increase in the aftermath of a high-profile financial failure or scandal because of media 
coverage. In this case, voters typically demand regulatory policies that restore 
“confidence” in the safety of the financial system.75 While the general public does not 
have the expertise to influence the kind of regulatory change, they can signal their 
preferences for “more” or “less” policy intervention, as theorized by Wlezien in his 
“thermostatic” analysis of public opinion.76 
A crisis that increases the media coverage of the mishaps of a financial sector will pose 
a regulatory and reputational threat to this industry.77 In order to limit the risk that 
regulators or lawmakers may react by introducing more stringent regulations or that 
investors may lose confidence, financial industry groups affected by the scandal are 
likely to react by designing self-regulatory measures. From this perspective, self-
regulatory measures are not only market actors’ attempt to solve a substantive problem, 
they also help decrease an issue’s salience in such a way as to send a signal to 
regulators, politicians, and the general public that the issue has been taken care of and 
that no further regulatory action is needed. 
A crisis that raises the salience of regulatory policies will also have a direct impact over 
regulatory agencies’ bureaucratic incentives. As Singer argues, the bureaucratic nature 
of regulatory agencies implies that a crucial priority for regulators will be to prevent their 
autonomy and prestige from being threatened by legislative interventions aimed at 
reclaiming previously delegated regulatory authority.78 When a crisis increases media 
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coverage of regulatory gaps a give sector, regulatory agencies will face strong 
bureaucratic incentives to introduce measures capable of satisfying their political 
superiors and conveying the message that the issue has been “taken care of”. According 
to Singer, regulators will seek to introduce policies capable of preserving a certain 
degree of confidence in the stability of the financial system without at the same time 
creating excessive costs for their domestic financial systems and, thus, endangering 
their competitive position. 
In many circumstances, regulators may see industry self-regulation as an optimal 
solution to reassure their political overseers that the private sector has “taken care of” 
the issue, while at the same time preventing the introduction of more prescriptive 
regulations that could be burdensome for the competitiveness of their primary 
stakeholders, the financial industry. 79   Regulators may also have an incentive to 
proactively promote the emergence of self-regulatory measures introduced by the 
financial sector. They can do so either directly by informally encouraging private actors 
to intervene or by formally delegating regulatory authority to them, or indirectly, by 
threatening to introduce more stringent regulations as a strategy to solicit a private 
sector response.  
Regulators could also intervene ex-post by providing a “seal of approval” to regulations 
established by private bodies. They could do so by incorporating them into their national 
regulatory frameworks or international regulatory arrangements. While from a 
constructivist perspective this behavior is indicative of an ideological-driven preference 
for market-based solution, it may also reflect the desire to hold the interferences from 
lawmakers at bay. On the other hand, regulators are unlikely to support industry-driven 
regulatory measures that are unlikely to satisfy the preferences of their political 
overseers. In order to avoid the possibility that lawmakers could openly challenge 
regulators’ position and seize back control over the regulatory process, regulators may 
face bureaucratic incentives should justify the choice of regulators to throw their weight 
behind the introduction of more stringent regulatory measures. 
In order to understand if a crisis will trigger a self-regulatory response or a more formal 
regulation we need to assess the impact that the shock will have on the preferences of 
elected politicians. The literature on the domestic foundations of international financial 
regulation is ambiguous in this respect. According to Singer, crises will create strong 
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pressure for legislatures to intervene to appease their constituents, but in reality, altered 
incentives for regulators will have a greater impact over the international agenda. Oatley 
and Nabors have argued that a crisis will lead elected politicians to directly promote 
regulatory changes at the national and international levels.80 Along the same lines, 
different authors that have analyzed the reforms introduced since the crisis have cited 
“politicization” as an important characteristic of the policymaking process during this 
period.81 For instance, Helleiner’s analysis of derivatives regulation highlights how the 
increase in “public anger about the financial crisis” has led many members of Congress 
to introduce a number of proposals to regulate derivatives, as well as a triggered a 
turnaround in the position of important regulatory agencies. In other words, while 
different authors writing before and since the crisis have acknowledged the impact of 
public opinion on altering the incentives of elected politicians, the dynamics and 
conditions through which enhanced public attention comes to shape regulatory policies 
have remained under theorized. This study builds on work on the domestic bases of 
international financial regulation while integrating issue salience literature analyzed in 
the first part of this chapter. The argument presented in this section maintains that the 
extent to which elected politicians will defer to regulatory agencies or play the lead role 
in shaping the content of regulatory policies in the aftermath of a crisis depends largely 
on the crisis’ impact on the issue’s level of salience.  
As the analysis in the previous section has discussed, a crisis is in itself not sufficient to 
make a significant number of elected politicians pay attention to a highly technical issue 
like financial regulation. Politicians will engage in financial regulatory issues only in 
cases where the crisis has increased the attention of the electorate to the extent that the 
electoral rewards from direct interference in regulatory affairs will costs of devoting time 
and resources in forming a position, and of alienating the support of important interest 
groups.  
These conditions are unlikely to emerge in a crisis that increases the degree of public 
attention towards financial regulatory issues weakly or for a short period of time – what 
Culpepper defines “temporary high salience”.82 While such a crisis will increase the 
involvement of policy entrepreneurs with a pre-existing expertise and interest in financial 
regulation, the majority of politicians will face only weak incentives to enter the regulatory 
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debate and acquire the expertise required to form their own position. Regulators and the 
financial industry’s preferences will act as a cognitive shortcut for most politicians who 
will defer to their combined expertise.  Under conditions of temporary issue salience, it is 
likely that by transferring regulatory responsibilities to private market actors and 
colluding with the financial industry, regulators will be able to pass the message that the 
problem was taken care, allowing the issue to exit the spotlight.  
However, incentives for elected politicians change considerably when a shock creates a 
situation of “durable high salience”.83 As Culpepper argues in his analysis of corporate 
governance, voters’ sustained attention towards a policy domain will create “a powerful 
incentive for politicians to develop the tools to intervene, so that they can be seen to 
respond to the concerns of voters.”84 Culpepper also argues that voters will pressure 
governments to intervene more heavily to regulate high salience policy domains that are 
governed through informal governance arrangements, such as self-regulation. 85 
Increasing public regulatory oversight over certain financial activities and overturning 
existing self-regulation regimes represent a very visible way of for politicians to signal to 
voters that they are committed to respond to their concerns. In a high salience 
environment, the costs of challenging the preferences of the financial sector are likely to 
be lower than the electoral rewards that lawmakers could gain by demonstrating their 
commitment to introduce more extensive regulations. 
In sum, as Culpepper argues in his analysis of the politics of corporate governance, the 
resilience of self-regulatory arrangements over the governance of certain markets is 
dependent on a certain level of public inattention, which makes politicians more likely to 
defer to the expertise of the financial industry.86 The higher and the more lasting the 
level of financial regulation’s salience, the more likely that the regulatory status of a 
financial sector will be moved towards the right end of the public-private divide spectrum 
for politicians seeking to gain electoral benefits by “tap[ping] into public outrage”.87 
We can derive some testable hypotheses from this argument to ask when a country’s 
position on international financial regulation will move from supporting the status quo of 
self-regulation towards endorsing more direct regulation, as happened during the global 
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financial crisis. This chapter’s argument presented holds that this shift is likely to occur 
after a shock that triggers a significant and long-lasting increase in the level of public 
attention towards that specific issue. 
This hypothesis differs from more traditional accounts of financial regulatory 
policymaking that link this change crises revealing regulatory failures. In fact, a severe 
crisis that reveals important regulatory failures will not necessarily lead to a long-lasting 
increase in issue salience. As argued above, financial industry groups directly 
threatened by the crisis will have an incentive to reduce the salience of financial 
regulation by adopting self-regulatory mechanisms. Instead we may expect a long-
lasting increase in the salience of financial regulation only when the financial institutions 
at the center of the crisis do not entirely internalize the costs created by the crisis. This is 
for instance the case when these reverberations also spill over to other societal actors, 
such as investors, end-users, clients, or impose broad costs on society. From this 
perspective, bailouts or crisis requiring the deployment of taxpayers money in support of 
financial institutions represent a very visible signal of the socialization of these costs. 
These events are more likely to generate a high degree of issue salience than more 
severe scandals and crisis that do not trigger the same sort of public intervention or 
whose costs are internalized by the financial industry.  
Moreover, when the directly affected financial groups do not internalize the costs 
generated by corporate scandals and crises, a permanent rise in issue salience will 
occur only where spillovers are widespread. If a crisis generates a deep but 
concentrated impact on a limited electoral constituency or area, only a limited number of 
politicians will face strong electoral incentives to demand more stringent regulatory 
measures. In less widespread crises, a majority of elected policymakers representing 
jurisdictions where financial regulation has remained a low salience issue will face only 
weak incentives to challenge the status quo.   
At the same time, unlike traditional account of financial regulatory policymaking, this 
model allows for a significant departure from the self-regulatory status quo in the 
absence of significant regulatory failures. Different analyses of the role of the public in 
influencing policies have stated that the public will not be able to collect information 
about a specific policy or industry. As Wlezien argues in his study of budgetary policies, 
“specific information about appropriations for those programs is not regularly and widely 
available to the public.” As a result, “the public still may responds to appropriations for 
social programs, but in a general way, with support for more (less) spending across 
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social programs in response to cuts (increases) in appropriations for the set of programs 
taken together.”88 Similarly, Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson argue that the general 
public does not have preferences for specific policies in particular domains but they have 
preferences “over the general contours of government activity.”89  
Thus, a crisis that significantly increase the salience of financial regulatory policies may 
also generate greater public appetite for more stringent regulatory policies towards 
sectors that were only marginally involved in the origin of the crisis. Wlezien argues: 
“Although survey organizations ask about specific programs, people’s responses in 
these domains reflect a single underlying preference for more (less) government, 
broadly defined … By implication, we should expect politicians to respond to the signal 
for policy change across domains; any apparent responsiveness to preferences in 
particular domains only conceals this more general responsiveness.”90 
It is also important to acknowledge some important limitations of this argument as an 
explanation of international regulatory change.  
First, while the explanation presented in this section identifies the main channel through 
which different levels of salience affect policies using elected officials’ electoral 
incentives, it is not the only one. As the literature on issue salience reviewed in the first 
part of this chapter argued, different degrees of salience will have a significant impact 
over the levels of influence and advocacy strategies that different interest groups and 
bureaucracies will adopt. Changes in the preferences and behavior of financial lobbies 
and regulatory agencies will represent an important part of the cases analyzed in this 
study. At the same time, the analytical contribution will focus on the impact that salience 
has over officials’ electoral incentives. This approach is the most direct way through 
which public opinion can shape regulatory policies, while changes in the conduct of 
interest groups and bureaucracies tend to derive from changes in the political context. 
Second, electoral incentives as determined by the level of public attention do not 
represent the only factor shaping elected officials’ position. On the contrary, any 
legislative assembly has members who usually occupy key positions in financial 
committees and whose preferences tend to consistently be shaped by a number of 
elements highlighted by other theoretical explanations, such as ideas or their support for 
specific vested interests. However, these “specialists” with pre-determined policy 
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preferences usually remain a minority. The majority of the members of any legislative 
assemblies usually lack the sufficient expertise to form an independent opinion on 
regulatory policies. They will therefore rely on proxies such as the preferences of 
regulators, the industry, or other experts. 
The degree of salience will play an overwhelming role in determining how difficult it will 
be for policy entrepreneurs within any given legislative body to gather majority 
consensus around their policy proposals. During periods of low salience, policy 
entrepreneurs will face difficulties in gathering support for proposals that go against the 
preferences of powerful constituencies, an issue that is not the case during periods of 
high salience. One of the most common dynamics through which a long-lasting increase 
in the level salience affects regulatory change is increased momentum for policy 
entrepreneurs to put their long-standing priorities back on the legislative agenda, not to 
create new legislative solutions. 
Third, similarly to other domestic theories of international regulatory change,91 this theory 
is purely an explanation of regulatory change at the domestic level and does not provide 
an explanation of the domestic preferences that will shape the international agenda. In 
order to explain international regulatory change, it needs to be complemented with 
different power analyses of international financial regulatory policies reviewed in the 
previous chapter. If we accept the argument presented by most realist scholars that 
market size is the primary determinant of a country’s influence over the international 
agenda, a shift in the international regulatory agenda is likely to occur only after a crisis 
has aligned the preferences of the most powerful countries in support of a new approach. 
Fourth, the degree to which politicians will be responsive to public opinion is not fixed but 
instead varies across time and institutional contexts. As different authors have argued, 
the electorate’s capacity to shape policy decisions will depend on “the credibility of their 
threat to sanction the government for these decisions.”92 From this perspective, proximity 
to elections is a factor shaping the likelihood that politicians will respond to the public 
opinion. Electoral payoffs will vary across different kind of political parties, with political 
parties on the left of the political spectrum more likely to reap the electoral benefits from 
financial regulatory issues during periods of high salience. From this perspective, 
acknowledging the importance of issue salience in the development of regulatory 
policies opens important opportunities of dialogue between this literature and the 
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important literature on the electoral and partisan cycles.93 These works have argued that 
“partisan electoral competition induces observable, regular cycles of electoral-calendar 
timing and incumbent-partisan nature in economic policies and outcomes.”94 While some 
of these insights will be addressed in the case studies, they remain outside of the scope 
of the argument developed in this study. 
Fifth, this domestic model does not account for how institutional variations in different 
domestic contexts affect public opinion’s role in shaping the behavior of elected 
politicians and other actors. It has long been recognized that institutions mediate the 
impact of the public opinion over the policymaking process. For instance, Risse-Kappen 
has argued that public opinion will have a lower impact in “strong states” whose 
institutions are highly centralized and whose political elite is capable of overcoming 
domestic resistance and a higher impact in “weak states that more open to pressures by 
societal interest groups and political parties.”95  
For the sake of parsimony, the analysis conducted in this study remains explicitly actor-
centric and does not explore how the impact of the public opinion on financial regulatory 
policies differs in countries with diverging domestic institutional contexts, traditions, 
varieties of capitalism, or financial system structures. However, this trade-off is important 
to highlight the common dynamics that change financial regulation’s public salience will 
generate in the relationship between unelected regulators, elected politicians, and their 
respective domestic financial industries in very different institutional contexts. 
 
3.6 An Empirical Analysis of the Salience of Financial Regulation 
Given that issue salience is the explanatory variable investigated in this study, the main 
challenge is to empirically assess how receptive public opinion is towards a certain area. 
While different methods have been developed within the literature to achieve this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Alesina & Rosenthal 1995; Alvarez, Garrett, & Lange 1991; Rogoff & Sibert 1998; Simmons 1996. 
94 Franzese 2002, p. 370. 
95 Risse-Kappen 1991. Risse-Kappen argues that as a result of these different domestic structures, mass public opinion 
matter to very different degrees in different countries. In particular, mas public opinion is more likely to limit the range of 
options for implementing policy goals in countries such as the US and Germany. This author concludes that “in countries 
with centralized political institutions byt polarized societies and rather weak social organizations, the policy network is 
likely to be state-dominated…. By contrast societal control of the policy network is to be expected in countries with 
comparatively homogeneous societies and a high degree of societal mobilization but weak stracture…. Countries with 
political institutions and a social organizations of comparable strength are likely to have a policy network characterized by 
democratic corporatism”.Along these lines, he argues that the US could be characterized by a decentralized political 
system, heterogeneous and weak societal organizations, and a society-dominated policy network, Germany as a political 
system characterized by an intermediate level of centralization, strong societal organizations, and corporatis policy 
network, and France characterized by a centralized political system, weak societal organizations, and state-dominated 
policy networks. According to Risse-Kappen, “the comparatively open and decentralized American political system and its 
society-domianted policy network should provide public opinion with ample opportunity to affect policy outcomes”. In 
contrast, “French public opinion is likely to play only a marginal role in the foreign policy-making process”. 
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objective, the approach that has gained more widespread acceptance in recent years 
infers an issue’s level of salience through the amount of media coverage it attracts.96 
Important literature has discussed how the media represents the primary mechanism 
through which the public learns about most issues. As a result, media contributes 
significantly to shaping voters behavior.97 As Cohen argues, while the media may not tell 
the public what to think, ‘‘it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think 
about.’’98 From this perspective, media coverage of an issue is the prerequisite for the 
public to take notice and react to certain news or policy decisions.99 Moreover, the 
academic literature has described amount of media reporting as the primary causal 
mechanism through which policymakers will gauge the public’s receptiveness to an 
issue.100 From this perspective, policymakers are particularly attentive to how prominent 
certain issues are in the media, as they realize that greater media attention is likely to 
produce greater public attention, while policy makers assume that the absence of a 
debate in the media means that there is very little public attention towards the issue.101 
Different studies have therefore sought to infer the level of issue salience of different 
issues by measuring their coverage in the media, either by tracking the minutes of 
nightly network news broadcasts devoted to different areas,102 or by counting the articles 
in different national newspapers.103 This approach is not without its limitations. For 
instance, works using media coverage as a proxy for public salience assume that 
newspapers cover issues in proportion to how much voters care about them. 104 
Moreover, the results of this kind of analysis may be subject to media-bias, as different 
media sources are frequently characterized as being biased in their topic selection.105 
However, according to Epstein and Segal, the study of media coverage maintains 
important advantages compared to other methods and it represents a “reproducible, 
valid, and transportable measures” of citizen attention to political issues.”106  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Epstein & Segal 2000. For instance, different studies have relied on public opinion polls, asking open-ended questions 
to the respondents regarding what they perceive as the ‘most important issue’ on the agenda. See Oppermann & Viehrig 
2009.  
97 Miller & Krosnick 2000; Page et al. 1987. 
98 Cohen 1963, p.13. 
99 Wlezien 1995, p. 998. 
100 Oppermann & Viehrig 2009. 
101 Powlick 1995. 
102 Knecht & Weatherford 2006, p. 713. 
103 Baumgartner et al. 2009; Culpepper 2011; Jones & Baumrgartner 2005. 
104 See Culpepper 2011, p.56. 
105 See Culpepper 2011, p.20; Helbling & Tresch 2011. 
106 Epstein & Segal 2000. 
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Given this approach’s advantages over other methods, this study will also use coverage 
from major national newspapers to identify different levels of issue salience at the 
domestic levels associated with the different stages in the governance of derivatives 
markets, rating agencies, and hedge funds. To limit the media bias associated with the 
reliance on a single national newspaper, this study will analyze a larger pool of sources 
accessed through “Factiva”, an online repository of newspapers and other sources of 
information. The sources consulted in this study have been selected among those 
newspapers and magazine identified by Factiva as “major newspapers” in four major 
countries (US, UK, Germany, and France).  
From this pool of newspapers, this analysis has excluded newspapers with a clear 
financial focus (Financial Times, Wall Street Journal), as well as major newswires 
agencies (Reuters, Dow Jones), since the coverage of financial regulatory issues by 
these sources is largely independent from their salience and they are a poor indicator of 
the level of public attentiveness towards financial issues. US and UK sources have been 
consulted for the period between 1994 and 2011, while the analysis of German and 
French newspapers begins in 1998 because of Factiva’s limited earlier French and 
German archive. 
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The focus on these four jurisdictions is justified by combined market power that the US 
and the EU exercise over international securities markets and which has already been 
documented in the review of the “Anglo-Dominance thesis” in Chapter 2. While Mahoney 
in her comparison of issue salience in the US and EU has relied on the coverage of a 
single newspaper per each institutional context (New York Times and Financial 
Times),107 this approach seems to be inappropriate given the diversity in the domestic 
agenda of different European countries and the coverage of different European 
newspapers. This analysis has therefore focused on the three major European 
economies, as well as the three countries that have been identified by the literature as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Mahoney 2007. 
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playing the main role in international financial regulatory issues (UK, France, and 
Germany).108 
What can media coverage analysis of financial regulatory issues in these four 
jurisdictions tell us regarding the domestic conditions that sustained the market-based 
regime that characterized the international approach to the regulation of finance before 
the crisis and the departure from this approach after the crisis?  
The argument presented in the previous section maintains that the resilience of such an 
approach relies on a certain degree of public inattentiveness, and the lack of incentives 
for politicians to challenge the preferences of the financial industry. The analysis of the 
coverage of financial regulatory issues in the US press broadly supports this hypothesis. 
As Figure 4 illustrates, in the years before 2007 financial regulation received the same 
level of public attention as other areas described by the literature as “low salience”, such 
regulation of the energy markets and environmental regulation. 
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The limited attention from the domestic public towards financial regulation during this 
period is in part surprising when we consider how the period from the early 1990s to the 
financial crisis of 2007-10 is by many account not a quiet one in the financial system’s 
history. Numerous crises in emerging countries occurred during this period, such as the 
Mexican crisis of 1994, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, and the Argentine 
crisis of 2001. These crises triggered important debates at the national and international 
levels on reforming international financial architecture.110 However, the very limited to 
non-existent costs that these crisis posed on US citizens (with the exception of the 
increase in IMF resources following the Mexican and East Asian crisis) limited the 
coverage of financial regulatory issues by the US mainstream media. 
The second aspect that emerges from the analysis of the American media’s coverage of 
financial regulation during this period concerns the impact of the financial crisis of 2007-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 This chart presents the articles discussing financial regulation, environmental regulation, and energy regulation, as a 
percentage of all the article published during a quarter by the sample of newspapers selected. The following keywords 
have been used. For financial regulation: “regulat* w/5 financ*”. For environmental regulation: “regulat* w/5 environment*”. 
For energy regulation:  
“regulat* w/5 (energ* or oil or gas))”. W/5 stands for “within 5 words of”. The search has been limited to the title and first 
paragraph of the articles. 
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2010 in focusing the US public’s attention on financial regulatory issues. The financial 
crisis has not only had the effect of revealing substantial market and regulatory failures 
in the eyes of the regulatory community and experts, it has also contributed to brought 
financial regulation to the attention of  mainstream media on an almost daily basis.  
However, the analysis of American press coverage reveals how the timing of public 
attention towards financial regulation differed from the timing of the regulatory 
community’s attention toward financial regulation. The breakdown of the crisis in the 
summer of 2007, as well as the regulatory initiatives introduced at the end of 2007 and 
throughout 2008 in the US and internationally, did not significantly raise the salience of 
financial regulatory issues in the US. This is illustrated by the fact that the coverage of 
financial regulatory issues by the US press is not significantly higher than in the pre-
crisis period. The intensification of the crisis and the deployment of taxpayers money in 
support of ailing financial institutions in the last quarter of 2008 have contributed to 
increasing the salience of financial regulation in the US, which has increased steadily 
since the end of 2008, peaking in the first half of 2010 with the passage of Dodd-Frank 
Act. Media coverage of this legislation and of the Congressional debate that preceded it 
stands in contrast with the lack of attention paid towards the important pieces of 
legislation passed by Congress before the crisis to dismantle the regulatory framework 
built during the Great Depression. The level and length of salience characterizing 
regulation during this period is more similar to high salience areas such as budgetary 
policies and unemployment than to a traditionally low salience area such as financial 
regulation.  
However, the impact of the crisis in turning financial regulation into a “high issue 
salience” area has not been limited to the US despite the fact that the crisis originated 
within its borders. When we expand this analysis to the main European countries we find 
a sizeable increase in the media’s coverage of financial regulation around the time of the 
crisis. As Figure 5 illustrates, in the United Kingdom financial regulation had attracted a 
significantly higher level of public attention before the crisis, probably as a result of the 
greater weight that the financial sector has in the economy compared to the US. 
However, this difference may reflect a media bias in the pool of British newspapers 
analyzed in this study. Like in the US, the outbreak of the crisis in the summer of 2007 
and high profile events such as the first bank run in more than a century (Northern Rock) 
have not significantly increased the attention towards financial regulation. Public 
attention significantly increased the end of 2008 when British authorities were forced to 
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take unprecedented actions to extend a wider public net in support of several domestic 
financial institutions.  Unlike what occurred in the US, media coverage in the UK has 
decreased since the first quarter of 2009, which represent the peak of public attention in 
this country. 
 
Figure 5 - Coverage of Financial Regulation in the UK Press111 
 
 
Moreover, the crisis also turned financial regulation into a high salience issue in 
countries where the financial sector occupies a smaller space in the national economy, 
such as Continental European countries, as Figure 6 illustrates. In these countries, the 
initial spike in the media coverage of financial regulation was followed by a weakening 
during the rest of the first year of the crisis, and a significant and steady increase since 
the second quarter of 2008. Unlike in the US, the mutation of the banking crisis into a 
sovereign debt crisis prolonged the attention of the media towards financial regulatory 
issues until the end of 2010, when the dominant narrative of the Eurozone crisis turned 
more towards the institutional and macroeconomic failures in that area. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 The following keywords have been used “regulat* w/5 financ*”. The search has been limited to the title and first 
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Figure 6 - Coverage of Financial Regulation in the German and French Press112 
 
 
However, while these figures are indicative of the general attention towards financial 
regulation in these countries and towards the impact of the crisis, how has public 
attention been distributed across different markets and institutions?  
A closer analysis of the media coverage of derivatives, hedge funds, and rating agencies 
is still supportive of the general notion that the crisis increased public attention towards 
these market actors in a long-lasting way. However, a closer look at the data reveals 
three important points. 
First, despite the fact that these three sets of markets and institutions did not attract the 
kind of sustained attention that they triggered in the 2008-2010 period prior to the crisis, 
their public profile rose significantly in the years preceding the crisis as a result of 
different shocks and corporate scandals. Derivatives entered the US public debate in 
1994 when a sudden turn in interest rates generated important losses for Orange County 
Municipality (see Figures 7). This episode was followed by two corporate scandals 
during the same year involving the use of OTC derivatives, the first one involving a 
transaction between Gibson Greetings and Bankers Trust and the second between the 
same Bankers Trust and a larger corporation, Proctor & Gamble. A few months later, in 
1995, Barings bank collapsed because of the work of a derivatives trader.  However, 
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since then the issue has disappeared from the domestic media, and the key legislation 
passed by the US Congress in 1999 to exempt derivatives from the federal regulatory 
oversight went largely unnoticed. 
	  




Rating agencies had also acquired a significant public profile in the years before the 
crisis. Enron’s bankruptcy at the end of 2001 raised the profile of rating agencies in the 
US media above those of the other two sectors considered in this study, although less 
than the peak of public attention towards derivatives in 1994. Enron had remained highly 
rated until a few days before the collapse. The outrage triggered by the Enron scandal 
was reinforced by the Worldcom scandal only a few months later. According to 
Culpepper, these two events “caught public attention and ignited public anger” and 
Enron became “an informational short-cut for corporate excess”, making “a class of 
scandals easier to explain to the wider public.”114  
Enron was perceived primarily as a US scandal and it failed to significantly raise the 
public attention towards rating agencies in Continental European countries (see Figure 9 
and 10). There, it was instead another corporate bankruptcy – the collapse of the Italian 
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conglomerate Parmalat in 2003 – and the failure of rating agencies to detect this event 
— that increased media coverage of rating agencies, particularly in France (see Figure 
10). 
In the case of hedge funds, the international regulatory community had started to debate 
the regulation of these market actors during the East-Asian financial crisis. However, this 
crisis failed to generate significant attention from the US public, which focused on the 
regulation of the hedge fund industry only in the aftermath a more US-centric shock, that 
is, the collapse of the US hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, a 
collapse that was averted at the 11th hour through a private bailout orchestrated by the 
Federal Reserve (see Figure 7). While this event was highly covered by the US media, 
hedge funds disappeared from the eyes of the media until 2005/06 when different frauds 
combined with the growing influx of pension funds and other institutional investors in the 
hedge funds’ customer base increased attention towards these investment vehicles. 
Moreover, during the same period, hedge funds also become particularly salient within 
Continental European countries. The main debate was triggered in January 2005 when 
Deustche Böerse AG’s takeover of the London Stock Exchange failed as a result of the 
interference of the London-based “Children’s Investment Fund” (see Figure 9).   
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However, these figures also reveal how these increases in public salience were in most 
cases short lived, lasting no more than a quarter.118 Public scrutiny during the 2008-2010 
period has not only been more intense, but, above all, more long-lasting.  
The keywords used in this analysis of media coverage do not allow the differentiation of 
the extent to which media attention focused on the underlying problems in the three 
markets and institutions or simply documented the policy response by regulators, 
politicians, or other actors. Indeed, it is important to acknowledge that important 
feedback loops may be in play in different circumstances. For instance, renewed public 
attention towards a policy domain as measured by the media exposure will create 
incentives for policymakers to introduce regulatory proposals or publicly take a position 
on this issue. This will further increase the coverage of that area, thus reinforcing the 
public’s attention and generating new incentives for other policymakers to take action.  
As the case studies will detail, this dynamic was clearly on display within the US 
Congress during the latest stage of the Congressional debates over the Dodd-Frank Bill, 
where public attention and media coverage had significantly increased the incentives of 
members of Congress to be perceived as active on the legislation. At the same time, 
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policymaker initiatives seeking to regulate a certain sector are not sufficient to attract 
media attention and generate this feedback loop. This is clearly demonstrated by the 
lack of media coverage in the years preceding the crisis of legislative proposals similar 
to the ones included in the Dodd-Frank bill.  
Second, it is important to notice that the increase in the salience of different financial 
sectors is not directly related to their role in causing the crisis. During the crisis, 
significantly higher media coverage was directed towards hedge funds rather than rating 
agencies, despite the fact that hedge funds were not directly involved in originating the 
crisis (see Figure 7, Figure 9, Figure 10). Hedge funds have also attracted significantly 
greater media coverage than ratings agencies in Europe. 
The third and final point is the increase in the level of salience documented above has 
varied significantly across countries. The difference between the level of public attention 
before and after the crisis is more significant in the US across the three sectors analyzed 
in this study than it is in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.  Most importantly, 
when we compare the sectors that have been the most salient in each of the four 
countries, important variations emerge. In particular, US-centric crises such as the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers and other scandals have focused the attention of the US 
public on derivatives, which the US media has covered more than the other two sectors. 
In Europe the public debate has concentrated primarily on the activities of rating 
agencies and hedge funds, with derivatives coming in at a distant third.   
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the impact that the degree of attention that the general public 
pays towards different financial issues has over international financial regulatory politics. 
The theoretical argument presented in the first part of this chapter suggested that the 
likelihood that regulatory policies will rely on mandatory regulatory mechanism rather 
than industry-driven solutions will be influenced by the impact that different degrees of 
salience of financial issues have over the incentives of elected officials. 
The second part of this chapter started to empirically assess this model’s capacity model 
to explain the shift in the public-private divide triggered during the crisis by inferring the 
different degree of salience surrounding the regulation of derivatives, rating agencies, 
and hedge funds – the main independent variable in this study - from their coverage in 
the media. This analysis provided early support to the working hypothesis by showing 
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how the resilience of the industry-driven regime that informed the governance of these 
markets and institutions before the crisis coincided with a period of what Culpepper calls 
“quiet politics” in the major jurisdictions interrupted by different shocks that failed to 
significantly impact the salience of these domains.  Instead, the departure of the market-
based regime triggered by the crisis has coincided with a period of heightened and 
sustained public attention towards markets and institutions as well as across sectors 
within each of the four countries analyzed in this study, although this attention was 
different in the US and Europe. 
Indeed, the evidence presented in this chapter is important to shed lights over two 
important characteristics of the international shift in the public-private divide described in 
the first chapter. The first is about the timing of this shift. The main international 
regulatory institutions’ endorsement of a direct regulatory approach coincided not with 
the beginning of the crisis and the discovery of market-failures, but rather with the 
heightened degree of public attention triggered by the intensification of the crisis in the 
second half of 2008. The second is about the extent to which this shift also affected 
sectors such as hedge funds that were not responsible for the crisis. The data presented 
in this section has revealed how despite hedge funds’ marginal role in the crisis, their 
governance has attracted unprecedented attention in the main countries. 
At the same time, the analysis of public salience through the media coverage does not 
provide conclusive evidence in support of the argument presented in the early part of 
this chapter. The argument presented in chapter has not directly linked public salience 
and international outcomes. On the contrary, different degrees of issue salience will 
impact international regulatory policies by altering the domestic policymaking process in 
the jurisdictions that exercise the greatest influence over the international agenda, 
particularly the incentives faced by elected officials.  
In order to assess the mechanisms through which the changes in the level of public 
salience have come to influence the international regulatory agenda, the rest of this 
study will now qualitative analyze three case studies. The media analysis of issue 
salience in this chapter has helped identify the “turning points” in the public salience of 
different financial domains and highlight noticeable differences in the level of public 
attention across the different cases and across national contexts. The rest of this study 
will analyze the impact that these variations in the degree of public attention had over 
the policymaking process. How has the increase in the public salience of derivatives, 
hedge funds, and rating agencies altered the incentives of elected officials in the 
	   127 
jurisdictions that exercise the greatest influence over the international agenda? To what 
extent did the conduct of elected officials during the crisis differ from the past? How have 
different degrees of public salience in Europe and in the US influenced dynamics 
between politicians, regulators, and their respective industries in these two contexts? 
These are some of the questions that will be addressed in the analysis of the three case 
studies in rest of this study. 
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Chapter 4. OTC Derivatives 
 
4.1 Plan of the Chapter 
This chapter will discuss the evolution of the international regime governing derivatives 
markets in light of the theoretical model presented in the previous chapter. Although 
many of the regulatory approaches covering these instruments also apply to other 
classes of derivatives, the particular focus of this chapter will be  one class of these 
instruments, that is, credit derivatives (CDS). Credit derivatives are instruments used to 
transfer the credit risk of an obligation without transferring the ownership of the 
underlying asset. There are two reasons for this specific focus. First, in the years 
preceding the crisis, credit derivatives were one of the fastest-growing corners of the 
derivatives markets. Since the creation of the first “credit derivative swap” (CDS) 
contract by Bankers Trust in 1993, the size of the market has exploded, growing to $4 
trillion by the end of 2003 and over $60 trillion at the end of 2007.1 However, the 
exponential growth in the volume of OTC derivatives markets has occurred outside of 
the direct oversight of public regulatory authorities in the major jurisdictions. In fact, the 
regulation of derivatives markets has been presented as one of the main examples of 
private governance in the regulation of finance.2 
Second, the regulation of these markets has occupied a central place in the regulatory 
agenda triggered by the global financial crisis, as credit derivatives were at the heart of 
some of the most pivotal events associated with the crisis. For instance, the emergency 
bailout of the US bank Bear Stearns in March 2008 was influenced by alarm over how 
the failure of a major counterparty in these markets might affect the market. Such risks 
materialized themselves only six months later with the failure of Lehman Brothers on 
September 15, 2008. Lehman was also an actively traded reference entity, and the lack 
of transparency regarding the total amount of CDS that had been written on its debt and 
who owned these contracts contributed to spreading panic in the markets.3  A third case 
came with the quasi-collapse of insurance AIG, the result of the severely mispriced risk 
attached to the $440 billion in swaps underwritten by its Financial Products division, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  The outstanding notion amount on these markets have later halved during the crisis as a result of the “compression” 
operations put in place by the industry to eliminate the offsetting contracts.  See Kiff, Elliott, Kazarian, Scarlata, & 
Spackman 2009.	  
2 Tsingou 2006. 
3 For a review of the role of derivatives in the case of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, see European Commission 
2009a; Jeffs, Schultes, & Vaughan 2008. 
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many of which were selling protection to other institutions on losses on their holdings of 
CDOs. The systemic importance of AIG and the losses that its failure would have 
imposed upon other banks led the US Federal Reserve to provide it with an $85 billion 
line of credit.  
Besides these three institutions, CDS were also involved in the case of other financial 
institutions that triggered CDS contracts, such as the three leading Icelandic banks, 
Glitner, Landsbanki, and Kaupthing; the US bank Washington Mutual; as well as Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae, where the decision by the US government to put them under 
conservatorship triggered CDS contracts. Moreover, the end of the banking crisis has 
not driven credit derivatives to fall out of the regulatory agenda. In particular, during the 
European debt crisis of 2010-11 different European policymakers denounced how 
financial institutions were deliberately manipulating the price of credit derivatives for 
Greek sovereign debt in order to influence the price of funding in the Greek bond 
markets. 
These events highlighted the potential for systemic disruption that could emerge if one of 
the parties in a derivative transaction could not meet its side of the bargain (so-called 
“counterparty risk”), and the possibility that the fear of such occurrence may trigger a 
“run” and also generate losses for market actors that had no direct exposure to the 
original derivative counterparty.4 More generally, the crisis put into question the notion of 
credit derivatives as instruments capable of mitigating credit risk in the financial system. 
On the contrary, credit derivatives are now often described as “manufacturing” risk” 
increasing the level of leverage,5 increasing much of the interconnectedness between 
financial institutions,6 and creating opportunities for market manipulation and for market 
actors to speculate on a borrower’s credit quality.7  
Despite the risk surrounding CDS, the reversal of the international market-based 
approach that had governed derivatives markets before the crisis and the negotiation of 
a wide set of international commitments to shift the authority for regulating these markets 
into the hands of public regulatory authorities during the crisis cannot be easily explained 
by the theoretical explanations presented in Chapter 2. While the crisis has revealed 
significant risks associated with derivatives markets, this event cannot be regarded as 
the unique cause of the decision to address these challenges through direct regulation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Kiff et al. 2009; Duffie, Li, & Lubke 2010.  
5 Das 2009.	  
6 G30 2009, p. 59. 
7  Kiff et al. 2009. 
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rather than market-based mechanisms. Previous episodes of instability associated with 
the derivatives markets had led policymakers to solicit a market-based response, and 
this approach in fact dominated the initial response to the crisis. Moreover, as argued in 
chapter 2, the dynamics that have informed the shift in the international agenda are 
somewhat puzzling. The key role in promoting this change in the international agenda 
has been played by US authorities, who should have the greatest stake in the 
maintenance of a market-based regime built by the mostly US-based firms dominating 
the derivatives markets. 
Most existing accounts of the transnational private regime governing derivatives before 
the crisis have focused on the role of financial industry groups in designing this market-
based architecture. However, the first part of this chapter (4.2) will investigate the 
sources of this regime in the domestic political economy of the United States, where the 
majority of derivatives dealers are based and whose regulatory authorities exercise the 
greatest influence over the international regulatory agenda. In line with the theoretical 
framework presented in the previous chapter, this part of the chapter will investigate the 
sources of a set of political decisions taken since the early 1990s by the US Congress to 
leave OTC derivatives markets largely outside the purview of federal regulatory 
authorities. Section 4.3 will analyze the sources of the continuation of this market-based 
regulatory approach during the initial regulatory response to the crisis. Section 4.4 will 
then explore the changes brought within the US policymaking process by the heightened 
public attention towards the regulation of derivatives markets brought by the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and subsequent events. This section will discuss 
the impact that this increase in the level of scrutiny had in altering the electoral 
incentives for US Congresspersons and other elected officials to assert public oversight 
over these markets. The final parts of this chapter (4.5 and 4.6) will shift and look at how 
similar developments occurred in Europe, where the approach of regulators has closely 
mirrored the US one. Section 4.6 will specifically discuss how the Eurozone debt crisis 
has re-opened the debate over the regulation of derivatives in Europe. The domestic 
realignment of preferences within the United States and Europe in favor of extending 
direct regulatory oversight over the main actors operating in OTC derivatives markets is 
the primary source of the shift in the international agenda. 
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4.2 The US Roots of the Transnational Private Regime Governing OTC Derivatives 
As argued before, derivatives markets, and in particular credit derivatives, represented 
one of the fastest growing segments in financial markets in the years before the crisis. 
The growth of these markets, however, did not arise in a complete regulatory vacuum. 
Since the late 1980s, a set of self-regulatory initiatives designed by the same banks that 
have acted as dealers in derivatives markets has played a critical role in providing the 
legal bases on which the growing volume of transactions has flourished outside of 
regulated exchanges, in the so-called OTC markets. The leading role in coordinating 
these measures has been played by an association of dealers created in 1984 under the 
name of the International Swap Dealers Association, and later renamed the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).8 ISDA initially focused on standardizing 
swap documentation in order to increase the legal certainty of these transactions, 
providing a first “Code of Standard Working Assumptions and Provisions for Swaps,” 
which later evolved in 1988 into a “Master Agreement” for swaps transactions.9  
While the Master Agreement provided the cornerstone of the new self-regulatory regime, 
ISDA was not alone in solidifying the self-regulatory foundations of OTC derivatives 
markets. The initiatives of other industry associations gradually complemented the work 
of the ISDA, expanding this self-regulatory regime to different corners of growing 
derivatives markets. For instance, the Emerging Markets Traders Association adapted 
the Master Agreement to the needs of emerging markets derivatives transactions.  This 
continued in 1995, when the US-based Financial Industry Association published a series 
of guidelines to address credit and operational risk in the industry, as well as convening 
a “Global Task Force on Financial Integrity”, where the main exchanges and clearing 
organization established a framework to share information after the occurrence of certain 
events.10 Also in 1995, six major derivative dealers forming the Derivatives Policy Group 
published a “Framework for Voluntary Oversight of the OTC Derivatives Activities of 
Securities Firm Affiliates to Promote Confidence and Stability in Financial Markets,” 
detailing a set of standards to promote better disclosure of information to the 
counterparties as well as to regulators.11 In 2000, several different financial markets 
trade associations developed a Cross Product Master Agreement in order to improve the 
management of counterparty risk. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Coleman 2003. 
9 Coleman 2003; Tsingou 2006. 
10 Coleman 2003. 
11 Faerman, McCaffrey, & Van Slyke 2001; Tsingou 2003. 
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Besides these dealer groups, Tsingou has also highlighted the role played by the G30, a 
private sector group of high profile individuals whose membership comprised both 
industry representatives and experts from outside the private sector. 12  The G30 
produced an influential report in 1993 entitled “Derivatives: Practices and Principles,” a 
set of recommendations directed both at private market actors and policymakers. These 
recommendations in turn provided the framework for the publication of further guidelines 
by the Institute of International Finance and the London Investment Banking Association, 
and they were incorporated into the practices of a large number of financial institutions.13  
These self-regulatory measures not only played a crucial role in favoring the growth of 
OTC derivatives markets in the years before the crisis but also were instrumental in 
preserving the status of these markets outside of the public regulatory umbrella. ISDA 
and other industry-driven bodies increasingly sought to convey the message that the 
industry was sufficiently capable of taking care of the regulation of the sector and no 
additional public regulation was required. According to Tsingou, “the industry was keen 
to establish that OTC derivatives required no special treatment but instead constituted 
one of several instruments used by financial institutions for risk-management purposes. 
In this context, the private sector seized the initiative and appeared to be dealing with 
the subject of OTC derivatives responsibly, thus pre-empting regulatory interference.”14  
While the steps taken by the industry to provide order to these growing markets and 
keep them free from burdensome regulatory requirements are the primary cause of the 
emergence of the transnational regulatory regime that sustained OTC derivatives 
markets before the crisis, the acceptance of this regime by international regulatory 
institutions is more puzzling. The growing size of the OTC derivatives markets and their 
popularity beyond the financial institutions that first created them, including less 
sophisticated users, generated new concerns since the early 1990s regarding the 
suitability of these products and the risks they posed. Nevertheless, the initiatives 
adopted over this period by international regulatory institutions never sought to challenge 
the market-based nature of OTC derivatives markets regulation, nor did they seek to 
assert direct regulatory oversight.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Tsingou 2003. 
13 Tsingou 2003. 
14 In particular, Tsingou argues that the G30 report played an important role in shaping the policy discussion and making 
self-regulation the “focal point”. The G30 report conveyed the message that “responsible and efficient self-regulation was 
key to the use of derivatives, as intrusive rule-based regulation can render these instruments rigid and hamper financial 
innovation”, and it was instrumental in demonstrating  “that the private sector had the expertise, capacity and incentive to 
self-regulate”. Tsingou 2006, p. 169-175. 
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In 1994 both the BCBS15 and the Technical Committee of IOSCO16 released a set of 
recommendations concerning OTC derivatives markets. However, as Tsingou 
documents, the focus on self-regulation that characterized the industry-driven initiatives 
also informed these reports. Neither of these two reports called for regulatory authorities 
to interfere directly in the derivatives markets, instead endorsing an approach based on 
enhanced self-regulatory measures by the industry.17 The recommendations released by 
the BCBS and IOSCO summarized the best practices of the major financial institutions 
and provided further guidance to the industry. Tsingou argues, “The reports show that 
both the Basel Committee and IOSCO have accepted a role of limited involvement; they 
have centered their work on promoting a better foundation for self-regulation, which 
amounts to reviewing progress in the area of disclosure”. 18   Despite such limited 
reccomendations, since these IOSCO and BCBS initiatives in the early 1990s, 
derivatives have remained on the agenda of international regulatory bodies. From 1996, 
the BIS has regularly monitored the size of the OTC derivatives markets and published 
annual surveys about derivatives activities of banks and securities firms.19 However, 
throughout this period no major official international initiatives challenged the self-
regulatory status of the derivatives markets.  
In order to explain the acceptance of this market-based approach during this period, we 
need to investigate the preferences brought to the table of these international regulatory 
institutions from the country where the majority of derivative dealers are based, that is 
the United States.  
Derivatives regulation entered into the US domestic agenda in 1994, when the sudden 
turn in interest rates created significant losses for Orange County Municipality, which 
had entered in a complex set of transactions involving derivatives in order to raise 
additional revenues.20 The blow to the reputation of OTC derivatives markets was further 
amplified by two other corporate scandals concerning the use of OTC derivatives 
occurred in the same year. The first involved the transaction between Gibson Greetings 
and Bankers Trust; the second was between the same Bankers Trust and a larger 
corporation, Proctor & Gamble, which resulted in losses of $160 million for P&G.21 In 
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18 Tsingou 2006. 
19 Coleman 2003. 
20 Faerman et al. 2001; Huang, Krawiec, & Partnoy 2001; Tsingou 2003. 
21 Tsingou 2003. 
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both cases, later investigations demonstrated that the bank had not acted in the interest 
of the less sophisticated client. 
These scandals raised the public profile of derivatives and increased the momentum 
behind different initiatives to regulate derivatives markets that had already made their 
way into the agenda of the US Congress.22 Two years before the Orange County 
scandal, Rep. Markey had asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to 
analyze the implications of the growth in derivatives markets. With words that in many 
ways predicted what occurred with the collapse of Lehman Brothers 14 years later, a 
1994 GAO report warned that the “combination of global involvement, concentration, and 
linkages means that the sudden failure or abrupt withdrawal from trading of any of these 
large US dealers could cause liquidity problems in the markets and could also pose risks 
to the others, including federally insured banks and the financial system as a whole.”23 
The report acknowledged that in this case the government “would be likely to intervene 
to keep the financial system functioning in cases of severe financial stress,” and this 
could “result in a financial bailout paid for or guaranteed by taxpayers.” 24 The GAO 
report denounced how the most significant activities on the OTC derivatives markets 
were conducted by unregistered affiliates of US banks and therefore remained outside of 
the oversight of federal regulators, and it urged Congress to rectify this gap and bring 
derivatives under regulatory authorities. 25	  
In the following months, different members of Congress introduced four different 
legislative proposals to rectify the gaps highlighted by the GAO report, which would have 
effectively ended the self-regulatory status of the industry. In May 1994, Congressmen 
Henry Gonzalez and James Leach introduced a bipartisan bill (“Derivatives Safety and 
Soundness Supervision Act of 1994”) to mandate increased regulatory oversight of 
derivatives by banking and other federal regulatory agencies, as well as to require the 
Treasury to request a study examining the international supervision and regulation of 
derivatives in an effort to improve international regulatory coordination26. This bill was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Maxfield 2011. 
23 GAO 1994, p. 2. 
24 GAO 1994, p. 2. 
25 The GAO report stated: ““Given the gaps and weaknesses that impede regulatory preparedness for dealing with a 
financial crisis associated with derivatives, we recommend that Congress require federal regulation of the safety and 
soundness of all major US OTC derivatives dealers. The immediate need is for Congress to bring the currently 
unregulated OTC derivatives activities of securities and insurance firm affiliates under the purview of one or  more of the 
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oversee OTC activities and to anticipate or respond to any financial crisis involving derivatives”. See GAO 1994, p. 3. 
26 The bill is available at: http://www.archive.org/details/hrderivativessa00insugoog. The proposed legislation would have 
imposed on federal regulators these requirements: “consistent regulations on capital, disclosure, accounting, and 
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followed by the “Derivatives Limitations Act of 1994,” presented by Senators Byron 
Dorgan and Barbara Mikulski to prohibit federally-insured depository institutions from 
engaging in any significant derivatives activity.27 The “Derivatives Supervision Act of 
1994,” presented in July by Senator Donald Riegle, required the introduction of 
standards for capital, accounting, disclosure, suitability, and internal oversight of 
institutions involved with derivatives, in addition to prohibiting federally-insured 
depository institutions from engaging in derivatives transactions for their own account. 
Moreover, Sen. Riegle’s bill also addressed the problem of the systemic risk posed by 
OTC derivatives markets, requiring regulators to “promulgate appropriate regulations to 
require regulated entities and major dealers to increase use of clearinghouses and 
multilateral netting agreements; reduce intraday debit positions; shorten intervals 
between financial transactions in cash markets and their final settlement; shorten 
intervals between delivery of and payment for financial products; and otherwise reduce 
payments and settlement risk."28 Finally, in July 1994 Rep. Edward Markey introduced a 
legislative proposal (“Derivatives Dealers Act of 1994”) to amend the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 in order to expand the jurisdiction of the SEC over OTC 
derivatives, subjecting all the previously unregulated dealers to SEC oversight.29 Despite 
the severity of the charges against derivatives markets, neither these legislative 
proposals nor similar proposals presented in the following years were turned into 
legislation.30 How can we explain the refusal by the Congress to seriously consider 
proposals to regulate derivatives and the overall support for self-regulation that 
characterized the US Congress during this period?  
A closer look at the debates surrounding these bills is helpful to identify what concerns 
and forces shaped the position of the majority of the US Congress. First, the legislative 
proposals coming from Congress to regulate OTC derivatives markets were 
unsurprisingly resisted by the banking industry, which defended the self-regulatory 
initiatives taken by the industry on the basis of the recommendations released by the 
G30. In particular, Tsingou has argued that dealers were able to capitalize on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
suitability; consistent examination guidelines across agencies; enhanced supervision of risk management processes and 
systems; and, additional reporting requirements for derivatives participants” 
27 The bill is available at: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d103:28:./temp/~bdghos: 
28 The bill is available at: http://archive.org/details/hr4503derivative1994unit/ 
29 Culp & Mackay 1994. 
30 A similar outcome also characterized other legislative proposals introduced in Congress in a later period, such as the 
bill introduced almost a decade later in the aftermath of the Enron scandal (march 2003) by Sen. Dianne Feinstein to give 
the CFTC the authority to investigate and punish manipulation in the energy derivatives markets. Also in this case, 
Congress decided not to take up this legislative proposal. 
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superior expertise demonstrated in the G30 report and their self-regulatory initiatives. 
This report proved to be a particularly important resource for the industry in such a 
technical area as derivatives regulation and helped to convince policymakers to accept 
the expertise of the private sector.31 
Furthermore, besides praising the effectiveness of the self-regulatory measures taken by 
the industry, financial lobbies also highlighted the implications that regulating derivatives 
would have on the competitiveness of US financial firms and the risk that bringing OTC 
derivatives markets under a more stringent regulatory regime would have the effect of 
shifting highly mobile market activities such as derivatives away from New York towards 
London.32 These concerns resonated heavily in the report presented in 1999 by the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, which argued that any attempt to 
regulate OTC derivatives markets would have the effect of moving a share of the market 
towards London.33 Indeed, given the importance of the financial industry as a source of 
political contributions across both the Republican and Democratic parties and its weight 
in the economy, Congressmen maintained an interest in not introducing regulatory 
measures that may have damaged the US financial sector. Indeed, the promoter of the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act, Sen. Phil Gramm, justified the initiative by stating 
that the bill would “keep our markets modern, efficient and innovative, and it guarantees 
that the United States will maintain its global dominance of financial markets."34 
A second element surrounding Congressional debates was that the complexity of the 
issue and the limited expertise of US Congress in this area created strong incentives for 
individual Congressmen not to deviate from the position of regulatory agencies. The 
example of Sen. Trent Lott during the 2002 Congressional debate regarding whether 
OTC energy markets should be brought under the oversight of the CFTC is significant, 
as he told that most in Congress did not understand what a derivatives contract was: 
“We don't know what we are doing here. I have serious doubts how many senators really 
understand [this] and it sounds pretty complicated to me".35 Indeed, during this period 
federal regulatory agencies were among the most important advocates of keeping OTC 
derivatives market outside of their oversight. The Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the FDIC, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Reserve in turn 
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35 Jeremy Grant & Flood 2008. Mr Lott turned to his colleagues with a warning: "We don't know what we are doing here. I 
have serious doubts how many senators really understand [this] and it sounds pretty complicated to me."	  
	   137 
denied in front of Congress that legislation was necessary and expressed their belief that 
the existing regulatory framework was adequate, praising the self-regulatory initiatives 
undertaken by the industry.36 
Since the mid-1990s, the Federal Reserve has also encouraged market-based 
improvements in the governance of derivatives markets by releasing different 
supervisory letters to guide banks’ treatment of credit derivatives in their capital 
requirement regulation as well as to direct attention towards different risks associated 
with derivatives markets.37 The SEC went even further in promoting self-regulatory 
solutions for OTC derivatives. Following the increase in Congressional scrutiny towards 
derivatives, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt called the main firms involved in the marketing 
of OTC derivatives to address derivatives’ regulatory gaps collectively and “voluntarily.” 
The initiative by the SEC led to the formation of the Derivatives Policy Group, which in 
March 1995 released its “Framework for Voluntary Oversight.”38 According to Maxfield, 
the SEC acted in this circumstance “as a buffer between the industry and Congress” in 
order to prevent the introduction of direct regulation.39 Faerman, McCaffrey, and Van 
Slyke argue that “the SEC and CFTC wanted to get a tighter grip on the OTC derivatives 
market without being asked to implement what they thought would be crude legislation, 
although they were willing to ask for legislation if the industry was uncooperative.” 40 
Authors seeking to explain the position of the Federal Reserve and other federal 
regulatory agencies on the subject have frequently referred not only to the close relation 
with the financial industry, but also the ideological viewpoint that dominated in these 
agencies, in particular the Federal Reserve headed by Alan Greenspan. Johnson and 
Kwaw have also argued, “For Greenspan, the rapid growth of the derivatives market was 
proof that they were socially beneficial. He believed, like many free market purists, that 
markets are self-regulating, and that as long as market participants have sufficient 
information, they will be aware of any potential dangers and protect themselves from 
them, and therefore outcomes in an unregulated market are necessarily good.” 41  This 
view informed the position of the Federal Reserve for the entire tenure of Alan 
Greenspan. As Tsingou points out, even in 2003 when the BIS and other institutions had 
started to raise the alarm regarding the risks created by OTC derivatives markets, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Tsingou 2003. 
37 Maxfield 2011. 
38 Faerman et al. 2001. 
39 Maxfield 2011. 
40 Faerman et al. 2001, p. 378. 
41 Johnson & Kwak 2010, p. 103. 
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Greenspan continued to advocate the view that  derivatives were beneficial instruments 
that allowed risk to spread around the financial system.42 In the words of Greenspan in 
front of Senate Banking Committee in 2003: “Derivatives have been an extraordinarily 
useful vehicle to transfer risk from those who shouldn’t be taking it to those who are 
willing to and are capable of doing so… The vast increase in the size of the over-the-
counter derivatives markets is the result of the market finding them a very useful 
vehicle.” According to Greenspan, it would have been a mistake going beyond the 
existing degree of regulation, since “derivative transactions are transactions amongst 
professionals.”43 
However, the extent of the ideological consensus among US regulatory agencies 
regarding the benefits of the existing self-regulatory model should not be overstated, as 
disagreement remained among these agencies. In particular, in 1997 Brooksley Born, 
the new head of the CFTC, called for a study on the growing range of OTC transactions 
occurring outside the public oversight to evaluate whether these should be brought 
under the federal regulatory umbrella. She also published a concept paper analysing 
how the CFTC could regulate the sector. In May 1998, the CFTC issued a report 
advocating greater disclosure in derivatives markets.44 
The view expressed by the CFTC under Born was nevertheless directly opposed by the 
other major Federal regulatory agencies, in particular Greenspan’s Federal Reserve, the 
SEC headed by Arthur Levitt, and the US Treasury under Secretary Robert Rubin. In a 
join statement, Greenspan, Rubin, and Levin raised “grave concerns” regarding the 
proposal presented by the CFTC.45 In the end, the disagreement between the different 
regulatory agencies was won by those opposing the regulation of the industry, and Born 
resigned in May 1999 from her position as CFTC chairman. After her departure, the 
President’s Working Group issued a report in November 1999 recommending legislation 
to exempt most derivatives from federal oversight.46  Following this report, Congress 
passed the “Commodity Futures Modernization Act” in 2000. This act, passed at the end 
of the 106th Congress, solidified the self-regulatory status of OTC derivatives markets by 
explicitly prohibiting regulators from regulating them.47 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Tsingou 2009. 
43 Johnson & Kwak 2010, p. 102. See also Greenspan 1997; Greenspan 2001. 
44 CFTC 1998. 
45 Barth et al. 2012, p. 98. 
46 PWG 1999b. 
47 Tett 2009. 
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Certainly, the common front created by financial industry groups and regulatory 
authorities in support of a self-regulatory regime goes a long way in explaining the 
limited support for measures seeking to directly regulate these sectors. However, it 
would be wrong to consider lawmakers as passively accepting the preferences 
expressed by the financial industry and regulators. Instead, it is important to consider 
how the low policy salience of this debate for most of the 1990s weakened the electoral 
incentives for most members of the US Congress to deviate from the preferences 
expressed by regulators and industry. As Figure 11 illustrates, while the events 
described above generated attention towards the regulatory status of derivatives, the 
issue saliency remained short-lived or regionally focused. The collapse of the hedge 
fund LTCM in 1998 failed to galvanize the attention of the public towards the regulation 
of derivatives despite the fact that these products weighed heavily in the trading strategy 
of the US hedge fund.   
The lack of sustained public attention limited the incentives for the Democrats who 
controlled the Congress in 1994 to pass any proposed legislation. As Maxfield argues, 
“Democrats were on the political defensive and scared to move any controversial 
legislation.” 48  This substantial degree of public inattentiveness towards derivatives 
throughout the 1990s also informed the passage of the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act. The bill was was introduced at the end of 106th Congress into an 
11,000 page omnibus appropriations bill during a lame-duck session, only four minutes 
before the beginning of the final considerations of the report. Neither the majority of 
Congressmen nor the public through the press paid significant attention to this initiative, 
which was approved by the Senate on a voice vote. 49   
In a nutshell, the decision by US Congress not to support different legislative proposals 
seeking to bring OTC derivatives markets within the purview of federal regulatory 
authorities was as important as the measures adopted by the financial industry in 
creating the bases for the emergence of the transnational private governance regime 
that governed derivatives markets before the crisis.  In seeking to identify the sources of 
these choices, this section has highlighted not only the preferences of the financial 
industry and most US regulatory authorities in favor of self-regulation, but also it has 
shown the limited incentives for elected politicians to challenge this position given the 
low salience of the issue throughout most of the period before the crisis of 2007-2010. 
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The continuation of this configuration of preferences within the US in the decade that 
preceded the crisis is one of the key factors explaining the lack of attempts to regulate 
derivatives markets at the international level after 1994, despite the growing alarms 
regarding the risks in these markets launched by organizations such as the BIS. 50   
	  
Figure 11 - Coverage of Derivatives in the US Media Before the Crisis (1994-2006) 
  
  
4.3 The Continuation of Self-Regulation under the Shadow of the Fed  
In April 2007, the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors stated that “the 
emergence of advanced financial techniques, such as credit derivatives, have 
contributed significantly to the efficiency of the financial system.”51 Only a few months 
later, however, the emergence of new instability forced the international regulatory 
community to reconsider their optimism towards the contribution of derivatives to the 
functioning of financial markets.  
When the Financial Stability Forum presented the first internationally coordinated 
response to the crisis in April 2008, derivatives figured prominently in the agenda. The 
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FSF acknowledged that “initiatives are required to make the operational infrastructure for 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives more robust”. In particular, the FSF called for 
amendments to the documentation of credit derivatives to allow for cash settlement of 
obligations, greater automation of trades, and for measures to strengthen the 
infrastructure supporting OTC derivatives markets.52  
However, it is important to note that regulators did not abandon the emphasis on 
industry-driven solutions that had emerged before the crisis. These recommendations 
were directed respectively to “market participants” and to the “financial industry” rather 
than to regulatory authorities.53 During its initial report in April 2008, the FSF self limited 
the role of public authorities to that of “encourag[ing] market participants to act promptly 
to ensure that the settlement, legal and operational infrastructure for over-the-counter 
derivatives is sound.”54 Similarly, in the follow-up report published in October 2008, the 
FSF envisioned the role of authorities as “maintaining momentum in developing and 
implementing the recommended actions effectively and in full.”55   
Indeed, the continuation of the support towards a market-based solution that 
characterized the international regulatory community in their initial regulatory response 
reflected the fact that the outbreak of the crisis did not undermine the domestic 
configuration of interests in the US that had supported the market this arrangement 
before the crisis. The same US federal regulatory authorities that before the crisis had 
demanded Congress to exempt derivatives from federal oversight returned to the issue 
of derivatives at the outset of the crisis. The report published at the beginning of 2007 
acknowledged that the infrastructure designed by the industry before the crisis had not 
kept pace with the explosion in these instruments complexity and the surging trading 
volumes.  In line with the approach adopted before the crisis, however, US federal 
authorities did not call for an extension of the regulatory net over these markets but 
rather invited the industry to address shortcomings in the infrastructure of derivatives 
markets through self-regulatory initiatives.56 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 FSF 2008b, p.21. More specifically, the FSF demanded “market participants” to “amend standard credit derivative trade 
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US regulatory agencies played a very active role in guiding the numerous self-regulatory 
changes in the operation of derivatives markets undertaken by the financial industry 
during the initial stage of the crisis. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York especially 
took a leading role in spurring these self-regulatory improvements. Since before the 
crisis, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had expressed concern over the rapid 
growth of the credit derivatives markets and the operational risks that emerged from the 
difficulty of the existing market infrastructures in supporting this. Then head of the New 
York Federal Reserve Timothy Geithner organized the first of a series of meetings with 
representatives of major market participants on September 15, 2005 to push them to 
address those vulnerabilities that could prove destabilizing should a crisis hit, such as 
the significant backlogs of unconfirmed or unprocessed trades.57The outbreak of the 
crisis reinforced the urgency of these self-regulatory improvements to the governance of 
derivatives markets, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York summoned a senior 
industry leadership group called the Operations Management Group in a series of 
closed-door meetings. This group was formed by the major derivatives dealers, buy-side 
actors, and major financial industry groups such as the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, the main US hedge fund managers’ group (the Managed Funds 
Association), and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), 
collectively accounting for more than 90% of all credit-derivatives trades.58 
These market actors quickly took steps to deliver the improvements in the operational 
infrastructures of the markets demanded by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Over the course of 2008, industry participants publicly committed to implement self-
regulatory measures to enhance the processing of derivatives traded over-the-counter, 
to expand automation of credit derivatives trade processing, and to submit a greater 
number of electronically eligible credit derivatives on electronic confirmation platforms 59 
in order to reduce OTC trade confirmation backlogs. 60  Derivatives dealers also 
committed in June 2008 to reduce counterparty credit exposure and operational risk by 
decreasing the enormous volume of outstanding credit derivatives trades through a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
promptly set…”, to “urge the industry to amend…” and “ask the industry to develop…” regulatory initiatives to address 
these shortcomings. PWG 2008 
57 Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2005. 
58 Two weeks after the publication of the PWG report, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York welcomed the commitments 
announced by the major derivatives dealers. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2008c 
59 Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2008c; 2008e.	  
60 Industry-driven initiatives to achieve these goals had been developed since 2005, and at the beginning of the crisis the 
industry claimed to have made significant progresses in this direction.  The number of credit derivatives traded on 
electronic platforms has increased from 53% to more than 90%, while the number of credit derivatives confirmations 
outstanding more than 30 days had been reduced by 86%. Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2008d; See also 
Operations Management Group 2008b.	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process called “portfolio compression”—tearing up contracts that have essentially 
opposite positions over the same risk—and to execute daily collateralized portfolio 
reconciliations for collateralized portfolios.61  
Further demonstrating the direction of US regulators, the focus of the Federal Reserve at 
the outset of the crisis progressively shifted from strengthening the plumbing through 
which derivatives markets flow (i.e. operational infrastructures) towards taking initiatives 
to redirect these flows through central counterparties where bilateral trades could be 
cleared in order to mitigate counterparty risk.62 At the end of July 2008 the major dealers 
committed to support these clearing platforms, declaring that they would “(i) support a 
clearing platform and (ii) utilize such platform to clear all eligible products where 
practicable.”63 After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York extended the invitation to its series of closed-door meetings to the representatives 
of four potential CDS counterparties (Eurex, NYSE Euronext, CME Group/Citadel, and 
IntercontinentalExchange/The Clearing Corporation), together with the major dealers 
and buy-side firms, in order “to accelerate market adoption of central counterparty 
services.”64 This intervention of US regulatory authorities in steering the self-regulatory 
response went as far as seeking to shift the balance of power between different private 
actors.  In particular, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York sought to dilute the role of 
derivative dealers (the sell-side), which have traditionally dominated the market, in 
favour of buy-side actors by manipulating the composition of the private sector 
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the collective credit of the clearinghouse and all its members to the credit of a single counterparty. Moreover, CCPs were 
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establishment of a central platform for clearing certain types of OTC credit derivatives – called ICE US Trust, followed by 
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64 Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2008a. On October 31, 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York stated: “As 
the primary authorities with regulatory responsibility over U.S. CDS CCP proposals, the Commodity Futures Trading 
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cooperatively reviewing the risk management designs of the U.S. CDS CCP proposals with the objective of granting 
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contingent invited to the closed-door meetings.65 In June 2009, invitations were also 
extended to buy-side clients and hedge fund associations for the first time.66 
On balance, the continuation of the self-regulatory approach that informed the early 
international response to the crisis occurred in the shadow of the New York Federal 
Reserve. At the same time, it is important to point out that the Federal Reserve and 
other US federal regulators continued during this period to downplay the need for any 
action by Congress to give them greater oversight and regulatory authority over OTC 
derivatives markets. In the period that preceded the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the 
SEC, Federal Reserve, and CFTC did not demand any new legislation from Congress. 
Kathryn Dick of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the body that oversees 
some of the largest banks dealing in the CDS markets, was explicit on this point during a 
Senate Banking subcommittee hearing in July 2008: “[W]e do not see a need for 
legislative intervention to supplement our ability to regulate the credit derivatives of 
national banks".67 Clearly, the continuous leadership role played by federal regulatory 
agencies within the US domestic political process during this period and their preference 
for self-regulation were an important determinants of the continued reliance on self-
regulation that also informed the international agenda during this period.  
 
4.4 Derivatives in the Congressional Agenda 
While during the initial regulatory response to the crisis, regulatory agencies continued to 
interpret their role in the regulation of derivatives primarily as that of steering the self-
regulatory measures of the industry, this approach came to be questioned by the US 
Congress. The first shot fired against this approach came from the influential Sen. 
Charles Schumer, who in June 2008 questioned whether the plan presented by the main 
derivative dealers of voluntarily clearing their CDS trades through a central counterparty 
(CCP) was sufficient to mitigate systemic risk. In a letter directed to the chairmen of the 
CFTC, SEC, and Federal Reserve, Schumer argued, "I am very concerned that the 
regulatory oversight of the credit derivatives market, like the regulatory oversight of the 
housing market, has been too lax for too long...We cannot wait for the next crisis before 
we act to rein in this risk. It is clear that the hands-off approach that U.S. financial 
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regulators have long taken towards over-the-counter (OTC) credit derivatives is no 
longer appropriate in today's global and interconnected markets."68 
Despite this early concern, the issue of derivatives regulation formally re-entered the 
Congressional agenda only after the default of Lehman Brothers, as Figure 12 
illustrates. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 passed by Congress at 
the beginning of October to bailout banking institutions in trouble also explicitly 
demanded the Treasury to review the regulation of over-the-counter swaps market and 
to provide recommendations on “(A) whether any participants in the financial markets 
that are currently outside the regulatory system should become subject to the regulatory 
system; and (B) enhancement of the clearing and settlement of over-the-counter 
swaps.”69  
 
Figure 12 - Number of Articles mentioning "Derivatives" in "Congressional 
Documents and Publications"70 
 
 
Besides spurring the US Treasury to act, the greater attention towards derivatives 
triggered by Lehman encouraged different Congressmen to present legislative proposals 
to regulate the sector. In October 2008, Sen. Tom Harkin announced a hearing on the 
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69 The text of the bill is available at: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr1424 
70 The “Congressional Documents and Publications” a wide variety of documents concerning the activity of US Congress, 
including legislative proposals, transcript of hearings, and press releases from individual Congressmen. It has been 
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issue of derivatives regulation. In the statement announcing this hearing, he argued: 
“Financial swaps or over-the-counter financial derivatives had been exempt from most 
regulations since 1993 …I firmly believe we have to revisit and examine very carefully 
how these financial swaps and derivatives are regulated – or really not regulated.” After 
a second hearing on October 14, Harkin stated, “It's clear we made a terrible mistake in 
2000 in excluding credit-default swaps from the CFTC."71  
Similarly to what occurred during the same period in other sectors, the crisis also 
created incentives for different Congressmen to reintroduce bills that had originally been 
introduced in previous sessions before the crisis but had failed to become law, some of 
which closely mirrored the proposals presented in the early 1990s. For instance, at the 
beginning of October 2008, Rep. Edward Markey announced its plan to reintroduce 
legislation he had first pushed for in 1994 to instruct the SEC to directly regulate 
derivatives. 72 In November, Sen. Harkin presented the “Derivatives Integrity Act of 
2008.”73 According to its sponsor the bill was an attempt to “undo…what was done in the 
early '90s and late '90s in terms of exempt [markets] and exclusions,” as well as to “end 
the unregulated ‘casino capitalism’ that has turned the swaps industry into a ticking time 
bomb”.74 This legislative proposal was followed by numerous other bills seeking to 
eliminate statutory exclusion of swap transactions from legislation, such as the “Financial 
Regulation Reform Act of 2008,” introduced by Sen. Susan Collins in November; the 
“Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009,” introduced by Rep. 
Collin Peterson in February; the bipartisan “Authorizing the Regulation of Swaps Act,” 
introduced in May 2009 by Sen. Carl Levin and Sen. Susan Collins; and the “Prevent 
Unfair Manipulation of Prices Act of 2009,” presented by Rep. Bart Stupak in May.75  
As the response to the Orange County scandal in 1994 demonstrates, this kind of 
legislative activism following an episode of financial instability was not unprecedented in 
the Congressional landscape. However, this time around, the default of Lehman 
Brothers and the bailout plan announced by the US Treasury created a political climate 
within the US Congress more favorable to these proposals. The default of Lehman 
Brothers also triggered a reverse in the position of the SEC and the CFTC. Blamed for 
having fallen “asleep at the wheel” in the aftermath of the bankruptcy of Lehman 
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74 Oil & Gas Journal 2008. 
75 The text of the Collins bill is available at: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr977. The text of the Levin and 
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Brothers, both the SEC and CFTC lamented their lack of authority over OTC derivatives. 
Speaking in front of the Senate Banking Committee a few days after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, the chairman of the SEC, Christopher Cox, urged Congress “to 
provide in statute the authority to regulate these products to enhance investor protection 
and ensure the operation of fair and orderly markets."76 The acting chairman of the 
CFTC, Walter Lukken, also recommended to the House Agriculture Committee that 
“regulatory reform should provide for clear enforcement authority over these products to 
police against fraud and manipulation."77     
The same request to Congress to be granted oversight over derivatives markets was 
also put forward by the new chairmen of SEC and CFTC appointed by President Barak 
Obama, Mary Schapiro. She stated during her confirmation hearing in Congress that 
credit-default swaps “absolutely” needed to come under federal regulation, and she 
requested a legislative act to grant her agency oversight over credit derivatives 
markets.78 The newly appointed head of the CFTC Gary Gensler also expressed his 
regret for not having pushed harder to bring OTC markets under greater regulation a 
decade earlier. Gensler acted as undersecretary of the Treasury in 2000 when Congress 
exempted OTC markets from regulatory oversight with the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act. Gensler vowed he would take a harder stance on bringing OTC 
derivatives trading under stricter controls.79 This reversal in the position of the SEC and 
CFTC helped in solidifying support within the main Congressional Committees for the 
legislative proposals seeking to regulate derivatives markets.  
The main point where the legislative proposals presented over this period differed was 
not whether to reverse the pre-crisis lack of regulation, but rather which regulator should 
be in charge of overseeing derivatives markets. One of the primary cleavages within 
Congress did not run across party lines, but rather between the House and Senate 
Financial Services and Banking committees on the one hand and the House and Senate 
Agriculture committees on the other hand. These committees defended the prerogatives 
of the regulatory agencies under their direct oversight, the SEC and CFTC respectively, 
by seeking to grant them primary responsibility to regulate these markets.80 This turf war 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76  Chung, van Duyn, & Davies 2008.	  
77  Lynch 2008a.	  
78 Crittenden 2009. Moreover, Schapiro went even further and presented in June 2009 a plan for bringing over-the-counter 
derivatives under federal securities laws. See Schapiro 2009.	  
79  Marron 2009.	  
80 The House Agriculture Committee Chairman Collin Peterson also raised doubts about the desirability of granting the 
SEC or the Federal Reserve the primary responsibility to regulate these markets, and its Derivatives Markets 
Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009 gave the CFTC the primary oversight over these markets derivatives. Also 
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was further broadened when the Energy and Commerce Committee entered the debate 
over the regulation of OTC derivatives markets, protesting that these legislative 
proposals would interfere with the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission.81 In the end, this turf war among different regulatory agencies was settled 
by splitting the jurisdiction over the supervision of the clearing of OTC derivatives 
between the SEC and CFTC.82  Nevertheless, none of the legislative proposals sought to 
defend the continuation of the self-regulatory approach endorsed by Congress with the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. While certain aspects of these 
legislations were opposed by Congressmen from the ranks of the Republican Party and 
a part of the Democratic Party known as “New Democrat Coalition,” the main alternative 
legislation coming from the other side of the aisle did not oppose the departure from the 
self-regulatory principle that informed the pre-crisis regulatory paradigm.83 
The proposals voted by the Congressional majority within both the House and the 
Senate quite closely followed the path presented by the US Treasury and did not 
challenge its expansion into the regulatory oversight over derivatives markets.84 The 
Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, which is Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act approved by both houses of 
Congress, removed the provisions of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 
that left the derivatives markets largely unregulated. It also introduced a comprehensive 
framework that would expand the grip of regulators over the main participants in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
another important legislative proposal debated by the Senate Agriculture Committee, that is the “Financial Regulation 
Reform Act of 2008” introduced by Senator Susan Collins, requested to report over-the-counter contracts to the CFTC. 
These proposals were instead opposed by the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee, 
the two committees sharing oversight over the SEC. The bill introduced in the Financial Services Committee by Rep. 
Edward Markey (the “Derivatives Market Reform Act”) requested derivative dealers to register with the SEC, thus granting 
this body “exclusive jurisdiction regarding accounts, agreements, transactions, and markets in derivatives”. The Chairman 
of the House Financial Services Committee Barney Frank has suggested instead limiting the authority of the CFTC to 
commodities that are “edible” (e.g. futures on agricultural products), while letting everything else under the jurisdiction of 
the SEC. See Lynch 2009a; Scannell 2009; Pagliari 2010; Davies 2009.	  
81  Platts 2009; Lynch 2009b.	  
82 Abbott 2009; Bloomberg 2009.	  
83  Chambliss, Shelby, & Gregg 2010.	  
84 Within the House, the task of reconciling the tension between the Financial Services Committee and the Agriculture 
Committee fell on the shoulder of the two chairman, Rep. Barney Frank and Rep. Collin Peterson. The two congressmen 
presented a shared draft in July 2009, before submitting two different bills to their respective committees. The “Over-the-
Counter Derivatives Market Act of 2009” was approved by the House Financial Services Committee on October 15 2009, 
while the House Agriculture Committee passed its legislation the following week (21 October). The two bills coming from 
the Financial Services and Agriculture Committee were reconciled at the beginning of December 2009. In the Senate, the 
leadership was instead taken by the Chairman of the Banking Committee Chris Dodd who presented on Nov 11 2009 a 
first legislative proposal directly building upon the US Treasury proposal, and dividing the authority to regulate these 
markets between the SEC and CFTC. This bill entitled “Restoring American Financial Stability Act” was approved by the 
US Senate Banking Committee in March 2010 (22 March 2010). Similarly to what occurred in the House, the bill 
presented by the Senate Banking Committee had to be reconciled with another bill out of the Agriculture Committee 
chaired by Sen. Blanche Lincoln. Sen. Lincoln presented her “The Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 
2010” on the 9th of April 2010 and this bill was voted by the Senate Agriculture Committee on the 21st of April 2010. The 
Dodd bill voted by the Senate Banking Committee and the Lincoln bill voted by the Agriculture Committee were later 
reconciled and voted by the whole Senate. In May 2010, a committee of Congressmen met to reconcile the bills approved 
by the House and the Senate	  
	   149 
derivatives markets, including derivatives dealers, major market participants, 
clearinghouses, and trade repositories. Besides requiring these market actors to register 
with federal regulators, the bill also subjected dealers to capital requirements, business 
conduct standards, reporting requirements, and initial margin requirements, as well as 
mandated the central clearing and trading of standardized derivatives.85 Moreover, the 
bill did not limit itself to regulating credit derivatives at the center of the crisis, but rather it 
encompassed nearly all commonly traded OTC derivatives, including options on interest 
rates, currencies, commodities, securities, indices, and various other financial or 
economic interests or property.86  
The activity of Congress and the US set the parameter not only for US legislation but 
also for the international agenda. When the US Treasury presented its legislative 
proposal, Treasury Secretary Geithner stated its intention to “continue to work with our 
international counterparts to help ensure that our strict and comprehensive regulatory 
regime for OTC derivatives is matched by a similarly effective regime in other 
countries.”87 Indeed, when G20 leaders met for the first time after the announcement of 
the legislation at the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009, their commitments did not 
depart from the parameters set up by the US Treasury, including the mandatory trading 
and clearing requirement for standardized contracts.88 Therefore, the main turning point 
in the international approach towards the regulation of derivatives, that is the extensive 
set of commitments adopted by G20 leaders at the Pittsburgh Summit, found its roots in 
the preferences towards this issue of US Congress and the US Administration.  
How can we explain the successful bid by Congress to regulate derivatives while in the 
past similar legislative proposals had failed to gather the same support? The central 
element to be considered is the different issue salience of derivatives regulation in the 
1990s versus during the global financial crisis. As discussed before in this chapter, 
legislative debates concerning the regulation of derivatives in the late 1990s were 
characterized by only very limited public attention towards the issue, thus limiting the 
incentives for the majority of the members of Congress to challenge the status quo 
supported by the financial industry and increasing their incentives to defer to the 
preferences of regulators and the financial industry. As demonstrated in the previous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Clearing organizations would be subject to margin and risk management requirements, default rates and procedures, 
settlement procedures and corporate governance, as well as record-keeping requirements, that is, to maintain records of 
all activities related to their clearing businesses and to report such information to regulators. 
86 The bill excluded commodity futures and physically settled sales of nonfinancial commodities for deferred shipment. 
87 Geithner 2009b.	  
88 G20 2009b. 
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chapter, the analysis of the media coverage of derivatives during the crisis reveals how 
the level of public attention towards the issue did not increase significantly during the 
first stage of the crisis. However, the public attention towards the issue increased 
markedly from the last part of 2008, continuing to rise steadily during the final stage of 
the Congressional debate surrounding the Dodd-Frank bill, as illustrated in Figure 13.  
Besides the bailouts of October 2008, other events also raised the prominence of the 
regulation of derivatives and decreased the importance of the support of the financial 
industry. A key turning point was the suit presented by the SEC against Goldman Sachs 
for its failure to disclose the role played by a major hedge fund in selecting a portfolio for 
a derivatives product it issued in 2007.89  As Bill Galston of the Brookings Institution 
commented, "In its timing and political value, the Goldman Sachs case is to financial 
reform what the Anthem Blue Cross [healthcare insurer] premium rate increases was to 
healthcare reform in February.”90 These episodes significantly turned public opinion 
against the attempts by the financial industry to limit the extent of the regulation of 
derivatives and therefore weakened the incentives for Congressmen—in particular in the 
Democratic Party—to adopt positions that could be perceived as too cosy with the 
financial industry. In a major reversal of the rhetoric that surrounded derivatives 
regulation in the 1990s and early 2000s, Congressmen supporting the legislation of 
derivatives frequently justified their position as in defense of taxpayers against the 
interests of financial institutions. In the same vein, President Obama intervened in 
person to declare that he would veto a bill that did not severely regulate derivatives91 
and that his administration would stand “firm against any attempt by the financial sector 
to avoid their responsibilities: in any future crisis the big financial companies must pay, 
not taxpayers."92  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 The Sec alleged that Goldman Sachs had committed fraud in marking this product, where customers had lost billions 
while Goldman had made money by betting against the product. 
90 Luce 2010. 
91  Favole 2010.	  
92 Marron 2010.	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Figure 13 - Coverage of Derivatives in US Press (2005-2011) 
 
  
Unlike in the pre-crisis period, the Congressional debate that followed the US Treasury 
proposal was characterized by a more adversarial tone between Congressmen and 
derivative dealers, and different proposals presented within Congress directly challenged 
the preferences of the dealers. For instance, derivative dealers supported the market-
based approach adopted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to push trades 
negotiated privately between counterparties through a central counterparty, which relied 
extensively on the input of market actors in determining which contracts should be 
cleared into CCPs and which ones kept outside of them.93However, when the regulation 
of derivative entered the Congressional agenda at the end of 2008, the main legislative 
proposals mandated the use of clearinghouses. The Derivatives Markets Transparency 
and Accountability Act of 2009, circulated by Rep. Peterson in January, required all OTC 
transactions to be cleared through a regulated clearinghouse, while giving the CFTC the 
authority exempt certain transactions from this requirement. The Derivatives Trading 
Integrity Act of 2009, introduced in January 2009 by the Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, Senator Tom Harkin, went beyond Peterson’s bill by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 In particular, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York announced its expectation that market participants would “set 
increasingly stringent targets over time” and it has worked throughout the crisis to push the dealers to expand the fraction 
of contracts cleared beyond the initial focus on credit derivatives market. Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2010 In 
September 2009, the major derivatives dealers made a series of individual commitments to submit at least 95% of their 
eligible trades to a central clearinghouse, while these targets were further increased in January 2010. See Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York 2010 In March 2010, ISDA announced that “more than 90 percent of new dealer-to-dealer 
volume of clearing-eligible Interest Rate Derivative products is now cleared through central counterparty clearing facilities 
(CCPs).  In addition, more than 90 percent of total dealer-to-dealer volume of clearing-eligible Credit Derivative products 
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proposing to force all derivatives contracts onto regulated exchanges, and therefore also 
onto central clearinghouses.94   
These proposals raised almost unanimous opposition from the interest groups that 
presented their views in front of Congress (see Table 8) and were ultimately not 
adopted. However, the legislative plan presented by the US Treasury in March 2009 still 
forced the central clearing of OTC derivatives with contracts that were regarded as 
sufficiently “standardized,” while promoting a greater use of CCPs by subjecting non-
standardized contracts to stricter capital requirements.95 This approach was opposed by 
the majority of derivative dealers, and some firms reportedly complained that the US 
Treasury has intentionally blindsided them in an attempt to maintain control of the 
legislative output, giving them almost no opportunity to review the proposal presented to 
Congress before its publication.96In sum, Congress had curtailed the control of dealers 
and clearinghouses regarding what contracts should be centrally cleared and 
significantly extended the responsibilities of regulators, although they did not push the 
intervention of regulation as far as covering all derivatives transactions.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 More specifically, the Harkin bill would terminate the authority of the CFTC to exempt swap transactions from the 
requirement to be traded on a regulated board of trade. In order to achieve this goal, the bill would amend the Commodity 
Exchange Act to eliminate the distinction between “excluded” and “exempt” commodities and transactions, and 
commodities and transactions traded or conducted on regulated exchanges. By forcing all the derivatives onto exchanges 
and clearinghouses, the bill would mark not only the end of the derivatives that are traded bilaterally over-the-counter but 
also significantly curtail the market for “customized” derivatives, since only derivatives that are sufficiently “standardized” 
can be centrally cleared. 	  
95 The proposal presented by Treasury Secretary and former head of the New York Fed Timothy Geithner in May 2009 
empowered the same central clearinghouses with the authority to decide what contracts are eligible for central clearing. 
Numerous policymakers, as well as the same derivative dealers comprising ISDA criticized this approach on the ground 
that for-profit clearinghouses may have an incentive to bolster their volume of contracts cleared by accepting contracts 
that are not safe to be cleared. Conversely, others denounced a different conflict of interest deriving from the fact that the 
largest clearinghouse for credit default swaps (ICE Trust) was controlled by a consortium of derivative dealers with an 
incentive to keep the most profitable swaps cleared bilaterally. See US Treasury 2009c; Morgenson 2009. This approach 
was altered by Congress which divided this power between rating agencies and regulators which required clearing 
organizations to submit all swaps that it sought to clear to the CFTC or SEC, which would determine whether the clearing 
requirement would apply to such swap or not. 
96 Derivatives Week 2009; Harper, Leising, & Harrington 2009.	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Table 8 - Preferences of Participants to Congressional Hearings regarding Central 
Clearing 
Witness Sector Date Comm Position on Clearing 
Craig Donohue - CME Infrastructure 9-7-08 S-Bank Demand regulators to foster 
competition among CCPs and 
exchanges. 
Robert Pickel - ISDA Banks 9-7-08 S-Bank No reference to central clearing. 
Robert Pickel - ISDA Banks 15-10-
08 
H-Ag No reference to central clearing. 
Pickel argues that the role of CDS 
in the crisis has been "greatly 
exaggerated." 
Jonhathan Shoft - ICE Infrastructure 15-10-
08 
H-Ag Support creating incentives for 
central clearing through higher 
capital requirements. 
Kimberly Taylor - CME Infrastructure 15-10-
08 
H-Ag Support for use of clearinghouses 
beyond inter-dealer trades. No 
position on regulation. 
Terence Duffy - CME Infrustructure 8-12-
08 
H-Ag Support mandatory CDS clearing. 
Specify that some trades are not 
clearable. 
Jonhathan Shoft -  ICE Infrastructure 8-12-
08 
H-Ag Supporte mandatory CDS 
clearing. Specify not every 
instrument should be cleared. 
John O'Neil - Liffe Euronext Infrastructure 8-12-
08 
H-Ag Support encouraging clearing of 
CDS contracts. Against mandatory 
clearing of non-standardized 
contracts. 
Thomas Book - Eurex Infrastructure 8-12-
08 
H-Ag Support mandatory clearing. 
Robert Pickel - ISDA Banks 8-12-
08 
H-Ag Support private-public dialogue as 
"the best way to achieve a high 
degree of clearing." Against 
clearing of custom-tailored 
transactions. 




H-Ag Support encouraging clearing on 
standardized CDS. 
Don Thompson -  JP Morgan Banks 8-12-
08 
H-Ag Against mandatory clearing 
solutions that would impede 
capacity to serve end-users. 
Support existing self-regulatory 
commitments. 
Gerald Corrigan - Goldman Sachs Banks 8-12-
08 
H-Ag In favour of mandatory clearing 
requirement. 
Murtagh - UBS Securities Banks 8-12-
08 
H-Ag In favour of mandatory clearing 
requirement. 
Tom Buis - National Farmers Union End-Users 3-2-09 H-Ag Generic endorsement of clearing 
all OTC transactions. 
John Damgard - Futures Industry 
Association 
Banks 3-2-09 H-Ag Against mandatory clearing of all 
OTC transactions that would 
"trigger a rush to overseas OTC 
markets and would be 
counterproductive to our national 
economic interests." Defend the 
importance of customized 
derivatives. Support measures 
encouraging of clearing through 
higher capital requirements. 
Michael Greenberger, University of 
Maryland 
Academia 3-2-09 H-Ag Support mandatory clearing. 
Michael Gooch - GFI Group Inter-dealer 
broker 
3-2-09 H-Ag Against mandating clearing of all 
CDS. 
Sean Cota - Petroleum Marketers 
Association of America 
End-Users 3-2-09 H-Ag Generic support clearing 
requirements to the OTC Trades. 
Terrence Duffy - CME Infrastructure 3-2-09 H-Ag Support mandatory clearing, but 
admit that some products may not 
be cleared. 
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Raniel Roth-  National Futures 
Association 
Banks 3-2-09 H-Ag Express concerns for the 
mandatory clearing of OTC 
derivatives. Call for granting 
regulators power to exempt 
contracts from mandatory clearing 
customized products. 
Slocum Tyson - Public Citizen Consumer's 
Group 
3-2-09 H-Ag Support mandatory clearing.  
Michael Masters - Masters Capital 
Management 
Hedge Fund 4-2-09 H-Ag Call for mandatory clearing and 
exchange trading of ALL OTC 
transactions. 
Jonathan Short - ICE Infrastructure 4-2-09 H-Ag Support encouraging clearing of 
standardized CDS. Call for leaving 
customized OTC instruments 
outside clearinghouses. 
Gary Taylor - National Cotton 
Council and American Cotton 
Shippers Association 
End-Users 4-2-09 H-Ag No action should be taken to 
discourage over-the-counter 
transactions with legitimate 
commercial purposes. 
Robert Pickel - ISDA Banks 4-2-09 H-Ag Oppose mandating clearing of all 
OTC contracts. Clearing should 
only be encouraged. 
Christopher Concannon - NASDAQ 
OMX 
Infrastructure 4-2-09 H-Ag Support mandatory clearing, but 
call giving regulators the power to 
exempt customized products. 
William Hale - Gargill End-Users 4-2-09 H-Ag Against mandatory clearing as it 
would "stifle activity in the OTC 
market and reduce hedging op- 
portunities in the agricultural and 
energy markets." 
Karl Cooper - NYSE Liffe Infrastructure 4-2-09 H-Ag Oppose mandatory clearing for all 
OTC contracts. Support 
empowering regulators to exempt 
customized products from 
centralized clearing. 
Paul Cicio - Industrial Energy 
Consumers of America 
End-Users 4-2-09 H-Ag Call for exempting commercial 
end-users from the clearing 
requirement. Only "speculator 
bilateral OTC transactions should 
be cleared." 
Mar Brickel - Blackbird Holdings Inter-dealer 
broker 
4-2-09 H-Ag ???? 
Thomas Book - Eurex Infrastructure 4-2-09 H-Ag Support mandatory clearing for 
suitable contracts but wide power 
for regulators to exempt contracts. 
Stuart Kaswell, MFA Hedge Fund 4-2-09 H-Ag Against mandatory clearing 
requirement for all OTC 
derivatives. Congress should 
"promote" central clearing and 
remove obstacle to creation of 
clearinghouses. 
JD Rosen, SIFMA Banks 4-2-09 H-Ag Against mandatory clearing. 
Clearing requirement defined as 
"unworkable" and "adversely 
affecting mainstream American 
companies." 
Brent Weisenborn, Agora-X Infrastructure 4-2-09 H-Ag Support for clearing all OTC 
commodity contracts. 
Donald Fewer, Standard Credit 
Group 
Broker/Dealer 4-2-09 H-Ag Central clearing should be 
encouraged by facilitating access 
to clearinghouses. 
David Dines - Cargill End-Users 4-6-09 S-Ag  Against mandatory clearing of 
customized derivatives since this 
would "reduce hedging activity" 
and "greatly restrict working 
capital at a time." Call for 
exempting from clearing 
requirement CDS that have not 
created systemic risk. 
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Daniel Driscoll - National Futures 
Association 
Banks 4-6-09 S-Ag ???? 
Mark Lenczowski - JP Morgan Banks 4-6-09 S-Ag All standardized OTC derivatives 
transactions between major 
market participants should be 
cleared through a regulated 
clearinghouse. 
Michael Masters - Masters Capital 
Management 
Hedge Fund 4-6-09 S-Ag Support US Treasury position in 
favour of mandatory clearing. 
Argue that it would lower costs for 
corporations. 
Donald Fewer - Standard Credit 
Group 
Broker/Dealer 9-6-09 H-Fin Support encourating use of CCP 
by providing open acces to 
clearinghouses. 
Robert Pickel - ISDA Banks 9-6-09 H-Fin Highlight the importance of 
preserving customized OTC 
derivatives. Not all OTC products 
can be cleared. 
Timothy Murphy - 3M End-users 9-6-09 H-Fin Against moving all derivatives into 
a clearinghouses. Call for 
exempting commercial end-users 
from margin requirements. 
Dan Thompson - JP Morgan Banks 9-6-09 H-Fin Call for clearing of all standardized 
derivatives transactions between 
systemically significant institutions. 
Christopher Ferreri - ICAP   Inter-dealer 
broker 
9-6-09 H-Fin Support mandatory clearing for the 
vast majority of trades, but argue 
that not all OTC can be cleared.  
Support continuous bilateral 
clearing for these contracts, while 
dealers could be incentivised to 
reduce the level of customized 
contracts. 
Thomas Callahan - NYSE Euronext Infrastructure 9-6-09 H-Fin Support mandatory clearing for 
standardized derivatives. 
Terrence Duffy - CME Infrastructure 9-6-09 H-Fin Oppose mandating clearing of 
OTC contracts because they 
would "induce certain market 
participants to transfer this 
business offshore, resulting in a 
loss to the US economy". Support 
incentives in the form of capital 
relief. 
Christopher Edmoncs - International 
Derivatives Clearing Group 
Infrastructure 9-6-09 H-Fin Against mandating clearing of all 
CDS. Argues that "the vast 
majority of transactions" is not 
suitable for central clearing. 
Jeffrey Sprecher - ICE Infrastructure 9-6-09 H-Fin Against forcing the clearing of all 
OTC derivatives since it would 
increase market risk. 
Larry Thompson - DTCC Trade 
Repository 
9-6-09 H-Fin ???? 




S-Bank Call for incentivizing use of central 
clearing through higher capital 
requirements. Advocate the 
continued use of customized 
derivatives.  Against exempting 
end-users from posting margins. 
Robert Pickel - ISDA Banks 22-6-
09 
S-Bank Against measures mandating 
clearing of all OTC products. 




S-Bank Favorable to move OTC 
derivatives into exchanges. 
John Hixson - Cargill End-Users 17-9-
09 
H-Ag Call for expanding exemptions of 
end-users from clearing 
requirements. 
Glenn English - National Rural 
Electric Cooperatives Association 
End-Users 17-9-
09 
H-Ag Demand to be exempted from 
clearing requirement and for 
removing higher capital 
requirements on non-standardized 
CDS. 
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H-Ag Support mandatory clearing of 
standardized derivatives but 
rejects that this requirement be 
extended also to transactions with 
end-users. Defend the importance 
of non-cleared transactions for 
end-users. 
Richard Hirst - Delta Air Lines End-Users 17-9-
09 
H-Ag Call for removing regulatory 
burdens over transactions where 
one counterparty is a physical 
hedger in commodity markets. 
Gary O'Connor - International 
Derivatives Clearing Group 
Infrastructure 17-9-
09 
H-Ag Support for mandatory clearing of 
standardized transactions. Against 
exempting end-users from clearing 
requirements ("Nor do we see why 
Corporate America should be 
immune from being part of the 
solution to the crisis we find 
ourselves in"). 




H-Ag Call for replacing mandatory 
central clearing with incentives to 
trade through a CCP. Call for 
exempting end-users from clearing 
requirements. 
Terrence Duffy - CME Infrastructure 17-9-
09 
H-Ag Warn that mandatory clearing may 
shift OTC business operations 
overseas. 
Robert Pickel - ISDA Banks 17-9-
09 
H-Ag Argue that not all standardized 
contracts can be cleared. 
Importance of retaining 
customization of derivatives for 
end-users to manage their risks. 
Regulatory framework should be 
defined by regulators. Call for 
exempting end-users from 
definition of major swap 
participant. 
Jonathan Short - ICE Infrastructure 17-9-
09 
H-Ag Mandating clearing would have 
unintended consequences, 
increasing risk to clearinghouses 
and increasing cost to commercial 
companies. 
Daniel Budofsky - SIFMA Banks 17-9-
09 
H-Ag SIFMA does not believe there is 
any reason for the government to 
mandate that business be 
transacted in this particular 
manner. Call for exempting end-
users from definition of major 
swap participant. 
John Hixson - Cargill End-Users 7-10-
09 
H-Fin n/a 
Scott Sleyster - Prudental Financial, 
American Council of Life Insurers 
Insurance 7-10-
09 
H-Fin Against "any bias toward 
compulsory clearing." This would 
increase the cost to end-users of 
hedging their risk. 
David Hall, Chatham Financial Corp Adviser 7-10-
09 
H-Fin Call for exempting end-users from 
clearing and trading requirements 
and to avoid requirements that 
would "create an extraordinary 
and unnecessary drain on working 
capital." 
James Hill - SIFMA Banks 7-10-
09 
H-Fin Support measures encouraging 
more clearing, but express 
concerns for the imposition of new 
capital requirements to cleared 
swaps. Oppose granting 
regulators the power to extend 
margin requirements upon end-
users. 
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Stuart Kaswell - MFA Hedge Funds 7-10-
09 
H-Fin Demand legislation to do more to 
promote central clearing, 
extending the requirements to 
more participants. 
Steven Holmes - Deere & Company  End-Users 7-10-
09 
H-Fin Against granting regulators 
powers to expand regulatory 
requirements to end-users. Argue 
against capital requirements for 
non-centrally cleared transactions 
with end-users. 
Christopher Ferreri - Wholesale 





H-Fin Focus on ensuring Non-
Discriminatory Access to Central 
Counterparty Clearing Facilities. 






H-Fin Warn against potential loopholes 
from exempting end-users and 
argue that end-users should not 
refrain from regulating derivatives. 
Reject the argument that 
standardizing derivatives would 
leave end-users without 
protection. 




S-Ag.   Argue for focusing on the trades 
among dealers. 
Terence Duffy - CME Infrastructure 2-12-
09 
S-Ag.   Clearing should be encouraged 
through capital charges. 
Blythe Masters - JP Morgan Banks 2-12-
09 
S-Ag.   Support mandatory central 
clearing but not for all OTC market 
participants and for all contracts. 
Support mandatory central 
clearing only for dealers and major 
swap participants. 
Jiro Okochi -  Reval.com End-Users 2-12-
09 
S-Ag.   Standardization of OTC 
derivatives limiting the capacity of 
end-users to hedge their risk. Call 
for exempting swap sold to end-
users from additional capital and 
margin requirements. Call for 
narrowing the scope of who may 
benefit from the exemption. 
Jonathan Shor - ICE Infrastructure 2-12-
09 
S-Ag.   Against mandating central clearing 
of all OTC transactions. Focus on 
unintended consequences and 
costs posed for end-users. 
Regulation should focus on the 
transactions between dealers and 
major swap participants. 
 
The role of electoral incentives in driving the progress of legislation and in directly 
running against the preferences of derivative dealers is typified by one of the most 
prominent instances in which the US Congress introduced a piece of derivatives 
regulation going well beyond the international commitments adopted within the G20. 
While the G20 leaders had followed the US Treasury in proposing the extension of 
regulatory requirements upon derivative dealers, these had been limited to minimum 
capital requirements and minimum initial and variation margin requirements. The 
Congressional debate that followed the G20 Pittsburgh Summit significantly departed 
from this by bringing Congress to adopt a proposal potentially limiting the financial 
institutions accessing the derivatives markets. Presented by Sen. Lincoln on April 9, 
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2010, this amendment to the Dodd-Frank bill  would force banks operating in the 
derivatives market either to spin off their derivatives trading activities into independently 
capitalized entities or to give up federal protections such as deposit insurance and 
access to Federal Reserve discount window.. 
Sen. Lincoln’s proposal, introduced the same day that the SEC announced its lawsuit 
against Goldman,97 was quickly recognized as the “most stringent bill so far” in the 
regulation of derivatives98 and a direct challenge to the banks dominating the markets. 
As Sen. Cantwell commented, “She is the daughter of a farmer, she knows the 
difference between farmers legitimately hedging and Wall Street speculators cooking up 
toxic assets. It looks to me as though Sen. Lincoln is proposing a real stare down of Wall 
Street.”99 But opposition to the bill extended well beyond the same derivative dealers 
that were the primary target of the legislation, expanding to smaller community banks 
and regional banks100 as well as the corporate end-users of derivatives.101  
In order to explain the formulation of her proposal, it is important to consider not the 
desire to appease powerful interest groups but rather the impact on Sen. Lincoln’s 
chances for reelection. During the campaign for the primary elections that Sen. Lincoln 
was fighting in Arkansas, she had been attacked for being too soft on Wall Street. Her 
main challenger, Bill Halter, ran a campaign to the left of Sen. Lincoln, primarily with the 
support of trade unions, and he frequently publicized contributions Lincoln received from 
Wall Street banks. Halter attacked Lincoln for her support of the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program in 2008, arguing that by voting for the $700 billion bank bailout in 2008, Lincoln 
had "already voted to side with Wall Street and big banks." According to Halter, 
“Derivative transactions were at the root of the financial meltdown…As a member of the 
Agriculture Committee, Sen. Lincoln had jurisdiction over derivatives for years but did 
nothing to provide appropriate oversight."102 The so-called “Lincoln Amendment” was 
therefore widely perceived as an attempt to regain the electoral support of the most 
progressive part of her electorate. Indeed, the bill and the strongly anti-Wall Street 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Cantwell 2010.	  
98 Kevin McPartland described this measure as “a back-door way to reinstate Glass-Steagall without actually doing so”. 
Cited in Comlay & Abbott 2010.	  
99 Cantwell 2010. 
100 Burne 2010. 
101 Coalition for Derivatives End-Users 2010. The Coalition for Derivatives End-Users demanded the removal of the 
Lincoln amendment as this measures “presents a number of practical problems for end users, including reducing or 
eliminating available counterparties, increasing the cost to hedge and possibly preventing some end users from hedging 
certain risks … Such a requirement could exacerbate a problem many end users already face, as fewer banks will offer 
derivatives, including many community and regional banks, thereby eliminating the only counterparties with which many 
smaller businesses hedge risk”. 
102 Swindell, Hagstrom, & Friedman 2010; Daniels 2010.	  
	   159 
rhetoric adopted by Lincoln in its defense103 allowed Lincoln to receive national attention 
and to score important points for her re-election bid in Arkansas, where polls showed a 
majority of voters supported Wall Street reform.104 
The public resonance of the amendment made it difficult for elected politicians to openly 
oppose the proposal. The US Treasury decided not to take a position on the most 
controversial part of the bill despite the widespread concern regarding its impact and 
feasibility.105 Sen. Dodd proposed but then withdrew an amendment to postpone the 
proposal for two years.106 As a commentator argued, “The problem is that everybody in 
Congress wants it out, but nobody wants the responsibility of taking it out.”107 Similarly, a 
House Democratic aide stated, “No one has wanted to step up and take it out of the 
legislation for fear of appearing to weaken the legislation.”108 Sen. Judd Gregg argued 
that his amendment to strip the most salient elements of the Lincoln proposal may have 
failed because of the fears of political backlash from defending the large banks.109 In the 
end, the Lincoln Amendment was approved by the entire Senate despite the widespread 
opposition of interest groups and concerns expressed by regulators and several 
Congressmen.  
The impact of electoral incentives in driving this part of the legislation became even 
clearer once the level of public attention towards derivatives decreased.  Sen. Lincoln’s 
victory in her primary election weakened the incentives to maintain a hard-stance 
against any amendment to her bill. When the legislation moved into the reconciliation 
committee between House and Senate, Lincoln agree to forge a compromise, allowing 
banks to retain the bulk of their swap trading operations on their books and to spin off 
only the trading of those derivatives perceived as riskier.110 Most importantly, in February 
2012, not long after the approval of the Dodd-Frank and with the focus of the US public 
significantly moving away from derivatives, the House Financial Services Committee 
approved a bipartisan bill by voice vote to remove the Lincoln amendment. In its place, 
they voted to allow banks to keep commodity and equity derivatives in their balance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Lincoln presented her bill as an attempt to defend small community banks from the excesses of the five largest banks most active 
on risky swaps activity - “activity that should never have been part of their operation in the first place”. See Lincoln 2010.	  
104 Reuters 2010b.	  
105 Kaper 2010.	  
106 Dennis 2010. 	  
107 Harper & Kopecki 2010. 	  
108 Montgomery & Merle 2010.	  
109 Kaper 2010.	  
110 Revised version of the bill forced banks to move into independently capitalized subsidiaries only commodity, equity, 
and credit default swaps, accounting only 10% to 20% of their derivatives portfolio.	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sheet, while only a swap tied to asset-backed securities comprised of subprime 
mortgages would still be pushed out.111  
The Congressional debate that surrounded this decision was characterized by a return 
of some of the rhetoric that characterized discussions over the regulation of derivatives 
before the crisis. In particular, different Congressmen pointed out how the lack of similar 
requirements in Europe and other countries would put US firms at a competitive 
disadvantage. Rep. Judy Biggert stated that the Lincoln amendment would “place U.S. 
financial institutions at a competitive disadvantage, because non-U.S. jurisdictions have 
not implemented similar regulations.”112 Her statement was followed by that of Rep. 
Grimm, who stated, “In order to maintain the competitiveness of the U.S. financial 
markets, we must ensure that our regulatory structure does not put us at a disadvantage 
relative to the rest of the world.”113   
Here we can see that the same electoral dynamics that had propelled a tightening in the 
legislation of derivatives in 2009-2010 had declined since the passage of the Dodd-
Frank bill. It is not surprising, therefore, that the proposal that more than any other 
reflected the politicization of the debate was also the first to be dismantled once public 
attention started to drift away from this subject.	  
 
4.5 Lagging Behind: the Regulation of Derivatives in Europe 
While the previous section discussed the dynamics that led US policymakers to actively 
champion a reversal in the international approach towards the regulation of derivatives, 
this section will explore the impact that the crisis had over the regulation of derivatives in 
Europe. 
European regulatory authorities have long participated as junior partner in the effort led 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to foster the emergence of an industry-driven 
regulatory solution to address the weaknesses in the infrastructures of derivatives 
markets. In particular, France's Commission Bancaire, the UK's Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), the German Bafin, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission, and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) coordinated informally with the New York Federal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 The bill entitled “H.R. 1838: To repeal a provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection and 
Consumer Protection Act Prohibiting any Federal bailout of swap dealers or participants” was sponsored by 
Representatives Jim Himes of Connecticut and Carolyn Maloney of New York, both Democrats, and Nan Hayworth, a 
New York Republican. The text of the bill can be found here: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1838. At the 
moment of writing (30 July 2012), the bill has not returned yet to the House. See Brush & Mattingly 2012. 
112 US House of Representatives 2011, p.3. 
113 US House of Representatives 2011, p.6. 
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Reserve, interactions that were formalized in September 2009 with the formation of the 
OTC Derivatives Regulators’ Forum.114    
Similarly to the US, however, the intensification of the market panic since the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers also represented a turning point for the regulation of derivatives in 
Europe. As the initiatives to introduce a direct regulation of derivatives started to gain 
steam in the US, and as US regulatory authorities demanded the authority to regulate 
these markets from Congress, the European Commission followed in the footsteps of US 
authorities. On the October 17, 2008, Commissioner McCreevy stated that there was a 
“pressing need” for greater use of central clearinghouses. 
Calls for clearinghouses notwithstanding, just like the approach endorsed by the Federal 
Reserve during the first stage of the crisis, the Commission sought to promote a market-
led solution by engaging in consultations with the main stakeholders in derivatives 
markets.115 To do this, the European Commission created the Derivatives Working 
Group, bringing together representatives from derivative dealers, central counterparties, 
trade repositories, and other European (ECB, CESR, CEBS and CEIOPS) and national 
(AMF, Bafin and FSA) regulatory authorities.  During its first meeting in 2008, the 
Working Group set up a roadmap to ensure that CDS were cleared through a central 
clearing counterparty by the end of the year.116 At the same time, the Commission 
threatened that in the case this market-led solution did not emerge, it would be forced to 
legislate. As Oliver Drewes, a spokesman for McCreevy stated, “[McCreevy] also 
explained to them that he believed that solutions would now be essential and that he 
would not refrain from imposing a legislative one if the industry did not deliver."117 Similar 
attempts to engage with market actors in order to achieve a market-based solution to 
establish central counterparties for CDS were also undertaken by the ECB, which hosted 
a meeting on November 3, 2008 with the potential providers of this CCP, their 
regulators, and the main dealers and buy-side users.118 
While in the US progress towards central clearing of CDS derivatives was steady and 
regulators simply “pushed on an open door,”119 according to Richard Metcalfe, head of 
policy at the ISDA, in Europe the relation between public authorities and private market 
actors was more difficult, so the Commission was not able to achieve the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009b. 
115 McCreevy 2008i. 
116 European Commission 2008c.	  
117 Bradbery 2008.	  
118 ECB 2008b.	  
119 Price 2009.	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commitment by private market actors. The main stumbling block in the negotiations 
between the European Commission and derivatives dealers remained the priority placed 
by the former of having one CCP for credit derivatives located in Europe. The European 
Commission recognized that letting the market decide the location of the CCP would 
have in all likelihood concentrated these trades into one clearinghouse located into the 
US. The European Commission and other European policymakers opposed this 
outcome on the ground that it would have left European trades cleared in the US outside 
the regulatory oversight of European authorities. Moreover, this solution would have left 
Europe with very limited powers to intervene should this US-based clearinghouse run 
into trouble, as central banks do not provide direct access to their liquidity facilities to 
financial institutions located outside their currency areas. As a Brussels official argued, 
“Can we afford the luxury of having a CCP clearing the whole world, over which we have 
no regulatory and supervisory powers or guaranteed access to information? And what if 
it goes belly up?”120 
Derivative dealers, for their part, described this geographical mandate as impracticable, 
and claimed that it would have been costly and ineffective to split the credit derivatives 
market according to geographical lines. They favoured instead a “global solution,” that is, 
clearing their CDS contracts through a single CCP independently of its location. When 
the major international dealers left the negotiating table, McCreevy declared on January 
20, 2009 that since “in the very last minute the industry gold cold feet,” the Commission 
was prepared “to go the legislative route if necessary” to set up a central clearing 
counterparty for swaps.121  
The European Commission looked for support from the European Parliament. Speaking 
in front of the European Parliament, McCreevy stated, “We also need to act urgently and 
close the deal. The response of the industry has been disappointing. Time is running 
out.” 122  McCreevy urged the members of the European Parliament to pass an 
amendment to the Capital Requirements Directive to impose higher capital requirements 
on credit default swaps not processed through a European clearing house.123 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Jeremy  Grant & Tait 2009 In July 2009, the European Commission has justified its preference for CCP clearing being 
located in Europe on the basis of “regulatory, supervisory and monetary policy concerns”. According to the Commission, 
“If a CCP is located in Europe, it is subject to European rules and supervision. Supervisors accordingly have undisputed 
and unfettered access to the information held by CCPs. It is also easier for European authorities to intervene in case of a 
problem at a European CCP. For example, central banks do not provide direct access to their liquidity facilities to financial 
institutions located outside their currencyareas.” See European Commission 2009c.	  
121  McCreevy 2009b. 
122 McCreevy 2009a. 
123 McCreevy 2009a. The bill in question is Amendment 59 Pervenche Berès - Proposal for a directive – amending act 
Recital 19 b (new) Such amendment was presented by the French socialist chair of the European Parliament's economic 
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Commission also looked for support from the ECB. On December 18, 2008 the 
Governing Council of the ECB “welcomed initiatives by the European Commission aimed 
at introducing European central counterparty clearing facilities for OTC credit 
derivatives,” and it also emphasized the “need for at least one European CCP for credit 
derivatives and that, given the potential systemic importance of securities clearing and 
settlement systems, this infrastructure should be located within the Euro area.”124 In 
particular, the ECB justified the need to have a CCP within the Euro area on the basis 
that in the case of a major liquidity problem, the ECB would not be able to provide 
emergency liquidity if the clearinghouse was located outside of the Eurozone. Similarly 
to what was done by the European Commission, the ECB also took steps to establish a 
European central clearinghouse by engaging in negotiations with those banks less 
hostile to a European-based clearing initiative. (e.g. European Banking Federation and 
the European Savings Banks Group).  At the same time, the ECB excluded the major 
American investment banks in what was perceived as an attempt to segment the dealers 
community. 125 The agenda of the meeting included a discussion on "whether and under 
which conditions, individual banks would be prepared to take a stake in a European 
CCP."126  
This push for a “European solution” coming from the European Commission was 
supported by some member states. In January 2009 the French government and the 
Banque de France supported the establishment of a Eurozone solution under the 
supervision of the ECB, a proposal already endorsed by the ECB.127 Unlike the case 
made by the European Commission, the support coming from the French government 
for a European solution reflected competitive concerns, especially the risk that letting the 
market decide the location of the CCP would likely lead to the clearing solution 
supported by the major US banks (US-based Intercontinental Exchange (ICE)).  In 
addition, this might allow US counterparties to take control of the European market at the 
expense of smaller European competitors.128 This possibility raised concerns not only in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and monetary affairs committee Pervenche Berès on January 19, 2009. This amendment presented as its formal 
justification “After the industry’s failure to reach an agreement on the set-up of a European clearinghouse, the 
Commission should come up with appropriate proposals to regulate this sector for the sake of financial stability and 
transparency … In order to ensure financial stability, the Commission should put forward appropriate legislative proposals 
to regulate credit-default swaps (CDS). CDS on European entities should be processed through a European clearing 
house (CCP) to mitigate the counterparty risks and more generally to reduce the overall risks. Only CCP-cleared CDS 
should benefit from favourable capital requirement treatment”. 
124 ECB 2008a. 
125 Tait 2009.	  
126 ECB 2008a.	  
127  B. Hall 2009.	  
128 A confidential report prepared by the Banque de France warned of the risk that the clearing business could move to 
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France, about also in Germany, where the German government supported the Deutsche 
Boerse’s Eurex in the derivatives clearing race.129 
The possibility of imposing a Eurozone clearing solution that would exclude any London-
based clearer from the European markets was opposed by the British banking industry, 
which would be excluded from this solution,130 as well as by the British Treasury131 and 
the FSA132. However, British authorities did not oppose the introduction of an EU-wide 
clearing requirement, despite the costs this would inevitably pose upon the numerous 
derivative dealers housed in London, as this “European solution” would both prevent the 
US banks operating in London from shifting their clearing business to the US and not 
endanger the advantage of London over other European financial centers. 
This legislative threat from the Commission and the European Parliament, on top of the 
threat of a Eurozone clearing solution, was ultimately successful in twisting the arm of 
the major transnational dealers. These committed in February 2009 to clear their EU-
eligible credit derivatives trades in Europe through a European-based clearinghouse by 
31 July 2009.133 This commitment set the stage for the creation of different European 
CDS clearinghouses, such ICE Clear, Eurex Clearing, and LCH Clearnet. The 
concession made by the main dealers helped them in deflecting the regulatory threat of 
being forced into a Euro-zone clearing requirement. However, these self-regulatory 
commitments were not sufficient to avoid the introduction of a broader regulatory 
framework for the industry in Europe. Shortly after the agreement, the European 
Commission committed in March 2009 to present a set of regulatory initiatives to 
increase transparency and to address financial stability concerns.134 Mario Nava, head of 
market infrastructure at the DG Internal, Market stated in March that the commitment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
London or the United States, and it called for the creation of a clearing house for the eurozone with sufficient critical size 
to face off the challenge that business could be absorbed by London and New York in order to promote the interests of 
Paris. In particular, the report called for the creation of a "consortium of eurozone banks and shareholders of major 
infrastructures with the objective of developing a common strategy for the integration of several of the eurozone's principle 
clearing houses". The confidential document was written by a working group headed up by the Banque de France and 
prepared for the Haut Comite de Place, a body formed by French finance minister, Cristine Lagarde, to promote Paris’ 
position in the financial markets. See de Teran 2009b.	  
129 Uhlig 2008.	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132 The Turner Review stated that “proposals that euro-denominated CDS must be cleared ‘within the Euro zone’ are 
unnecessary for financial stability reasons which requires only that robust and well regulated arrangements are in place 
regardless of location”. See FSA 2009b, p. 83. 
133 European Commission 2009f.  Barclays Capital 2009The signatories of the letter were AIMA, CEA, EBF, ISDA, LIBA, 
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achieved by dealers did not mean the legislative initiatives were complete.135 Following 
the industry’s commitment, the Commission formed a Member States Experts Working 
Group on Derivatives and Market Infrastructures in order to prepare further legislative 
measures and monitor compliance by the industry with its commitments.136   
On July 3, 2009, the European Commission presented its first Communication 
containing possible measures to be adopted for the regulation of derivatives that went 
beyond the use of central clearinghouse.137 The Commission described its approach as 
informed by a “paradigm shift…away from the traditional view that derivatives are 
financial instruments for professional use, for which light-handed regulation was thought 
sufficient, towards an approach where legislation allows markets to price risks 
properly.” 138  The “paradigm shift” announced by the European Commission was 
welcomed by the European Council139 as well as by the European Parliament, which 
approved in June 2010 a report presented by the Rapporteur Werner Langen.  
The legislative proposal presented by the Commission in September 2010 praised the 
initiatives taken by the main derivative dealers in increasing the use of central clearing 
platforms. While it was also positive on commitments to increase contract and processes 
standardisation and also to improve the transparency of these markets, it denounced the 
limited scope of these initiatives, confined only to the main dealers, and the non-binding 
nature of the commitments. The regulation introduced by the Commission (EMIR) 
mirrored in scope and main requirements the Dodd-Frank Act adopted in the US. In 
addition, the regulation fulfilled the commitment assumed by European governments 
within the G20, mandating the central clearing of standardized contracts, introducing 
regulatory requirements for the CCPs and trade repositories, and giving the newly 
created European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) a central role in regulating 
derivatives markets. Similar to the US legislation, the European regulation covered not 
only credit derivatives but also all OTC derivative contracts conducted by both financial 
and non-financial institutions domiciled in the European Union. Covered contracts 
included interest rate derivatives, FX derivatives, and commodities derivatives, which 
had played no direct role in the context of the financial crisis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 de Teran 2009a.	  
136 European Commission 2010b.  
137 European Commission 2009c. 
138 European Commission 2009d, p.2. 
139 European Council 2009. 
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Furthermore, the attempt by the European Commission to regulate OTC derivatives 
markets also included four other pieces of legislation. The first was the revision of the 
Capital Requirements Directive in order to introduce a differentiation of capital charges 
between CCP cleared and non-CCP cleared contracts. 140  The second piece of 
legislation was a revision of the Market in Financial Instruments Directive to regulate the 
trading of standardized contracts on organized trading venues. 141 The third piece of 
legislation was a revision of the Market Abuse Directive to increase the power of 
regulatory authorities to investigate market abuses in derivatives markets.142 The final 
piece of legislation was a regulation of short-selling also covering the use of credit 
default swaps.143  
On balance, the evolution of derivatives regulation within Europe has followed a path 
with important similarities with that in the US. The initial focus of the European 
Commission at the beginning of the crisis in promoting a market-based solution to the 
problem of shifting bilaterally negotiated contracts into a central clearinghouse was 
followed by the introduction of a more extensive regulatory framework. This brought 
derivative dealers and major participants in the derivatives markets, as well market 
infrastructures such as counterparties, exchanges, and trade repositories, under the 
direct oversight of regulators, thus departing from the pre-crisis approach.  
While the two jurisdictions reached a similar end-point, the analysis in this section has 
shown how the US represented the driver in this process and was the main determinant 
of the international regulatory agenda, while Europe frequently lagged behind. Indeed, 
after having presented his legislative proposal to regulate derivatives, US Treasury 
Secretary Geithner declared that one of his priorities would be “to work with authorities 
abroad...so that achievement of our objectives is not undermined by the movement of 
derivatives activity to jurisdictions without adequate regulatory safeguards."144 After the 
approval of Dodd-Frank, US regulatory authorities publicly expressed concerns 
regarding the lag of Europe in implementing commitments similar to the one introduced 
in the US and the possibility that this may confer a competitive advantage to European 
institutions.145 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 European Commission 2011e. 
141 European Commission 2011d. 
142 European Commission 2011c. 
143 European Commission 2010d. 
144 Geithner 2009a. 
145 CFTC 2011. 
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Different reasons can explain this pattern. One explanation points towards the fact that 
US regulatory authorities had developed a greater expertise on the area than had their 
European counterparts, as the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had held regular 
meetings with derivative dealers since 2005 to discuss possible improvements in the 
regulatory infrastructure of these markets. The existence of dialogue before the crisis 
between US regulators and derivative dealers certainly can explain how the approach 
adopted by US authorities largely informed the initial international regulatory reaction by 
the FSB.  
However, it is important to acknowledge how the different level of public salience 
acquired by derivatives regulation in the two contexts also created different incentives for 
the respective governments to get involved in the international agenda.  The analysis of 
the media coverage of different financial sectors developed in Chapter 3 has revealed 
that while after the crisis derivatives regulation rose to become one of the top issues 
covered by the US press, the same was not the case in Europe. With the exception of 
the UK, the outbreak of the crisis led the media in Continental European countries to 
focus primarily on other areas that had attracted the attention of the public before the 
crisis rather than derivatives, whose relevance for the voters remained more difficult to 
explain. The lack of a Lehman-like event directly linked to derivatives in Continental 
Europe was important to limit the attention of the general public to the issue. As a result, 
European authorities largely followed rather than led the efforts of their US counterparts 
to regulate derivatives.  
  
4.6 The Eurozone debt crisis and the regulation of sovereign credit derivatives 
The main instance in which European authorities played an active role in expanding the 
international agenda came in pushing for an international agreement over the regulation 
of sovereign derivatives in 2010. At the same time that the US Congress started to turn 
the page on the design of new norms concerning the regulation of derivatives, the 
emergence of turbulence in the sovereign debt markets in 2010 had the effect of 
politicizing the debate over regulation of derivatives in Europe and increased the 
attention on this issue among European policymakers. In particular, the first sign of woes 
in the European debt markets raised the possible use of CDS to speculate on these 
markets and on the extent to which so-called “naked” trading of these tools could 
influence the prices of the underlying sovereign bonds. This practice of trading in CDS 
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without owning the underlying obligations has received significant attention during the 
crisis and has been criticized by different commentators, who have called for making this 
practice illegal.146 
The decision by European leaders to pledge support for Greece in February 2010 was 
followed shortly after by a statement from French finance minister Christine Lagarde, 
who argued that European leaders should take a united approach towards “speculators” 
and that "what we are going to take away from this crisis is certainly a second look at the 
validity, solidity of sovereign [credit default swaps],”147 whose movements she described 
in front of the French Parliament as “disconnected from the underlying economic 
situation.” 148  After having singled out a handful of British and American financial 
institutions for speculating on the Greek debt during the crisis,149 Lagarde publicly stated 
her opinion that “the CDS on sovereign debt have to be at least very, very regulated, 
rigorously regulated, limited or banned.”150  
French politicians were not the only ones to call for a crackdown on the trading of 
sovereign derivatives. On 10 March 2010, French President Sarkozy, German 
Chancellor Merkel, Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, and Prime Minister of 
Luxembourg Junker wrote to President of the Commission Barroso to demand an official 
inquiry at the European level “into the role and impact of speculative practices in 
connection with CDS trading in the government bonds of European countries.” They also 
pushed for the introduction of measures including “introducing minimum holding periods 
for CDS trading, banning speculative CDS trading as well as banning the acquisition of 
CDS which are not being used for hedging purposes”.151 Similar requests were also 
supported by the European Parliament, which in June 2010 approved a resolution both 
pressing “for a ban on CDS transactions with no underlying credit which are purely 
speculative transactions involving bets on credit defaults” and calling “on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 For instance FT columnist Munchau has described the trading of “naked CDS” as “purely speculative gamble”. 
Munchau argued: “It is a purely speculative gamble. There is not one social or economic benefit. Even hardened 
speculators agree on this point. Especially because naked CDSs constitute a large part of all CDS transactions, the case 
for banning them is about as a strong as that for banning bank robberies.” According to Munchan, while CDSs are 
insurance products that allow the buyer to insure himself against the default of an underlying security, these products 
defied “a universally accepted aspect of insurance regulation is that you can only insure what you actually own”. Münchau 
2008. See also Soros 2009.	  
147 Tett 2010.	  
148  Donahue 2010.	  
149 Parussini, Cohen, & Dalton 2010.	  
150 Wendlandt 2010. 	  
151  Sarkozy, Merkel, Papandreou, & Juncker 2010. This request was followed by others calls from the same French and 
German leaders to speed up the investigation on the impact that as naked credit default swaps on sovereign bonds The 
two leaders said the “return of high market volatility raises legitimate questions specifically about certain financial 
techniques and the use of certain derivative products, such as short-selling and credit default swaps” Sarkozy & Merkel 
2010. 
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Commission to consider upper risk limits for derivatives, particularly CDSs, and to agree 
on them with international partners”.152  
These calls were taken further in May 2010, when German regulatory authorities (Bafin) 
surprised the world by unilaterally introducing a ban over naked transactions of CDS 
traded in Germany where the debt of a Eurozone member state served as a reference 
liability.153 This was followed by the introduction of a legislative proposal, theAct on the 
Prevention of Improper Securities and Derivatives Transactions,which became effective 
at the end of July 2010. While the original ban applied to naked CDS on all Eurozone 
government bonds, the legislation extended the ban to cover CDS on regional and 
municipal bonds of Eurozone countries traded in Germany, including a ban on currency 
derivatives referencing the Euro.154  
This introduction of an outright ban on naked trading of CDS on Eurozone sovereign 
debt caught other countries by surprise, and it was not coordinated at the European 
level.155 Indeed, this policy decision was puzzling in three ways. First, it was difficult to 
explain on an efficiency ground. Different regulatory authorities, including the British FSA 
and even the German Bafin itself, had not found significant evidence that CDS trades 
were affecting bond markets.156 Most importantly, since the leading site for sovereign 
CDS trading remained in London rather than Frankfurt, a ban on naked CDS traded in 
Germany would have very limited impact without being coordinated at the European 
level. In fact, the ban had no discernible effect on mitigating the source of the crisis.157  
The second reason that this policy measure was puzzling is that it was strongly opposed 
by the quasi-totality of interest groups and societal actors. The main opposition came 
from the banking industry and the financial actors directly involved in the trading of 
sovereign credit derivatives. For instance, ISDA argued that the line of reasoning holding 
that CDS markets were influencing the bond market was “flawed and inconsistent,” since 
the market for sovereign CDS ($9 billion) was significantly smaller than the underlying 
market for government bonds ($400 billion).158 ISDA and other banking associations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 European Parliament 2010. 
153 In a statement, BaFin justified this move, saying it was necessitated by what it called “the extraordinary volatility of debt 
securities of countries from the euro zone”. See Lesova 2010. 	  
154 BaFin 2010. 
155 French Economy Minister Christine Lagarde regretted the unilateral nature of the decision and announced that it would 
not have followed the German lead, while the European Commissioner Barnier openly criticized the unilateral nature of 
the move H. Jones & O'Donnell 2010.	  
156 Duffie 2010; Hughes, Tett, & Mackintosh 2010. 	  
157 Banks such as Credit Suisse also argued later that the unilateral ban implemented by the German government had 
backfired, reducing liquidity in the German financial markets and causing the number of shares traded in the 10 banned 
financial stocks to fall compared to other stocks. See H. Jones 2010.	  
158 ISDA 2010b.	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argued that the German government was “shooting the messenger” and CDS markets 
were simply signaling the real sources of the troubles faced by countries such as Greece 
rather than being the source of those problems.159 In addition to banks, the decision of 
banning naked CDS trading was also opposed by end-users of derivatives, which 
argued that restricting CDS trades to those owning the underlying bonds would have the 
unintended consequence of making it more difficult for those market players wanting to 
buy protection to find a seller. Indeed, as the responses to the Consultation launched by 
the European Commission on this subject160 reveal (see Table 9), the policy introduced 
by German regulators was opposed among a wide range of German interest groups. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 In particular, banking associations have sought to dispel the notion that CDS were used in a speculative way to bet 
against the creditworthiness of individual companies or governments, arguing that the majority of short CDS positions 
were held as a hedge against long positions in the underlying bonds or in Greek stocks and for entities that have 
significant real estate or corporate holdings in Greece. ISDA also rejected the analogy comparing CDS to fire insurance, 
and writing naked CDS as equivalent to buying such insurance and committing arson. According to ISDA “these claims 
also ignore short selling activity in Greek government bonds, which certainly has a greater effect on Greek bond prices as 
it involves selling the actual instruments in the market.” ISDA 2010b.	  
160 European Commission 2010f. 
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Table 9 - Responses by interest groups to the Consultation by the European 
Commission on Short-Selling 



















ACI (Financial Markets Association) General Finance International No Yes Yes 
AFME, ISLA, and ISDA Banking International No Yes Yes 




AMAFI and Association Francaise des 









Association of British Insurers Insurance UK No Yes Yes 
Association of Foreign Banks in Germany Banks International No Yes  
Association Francaise des Investisseurs 
Institutionnels Institutional Investors    
Alternative Investment Management 








Association of Private Client Investment 
Managers and Stockbrokers  Asset Managers UK No Yes Yes 
Assogestioni Asset Managers Italy    
Assosim Securities Italy No   
Austrian Federal Economic Chamber Bank Austria Yes Yes  




BATS Trading Limited Securities UK No Yes Yes 







Bloomberg Tradebook Investment Firm UK    
BME  Securities Spain No Yes  




Bundesverband Alternative Investment Asset Managers Germany No Yes Yes 
Bunderverband Investment und Asset 
Management Asset Managers Germany No   
he Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen an 
den deutschen Börsen  Securities Germany No Yes Yes 
Business Europe Corporate International No Yes Yes 




CFA UK GeneralFinance UK No Yes Yes 
Chi-X Europe Securities UK No 
Yes 
(shorter Yes 
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period) 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise Corporate Sweden    





n) Yes Yes 
Daimler Corporate Germany    
Danish Mortgage Banks Associations Bank Denmark No   
Danish Shareholder Association Shareholders Denmark  Yes  








Deustscher Industrie und Handelskammertag Corporate Germany No Yes Yes 
DGB Trade Union Germany    
Eumedion 
Institutional 
Investors Netherland    
Euroclear Clearing 
                      
International    
European Association of Public Banks Bank International No Yes Yes 
European Banking Federation Bank International No Yes Yes 
European Fund and Asset Management 
Association Asset Managers International No Yes Yes 
European Savings Banks Group Register Banks International No Yes  





Europeanissuers Mixed International    
Federation of European Securities Exchanges Exchange International  Yes Yes 
Flow Traders Securities Netherland No Yes Yes 
Fogain Securities Spain No Yes Yes 




Futures and Options Association Securities UK  Yes  
GETCO Securities Internatioanl    
German Insurance Association Insurance Germany No Yes Yes 
Hedge Fund Standards Board Hedge Fund UK No Yes Yes 
HSBC Bank UK    
ICE Clearinghouse US    
IG Bau Trade Union Germany Yes  No 
International Capital Markets Association Securities International    





n) Yes Yes 
Interest Capturing System Infrastructure US    
Internatioanl Centre for Financial Regulation Think Tank UK No Yes Yes 
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Investors Spain  Yes Yes 
Investment Adviser Association 
Investment 
Adviser US    
Investment Management Association Asset Managers UK No Yes Yes 
Investment Quotient Asset Managers      UK No No  
Irish Stock Exchange Exchange Ireland    
Italian Banking Association Bank Italy No Yes Yes 
KDPW Infrastructure Poland not clear Yes Yes 
Legal and General Investment Management UK No Yes Yes 
London Metal Exchange Infrastructure UK    






Luxembourg Bankers Association Bank Luxembourg No Yes Yes 
Managed Funds Association Hedge Funds US    
Man SE Insurance Germany    














NFU (Confederation of the Nordic Bank, 
Finance, and Insurance Unions) Trade Union Sweden    
NYSE Euronext Infrastructure International No Yes Yes 
Oesterreichs Energies Corporate Austrian    
Optiver Securities Netherland No   
REB Securities Netherland    
Rivoli fund Management Asset Managers France  Yes  
Rolls-Royce  Corporate UK    




Spanish Banking Association (AEB) Bank Spain    
State Street Bank US No Yes Yes 
Stuggart Stock Exchange Exchange Germany  Yes  
Unicredit Bank Italy    
Wolkswagen Corporate Germany    
World Economy, Ecology, and Development 
(WEED) Think Tank Germany Yes No  
Zentraler Kreditausschuss Bank Germany No Yes Yes 
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Third, the decision by naked trading solution introduced by German regulators was 
opposed not only by the British authorities, the country where most derivatives trading 
occurs in Europe,161 but also by numerous other European authorities (see the summary 
of the responses from regulatory authorities to EC Consultation in the Table 10). Neither 
France nor other Continental European countries with the exception of Austria followed 
the German example. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 The chairman of the FSA Lord Turner admitted that there were "major questions" about the utility of the market for credit-default 
swaps but also stated that banning the trading of CDS on the Greek debt would not address the causes of the problem and the 
volatility in the Greek debt markets. See Hannon 2010. 
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Table 10 - Responses by public authorities to the Consultation by the European 
Commission on Short-Selling 



























sales) Yes No 
Bank of Italy Central Bank Italy No Yes Yes 








Advisory Board of the National Securities 
Market Commission (CNMV) Regulator Spain Yes Yes Yes 
Consob Regulator Italy No Yes  













Danish Ministry of Economic and Business 
Affairs 
Ministry of 
Finance Denmark No   
Denmark Nationalbank Central Bank Denmark No Yes Yes 
European Central Bank Eurosystem Central Bank Europe    
Finnish Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of 
Finance Finance No   
Germany Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of 







Italian Treasury Department 
Ministry of 
Finance Italy    
Latvian Minsitry of Finance 
Ministry of 
Finance Latvia No Yes Yes 
Hungary Ministry for National Economy 
Ministry of 
Finance Hungary No   
Ministère français de l’Economie, de l’Industrie 
et de l’emploi 
Ministry of 
Finance France Yes  Yes 












Reg + Central 
Bank + Minsitry 
of Finance Sweden No Yes Yes 
FSA + HMT 
Reg + Ministry 
of Finance UK No Yes Yes 
 
While the unilateral move by German authorities cannot be attributed to efficiency 
considerations, interest group pressures, or emulations of other European authorities, it 
is important to consider the unique domestic political context in which German 
policymakers found themselves operating during this period. The measure was 
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introduced at a moment in which the deterioration of the Greek debt crisis had opened a 
debate over the creation of a Euro zone bailout fund, with Germany as the main financial 
contributor. The need to achieve the consent from a reluctant Bundestag created 
pressures upon the German government to demonstrate a commitment to tackle the 
sources of the crisis, including the role of “speculation” in the derivatives markets. Ralph 
Brinkhaus, a lawmaker from Merkel’s party, described this regulatory measure as 
“symbolic politics:” “Sometimes it's important, alongside facts, also to send signals."162 
Sharon Bowles, an influential Member of the European Parliament, stated, “It was done 
for political purposes not technical purposes--that is absolutely clear. It was done to 
show people they were clamping down on speculation in order to get political votes 
through to approve an E.U. bailout regime.”163 
The lack of similar domestic constraints in other European countries impeded the 
formation of a consensus around this policy approach at the European level. The 
Committee of European Securities Regulators did not support the German ban and 
instead announced its intention simply to step up its monitoring of derivatives because of 
the “exceptional volatility” associated with the Greece’s debt crisis.164 In addition, the 
European Commission created an internal taskforce in March 2010 to address the 
concerns expressed by German and French regarding the impact of sovereign CDS on 
the underlying sovereign bond markets. 165  President of the Commission Barroso 
announced that the Commission was examining “the relevance of banning purely 
speculative naked sales on credit default swaps of sovereign debt,”166 but the proposed 
regulation presented by the European Commission in June 2010167 and confirmed in 
September168  stopped short of proposing the kind of permanent ban introduced in 
Germany. Instead, the regulation approved in Europe allowed regulators to introduce 
this ban only in emergency situations and for a limited time—up to a three month 
period.169  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Cited by Moulson 2010.	  
163 McGlinchey 2010. 	  
164 CESR 2010.	  
165 Gowling 2010. 	  
166 Barroso 2010.	  
167 European Commission 2010f. 
168 European Commission 2010c. 
169 This ban could then be “extended for further periods of three months at a time” after having received an opinion from 
ESMA regarding to what extent such restriction is justified (p.9, see also Article 18). ESMA would be given a role in 
coordinating action in exceptional circumstances, in particular to avoid that countries could abuse of their powers of 
restricting trades in exceptional circumstances. Besides the coordinating role, ESMA would also be given power to take 
action in situations with cross border implications and where “competent authorities have not adequately addressed the 
threat”. In this case, “any measure taken by ESMA in such situations would override measures by competent authorities if 
there is any inconsistency”. See European Commission 2010d; European Commission 2010c.	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Not only did the opposition of other European countries prevent German authorities from 
exporting their approach to the European level, but also the regulation of sovereign CDS 
failed to appear in the international agenda. This happened despite the fact that the 
German government announced in February 2010 its intention to push for a discussion 
at the international level over the regulation of sovereign CDS,170 while the German 
Chancellor Merkel openly called for the US to support an international regulation of the 
sector.171 Also Greek Prime Minister Papandreou demanded that the US President 
support an international regulation of sovereign derivatives during an official visit to the 
US, blaming them for exacerbating Greece’s problems.172  
As argued above, during the first part of the crisis, the US had been the main country to 
promote an international agreement within the G20 over the central clearing and 
exchange trading of derivatives, the policy solutions to the failures revealed by the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. However, the risks associated with the trading of 
derivatives tied to the sovereign debt did not raise the sort of public attention in the US 
that they did in the initial stage of the Eurozone debt crisis. As a result, over this period 
US authorities faced less domestic pressures to cave to the requests of Continental 
European countries for an international agreement over the regulation of sovereign 
derivatives and acted primarily as a veto player in the international agenda. 
  
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the sources of the evolution of the international regime 
governing derivatives markets from the industry-driven arrangements that characterized 
the pre-crisis period to the decisions to bring these markets firmly under the oversight of 
public authorities. In particular, this chapter has argued that the origin of this shift is to be 
found primarily in the impact that the crisis had in altering the incentives of the US 
Congress by raising domestic public attention towards the issue.  
In the fifteen years preceding the crisis, the low degree of public salience created strong 
incentives for Congress to support the market-based mechanisms endorsed by the main 
US dealers and regulatory agencies. However, the unprecedented degree of public 
attention towards this issue during the crisis reinforced the electoral incentives for the 
majority of Congress to regulate the sector and challenge the preferences of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Thomas & Bartha 2010. 	  
171 Parussini, Thomas, & McGroarty 2010.	  
172 Wearden 2010.	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financial industry. The timing of the increase in the public salience of derivatives is 
important to explain the timing of the involvement of Congress and of the shift in the 
international agenda, which continued to rely at the beginning of the crisis on market-
based solutions.  
At the same time, the lower degree of salience that derivatives occupied in the agenda 
of European countries compared to other sectors is important to explain why during this 
period European authorities, at least until the Eurozone crisis, largely lagged behind US 
authorities in promoting changes in the international agenda. As the next two cases will 
show more in depth, during this same period, Europe has exercised a more significant 
role in driving change in two sectors that became more salient over this period: rating 
agencies and hedge funds.
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Chapter 5. Credit Rating Agencies 
	  
5.1 Plan of the Chapter 
This chapter will explore the evolution of the public-private divide in the international 
approach towards the regulation of credit rating agencies (CRAs).  
From the publication of the Manual of Railroads and Corporation Securities by John 
Moody in 1900, CRAs have remained largely outside the direct purview of national 
regulatory authorities for more than a century. Their conduct has been guided primarily 
by self-regulatory initiatives rather than government-imposed rules. Indeed, when rating 
agencies entered into the international regulatory agenda for the first time in the early 
2000s, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) signaled its 
approval of the self-regulatory status of the industry. The trigger that brought the 
regulation of rating agencies into the agenda of the international securities regulatory 
bodies was a series of corporate scandals at the turn of the millennium that were not 
detected by the main rating agencies. The bankruptcy of Enron in 2001 in particular 
focused the attention of policymakers on the shortcomings of rating agencies.  
Instead of attempting to implement direct supervision, though, the international initiative 
coordinated by securities regulators through IOSCO sought to place the responsibility to 
correct the failures revealed by these corporate scandals in the hands of rating 
agencies. Reflecting this, the 2004 IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit 
Rating Agencies was a set of non-binding recommendations intended to be a model that 
rating agencies could include in their individual codes of conduct.1  
This approach persisted into the global financial crisis of 2007-09, as the initial 
regulatory reaction of IOSCO at the beginning of 2008 did not depart from the reliance 
on self-regulation that characterized the international response to Enron. While IOSCO 
urged rating agencies to incorporate a revised version of its Code into their self-
regulatory practices, the role of public actors was limited to monitoring the level of 
implementation. However, throughout the course of the crisis this approach came to be 
challenged to the point that, as IOSCO acknowledged in May 2010, “A consensus 
emerged that the IOSCO CRA Code, as an industry code that promoted CRAs to 
implement internal controls and processes designed to give effect to the IOSCO CRA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  IOSCO 2004a. This was preceded by a consultation report: IOSCO 2004b. 
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Principles, should be supplemented with regulation of CRAs by national competent 
authorities.”2  
How can we explain the decision taken by international securities regulators before the 
crisis to rely on the self-regulatory initiatives of the rating agencies and on market 
discipline imposed on market participants as the primary mechanisms to address the 
regulation of rating agencies after the collapse of Enron? And why was this approach 
abandoned in the aftermath of the global financial crisis?  
Section 5.2 will discuss how the self-regulatory nature of the international regime that 
emerged before the crisis reflects the preferences of securities regulators both in the 
United States and in Europe, and it will examine their attempts to deflect the pressures 
from their respective political administrators in the aftermath of the Enron and Parmalat 
scandals. However, the United States and Europe diverged in their approach towards 
the implementation of this international commitment. Section 5.3 will explain how while in 
the years following these scandals the US Congress rejected the self-regulatory 
approach and decided to regulate rating agencies directly, self-regulation had remained 
the status quo within Europe.  
The second part of this chapter will shift to look at the evolution of the public-private 
divide in the regulation of rating agencies after the crisis. Section 5.4 will analyze the 
political dynamics in the United States and Europe that led the initial international 
response to the crisis to rely once again on a self-regulatory approach. Section 5.5 will 
discuss how the greater public salience of financial regulation in the United States led 
Congress to intervene progressively more in the regulation of the industry. However, the 
lower level of public attention paid to rating agencies compared to the regulation of 
derivatives described in the previous chapter did not push Congress to depart 
significantly from the recommendations of securities regulators. 
Section 5.6 will turn to Europe and analyze how heightened public attention there 
created strong incentives for key policymakers within the EU policymaking process to 
oppose the continuation of the market-based approach endorsed by IOSCO and 
European securities regulators. This change within Europe aligned the position that 
emerged among EU politicians with that of their US counterparts and therefore set the 
stage for a shift in the international agenda via the G20. 
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   181 
 
5.2 Enron, Parmalat and the Regulation of Rating Agencies before the Crisis 
Despite their long history dating back since the early 20th century, rating agencies have 
remained largely outside of the international regulatory agenda. This lack of international 
regulatory initiatives persisted despite key developments that affected the industry over 
time. The first of these was the liberalization of world financial markets starting in the 
1970s, which spurred a limited number of rating agencies whose activities up to that 
point had been limited to US markets to begin to play a crucial role in international 
markets.3 The second was the involvement of rating agencies in one of the most severe 
episodes of financial instability of the post-war period, the 1997 East Asian financial 
crisis. Different commentators denounced the failure of rating agencies to predict the 
crisis and the incorrect ratings of East Asian countries at the outset of the crisis, while 
others argued that rating agencies had further aggravated the crisis by downgrading 
East Asian countries more than the deterioration in their economic fundamentals had 
justified.4 
While these developments did not trigger the emergence of international regulatory 
initiatives concerning the regulatory status of rating agencies, this changed in the early 
2000s. The turning point bringing rating agencies into the international regulatory 
agenda was their failure to properly identify a series of corporate defaults during this 
period, including those of Enron in 2001, Worldcom in 2002, and Parmalat 2003. The 
financial and human costs of these corporate bankruptcies, however, certainly could not 
rival those of the East Asian financial crisis. In order to understand why these events had 
the effect of bringing rating agencies into the international regulatory agenda, we need to 
investigate the impact that these events triggered at the domestic level in the United 
States, where the most important rating agencies are located.. 
In the United States, the East Asian crisis was perceived as primarily a failure of the 
East Asian model of capitalism, and no significant initiatives by US regulators or the US 
Congress were launched to probe the involvement of these agencies in the crisis. On the 
contrary, the bankruptcy of Enron and the significant resonance that this event had with 
the American public had the impact of catalyzing the attention of the US Congress on a 
number of financial regulatory issues. Ten different congressional committees probed 
the company over this period.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Sinclair 2005; Abdelal 2007; Bruner & Abdelal 2005. 
4 Ferri, Liu, & Stiglitz 1999. 
	   182 
While rating agencies where not the main focus of this Congressional activism, they 
were nonetheless not left unscathed. In an investigation into the role of private sector 
watchdogs in the Enron collapse, launched by the Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs in January 2002, several Congressmen blamed rating agencies for not having 
identified Enron’s financial condition despite their privileged access to company’s 
books.5 As Rep. James Greenwood argued, "I'm considering asking them how it was 
that they rated the credit so high, up until just days before the collapse of the company, 
and how they would have missed that."6 The Congressional offensive was also directed 
at the regulatory status of rating agencies, and several Congressmen denounced the 
lack of formal oversight of rating agencies in the United States.  Since 1975 the US SEC 
had identified those agencies that could be relied upon to judge the creditworthiness of 
securities under federal securities laws by granting them the status of “Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization” (NRSRO). However, this limited action 
during this period was indeed never extended to overseeing or regulating directly the 
operations of rating agencies.7  
The chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Joseph Liberman 
argued, “I think it's appropriate, as we try to learn the lessons of Enron, to ask if the 
agencies should have some sense of accountability—some oversight, from the SEC 
perhaps–to ensure they properly perform their function as watchdogs."8 The report 
released by the Committee in October 2002 denounced how the little, if any, formal 
regulatory oversight of rating agencies made it very difficult to hold them accountable for 
future mistakes. The report recommended the SEC to develop “a set of standards and 
considerations that the rating agencies must use in deriving their ratings" and “standards 
for training levels of credit rating analysts,” making the NSRSO designation conditional 
on compliance with these and assuming responsibility for monitoring compliance.9  
A provision regarding the regulation of rating agencies was also incorporated in the 
Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, better known 
as Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the main legislation passed by the US Congress in response to 
the Enron scandal. While the focus of the scandal and the legislation was on corporate 
governance issues and auditors, the bill also involved the regulation of rating agencies, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 US Senate 2002. During this hearing “concerns had been expressed regarding the significant market power of the three 
NRSROs, their privileged access to nonpublic issuer information, their apparent lack of care and diligence in the Enron 
situation, and their very limited regulatory oversight”. See SEC 2003b, p. 16. 
6 Drawbaugh 2002. 
7 For a review of US regulatory regime see Duff & Einig 2007; SEC 2007. 
8 Cited in Wetuski 2002 .	  
9 Staff of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 2002.  
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demanding federal regulators to look into the regulation of these markets actors. Title VII 
of the Act required the SEC to conduct a study of the role and function of CRAs in the 
operation of the securities markets and to submit a report discussing possible measures 
required to improve the dissemination of information or prevent conflicts of interest in the 
operation of CRAs.  
In response to the requests contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC launched an 
investigation to ascertain the appropriate level of regulatory oversight of rating 
agencies.10 In the report, submitted to Congress in January 2003, the SEC announced 
that it would investigate in more detail “whether more direct, ongoing oversight of rating 
agencies is warranted and, if so, the appropriate means for doing so (and whether it is 
advisable to ask Congress for specific legislative oversight authority).” 11  This was 
followed in June 2003 by the issuance of a Concept Release to seek comments from 
market participants on different options ranging from eliminating the NRSRO designation 
from the SEC’s rules to implementing more direct ongoing oversight of rating agencies 
and imposing minimum standards to which rating agencies should adhere.12 
This was not the first time that the failure of rating agencies to warn investors before the 
default of a rated company had triggered discussions within the SEC about the 
adequacy of their regulatory status.13 However, similar to past instances, at the end of 
this consultation in July 2003, the SEC did not take a formal position on whether 
additional legislation should be forthcoming.14 Divisions emerged across the five SEC 
Commissioners regarding the desirability of this solution.15 According to Davies and 
Green, “Majority opinion among the regulators was that the [rating] agencies should 
themselves be responsible for policing conflicts of interest and ensuring the integrity of 
their analysis”.16  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 SEC 2002a.	  
11 SEC 2003b. 
12 SEC 2003a. 
13 The SEC first considered the possibility of extending its oversight authority over credit rating agencies in 1992, after that 
Rep. John Dingell and the Justice Department denounced the lack of competition and accountability among the agencies. 
However, the SEC failed to reach a consensus on the need for regulation. The revival of Congressional interest only two 
years later led the SEC to issue a concept release to solicit public comments about “whether the Commission should take 
further steps regarding NRSROs in order to increase its regulatory oversight role, including seeking legislative authority if 
necessary” ad on “whether NRSROs should be required to register with the Commission”. This initiative resulted three 
years later in a proposal in 1997 by the SEC to formalize the criteria for designating NRSRO, but this initiative stalled due 
to a lack of consensus and the SEC failed to take final action on the proposal.  See SEC 1994. For a summary of previous 
regulatory attempts see SEC 2002b; Hume 2002 .	  
14 SEC 2005. 
15 Burns 2004b; Peterson 2004; SEC 2005.	  
16 Davies & Green 2008 p. 70 
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Instead of invoking the legislative intervention of Congress, the SEC tried to work out an 
agreement with the major CRAs over a voluntary code of conduct that would rely on 
these agencies to adopt measures to avoid conflicts of interest, ensure the protection of 
companies' confidential information, and address other concerns. The SEC repeatedly 
defended the benefits of this proposal, arguing that “a strong and effective industry-led 
regime could prove to be a constructive and reasonable approach to address a number 
of concerns involving the credit rating industry that have been raised in recent years by 
Congress, the Commission, and others, such as the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions.”17 
Even outside the United States, when international scrutiny triggered by Enron, 
Worldcom and Parmalat brought the regulation of rating agencies into the agenda of the 
IOSCO Technical Committee, the self-regulatory solution endorsed by US regulatory 
authorities at the domestic level also came to inform the international approach. IOSCO 
published a set of high-level principles in September 2003 in order to guide the conduct 
of rating agencies, listing four distinct mechanisms through which these principles should 
be enforced. Each mechanism allocated the responsibility to regulate rating agencies 
differently among public and private actors: “1) Government regulation; 2) Regulation 
imposed by non-government statutory regulators; 3) Industry codes; and, 4) Internal 
rating agency policies and procedures.”18  
IOSCO itself did not formally take a position on whether rating agencies should fall under 
the regulatory oversight of public authorities. However, securities regulators leaned 
decisively towards the fourth option when they drafted the 2004 IOSCO Code of 
Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies.19 In line with the regulatory paradigm 
analyzed in the first chapter, this was a non-binding set of recommendations intended to 
be a model that rating agencies could include in their individual codes of conduct. 
IOSCO also sought to place the task of monitoring the enforcement of these 
recommendations primarily in the hands of the market participants. In fact, it solicited 
rating agencies to disclose publicly any deviation from the Code (so called “comply or 
explain” mechanism) in order to permit market participants and regulators to assess to 
what extent CRAs had implemented the Code of Conduct and to react accordingly.20   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 SEC 2005 
18 IOSCO 2003. IOSCO stated that it “would await future consideration of these alternatives in the major jurisdictions and 
take account of preferences of other sector supervisors before considering its preferred method of implementation” 
19  IOSCO 2004a. This was preceded by a consultation report: IOSCO 2004b 
20While disclosure remained the main compliance mechanism, in the consultation report IOSCO envisioned different 
strategies to enforce compliance. IOSCO “envisioned that securities regulators may decide to incorporate the CRA Code 
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The reliance on market-based mechanisms informing the IOSCO Code of Conduct 
certainly mirrored the preferences of US regulators. At the same time, US authorities did 
not have to exercise their power to impose this solution over reluctant European 
regulators. On the contrary, a market-based solution to the regulation of rating agencies 
was also endorsed collectively by securities regulators in Europe. As a matter of fact, the 
collapse of Enron had triggered dynamics in Europe similar to those described in the US. 
In particular, the heightened public attention towards rating agencies in Europe had 
brought elected politicians to question the lack of a formal regulation of rating agencies 
and to solicit a response from regulators. At the Oviedo Informal Ecofin Council in April 
2002, European finance ministers required the European Commission to investigate this 
issue.  
The incentives for European politicians to enter the debate over the regulation of rating 
agencies were further reinforced by the failure of rating agencies to detect the collapse 
of the Italian conglomerate Parmalat in 2003.  Indeed, the bankruptcy of Parmalat set 
the stage for a greater involvement of the European Parliament in the debate over the 
regulation of rating agencies. A report presented to the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs at the end of 2003 by MEP Giorgos Katiforis argued that the Enron and 
Parmalat scandals “showed the agencies were subject to little formal regulation or 
oversight” and called on the EU to follow the US authorities in investigating CRAs in the 
context of recent corporate scandals.21 The report suggested that rating agencies active 
in Europe should register with a European Union Ratings Authority in order to introduce 
greater accountability and oversight. The initial draft of the report also encouraged the 
EU to consider championing the creation of a European rating agency as a 
counterweight to the US-based agencies dominating the world markets: "In the light of 
the predominantly American character of existing rating agencies, the creation of a new 
European rating agency must be considered."22 The final version of the report approved 
by the European Parliament in January 2004 removed any reference to the creation of a 
European Union Ratings Authority but still called on the European Commission to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of Conduct Fundamentals into their own regulatory oversight of CRAs, may decide to oversee compliance of the CRA 
Code of Conduct Fundamentals directly, may decide to provide for an outside arbitration body to enforce the CRA Code of 
Conduct Fundamentals, or may rely on market mechanisms to enforce compliance if an individual CRA’s own code of 
conduct fails to adequately address the provisions outlined by the CRA Code of Conduct Fundamentals”. See IOSCO 
2004b. 
21  European Parliament 2003a. 
22 European Parliament 2003b. 
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produce its assessment of the need for appropriate legislative proposals and to consider 
whether rating agencies should register with European regulators.23  
In turn, the European Commission requested the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) to provide technical advice regarding the introduction of a European 
regulation of rating agencies. 24  However, European regulators in their response 
dismissed the desirability of introducing direct regulation of the industry, arguing that the 
benefits of this solution would not outweigh the negative aspects.25 According to CESR, 
direct regulation would have “the potential to create barriers to competition and 
innovation,” and it could lead “to an increase in the cost of ratings thereby potentially 
discouraging the access of smaller issuers to rating and therefore the European Capital 
market.” CESR also pointed out that regulatory involvement “could risk inadvertently 
giving a quality seal to ratings and might threaten the perception of their 
independence/credibility,” as possibly generating the risk that ratings could be treated 
differently in Europe from other jurisdictions, thereby creating an un-level playing field.  
On the other hand, European securities regulators praised the benefits a market-based 
approach. The CESR argued that rating agencies already “face[d] significant incentives 
to maintain the highest possible standards, particularly as they rely heavily on their good 
reputation with issuers and users of ratings,” concluding that “the perception that a CRA 
was not fully compliant with the fundamentals of the IOSCO Code could lead to market 
sanctions that would severely impair its business.” Moreover, this solution would avoid 
the problems associated with regulation described above such as the impression of an 
absolute guarantee of quality of ratings. While acknowledging that a market-based 
solution would not be foolproof,26 European securities regulators still regarded self-
regulatory improvements based on the recommendations released by IOSCO as the 
most desirable solution and recommended to the European Commission that the role of 
regulators should be limited to monitoring for the time being how rating agencies were 
adopting the IOSCO Code of Conduct.27  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 European Parliament 2004. 
24 European Commission 2004.  
25 CESR 2005a. 
26 European securities regulators acknowledged the weaknesses of this approach, most importantly “the risk that CRAs 
will choose not to implement it effectively, thereby undermining its value”, and that “if some kind of problems exist in the 
market for the provision of ratings, selecting this option will allow these problems to exist for a longer period of time”. 
However, these weaknesses were regarded as smaller than the advantages.	  
27 Similarly to the “comply or explain” mechanism introduced by IOSCO, European securities regulators required each 
CRA operating in the EU to sent a public annual letter to regulators describing how it had complied with the IOSCO Code 
of Conduct and any deviation from it, to meet with the CESR to discuss issues related to the implementation of the IOSCO 
Code, and to provide an explanation to national regulatory authorities in the case of any major incident occurring with a 
certain issuer. Only in the case self-regulation failed, CESR acknowledged that there might be a need for statutory 
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In sum, the emergence of an international regulatory regime based around self-
regulation before the crisis reflected not only the preferences of US regulatory authorities 
and their attempt to deflect the pressures from US Congress in the aftermath of Enron 
but also similar dynamics in Europe, where this solution was fully supported by 
European regulators.  
 
5.3 Diverging paths between the US and Europe 
How can we explain this support for self-regulation among regulatory agencies on both 
sides of the Atlantic?  One popular interpretation in the literature points towards the 
influence of the rating industry and its privileged relation with its potential overseers. A 
self-regulatory regime based on the voluntary implementation of high level principles 
such as those incorporated within the IOSCO Code of Conduct remained throughout this 
period the preferred solution of the rating agencies themselves. Following the 
bankruptcy of Enron and the renewed attention towards their regulatory status, rating 
agencies in the United States intensively lobbied both the SEC and Congress against 
the introduction of mandatory regulatory requirements. The industry argued that direct 
regulatory requirements would compromise the quality and independence of their 
analysis, erect barriers to entry in an oligopolistic market, stifle innovation, and “infringe 
on the NRSROs' well-established rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.”28 According to rating agencies, the market should remain the primary 
judge of the credibility and reliability of their opinions.  Rating agencies supported instead 
the SEC plan to develop a voluntary oversight framework.29 Their lobbying of in favor of 
a market-driven regulatory solution was not confined to the United States, but it also 
extended to Europe, where rating agencies supported reliance on the IOSCO Code of 
Conduct as the primary European regulatory mechanism.30  
Rating agencies also extended their mobilization directly to the transnational level. 
Following the publication of the IOSCO Principles in 2003, rating agencies were among 
those who demanded IOSCO to develop a more specific code of conduct giving 
guidance on how these guidelines could be implemented. Rating agencies were also 
active participants in the public consultation launched by the IOSCO to solicit the input of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
regulation. Only a minority of CESR members supported a distinct “EU voluntary recognition system along with a 
subsequent reporting on the compliance with the IOSCO code”. CESR 2005a, p. 1. 
28 S&P's 2003; Moody's 2003. 
29 Layfield 2005. 
30 S&P's 2005a; Moody's 2005; Fitch 2005.   
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market actors regarding the appropriate allocation of regulatory responsibilities between 
market actors and public authorities.31  
Moreover, beyond stating their support for self-regulation, rating agencies also 
contributed to the affirmation of this solution by promptly implementing these self-
regulatory measures by incorporating the Code of Conduct recommendations into their 
internal guidelines, as requested by the CESR and IOSCO. Indeed, when the CESR and 
IOSCO reviewed the self-regulatory steps undertaken by rating agencies in the years 
preceding the crisis, they both concluded that rating agencies had made significant 
progress in incorporating the Code of Conduct into their internal codes of best practices. 
32  
Nevertheless, while the preferences of the US-based rating agencies are likely to have 
played an important role in shaping the preferences of their home-country regulator, the 
SEC, the same argument cannot explain the preferences of regulators in European 
countries, which do not house any of the major international rating agencies. This is 
particularly the case for domestic regulators of European countries. Different authors 
have described the rising importance of rating agencies in international markets as 
standing at odds with the reliance on bank-funding and patient capital that characterize 
“coordinated” market economies more characteristic in Europe. Moreover, during the 
negotiations of the Basel II Agreement, German authorities challenged the inclusion of 
ratings in the calculation of capital requirements, presenting this as incompatible with the 
German model of capitalism.33 
However, an analysis of the mobilization of interest groups across Europe reveals how 
the support for self-regulation in Europe went well beyond the American rating agencies 
dominating the European markets and included the majority of business groups that 
responded to the consultation launched by the CESR.34 For instance, the imposition of 
direct regulatory requirements was opposed by all the European banking groups 
participating in the CESR consultation—the European Banking Federation,35 the British 
Bankers’ Association,36 the International Banking Federation37, the German Banking 
industry (ZKA), and the European Association of Public Banks38—with the exception of 
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32 CESR 2006; IOSCO 2007. 
33 Wood 2005. 
34 CESR 2005b. 
35 European Banking Federation 2005.	  
36 British Bankers' Association 2005. 
37 International Banking Federation 2005. 
38 European Association of Public Banks 2005. 
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Italian Banking Federation, where banks were more exposed to the collapse of the 
Italian conglomerate Parmalat.39  
As the British Bankers’ Association argued, “Banks are not putting forward an agenda of 
self-regulation for CRAs as a single interest group but rather as part of a majority 
consensus with the financial community.”40  Regulation of rating agencies was also 
opposed by insurance firms (the Association of British Insurers,41 the German Insurance 
Associatio42), institutional investors (the Investment Management Association43), and 
securities firms (the International Securities Market Association and the International 
Primary Market Association,44 the Bond Market Association45) in addition to interest 
groups outside of the financial industry, such as corporate actors involved in the credit 
ratings business as issuers of rated obligations (the US Association for Financial 
Professionals, the Association Française des Trésoriers d’Entreprise, the British 
Association of Corporate Treasurers, 46  the European Association of Corporate 
Treasurers,47 the Mouvement des Enterprises de France, 48 and the Union of Industrial 
and Employers’ Confederation).49 The only dissonant voice in the corporate world was 
the European Association for Listed Companies.50  
These groups denounced how regulation by official bodies would make European 
financial markets less attractive as a result of over-prescriptive measures, reduce the 
quality and availability of ratings, and impose costs to the rating agencies that would 
then be borne by investors and issuers. European direct regulation of the industry would 
also ignore the global nature of the financial services industry and undermine 
international consistency. On the contrary, financial and corporate interest groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Italian Banking Association 2005.	  
40 British Bankers' Association 2005. 
41 Association of British Insurers 2005. 	  
42  German Insurance Association 2005.The German Insurance Association endorsed a monitoring of the market 
developments and an assessment of the compliance with the IOSCO Code of Conduct by the supervisory authorities. 
However, they stressed the importance that some supervisory authorities could collect the respective information, “since 
otherwise a review of the Code seems hardly possible”. At the same time, the German Insurance Association also 
endorsed the creation of an external arbitration body. “ 	  
43 Investment Management Association 2005. IMA argued that “the role of regulators should be encourage transparency 
and the development by rating agencies themselves of proper procedures to deal with the issues raised”. According IMA 
“any form of registration/regulation will raise barriers to entry and that it should be the role of the regulator to encourage 
more competition with respect to credit ratings assessments”. Moreover, “there is a real danger of the investor being 
mislead as to the quality of a rating if there appears to be some formal regulatory “endorsement” of the CRA” 
44  International Securities Market Association, International Primary Market Association, Danish Securities Dealers 
Association, London Investment Banking Association, & Swedish Securities Dealers Association 2005.  	  
45 Bond Market Association 2005. 
46 Association for Financial Professionals, Association Française Des Trésoriers D’Entreprise, & Association of Corporate 
Treasurers 2004. 
47 European Association of Corporate Treasurers 2005. 
48 Mouvement des Enterprises de France 2005. 
49 UNICE 2005. 
50 European Association for Listed Companies 2005. 
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supported the claim of the rating agencies that the market was ultimately the best 
regulator and that market pressures would be sufficiently capable of disciplining rating 
agencies.  As the summary of the preferences of the respondents to the CESR 
consultation illustrates in Table 1, support for self-regulation came not only from interest 
groups in the UK but also from most respondents from France and Germany. 
 
Table 11 - Responses to 2005 CESR Consultation on Rating Agencies 




European Banking Federation Banking International  Self-regulation 
British Bankers’ Association Banking  UK Self-regulation 
Association of British Insurers Insurance UK Self-regulation 
German Insurance Association Insurance Germany Self-regulation + 
External arbitrator 
Investment Management Association Securities UK Self-Regulation 
International Securities Market Association + 
International Primary Market Association 
Securities International Self-regulation 
Bond Market Association Securities US Self-regulation 
European Association of Corporate Treasurers Corporate  International Self-regulation 
Moody’s Rating Agency US Self-regulation 
S&P’s Rating Agency US Self-regulation 
Fitch Rating Agency US Self-regulation 
Danish Shareholders’ Association Shareholders Denmark No position taken 
Department of Economics, University of Bari Academia Italy No position taken 
European Association of Public Banks Banking International Self-regulation 
HVB Group Banking  Germany Self-regulation + 
external 
arbitration body 
Institutional Money Market Funds Association Securities International Self-Regulation 
International Banking Federation Banking International Self-Regulation 
Italian Banking Association Banking Italy Direct Regulation 
German Zentraler Kreditausschuss Banking Germany No position 
BdRA (Federal Association of Rating Analysts and 
Rating Advisors) 
Rating Germany Self-Regulation + 
some form of 
public oversight 
European Association for Listed Companies Corporate/Users of 
derivatives 
International Direct Regulation 
Mouvement des Enterprises de France Corporate France Self-regulation 
Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation UK International Self-regulation 
 
This unified front in support of self-regulation constituted by regulatory authorities, rating 
agencies, and the quasi-totality of financial and corporate interest groups convincingly 
explains why the European Commission announced its intention not to present new 
legislative proposals in the regulation of rating agencies in January 2006. The European 
Commission affirmed its confidence that the self-regulation by the CRAs on the basis of 
the newly adopted IOSCO Code would provide an answer to concerns raised by the 
European Parliament. According to the Commission this was consistent with its the 
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principles of “Better Regulation,” maintaining that “legislative solutions should be applied 
only where they are strictly necessary for the achievement of public policy objectives.”51 
This endorsement of self-regulation by the European Commission was backed up, 
however, by the threat of regulatory intervention. The European Commission asked the 
CESR to monitor compliance with the IOSCO Code and explicitly threatened 
“introducing legislative proposals if new circumstances arise—including serious 
problems of market failure…The ratings industry should be aware that the Commission 
may have to take legislative action if it becomes clear that compliance with EU rules or 
the Code is unsatisfactory and damaging EU capital markets.”52 When the first review 
conducted by CESR in 2006 confirmed the substantial compliance of rating agencies 
with the IOSCO Code of Conduct,53 Internal Market Commissioner McCreevy welcomed 
the report as confirming “that the self-regulation by CRAs functions reasonably well,” 
“the right regulatory balance had been struck,” and “the case for new legislation in this 
area remains unproven”.54   
While in Europe regulators and market actors were successful in triggering the 
emergence of a market-based regulatory regime, in the United States the attempt by the 
SEC to negotiate a voluntary oversight framework failed to appease Congress. On the 
contrary, in many circumstances Congress criticized the reluctance of the SEC to take 
action in introducing regulation of rating agencies.  
In April 2003, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Capital Markets held a 
hearing to investigate the SEC’s role in policing credit rating agencies and its 
relationship with the agencies.55 As Rep. Christopher Shays argued in a contentious 
house hearing in April 2003, "I get the feeling, basically, that you all are pretty much 
asleep."56 In September 2004 the influential Congressman Richard Baker,Chairman of 
the Committee, and the leading Democrat on the House panel, Rep. Paul Kanjorski, 
threatened to shift the task of regulating rating agencies to another regulatory agency 
such as the Federal Reserve if the SEC did not act within the following year.57 Kanjorski 
declared that he was considering a bill telling the SEC to "get going and, in a year, if you 
don't act, your authority by the act itself will be put in another agency." 58 Rep. Baker 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 European Commission 2006a, 2006b. 
52 European Commission 2006a European Commission 2006b. 
53 CESR 2006. 
54 European Commission 2007. 
55 U.S. House of Representatives 2003. 
56  Klein 2003. 	  
57  Burns 2004a.	  
58 Drawbaugh 2004. 	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stated that if the SEC did not propose a viable solution soon, there existed bipartisan 
support to introduce legislation.59 
In its reply, the SEC still defended the benefits of an industry-led regime as “a 
constructive and reasonable approach to address a number of concerns involving the 
credit rating industry that have been raised in recent years by Congress.” At the same 
time, the SEC acknowledged that the negotiations with the rating agencies had failed in 
delivering an “agreed-upon voluntary oversight framework.”60 Nevertheless, if Congress 
wanted more extensive regulatory oversight, the SEC stated, then it should have 
explicitly granted this authority to the SEC via legislation; although the SEC explicitly 
refused to take a “formal position on whether additional legislation should be 
forthcoming.”61 
Facing the option of supporting the market-based approach defended by the SEC and 
IOSCO or imposing direct regulation, Congress moved decisively towards the latter 
option, rejecting the desirability of relying on voluntary standards and hosting in June 
2005 a hearing on "Legislative Solutions for the Rating Agency Duopoly.”62 Rep. Mike 
Fitzpatrick introduced a bill to bring to an end the self-regulatory status that 
characterized the industry and to give the SEC inspection, examination, and 
enforcement authority over CRAs. 
This bill found significant opposition within the US Congress63 as well as from the rating 
agencies, which urged Congress to wait before legislating for market-driven initiatives 
already underway, such as the international Code of Conduct and the voluntary 
framework developed by SEC.64 Despite this opposition, the US Congress approved in 
September 2006 the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (CRA Reform Act). This 
bill replaced the previous NRSRO status with the new status of Statistical Rating 
Organization. Most importantly, the CRA Reform Act brought registered CRAs under the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Klein 2004. 
60 SEC 2005. 
61 SEC 2005 Asked if Rep. Kelly if the SEC was “seeking authority from Congress to rate the raters”, Nazareth responded: 
“No. We are not seeking authority. We have no official position on seeking authority. What is being discussed is granting 
the Commission authority to have an oversight regime for those entities who fit the definition and who have applied for 
recognition”. Answering a similar question by Rep. Brown-Waite, Nazareth responded: “The Commission has not yet 
taken a position on whether it is requesting statutory authority. What the Commission has done is make clear that it 
believes that to do more would require statutory authority”. 
62 US House of Representatives 2005. See also Hume 2005a; Hutnyan 2005. 
63 For instance, the influential NY Senator Charles Schumer, who in 2006 encouraged the SEC to revive a voluntary 
oversight plan”. Fitzpatrick, who initially introduced the bill, later argue that the bill had been significantly been watered 
down, blaming in particular Sen. Schumer. Protess & Sebert 2010.  
64 S&P's 2005b. S&P’s reacted declaring "We think the self-regulatory approach is the way to go. We think that there's 
been substantial progress made [on a system of voluntary standards] and that anything that requires registration could run 
into real constitutional concerns." Cited in Hume 2005b. 	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oversight of the SEC and required them to comply with record-keeping and disclosure 
requirements, provisions on management of conflicts of interest and other procedures, 
and provided the SEC with authority to take action against a rating agency that failed to 
comply with these requirements.65 
In sum, while in the United States the regulatory framework that eventually emerged 
after the collapse of Enron placed the responsibility to set the rules governing rating 
agencies and enforce compliance in the hands of public authorities, the regulatory 
approach in Europe and at the international level instead continued to rely on self-
regulatory efforts by rating agencies and on the discipline of markets. In the European 
context, the more modest role of public authorities was to be that of monitoring the self-
regulatory efforts by rating agencies.  
How can we explain the emergence of two frameworks allocating regulatory 
responsibilities so differently among public regulators and private market actors? And 
how can we explain the fact that the more stringent regime emerged in the United States 
rather than in Europe, thus challenging the expectation of the literature holding that 
liberal market economies should be supportive of a light approach to the regulation of 
rating agencies? 
One possible interpretation would point towards the different impact that the collapse of 
Enron had on the balance of influence between regulators and policymakers in Europe 
and in the United States. In both the United States and Europe, the bankruptcy of Enron 
and subsequent corporate scandals generated incentives for politicians to enter the 
regulatory debate and to question the lack of formal regulation of rating agencies, in turn 
leading  securities regulators to endorse market-based improvements in order to satisfy 
the concerns of political  overseers.  
However, the collapse of Enron had no direct impact over European markets, while the 
bankruptcy of Parmalat remained a more localized shock, largely restricted to the Italian 
market. As a consequence, these shocks failed to generate sufficient incentives for 
policymakers in European countries to challenge the preference of regulators and of the 
large majority of interest groups both within and outside the finance industry for a self-
regulatory solution.  
On the other hand, according to Culpepper, the Enron and the Worldcom scandals 
“caught public attention and ignited public anger” in the United States, becoming “an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Text of the bill is available here: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s3850 
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informational short-cut for corporate excess” and making “a class of scandals easier to 
explain to the wider public.”66 The Enron scandal had the effect of “forc[ing] a reluctant 
Congress to act” and to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley act.67 As Culpepper argues, “In the 
US, the sharp increase in the political salience of executive pay in the post Enron period 
created an incentive for politicians to intervene with formal legal proposals, and political 
entrepreneurs in the Democratic party responded to this incentive.”68  
 
Figure 14 - Coverage of Rating Agencies in the US Press (1994-20007) 
 
 
The analysis of coverage of rating agencies in the US media in Figure 14 illustrates the 
impact of this shock in raising the salience of these actors more than did previous 
corporate bankruptcies that went undetected by rating agencies. The significant attention 
raised by Enron towards the shortcomings in the regulation of corporate firms and 
securities markets generated strong momentum for Congress to be involved in these 
areas even beyond the passage of Sarbanes Oxley.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Culpepper 2011 P. 159. 
67 Culpepper 2011 P. 159. 
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At the same time, the analysis of the degree of public salience of rating agencies does 
not fully support that the momentum coming from the public opinion represented the only 
or even the main factor at play in explaining the different approach in the US and in 
Europe. It is true that the bankruptcy of Enron increased the profile of rating agencies 
more than any other corporate bankruptcy of the past, but as Figure 15 illustrates, while 
the level of media attention towards rating agencies was higher in the United States than 
in Germany during most of this period, it was significantly lower than in France.   
 
Figure 15 - Media Coverage of Rating Agencies in the US, UK, Germany, France 




In addition, the decision of Congress to reject the market-based approach devised by the 
SEC and to regulate rating agencies directly occurred not at the peak of the public 
attention in 2002, but rather three years later in 2005. At the time of the passage of the 
CRA Reform Act, the level of public attention towards rating agencies in the US had 
declined to pre-Enron levels. 
It is therefore important to consider additional factors that may explain the different 
attitude of elected officials in the United States and in Europe. One possible 
interpretation points towards the fact that US regulators could not fully deliver on their 
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agencies hit a deadlock. This weakened the capacity of the opponents of the direct 
regulation to point towards the existence of a viable self-regulatory alternative to direct 
regulation, and it facilitated the attempt to gather support within Congress for a 
legislation to directly regulate the sector. This is a clear difference from the debates 
regarding the desirability of regulating derivatives during the same period, when the 
financial industry and the defenders of the status quo were able to demonstrate the 
existence of numerous industry-driven alternatives. Contrary to the situation in the 
United States, when the European Commission assessed the desirability of relying on 
the market-based implementation of the IOSCO Code of Conduct, rating agencies were 
able to demonstrate a greater commitment towards implementing these principles.  
Competitive concerns may also have played an important role in explaining the greater 
appetite of Congress for regulating rating agencies than for derivatives. In the case of 
derivatives discussed in the previous chapter, the threat that direct oversight of the 
sector would have favored a migration of derivatives trading from New York to London 
was an important argument used in support of self-regulation. In the case of rating 
agencies, the global dominance of US rating agencies and lack of strong competitive 
concerns strengthened the appetite of Congress to “go it alone” in regulating the 
industry. Over this period, the United States did not pressure its European counterparts 
to follow by introducing an equivalent regulatory framework, given that the self-regulatory 
framework that emerged in Europe was directly in the interests of US firms. 
As the next section will show, the more extensive impact that the crisis of 2007-09 had in 
increasing the salience of derivatives regulation in Europe also had the impact of 
triggering dynamics resembling those in the United States after Enron, thus setting the 
stage for a shift in the public-private divide in the regulation of rating agencies both in 
Europe and at the international level.	  
 
5.4 The Initial Response to the Crisis in the Regulation of Rating Agencies 
Since the early stages of the crisis in the summer of 2007, many analysts have identified 
rating agencies as one of the main culprits. Several commentators pointed a finger 
towards the function of “gatekeepers” that rating agencies performed for most products 
at the core of the financial crisis, such as the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). The fact that 62% of all the securitized products 
issued in the US and 75% of those issued in Europe were AAA-rated instilled significant 
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confidence among investors in the safety of these structured finance products. This also 
led these structured finance instruments to be widely bought by investors subject to 
regulatory requirements explicitly linked to ratings. 69  
However, from the outset of the crisis it became evident that most of these ratings had 
overlooked the problems in structured finance markets. When mortgage defaults began 
to accelerate, rating agencies quickly started in July 2007 to downgrade securities that 
were once highly rated to below investment grade, with S&P downgrading more than 
two-thirds of its investment grade ratings and Moody’s over 5000 investment-grade 
ratings.70 This widespread downgrading of subprime-related securities that occurred in 
2007 and 2008 generated significant market distress, as investors lost confidence in the 
accuracy of the ratings of a wide range of MBS and CDOs and all looked to sell off in a 
market with no buyers.  
By demonstrating how rating agencies had severely underestimated the risks attached 
to MBS and other structured finance products, the crisis once again focused the 
attention of politicians and regulators on the adequacy of their regulatory status.71 One 
main interpretation of the rapid downgrades of MBS and other structured credit products 
stressed important errors in the ratings of these tools. For instance, different reports 
revealed severe shortcomings in the methodologies, models, and key rating 
assumptions used by rating agencies;72 their failure to incorporate in their analyses 
significant pieces of information regarding the quality of the assets underlying structured 
finance products they rated;73 and the inherent differences between the reliability of 
ratings of structured products and those of traditional debt issues. An alternative 
interpretation of the inflated ratings provided by rating agencies prior to the crisis pointed 
to the importance of the skewed incentives faced by rating agencies. In particular, 
policymakers and commentators identified in the “issuer-pays” business model the 
source of several conflicts of interests potentially undermining the accuracy of ratings.74  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 The role of rating agencies in the securitization process and in the creation of structured finance products is well 
analyzed in ESME 2008; Coval, Jurek, & Stafford 2009; European Commission 2008a; CGFS 2008; Fons 2008.  	  
70 Waxman 2008. 
71 FSF 2008b; CESR 2008b; PWG 2008. 
72 For instance, these models frequently involved excessively optimist assumptions, relying on a historical data available 
only to the relatively recent years, without sufficiently accounting for the possibility that the benign economic outlook and 
rising house prices could change significantly. See for instance SIFMA 2008b; CGFS 2008; PWG 2008. 
73 In particular, rating agencies failed to detect and incorporate into their credit assessment the rapid deterioration in 
underwriting standards for subprime mortgage loans which occurred over a very short period from the 2001. 
Congressional Oversight Panel 2009; SIFMA 2008b. 
74 Since the large majority of the rating agencies are being paid by the same issuer of the security that is being rated or 
the originator of the issue, they have an incentive to provide favourable ratings in order to avoid that issuers could bring 
future rating business to other rating agencies. This threat to the agency’s independence is particularly acute in structured 
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Moreover, most reports denounced how this conflict of interest was heightened by the 
nature of the interaction between credit raters and underwriters during the rating of 
structured finance products.75 Finally, observers highlighted how the objectivity of rating 
agencies could be further undermined by their provision of so-called “advisory” and 
“ancillary” services to the issuers of the securities.76  
And so rating agencies returned in the international regulatory agenda as early as 
September 2007, when IOSCO invited them for a meeting in Washington to obtain 
greater information on their role in the emerging market turmoil.77 However, despite the 
severity of both the market shock and the shortcomings in the work of rating agencies 
revealed by the crisis, the initial international regulatory response did not significantly 
depart from the self-regulatory approach that had dominated the international agenda 
since the Enron scandal. Following a request from the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee had already by the beginning of 2007 started to discuss 
the need to amend its Code of Conduct to address specific problems related to the role 
of rating agencies in rating structured finance. The turmoil that originated in the US 
subprime mortgage market increased the urgency of this revision. 
After a brief consultation with market participants launched on 26 March 2008,78 IOSCO 
amended the Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies in May 2008 to 
better address the regulatory issues raised by the role of rating agencies in structured 
finance.79 The changes represented a comprehensive set of regulatory proposals, with a 
range of recommendations on  enhancements to the quality of the rating process, the 
independence of rating agencies and avoidance of conflicts of interest, transparency and 
timeliness of ratings disclosure, and communication with market participants. However, 
this initiative from IOSCO did not challenge the allocation of regulatory responsibilities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
finance where fees for rating agencies are heftier than in the case of corporate ratings and the dependency of rating 
agencies is increased by the limited number of investment banks requesting their services. CESR 2008b; Smith 2008. 
75 As the CESR has argued “the rating of structured finance transactions distinguishes itself from the rating of traditional 
instruments by the greater flexibility to adapt the features of the transaction in order to achieve the rating level desired for 
each tranche of the structure. As opposed to traditional ratings, the rating of a structured finance transaction is a target, 
not the outcome of the rating process.” See CESR 2008b. Several commentators have raised concerns that this close 
interaction between rating agencies and issuers has become advisory in nature. The conflicts of interests inherent in this 
advisory role were aggravated by the fact that analysts were also taking part in fees negotiation, and they were often 
attractive recruitment target for investment banks and other originators/issuers. Therefore, they could be tempted to give 
more favourable ratings to securities issued by their future employers. See Coffee 2007; Lardner 2009; Morgenson 2008. 
76 Examples are pricing services for structured finance securities that do not have a liquid market, risk-management 
consulting, and rating assessment services, providing issuers with a preview of what ratings they are likely to receive after 
certain hypothetical events or if structured in different ways. At the outset of the crisis commentators have denounced the 
lack of clarity regarding what ancillary services are and the lack of operational and legal separations between the analysts 
and other business of the rating agencies. Since these services represent an important source of revenues for rating 
agencies, they have an incentive to continue this profitable relationship with their clients by providing favourable ratings. 
77 Grantin 2007. 
78 IOSCO 2008b. 
79 IOSCO 2008a. 	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between public and private actors that had emerged internationally prior to the crisis, nor 
did it alter the focus on self-regulation. As the Chairman of IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee, Michel Prada, admitted when IOSCO met in Amsterdam in February 2008 to 
decide their course of action, “There’s still hesitation within some regulators to 
[introduce] formal regulation.”80  
Similar to the first set of best practices drafted in 2004, the amended Code of Conduct 
remained non-binding, relying on ratings agencies to incorporate these 
recommendations voluntarily into their individual codes of conduct “according to each 
CRA’s specific legal and market circumstances.” Moreover, just as with the 2004 
initiative, the amended version of the Code relied on discipline imposed by other market 
participants—investors and issuers to be the unique mechanism to ensure compliance. 
In order to improve the ability of market participants to judge whether a CRA had 
satisfactorily implemented the Code fundamentals, IOSCO required rating agencies to 
publicly disclose how each provision of the Code was addressed in their own codes of 
conduct.  
The FSF also provided its endorsement to this market-based approach. When it firstly 
took the lead in coordinating an international regulatory response to the crisis in April 
2008, the FSF urged rating agencies to “quickly revise their codes of conduct to 
implement the revised IOSCO CRA Code of Conduct Fundamentals.” The role of public 
authorities would have been to “monitor, individually or collectively, the implementation 
of the revised IOSCO Code of Conduct by CRAs, in order to ensure that CRAs quickly 
translate it into action”.81   
As in the past, this initiative triggered an immediate response from rating agencies. In 
October 2007 a group comprising five major rating agencies (A.M. Best Company, Inc.; 
DBRS Limited; Fitch, Inc.; Moody's Investors Service, Inc.; and Standard & Poor's 
Ratings Services)82 began cooperating to develop a joint response to concerns being 
raised by policymakers. These agencies jointly responded to the consultation launched 
by IOSCO in March 2008, largely welcoming IOSCO’s revised Code of Conduct and 
affirming their commitment to move swiftly to incorporate its recommendations in their 
respective codes of conduct. They also noted how many of these recommendations had 
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already been adopted by rating agencies through their previous self-regulatory steps.83  
In addition, in their collective response to the CESR’s “Consultation Paper on the Role of 
Credit Rating Agencies in Structured Finance,” rating agencies defended a regulatory 
response based on market discipline, arguing that “market disciplinary forces have 
proven effective in persuading [rating agencies] to implement the existing IOSCO Code 
and [to] propose changes to it or their own codes where market participants and/or 
regulators have raised concerns or identified limitations in the scope of the IOSCO 
Code.”84  
Indeed a review published by IOSCO in March 2009 “found that a larger proportion of 
the CRAs reviewed were aware of the IOSCO CRA Code, and have taken steps to 
incorporate its provisions into their codes of conduct, than when they were previously 
surveyed for IOSCO’s first implementation review in 2007.”85 Moreover, besides jointly 
committing to incorporate the recommendations made by IOSCO in their own codes of 
conduct, rating agencies individually adopted additional self-regulatory commitments to 
counter the rising criticisms regarding their conflicts of interest and the weaknesses in 
their methodologies and data.86 
How can we explain the continuous reliance on a market-based solution despite the 
severity of the shortcomings in the activities of rating agencies demonstrated by the 
crisis? The continuation in the international approach during this period reflects the 
continued leadership of the same US and European securities regulators that had 
promoted self-regulation during the pre-crisis period. 
In the US, the SEC reacted to the first signals of the crisis at the end of July 2007 by 
announcing an investigation into the causes that had led to the inflation of the rating of 
subprime MBS and CDOs.87 The results of this investigation, released in July 2008, 
showed that rating agencies had struggled to stay abreast of the increase in the number 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 A.M. Best, DBRS, Fitch, Moody’s, & S&P's 2008b. 
84 A.M. Best, DBRS, Fitch, Moody’s, & S&P's 2008a. 
85 IOSCO 2009e, p. 15. 
86 Tett 2008b; Moody's 2008; S&P's 2008b. S&P’s has established an Office of the Ombudsman in charge of addressing 
concerns related to potential conflicts of interest that may be raised by issuers and investors, a public annual review of 
governance processes by an independent firm, established a rotation of analysts and decided to study the track record of 
analysts leaving to work for issuers to identify unusual patterns. This was followed by Moody’s, which reorganized its 
internal organization to formalize the separation of its ratings-related and non-rating activities into two different business 
units, to separate the  Credit Policy function from parts of the rating agency with revenue-generating responsibility. Fitch 
separated its non-rating businesses into a separate division, implemented senior management changes in its structured 
finance operations, and revised its approach to the rating of mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt 
obligations. Also the three rating agencies have also announced measures to improve the effectiveness of their analytical 
methodologies, to review their methodologies and assumptions for rating structured financial products, to incorporate 
items currently excluded from credit ratings, and to improve the rating process in the face of the unprecedented market 
changes.  
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and complexity of subprime mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt 
obligations since 2002, they lacked comprehensive written procedures for rating these 
instruments, and they neither appropriately managed their conflicts of interest in relation 
to these deals nor effectively monitored these ratings.88  
Similarly to what occurred in other past circumstances, the SEC initially sought to 
address these shortcomings not by expanding its regulatory oversight of rating agencies 
but rather by soliciting an industry-driven response. The first recommendations regarding 
the regulation of rating agencies, in a report published in March 2008 by the President’s 
Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG), were directed primarily to rating agencies 
themselves. 89  In particular, the PWG urged rating agencies to reform their rating 
processes for structured credit products to ensure integrity and transparency, welcoming 
the self-regulatory steps already taken.  
Additionally, the PWG sought to encourage this industry-driven solution by announcing 
its intention to “facilitate formation of a private-sector group (with representatives of 
investors, issuers, underwriters, and CRAs) to develop recommendations for further 
steps that the issuers, underwriters, CRAs, and policy makers could take to ensure the 
integrity and transparency of ratings, and to foster appropriate use of ratings in risk 
assessment.”90 This “carrot” offered to the industry in the form of public endorsement of 
an industry-led reform was accompanied by the “stick” of threatening to “revisit the need 
for changes to CRA oversight if the reforms adopted by the CRAs are not sufficient to 
ensure the integrity and transparency of ratings”.91  
This approach was supported by the rating agencies, seeking to avoid a more formal 
regulatory response. Speaking before the US Senate on September 26, 2007, Managing 
Director of Moody’s Michael Kanef declared to be “eager to work with other market 
participants on broader market-based reforms and solutions that would enhance the 
transparency and effectiveness of the global credit markets”.92 As S&P’s Chairman 
Deven Sharma argued in a hearing before the House of Representatives, “We have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88  SEC 2008b. 	  
89 PWG 2008. 
90 PWG 2008, p.4. A group with representatives of different members of the financial services industry, assets managers, 
issuers, and underwriters and led by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) issued in July 
2008 a set of recommendations to address the issue raised by the PWG report, which placed the onus entirely in the 
hands of credit rating agencies and other market actors. SIFMA 2008b. 
91 Paulson 2008. 
92 Moody's 2007. 
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learned from this experience and we have made major changes ourselves to restore 
confidence in our ratings.”93 
The subprime mortgage crisis also triggered dynamics in Europe similar to those created 
by the bankruptcy of Enron and Parmalat almost a decade earlier. When the outbreak of 
the crisis led different policymakers to demand a reassessment of the self-regulatory 
status of the industry, the European Commission once again responded to these 
demands by requesting the CESR to investigate whether recent developments in 
structured finance would cause a reassessment of the need to regulate CRAs. In a letter 
to the CESR, McCreevy argued that the crisis had raised doubts on whether rating 
agencies had adequate resources to understand the "rapidly changing and growing 
complex structured finance market," and he asked regulators to analyze the “apparently 
slow response” of rating agencies to the problems with structured finance products.94  
Mirroring what occurred after the bankruptcy of Enron and Parmalat, the response from 
European securities regulators solicited a market-driven regulatory response. Speaking 
before the European Parliament in January 2008, the chairman of the CESR, Eddy 
Wymeersch, declared that "on the question of self-regulation or government regulation, 
it's too early to make a decision about that…We should give a chance to rating agencies 
to put their house in order.” 95  At the same time, European regulators sought to 
encourage rating agencies to self-regulate by threatening regulatory intervention. The 
head of the French Autorité des Marchés Financiers (and chairman of IOSCO’s 
Technical Committee) Michel Prada declared in the same month, “Credit rating agencies 
have to do their homework and provide us with relevant answers to the issues (we are 
worried about), and this needs to be done now. We are in the middle of a crisis and we 
cannot wait….What the regulators do next will very much depend on what the rating 
agencies do…the more they provide good answers, the less we will need to step in."96 
Prada also urged rating agencies to create an industry organization that would allow 
them to speak with a single voice in order to better coordinate their attempts at self-
policing.97  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 S&P's 2009a. 
94 McCreevy 2007a . 
95 H. Jones 2008. 	  
96 Tett 2008a.	  
97 Tett 2008a. Prada declared: "One of the concerns is that over the past two years we have had some hesitation from the 
rating agencies in dealing with our questions. It has not been easy to talk to them collectively - it is the only profession 
which does not have a global organisation and it is hard to understand why." Prada reiterated similar requests in June 
2008. See Baird 2008.	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Indeed, the failure of rating agencies to create such a self-regulatory organization led the 
CESR to recommend to the European Commission in May 2008 the creation of a CRAs 
standard setting and monitoring body, formed by senior representatives of CRAs as well 
as of investors, issuers, and investment firms. This body would be in charge of 
developing international standards for the rating industry and of “naming and shaming” 
rating agencies not in compliance with these standards. For the majority of European 
securities regulators, this form of enhanced self-regulation represented the appropriate 
regulatory response to the deficiencies of the existing self-regulatory regime, in particular 
the lack of clear market sanctions in case of transgressions of the IOSCO Code.98  
At the same time, European securities regulators rejected the desirability of directly 
regulating rating agencies. In its recommendations to the European Commission, the 
CESR argued that it “still believe[s] that there is no evidence that regulation would have 
had an effect on the issues which emerged with ratings of US subprime backed 
securities.”99 Indeed, as in the pre-crisis period, a self-regulatory solution built around an 
amended IOSCO Code of Conduct represented the regulatory solution supported not 
only by European securities regulators but also by the large majority of the market actors 
that participated to the latest consultation launched by CESR.100 
This section has identified the source of the continuous support for a market-based 
approach that characterized the initial response of the international regulatory 
community, which can be found in the continuous support for this approach among 
securities regulators both in the United States and Europe. The next two sections will 
discuss how the intensification of the salience of financial regulation would then lead to a 
shift in the balance of influence in setting the domestic regulatory agenda between 
regulators and elected politicians both in the United States and in Europe. 
 
5.5 Congress and the Regulation of Rating Agencies 
Echoing the dynamics surrounding derivatives described in the previous chapter, the 
monopoly of US federal regulators in setting the agenda for the regulation of rating 
agencies began to come under threat as the intensification of the crisis triggered the 
growing attention of the US public towards the mishaps of the financial sector, including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 CESR 2008b. 
99 CESR 2008b. Among the advantages of this approach highlighted by market participants there was the greater degree 
of flexibility, the greater cost effectivness. CESR argued that “all respondents agreed that a key measure to improve the 
current regime would be the amendment of the IOSCO Code”. 
100 CESR 2008b. 
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rating agencies. This strengthened the incentives for the US Congress to increase its 
engagement in the regulation of rating agencies. Regulation of rating agencies made its 
appearance back into the Congressional agenda for the first time since the beginning of 
the crisis in September 2007, when the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets held a 
hearing on “The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market.”101 
This was only the first of several hearings held by Congress during this period to 
investigate the role of rating agencies in the financial crisis. During these hearings, 
severe criticisms were directed by different Congressmen at the inability of the SEC to 
identify their mistakes of the rating agencies.102 During the hearing on rating agencies in 
October 2008, the Chairman of the Government Oversight Committee, Henry Waxman, 
argued, “The story of the credit rating agencies is a story of colossal failure. The credit 
rating agencies occupy a special place in our financial markets.  Millions of investors rely 
on them for independent, objective assessments.  The rating agencies broke this bond 
of trust, and federal regulators ignored the warning signs and did nothing to protect the 
public. The result is that our entire financial system is now at risk.”103 At the same time, 
Congressmen also questioned the capacity of rating agencies to self-police themselves 
and urged regulators to step up their oversight of rating agencies.   
In line with the expectation of the theoretical model presented by David Singer that has 
been discussed in Chapter 3,104 the greater Congressional scrutiny triggered a reaction 
from the SEC. Starting from June 2008, the SEC moved from simply soliciting a self-
regulatory response to using the authority conferred by the CRA Reform Act of 2006 and 
incorporating into its rule-book several of the principles suggested by the amended 
IOSCO Code of Conduct to limit rating agencies’ conflicts of interest; to increase their 
disclosure; to better differentiate between structured, corporate, or municipal 
securities;105 and to strip references to NRSRO in most of its rules in order to reduce 
excessive reliance on credit ratings.106  The SEC also stepped up its oversight of rating 
agencies by allocating resources in February 2009 to establish a branch of examiners 
dedicated specifically to conducting examination of rating agencies and by announcing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 U.S. House of Representatives 2007. 
102 Three distinct bills were introduced in January of 2009 by Rep. Darrell Issa (Financial Oversight Commission Act of 
2009 - H.R. 74), and by Senator Johnny Isakson (Financial Markets Commission Act of 2009 - S. 298), and in May 2009 
by Rep. Willliam Delahunt (Financial Markets Commission Act of 2009 - H.R. 2253) to ask the establishment of a 
commission to investigate the role of credit rating agencies in the financial crisis. 
103 Waxman 2008.	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in July 2009 the creation of a monitoring group to enhance the oversight of rating 
agencies.107 
These regulatory initiatives, however, failed to appease the US Congress. As New York 
Sen. Charles Schumer said after the SEC disclosed an additional set of rules in 
December 2008, "None of the rules adopted today are a substitute for the larger 
regulatory reform that is coming next year."108 As Figure 16 illustrates, starting from the 
fall of 2008, Congressmen began to play a much more direct role in shaping the 
regulation of rating agencies, using their legislative authority not only to pressure 
regulators to intervene but also to directly set the rules governing different aspects of the 
rating business.  
 
Figure 16 - Number of Documents mentioning "Rating Agencies" in 
"Congressional Documents and Publications"109 
 
 
These proposals sought to strengthen the regulatory oversight of public authorities over 
rating agencies beyond what had been suggested by securities 
regulators.Demonstrating this, a bill introduced in July 2009 by Rep. Keith Ellison (H.R. 
3128) suggested addressing the “wholly inadequate” current oversight of rating agencies 
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109 The “Congressional Documents and Publications” a wide variety of documents concerning the activity of US Congress, 
including legislative proposals, transcript of hearings, and press releases from individual Congressmen. It has been 
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by giving the Federal Reserve authority over the CRAs when they analyze and rate 
structured financial products.110  
While this proposal was rejected, several legislative proposals sought to broaden the 
oversight of securities regulators over rating agencies by requiring the SEC to establish 
an office to administer its rules with respect to the practices of rating agencies;111 to 
conduct an annual audit of each NRSRO to ensure rating methods and procedures are 
sound, adhered to, and disclosed;112 or to empower the SEC to discipline executives at 
rating agencies for failures to supervise.113 Some of these provisions were later included 
into the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed by the US Congress in 
the summer of 2010, which strengthened the powers of public authorities to regulate 
rating agencies by establishing an Office of Credit Ratings within the SEC.114  
In addition to reorganizing the SEC, Congressional involvement also contributed to 
expand the degree of SEC regulatory intervention beyond the measures already 
adopted or proposed by the agency. The reforms already introduced by the SEC during 
the crisis had largely fallen within the perimeter of measures negotiated internationally 
within the IOSCO Code of Conduct. In particular, the SEC had introduced into its rule-
book several of the disclosure requirements coordinated at the international level to 
assist investors in understanding the actual performance of credit ratings, the 
procedures and methodologies used the determine credit ratings, and the extent they 
could be undermined by conflicts of interest deriving from the issuer-pays model and the 
oligopolistic nature of the market for ratings. In addition, it had barred rating agencies 
from providing advice on how to structure the same products that they rate.115 Finally, 
legislation introduced detailed regulatory requirements regarding the internal governance 
of rating agencies, for instance dictating the composition, compensation, and duties of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Ellison 2008. This authority would build upon powers that the Federal Reserve has already assumed as part of its 
administration of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) program, expanding the authority of the Fed to 
oversee all asset-backed securities, not just those financed through TALF.	  
111 See the Rating Accountability and Transparency Enhancement (S. 1073) introduced on May 19 2009 by Sen. Reed. 
The text of the bill is available online at: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s1073 
112 See the Credit Rating Agency Responsibility Act of 2009 (S. 927) introduced on April 29, 2009 by Sen. Mark Pryor. 
The text of the bill is available online at: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s927 
113 See the Accountability and Transparency in Rating Agencies Act (HR 3890) introduced on 21 April 2009 by Rep. Paul 
Kanjorski. 
114 See Section 932 of the legislation. This Office would also have the mandate to “conduct an examination of each 
nationally recognized statistical rating organization at least annually”, and make the essential findings of this inspection 
available to the public. 	  
115 The SEC als prohibited anyone who participates in determining a credit rating from negotiating the fee that the issuer 
pays for it and from receiving gifts, and requiring agencies to disclose information on the source and magnitude of their 
revenues that could allow investors to assess potential conflicts of interests. SEC 2008a; 2009a; 2009b; 2009f SEC 
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the board of directors of rating agencies as well as removing the legal protection 
traditionally granted to rating agencies under the freedom of speech principle.116  
However, Congress did not go so far as to challenge the principle codified in the CRA 
Reform Act of 2006 and informing the actions of the SEC and IOSCO holding that 
regulation should not directly interfere with the methodologies employed by rating 
agencies or the substance of their credit ratings. This principle had been questioned by a 
report presented by the Congressional Oversight Panel, established by Congress when 
it provided the US Treasury with the authority to spend $700 billion to implement the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program. The January 2009 report had suggested the creation of 
a “Credit Rating Review Board” in charge of endorsing any rating before it took on 
regulatory significance,117 later codified in a bill presented in February 2009 by Rep. 
Gary Ackerman and Rep. Michael Castle.118 However, the Ackerman and Castle bill 
failed to gather significant support and was not incorporated into the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.119  
The same dynamics are clearly visible in the approach towards the regulation of conflicts 
of interest associated with the work of rating agencies. The regulatory paradigm 
developed prior to the crisis, the same approach adopted by IOSCO in response to the 
crisis, did not encourage regulators to interfere directly with credit rating agencies’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 The WSRCPA Act requires half of the board of directors to be independent, with a compensation not linked to the 
performance of the firm, a non-renewable fixed term not to exceed five years, and a specific set of duties. The bill also 
required the SEC issue rules to regulate the training of the person employed by rating agencies to ensure they meet 
“standards of training, experience, and competence necessary to produce accurate ratings”. Moreover the legislation has 
also challenged the protection, introduced a provision making easier for investors sue rating agencies if they can show 
that the agency “knowingly or recklessly” failed “to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security with respect to 
the factual elements relied upon by its own methodology for evaluating credit risk” or it failed “to obtain reasonable 
verification of such factual elements … from other sources”. 
117 Congressional Oversight Panel 2009 The Report stated that: “Ideally, the board would be given direction by lawmakers 
to favor simpler (plain vanilla) instruments with relatively long track records. New and untested instruments might not 
make the cut”. While this solution would not prevent new instruments from being be actively bought and sold in the private 
marketplace, institutional investors that follow rating guidelines would be able to buy exclusively to those instruments 
whose ratings were approved by the review board.   
118 The bill requested the SEC to set new rules defining the types of structured finance investments eligible to receive 
ratings from credit rating agencies, thus placing regulators in charge of directly defining what products could or could not 
be rated.  This legislative proposal envisioned that only structured finance investments whose future performances could 
be reasonably predicted (e.g. securities with established track records and proven default rates, and securitizations that 
are comprised of homogeneous securities) could be eligible to receive ratings US House of Representatives 2009. 
119 The Dodd-Frank Act however still grants regulators the authority to revoke the authorization to agencies that had 
“failed over a sustained period of time, as determined by the Commission, to produce ratings that are accurate for that 
class or subclass of securities”.While the bill approved by the US Congress does not put regulators in the position of 
arbiter of the performance of rating agencies, the bill gives the SEC the power to temporarily suspend or permanently 
revoke the registration of a rating agency if regulators find that this does not have the resources “to consistently produce 
credit ratings with integrity”. In making this determination, the WSRCP Act requires regulators to consider “whether the 
nationally recognized statistical rating organization has failed over a sustained period of time, as determined by the 
Commission, to produce ratings that are accurate for that class or subclass of securities”.   	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business models, nor did it suggest supporting the emergence of rating agencies 
following alternative models in order to break the oligopolistic nature of the market.120 
The greater involvement of the US Congress also had the effect of widening the range of 
regulatory proposals to address conflicts of interest. While Congress did not seek to 
promote the emergence of rating agencies funded by investors121 or government-run 
agencies,122 it did seek to sever the direct link between issuers and rating agencies at 
the core of the conflicts of interest created by this business model.  
In August 2009, the influential Democratic Sen. Charles Schumer proposed that when 
an issuer contracted an agency, the SEC should randomly choose another CRA to 
provide a second, back-up random rating, thus providing additional checks.123  Two 
distinct amendments introduced on the House floor by Rep. Brad Sherman and Rep. 
Stephen Lynch in October 2009 and on the Senate floor by Sen. Al Franken in May 2010 
sought to give the SEC the power to establish an independent self-regulatory 
organization to be called the Credit Rating Agency Board, which would act as a 
middleman between issuers seeking ratings on structured securities and the rating 
agencies, allocating issuers to different agencies.124   
However, while this bill was approved by the US Senate with a 64-35 vote, the measure 
was stripped only a few weeks later as the House and Senate compromised on their 
respective bills within a reconciliation committee—outside of public scrutiny. The Dodd-
Frank Act instead asked the SEC to conduct a two-year study to examine “the feasibility 
of establishing a system in which a public or private utility or a self-regulatory 
organization assigns nationally recognized statistical rating organizations to determine 
the credit ratings of structured finance products.”125 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 The IOSCO Code of Conduct was instead directed towards CRAs relying on different business models.	  
121 One of the leaders of the legislation on credit rating agencies, Rep. Kanjorski, in a first moment described that this 
option of promoting more investor-pays agency was “worthy of our consideration”, to later retreat and declare that when 
lawmakers had looked  into solution to change the model, they found it was impractical. See Kanjorski 2009.  	  
122 Key lawmakers within Congress also rejected the possibility of a government-run credit rating agency. Rep. Barnkey 
Frank said he has contemplated introducing this kind of solution but he was “skeptical that you could insulate a 
government-run rating agency from pressure from the people being rated”. See Protess 2010.	  
123 Schumer described this proposal in this way: "It would be done randomly and secretly and the pool would be a lot 
greater than the big three rating agencies, so there would be some incentive to get it right…This proposal would provide a 
check against ratings shopping and other conflicts of interest inherent in the system."According to one version of this 
proposal, every tenth debt security produced by a corporation would be subject to a second rating produced by a random 
issuer. According to a second approach instead, every tenth security produced by all the rating agencies would be subject 
to a second rating. See Schumer 2009. 
124 The board would evaluate different mechanisms to assign rating agencies, including by rotation or a lottery, but it 
would also have to take into account agencies' accuracy and technical capacity, so that rating agencies with the best track 
record over time would be rewarded with a greater share of business.     
125 The US Congress required the SEC also to study: “(A) an assessment of potential mechanisms for determining fees for 
the nationally recognized statistical rating organizations; (B) appropriate methods for paying fees to the nationally 
recognized statistical rating organizations; (C) the extent to which the creation of such a system would be viewed as the 
creation of moral hazard by the Federal Government”. 
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The legislation passed by the US Congress also required the SEC to examine  
“alternative means for compensating nationally recognized statistical rating organizations 
that would create incentives for accurate credit ratings.”126 Under this pressure from 
Congress, the SEC invited industry representatives, investors, and academics to a 
roundtable to discuss alternative compensation models beyond the issuer-pays 
model.127 However, at the moment of writing, the SEC has failed to endorse such an 
approach.128 The Government Accountability Office, in its study of alternative models for 
compensating CRAs, has acknowledged that “there is little incentive to continue 
developing these models because it appears unlikely they will receive attention from 
regulators or legislators.” 129  Instead, the SEC has so far adopted a market-driven 
mechanism to favor the entry of more rating agencies, requiring the rating agencies 
hired by issuers to disclose all information provided by the issuer in order to encourage 
other rating agencies that are not paid to rate the security to step forward and to issue 
their own unsolicited ratings.130 
In sum, while the intervention of Congress had the effect of extending the range of 
regulatory requirements imposed upon rating agencies beyond the focus on disclosure 
requirement that characterized the initial approach by the SEC and IOSCO, Congress 
has not challenged the preferences of regulators concerning two key principles at the 
core of this regulatory paradigm: that the intervention of regulatory authorities should 
interfere directly neither with the methodologies employed by rating agencies and the 
content of ratings nor with their business models.  
This deferral to the preferences of CRAs represents a contrast with the conduct of 
Congress in the regulation of derivatives described in the previous chapter. A partial 
explanation for this divergence comes from the evolution of the public opinion towards 
the two sectors. In the case of derivatives, the final stages of the Congressional debate 
attracted greater attention from the media, a development that created strong incentives 
for Congress to support proposals going beyond the position previously endorsed by 
regulators and major market actors, as demonstrated by the Lincoln amendment. 
Instead, rating agencies consistently exhibited lower salience than did derivatives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 At the end of this period, the SEC would be required to implement the proposed new clearinghouse “unless the 
Commission determines that an alternative system would better serve the public interest and the protection of investors”.  
127 SEC 2009g. 
128 See Section 939F of the Dodd-Frank Act. In response to this proposal, the SEC issued a Solicitation of Comment on 
10 May 2011 "Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings". See Franken & Wicker 2011; SEC 
2011. 
129 GAO 2012.	  
130 SEC 2009f. 
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throughout the entire crisis, and in particular during the concluding phases of the 
Congressional debate over the passage of Dodd-Frank Act. As a result, this limited the 
incentives for Congress to deviate too much from the preferences of regulators by 
supporting a measure highly interfering in the structure of the rating markets, such as a 
rating clearinghouse. 
To conclude, the primacy of the SEC in charting the initial regulatory response to the 
crisis in the United States was an important component of the continuity in the initial 
international regulatory response with the market-based approach centered on the first 
IOSCO Code of Conduct that had emerged after Enron. Nevertheless, the shift that 
occurred at the domestic level within the United States and the greater activism of 
Congress in strengthening the oversight of rating agencies are not sufficient to explain 
the shift in the public-private divide that would next occur at the international level and 
the decision by the G20 to bring rating agencies firmly under the perimeter of public 
regulation. In fact, the principle that rating agencies should register with national 
securities regulators had already been introduced in the United States before the crisis. 
However, this had not triggered an equivalent shift in the international agenda, as 
European authorities had not yet abandoned their reliance on a market-based 
enforcement of the IOSCO Code of Conduct.  
In order to explain the shift in the international agenda towards the support of direct 
regulation, the next section will analyze impact that the crisis had in altering the domestic 
baswes of the regulation of rating agencies in Europe. 
 
5.6 The Regulation of Rating Agencies in Europe  
The previous section argued that the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis did not 
undermine the support for a market-based approach from European securities 
regulators, which denied that the crisis justified the introduction of a direct regulatory 
framework. However, a key difference this time from the regulatory response that 
followed the bankruptcy of Enron was the political response that the crisis solicited within 
Europe. 
As argued in the first part of this chapter, in 2006 the proposal presented by the CESR 
for a market-driven regulatory response had been endorsed by the Commission and was 
not challenged by other relevant policymakers. On the other hand, the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2010 triggered a different response.  
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European Commissioner McCreevy had initially urged credit rating agencies to 
strengthen their self-regulatory efforts,131 threatenjng to move forward in introducing 
regulatory measures only in the case rating agencies failed to deliver meaningful self-
regulatory measures.132 However, starting from June 2008, the European Commission 
gradually abandoned this position and openly criticized the emphasis on industry self-
regulation that informed the recommendations presented by European securities 
regulators and IOSCO. McCreevy himself publicly questioned this self-regulatory 
approach, declaring, “I am flabbergasted at the naivety of anyone who thinks these 
same credit rating agencies should be trusted to abide by a non-legally enforceable 
voluntary code of conduct drawn up under palm trees—A code that has proven itself to 
be toothless, useless, and worthless time and time again. Fool me once shame on you, 
fool me twice shame on me.”133 McCreevy described the IOSCO Code of Conduct as a 
“toothless wonder.”134  
The European Commission moved forward in July 2008  by presenting a proposal to 
directly regulate the activities of rating agencies in Europe. The Commission described 
this regulatory proposal as motivated by “the manifest failure of self-regulatory efforts, 
both formal and informal, to ensure high standards of independence, integrity and 
professional diligence.” 135   The European Commission did acknowledge that rating 
agencies had recently presented several self-regulatory proposals to address the 
concerns of regulators. However, according to the European Commission, the status 
quo based on rating agencies self-regulating their internal organization, processes, and 
mechanisms by adopting the revised IOSCO code was not a viable option because of 
the deficiencies in this code and, above all, the lack of mechanisms besides market 
discipline of external enforcement and sanctioning of the CRAs actual compliance with 
the Code.136  
Unlike in the period preceding the crisis, this time the European Commission openly 
attacked reliance on market discipline, arguing that, “given the oligopolistic structure of 
the CRAs' market, it is highly unlikely that market pressure alone is sufficient to discipline 
the CRAs to change their conduct.”137 The European Commission also rejected the 
proposal coming from the CESR for the creation of an external oversight body 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 McCreevy 2008h.   
132 McCreevy 2008a; McCreevy 2008b; Kelly 2008.  
133 McCreevy 2008g. 
134 McCreevy 2008c. 
135 European Commission 2008b, p.2. 
136 European Commission 2008b; European Commission 2008a. 
137 European Commission 2008a, p. 44.  
	   212 
composed of market actors to monitor CRA self-regulation, since this industry-driven 
monitoring body would have the authority neither to effectively supervise rating agencies 
nor to enforce compliance as public authorities would.  The Commission even found that 
“recent events have unveiled that the reputational risk is not sufficient for CRAs to 
abandon harmful practices.”138  
The regulatory framework formally proposed by the European Commission in October 
2008 required rating agencies that were to issue credit ratings intended to be used for 
regulatory purposes in the European Union to register with the relevant public authorities 
and to comply with different rules regarding their conflicts of interest, the quality of their 
rating methodology and their ratings, and their transparency. Moreover, the regulatory 
plan would also put European regulators in charge of supervising these credit rating 
agencies, giving the regulators the necessary powers to ensure compliance with the 
regulatory requirements associated with the registration.139  
The European Commission acknowledged that the registration regime would pose new 
compliance and administrative costs upon rating agencies and be less flexible and less 
capable to adapt to market innovation than a self-regulatory solution. Unlike in the past, 
though, the European Commission downplayed the impact of these shortcomings, 
arguing they would not outweigh the benefits of having in place legally binding rules and 
enforcement mechanisms.140 Indeed, the Regulation presented by the Commission also 
departed from the approach endorsed by IOSCO and European securities regulators by 
relying on a more extensive set of detailed regulatory requirements interfering with the 
internal procedures sustaining the rating process 141  and by addressing conflicts of 
interest in the rating business.142  
One example of interference with the internal practices included a measure requiring the 
introduction of a rotation mechanism for analysts on a four-year basis to avoid the risk 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 European Commission 2008a, p. 46. 	  
139 European Commission 2008d. 
140 European Commission 2008a. 
141 In particular, Article 8 requires rating agencies to review its credit ratings and methodologies “at least annually”, in 
particular “where material changes occur that could have an impact on a credit rating”, as well as “to establish internal 
arrangements to monitor the impact of changes in macroeconomic or financial market conditions on credit ratings”. 
Moreover, the regulation address in detail the steps a CRA must take when its methodologies, models, or key rating 
assumptions used in credit rating activities are changed. In this case, “a credit rating agency shall “immediately… disclose 
the likely scope of credit ratings to be affected” and “review the affected credit ratings as soon as possible and no later 
than six months after the change”, and “re-rate all credit ratings that have been based on those methodologies, models or 
key rating assumptions if, following the review, the overall combined effect of the changes affects those credit ratings”.  
The regulation introduced by the European Commission also includes provisions requiring rating agencies to allocate a 
sufficient number with appropriate knowledge and experience to its credit rating activities. 
142 The assessment of this approach from the European Commission was that “the existing general approach in the 
IOSCO Code has not been sufficiently effective to manage the CRAs' conflicts of interest. It does not guarantee certainty 
for stakeholders and CRAs. It essentially leaves to the CRAs to decide what is effectively prohibited and what safeguards 
are necessary in their internal structures and procedures”. European Commission 2008a. 
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that long-lasting relationships with the same rated entities could compromise the 
independence of these rating analysts. In addition, the Regulation detailed 
organizational requirements dictating the mandate, composition, and compensation of a 
rating agency’s administrative or supervisory board.143   
What explains such a change in the position of the Commission from self-regulation to 
direct regulation of rating agencies? Why, unlike in the period preceding the crisis, did 
the European Commission this time reject the advice from European securities 
regulators? This shift is particularly puzzling when we consider how the departure from 
self-regulation and the prescriptive nature of the Regulation proposed by the 
Commission were contested not only by securities regulators144 but also by the majority 
of interest groups that responded to the consultation launched by the European 
Commission and the CESR.145  
The decision by the Commission was opposed by the main rating agencies operating in 
Europe. S&P’s stated that it was “premature for the Commission to now conclude that 
the IOSCO Code is a failed initiative,” and it criticized the Regulation proposed by 
Commission for “contain[ing] a detailed set of prescriptive rules that go well beyond the 
standards of best practice currently advocated by IOSCO, or beyond the standards of 
regulations that are in place in any other countries (including the current standards 
enforced by the US SEC).”146 Its main competitor, Moody’s, criticized the Commission for 
having “discounted the steps that industry participants and regulatory authorities have 
already taken over the past year,” attacking the excessive level of detail of the proposed 
regulation: “We fear that it will establish a cumbersome and potentially unworkable 
regime”.147  
The continuation of the self-regulatory approach was supported not only by rating 
agencies but also by the large majority of financial groups. Interestingly, this position 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 In particular, Annex I (2) required rating agencies “at least one third, but no less than two, of the members of the 
administrative or supervisory board of a credit rating agency shall be independent members who are not involved in credit 
rating activities”, their compensation “shall not be linked to the business performance of the credit rating agency”, and 
their term of office “shall be for a pre-agreed fixed period not exceeding five years and shall not be renewable”. Moreover 
“at least one independent member and one other member of the board shall have in-depth knowledge and experience at 
a senior level of the markets in structured finance instruments”. The board was given the task of monitoring the 
effectiveness of the measures instituted by the agency to manage conflicts of interest. 
144 CESR criticized the regulation proposed by European Commission for placing in the hands of regulatory authority the 
task of enforcing excessively prescriptive obligations, “giv[ing] rise to a very considerable liability for competent authorities 
and a possible undesirable moral hazard”. See CESR 2008. 
145 Similarly to the CESR, different financial market respondents denounced the “haste with which this measure appears 
to have been designed” and the lack of coordination between the European Commission and regulators, in Europe and in 
foreign jurisdictions See for instance, SIFMA 2008a; European Banking Federation 2008a. 
146 S&P's 2008a. 
147 Moody's 2008. 
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was not expressed uniquely by financial groups representing the City of London, such as 
the British Bankers' Association and the London Investment Banking Association.148 In 
fact, a similar opposition to the introduction of direct regulation also informed the position 
of important interest groups in the same countries whose governments had been most 
vocal in promoting a direct regulatory approach within the European agenda, such as the 
French Banking Federation,149 the Association Française de la Gestion financière,150 and 
the four main German banking associations. 151  The pan-EU European Banking 
Federation criticized several aspects of the proposal, including “the intrusiveness of the 
proposals, which would allow interference with individual ratings; the potential extra-
territorial effects, which would put at risk the international regulatory dialogue; and the 
approach to corporate governance, which we do not believe should be prescribed in this 
manner.”152  
Criticisms towards the approach adopted by the Commission also came from non-
financial groups, such as the European Association of Corporate Treasurers, which 
argued that there had “been only limited market failures as far as CRAs are concerned,” 
further claiming that market discipline was “already causing the needed behavioral 
changes among CRAs without extensive interventionist new regulation.”153 Along these 
same lines, the French Association of Corporate Treasurers criticized the intrusiveness 
and rule-based nature of the regulation.154 The position of all the respondents in the 
consultation launched by the CESR regarding the desirability of preserving a self-
regulatory approach (Question 177) is summarized in the Table 12. 
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Table 12 - Responses to the 2008 CESR Consultation on Rating Agencies155 
Name Sector Country Position on Q #177 




Italy Call for Direct regulation for 
conflicts of interest and 
transparency. 
CFA Institute Financial Education UK Call for a “more rigorous 
self-regulatory’ regime. 
Rating Evidence Rating Agency Germany N/A 
Reuters Media International N/A 
Association of Corporate 
Treasurers 
Non-financial corporates UK N/A 
British Bankers Association and 
London Investment Banking 
Association 
Banking UK Call for maintenance of self-
regulatory regime. 
European Savings Banks Group Banking International Support for self-regulation 
European Banking Federation Banking International Support for self-regulation 
(IOSCO Code of Conduct + 
Market pressures). 
Federation Bancaire Francaise Banking France Support for self-regulation. 
Intesa San Paolo Banking Italy Call for a “light regulatory 
regime” provided by an 
external auditor. 
Zentraler Kreditausschuss (ZKA) Banking  Germany 
 
Support for self-regulation. 
Ferli Rating Germany N/A 
Moody’s, S&P’s, Fitch, A.M. Best, 
DBRS 
Rating International Support for self-regulation. 
Association of British Insurers Insurance UK Support for self-regulation. 
Association Francaise de la 
Gestion Financiere 
Asset Management France Support for self-regulation 
based on IOSCO CoC + 
monitoring role of 
regulators. 
Bundesberband Investment un 
Asset Management 
Asset Management Germany Support for self-regulation. 
European Fund and Asset 
Management Association 
Asset Management International No consensus among 
EFAMA Members. 
German Insurance Association 
(GDV) 
Insurance Germany Support for arbitration and 
enforcement procedures for 
IOSCO Code of Conduct. 
Institutional Money Market Funds 
Association 
Securities International Support direct regulation. 
Investment Management 
Association 
Asset Management UK Support for self-regulation. 
European Federation of Financial 
Analysts Societies 
Investment Advice International Support for direct 
regulation. 
Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association + European 
Securitisation Forum 
Securities International Support for self-regulation. 
 
Even though proposals to directly regulate rating agencies faced the widespread 
opposition of interest groups as well as regulators, the Proposal presented by the 
Commission reflected instead the preferences of the two main political bodies 
dominating the EU policymaking process, the European Parliament and the European 
Council.  
As argued above, the European Parliament had been a long-standing advocate of 
introducing the direct regulation of rating agencies since the publication of the Katiforis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 The responses made available have been published on the CESR/ESMA website 
(http://www.esma.europa.eu/consultation/Consultation-role-credit-rating-agencies-structured-finance#responses) 
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Report in 2003, which invited the Commission to study the possibility of directly 
regulating rating agencies.156  The outbreak of the crisis and the increased politicization 
of financial regulatory issues created momentum for MEPs to support more vocally the 
need to regulate financial firms and to bring this issue back into the EU agenda.   
At the beginning of the crisis in April 2008, different members of the European 
Parliament drafted two reports renewing pressure on the European Commission to bring 
the regulation of rating agencies firmly into the hands of public authorities. The initial 
formulation of the first report, drafted by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, called on the European 
Commission to “formulate rules by which to deal with the conflicts of interest inherent in 
their current business models, and arising from the interplay among actors in today's 
financial markets.” 157  The report was approved by the European Parliament in 
September 2008.158  The second report, drafted by Ieke van den Burg and Daniel 
Dăianu, urged the Commission to be more assertive in regulating rating agencies. The 
report stated that the “vague promise to regulate Credit Rating Agencies [is] all but an 
appropriate policy response to the current crisis.”159 An amended version of this non-
legislative resolution was approved in October 2008, criticizing the continuation of a self-
regulatory approach as “yet untested and probably insufficient to meet the pivotal role 
they play in the financial system”.160 
Indeed, the regulatory solution proposed by the European Commission largely mirrored 
the proposal for a “European Registration Scheme” contained in the Katiforis Report and 
approved by European Parliament in 2004. The debate within the European Parliament 
regarding the Regulation proposed showed strong support among all the major parties 
for ending the self-regulation of rating agencies in Europe.  
For instance, the MEP Gianni Pittella argued, “The regulation also has a strong symbolic 
value, however. We are in fact regulating a sector that like others—I am thinking for 
example of speculative funds—has benefited in recent years from a total legislative void. 
The outcome of this kind of self-regulation is clear for all to see, and it is terrible. Now is 
the time to take courage and build a new structure for the financial markets.” Sahra 
Wagenknecht, on behalf of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left group opened 
her speech by pointing out, “The crisis has shown only too clearly that voluntary self-
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regulation has failed.” Margaritis Schinas stated, “Why did we need to wait for all this to 
happen in order to introduce rules? The answer will be given by the citizens, by 
rewarding those who are calling for legislation and punishing those who wanted to 
persuade us that self-regulation is the panacea for all the evils we are experiencing 
today.”161  
While the rhetoric against the dangers of self-regulation was certainly stronger on the 
left-end of the political spectrum, the legislation for the Regulation proposed by the 
Commission was approved by a very large majority in April 2009, with 569 votes in favor 
and 47 against,162 and the European Parliament sought to strengthen the proposal by 
granting the CESR/ESMA a more central role in the registration of rating agencies.163 
Alone, the preference of the European Parliament for direct regulation of rating agencies 
over self-regulation is not sufficient to explain the shift in the public-private divide that 
occurred in Europe, since it is consistent with the pre-crisis period. Equally if not more 
important was the support for ending the self-regulation of rating agencies coming from 
the governments of the European member states that comprise the European Council.    
The most vocal advocates of the need to regulate rating agencies among the European 
governments were German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, who in a joint letter in August 2007 urged the European Commission to 
investigate the role of rating agencies in the market turmoil.164 In August, members of 
Merkel’s party called for a revision of the regulatory status of rating agencies, arguing 
that German supervisors would either have to stop using rating agencies' assessments, 
"or we'll fold the ratings agencies' voluntary code of conduct into a reform by law."165  
However, their call for a European regulation of the industry clashed with the preference 
of countries such as the UK, which resisted the centralization of financial regulatory 
policies at the EU level. When the main European prime ministers and heads of state 
addressed the regulation of rating agencies jointly for the first time in January 2008, the 
compromise that emerged still called upon rating agencies to address the shortcomings 
revealed by the crisis, further strengthening the incentives for rating agencies to self-
regulate through the threat of regulatory intervention. The joint statement declared, 
“While preferring market-led solutions, such as the amendment of the IOSCO code of 
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conduct, if market participants prove unable or unwilling to rapidly address these issues 
we stand ready to consider regulatory alternatives.” 166  
The greater public attention towards financial issues triggered by the intensification of 
the crisis had the effect of shifting this compromise. On the one hand, the increased 
salience of financial regulatory politics has strengthened the incentives for policymakers 
from Continental European countries to bring forward their regulatory agenda. In May 
2008, after IOSCO published its revised Code of Conduct, French finance minister 
Christine Lagarde announced that she planned to push for bringing CRAs more formally 
under the authority of supervisors by introducing the registration of CRAs operating in 
Europe when France took over the presidency of the European Union in July 2008.167  
On the other hand, the deepening of the crisis made it increasingly difficult for the British 
government and regulators to resist a European regulation that would also cover the 
activities of the City of London, the host of the European operations headquarters of the 
main rating agencies. The failure of the British bank Northern Rock in September 2007 
brought rating agencies under investigation by the House of Commons’ UK Treasury 
Select Committee, which blamed rating agencies for having reacted slowly to the 
Northern Rock debacle and not having warned of the risks ahead of time.168 The British 
governments thus came to support the introduction of a European registration system to 
ensure effective compliance with the IOSCO Code,169 while criticizing other provisions 
that could hamper financial markets and disadvantage the position of the City of 
London.170  
The consensus among European leaders regarding the public-private balance in the 
regulation of rating agencies thus progressively shifted. When the ECOFIN met on July 
8, 2008, European finance ministers stated, “The Council shares the Commission view 
that the current initiatives do not fully address the challenges posed, that further steps 
are needed and that regulatory changes might be necessary.” In order to introduce a 
strengthened oversight regime for rating agencies, they declared to be “support[ing] the 
principle envisaged by the Commission that the rating agencies should be subject to an 
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168  House of Common 2007; see also Chinwala 2007.	  
169 See for instance Treanor 2008; FSA 2009b; Watson & Duncan 2008.	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EU registration system.” According to ECOFIN, the revised IOSCO Code of Conduct 
could only work as a “minimum benchmark for the actions that credit rating agencies 
should take to address concerns about their activities in the market for structured 
products.”171  
The support coming from the European Council and the European Parliament for placing 
the oversight and regulation of rating agencies operating in Europe directly in the hands 
of regulators allowed the Regulation proposed by the Commission to be approved after a 
three-party negotiation, and it became effective in 2010.172 
In sum, the primary role occupied by the European Parliament and key European 
governments in openly challenging the support by European regulators and key interest 
groups for self-regulation reveals the importance that political forces had in driving this 
shift in the public-private divide in Europe. While the degree of public salience of rating 
agencies was not significantly higher than it was in the years after the Parmalat scandal, 
it nonetheless provided an opportunity for political entrepreneurs within the European 
Parliament and European Council to bring back their long-standing priorities. 
Moreover, this shift in the public-private divide at the European level also set the stage 
for an analogous shift at the international level. As the EU regulation aligned the 
regulatory status of rating agencies in Europe with that already in place in the United 
States since 2006, the US government and European members of the G20 now had an 
interest in exporting to the international level the principle that rating agencies should be 
registered with national authorities. Only a few months after the European Council 
endorsed this principle and the European Commission presented its regulatory proposal, 
the same principle was endorsed by G20 leaders at the Washington Summit in 
November 2008, which overturned the preference of IOSCO for a market-driven 
solution.173  
Furthermore, the importance of political pressures and electoral politics in driving the 
European agenda on rating agencies can be found in developments that occurred after 
the approval of the European regulation on rating agencies described in this section. As 
illustrated in Figure 17, the focus of the media returned prominently to the activities of 
rating agencies upon the downgrade of the obligations of the Greek government to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 ECOFIN 2008.	  
172 The European Parliament has approved the proposal on 23rd April 2009 2009 while the European Council has 
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the treatment of ratings issued in third countries, but they did not questioned the turn in the division of regulatory 
responsiblities between public and private actors impressed by the Commission.	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below investment grade in January 2010, followed by the downgrade of the debt of other 
European governments and banks throughout the first half of 2010. These measures 
affected the capacity of Greek banks to access liquidity from the ECB and highlighted 
the vulnerability of European markets to the decisions of American rating agencies.  
	  
Figure 17 - Press Coverage of Rating Agencies in Europe (1998-2011) 
 
 
These events have provided new window of opportunity for different political actors 
within the EU to call for the creation of a European rating agency. The proposal to create 
a public European rating agency capable to challenge the duopoly created by S&P’s and 
Moody’s had already been discussed by the European Parliament in 2003, when the 
Katiforis Report encouraged the European Commission EU to consider championing the 
creation of a European rating agency as a counterweight to the US-based agencies 
dominating the world markets.174  
The Greek debt crisis has led several members of the European Parliament to urge the 
European Commission and the European Council to take steps to reduce the power of 
these agencies and to support the creation of an “EU body which is seen to act 
objectively and with neutrality so as to avoid the speculative tendencies of companies 
from the USA.” 175  For instance, Member of European Parliament Udo Bullmann 
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highlighted the role played by rating agencies in aggravating the recent sovereign debt 
crisis and asked the Commission, “Is the Commission considering the creation of a 
European Public Credit Rating Agency, not only to compete with existing ones but also 
to overcome the shortcomings in their business models? Has the Commission 
considered the possibility that existing national public bodies issuing ratings could be 
entitled to rate the economic situation of Member States?”176 At the height of the Greek 
debt crisis, MEP Antolin Sanchez Predo asked, “Does it [the Commission] think that 
private bodies governed by the profit motive have the necessary independence and the 
required governance for their ratings to be allowed to influence the public interest in such 
a decisive way?”177  
The creation of a European rating agency had also been advocated in the early stages 
of the crisis by French President Sarkozy178 and German Chancellor Merkel.179 The 
intensification within Germany of the debate over the European debt crisis led the key 
German political figures such as the Foreign Affairs Minister Guido Westerwelle and 
Chancellor Merkel  to explicitly declare in April and May 2010 their support for creating a 
European agency to counter the dominance of the US-based firms.180 Speaking in May, 
Merkel claimed, "We will press for the creation of a rating agency in Europe so that 
European financial markets become more stable and reactive.”181    
The galvanization in the level of attention paid by the European Parliament and key 
politicians in Continental countries towards rating agencies in the spring of 2010 once 
again forced the European Commission to take action. In May 2010 the European 
Commission announced its intention to investigate the rapid downgrading of the Greek 
debt by the US agencies.182 Only one month later, the European Commission launched 
a new regulatory initiative, proposing amendments to the European regulation of rating 
agencies. Among the motivations for this initiative, the Commission stated, “The level of 
competition in the rating industry is a real concern. The Commission believes the CRA 
market is too concentrated, and more competition and diversity would be positive. The 
Commission is examining structural solutions including whether a European credit rating 
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179 Merkel argued that while Europe had developed a certain independence in thanks to the creation of the Euro, “the 
robust currency system of the euro has not yet secured sufficient influence over the rules governing financial markets." 
She thus supported the creation of a European ratings agency to challenge the dominance of Moody's and Standard & 
Poor's. See Barber, Benoit, & Williamson 2008.	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agency would be beneficial and whether independent public entities should have a 
stronger role in the issuing of ratings.”183  
Following a public consultation launched at the end of the 2010 exploring different 
options for how diversity in the rating industry could be increased,184 the Commission 
proposed a new Regulation and a Directive in 2011.185 In two important aspects these 
measures moved significantly beyond what was previously agreed by securities 
regulators within IOSCO. First, responding to the greater attention towards the rating of 
sovereign debt catalyzed in Europe by the Eurozone debt crisis, the Commission 
introduced specific disclosure requirements for the rating of sovereign countries, 
requiring rating agencies to publish these ratings outside the working hours of the stock 
exchanges. Second, responding to the concerns regarding the excessive concentration 
of the rating business in the United States and the excessive influence of S&P’s and 
Moody’s in Europe, the Commission introduced different measures to favor a greater 
degree of competition in the rating business. In particular, the regulation introduced a 
“rotation rule,” requiring corporate issuers to regularly change rating agencies every 
three years, introducing a cooling-off period of four years after this, and limiting cross-
shareholdings between rating agencies to limit further concentration in the rating 
business.  
The Regulation proposed by the European Commission did not, however, propose to set 
up a European rating agency, arguing that “setting up a credit rating agency with public 
money would be costly, could raise concerns regarding the CRA’s credibility especially if 
a publicly funded CRA would rate the Member States which finance the CRA, and put 
private CRAs at a comparative disadvantage.” The regulation proposed by the 
Commission would rely instead on the rotation requirement as the primary strategy to 
promote diversity in the market for ratings.186   
A central factor explaining the decision not to pursue the establishment of a European 
rating agency advocated by Germany and France remains the opposition of different 
countries, starting from the British government and authorities.187 The opposition of 
London to this measure certainly reflected the traditional suspicion of British authorities 
towards any European solution perceived as potentially subjecting the City of London to 
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the influence of Continental European countries. At the same time, we also need to 
consider the more limited impact that the Eurozone debt crisis had in politicizing the 
debate over financial regulation in Britain compared to the banking crisis of 2007-2010. 
As a result of this divergence, the Eurozone debt crisis has failed to create significant 
incentives for British politicians to accept the solution endorsed by Continental European 
countries. 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge how the different salience in different countries of 
the regulation of rating agencies triggered by the Eurozone debt crisis impacted the 
international agenda. As argued above, unlike the banking crisis of 2008-2009, the 
Eurozone debt crisis has not significantly impacted the salience of financial regulation in 
the United States. So, during the same period when rating agencies have returned to the 
public eye in Europe, their activities have not occupied a prominent space in the US 
media, with the exception of the downgrade of the US sovereign debt by S&P’s in 
August 2011. As a result, the regulatory initiatives adopted by the European Commission 
have failed to create strong incentives for US politicians and regulators to get involved. 
During this period international agenda has failed to return to rating agencies, and 
neither the G20 nor IOSCO has discussed the regulation of sovereign ratings. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the importance that the public salience of rating agencies in 
the United States and Europe had in shaping the way the international regulatory 
agenda has allocated regulatory responsibilities between public and private actors. More 
specifically, the analysis of this case has explored the impact that different degrees of 
public attention had in shaping both the incentives of elected officials on both sides of 
the Atlantic and the balance between regulators and politicians. 
In the period between the bankruptcy of Enron and the financial crisis of 2007-2010, the 
market-based international regulatory regime centered on the IOSCO Code of Conduct 
still reflected the preferences of securities regulators both in Europe and the United 
States in response to the corporate bankruptcies of the early 2000s. The predominant 
position exercised by securities regulators in the debate over the regulation of rating 
agencies both in Europe and the United States during the initial stage of the financial 
crisis can explain why the initial international regulatory reaction to the financial crisis did 
not challenge the self-regulatory paradigm that had emerged prior to the crisis.   
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This chapter has also explored the hypothesis that different degrees of public salience of 
rating agencies over this period created different incentives for politicians in the United 
States and Europe to accept or to oppose market-based approaches. In the years before 
the crisis, European politicians did not challenge the preferences of both securities 
regulators as well as of the majority of interest groups for a market-based approach. On 
the other hand, the implications of the Enron scandal raised the salience of rating 
agencies in the United States to an unprecedented extent, leading the US Congress to 
oppose the status quo based on self-regulation in the years before the crisis. However, 
the analysis in this chapter presented only inconclusive evidence that this divergent path 
could be attributed uniquely to the different electoral incentives triggered by different 
degrees of public salience. 	  
The second part of this chapter has explained how the global financial crisis of 2007-
2010 led Europe to endorse a direct regulation of rating agencies, thus setting set the 
stage for an equivalent shift in the international agenda. However, this shift in the 
regulatory approach did not reflect a change in the position of securities regulators, 
which on the contrary continued to support a continuation of the pre-crisis market-based 
approach. It was instead the greater attention towards rating agencies among the 
European that created strong incentives for European politicians to reject the advice 
from European securities regulators in favor of the continuation of the market-based 
status quo. 
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Chapter 6. Hedge Funds   
	  
	  
6.1 Plan of the Chapter 
This chapter will explore the evolution of the international regime governing the 
regulation of hedge funds. Since the first hedge fund was created in 1949, the industry 
has been able to avoid an international agreement to directly regulate its activities for six 
decades. Indeed, the lack of a specific regulatory framework has come to represent one 
of the most common ways to define an increasingly variegated group of investment 
vehicles employing different strategies, leverage, and instruments. The lack of a formal 
regulatory regime cannot easily be explained in functionalist terms, as two distinct 
international shocks at the end of 1990s raised the concerns of different commentators 
and policymakers regarding the impact of hedge funds over the stability and integrity of 
international financial markets. The first shock focusing the attention of financial 
regulators on the hedge fund industry was the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, 
which led policymakers from several emerging countries to denounce the destabilizing 
effect that hedge funds had in these countries.  
While the responsibility of hedge funds in causing the crisis in the four East Asian 
countries was contested, the risks posed by the sector for the stability of financial 
markets became clearer one year later when the long wave of the East Asian crisis and 
the unilateral declaration of a debt moratorium by Russia in August 1998 caused the 
near collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM). LTCM was the world’s largest 
hedge fund, holding more than $125 billion in total assets at the moment of its crisis, and 
above all it was one the most highly leveraged funds. The quasi-collapse of LTCM in 
1998 opened the eyes of the global regulatory community towards the possible systemic 
risk generated by the hedge fund industry. While hedge funds were regarded up to that 
point as primarily minor players in the financial markets, LTCM demonstrated the 
possibility that the collapse of a highly-leveraged fund—or several funds—could cause 
heavy losses to banks which act as its counterparties through its prime brokerage 
activity, trade with it in over-the-counter markets, or provide it with leverage.1 
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However, while the East Asian crisis and LTCM brought the issue of how to regulate 
hedge funds into the agenda of the G7 and of the newly created Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF), the report released by the latter institution in 2000 did not recommend the 
introduction of regulatory measures to directly regulate hedge funds.2 Instead, the FSF 
recommended that the risks posed by hedge funds could be regulated by focusing on 
the banks and prime brokers that provide hedge funds with leverage, what has come to 
be known as the “indirect” approach to the regulation of hedge funds. This market-based 
paradigm continued to inform the approach of the international regulatory community 
through the 1990s and 2000s. When in 2007 the FSF updated its recommendations, the 
new report still focused on the already-supervised counterparties while demanding that 
hedge funds update their industry codes of best practices.3  
Unlike the collapse of LTCM, the international financial crisis that started with the US 
subprime mortgage in the summer of 2007 was recognized by regulatory authorities 
from all around the world as not primarily a “hedge fund crisis.”4 With the exception of a 
few commentators who argued that hedge funds were partially responsible for the origin 
of the crisis,5 most analysts identified the primary culprit of the crisis in the banking 
sector.  
Instead, it was hedge funds that fell victims to the turmoil in the banking industry when 
hostile market conditions following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
triggered the liquidation of an unprecedented number of hedge funds.6 In contrast to the 
LTCM episode, this time the failure of even a large number of hedge funds did not cause 
significant damage to the banking sector, primarily as a result of the success of the 
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3 FSF 2007c. 
4 De Larosière 2009. 
5 In particular, they pointed out that hedge funds had contributed to amplifying the asset price bubble at the core of the 
crisis (instead of acting counter-cyclically and shorting overvalued assets as frequently claimed), and how they were 
among the main players providing liquidity and demand for the most exotic structured finance products associated with 
the core of the crisis. See for instance Rasmussen, cited in M. Turner 2009b; Rasmussen 2009. 
6 The turbulence in the credit markets that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 created a hostile 
environment for hedge funds. Investment banks and prime brokers reacted to the distress in some financial markets by 
scaling back lending, thus making it more costly for hedge funds to obtain the credit necessary to conduct their traditional 
trading strategies. The losses registered by hedge funds in 2008 (in average -21.7%), besides undermining the belief that 
hedge funds would generate positive returns in all market conditions, have also reinforced the “flight to quality” among 
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redemption. The panic in the market has caused an implosion of the hedge fund industry, whose size has halved from the 
peak of around $2 trillion worth of assets under management in the summer of 2008 to around $1 trillion at the beginning 
of 2009, and forcing between 1500 and 2000 funds to go out of business in 2008. IOSCO 2009b. 
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measures introduced after LTCM to collateralize banks’ exposures to hedge funds and 
to reduce the leverage in the hedge fund industry.7  
This is not to say that hedge funds did not contribute to the crisis. The forced liquidation 
of hedge funds’ positions in order to meet the margin calls from banks and redemption 
calls from their investors had a direct impact on the financial markets beyond the impact 
on their bank counterparties, and according to different analyses still contributed as a 
“transmission mechanism” or “amplifier” of problems originated in the already regulated 
banking system.8 
However, despite the secondary role played by hedge funds in the context of the crisis, 
the international regulatory community responded by departing from the approach that 
emerged after LTCM that kept hedge funds outside of the direct purview of public 
regulatory agencies. Instead the regulatory approach presented by the G20 Leaders at 
the London Summit of 2009 announced that “hedge funds or their managers will be 
registered and will be required to disclose appropriate information on an ongoing basis 
to supervisors or regulators, including on their leverage, necessary for assessment of 
the systemic risks that they pose individually or collectively.”9    
How can we explain this shift in the international approach towards the regulation of 
hedge funds despite their secondary role in the crisis? In line with the theoretical 
framework introduced in Chapter 3, this chapter will analyze how the East Asian crisis, 
the collapse of LTCM, and the global financial crisis of 2007-2010 raised the public 
attention towards hedge funds in the United States and Europe and how this has altered 
the incentives of the hedge fund industry, regulators, and elected politicians. In 
particular, the first part of this chapter (Section 6.2) will discuss the focus on indirect 
regulation and market-based mechanisms that was codified in the first FSF report in 
2000 and characterized the international agenda before 2009.  The section finds the 
origins of this focus in the preferences of US federal regulators and their attempt to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Since the collapse of LTCM, the average leverage ration for the hedge fund industry has fallen significantly (it was 1.7 
times at the beginning of the crisis in 2007), but average leverage changes significantly across fund types (e.g. it is 10 
times for relative value/fixed-income arbitrage funds).  See IMF 2008, p. 41. 
8 The pressure of hedge funds’ selling drove prices further down, triggering another round of margin calls, and thus 
another round of forced selling, in a vicious cycle that created instability in financial markets. Hedge funds have been 
blamed for contributing to a “downward spiral of deleveraging and declining asset prices, in particular in markets where 
there has been crowding of positions in similar assets”, thus increasing volatility in the markets and impairing the 
functioning of some markets in which they were significant players FSA 2010. On the systemic risk posed by hedge fund, 
see King & Mayer 2009; Bernanke 2006; Danielsson 2004; IOSCO 2009b. Also in the case a single hedge fund may not 
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9 G20 2009a. 
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satisfy the demand of the US Congress for a regulatory response in the aftermath of 
LTCM. Section 6.3 will detail how in the period before the crisis this international 
approach came to be challenged on the international stage by Continental European 
countries such as Germany and France. 
The second part of this chapter will explain the subsequent international regulatory 
response to the financial crisis of 2007-10 and the reversal of the market-based 
approach from before the crisis. Section 6.4 will discuss the impact that the crisis had 
within Europe in creating incentives for policy entrepreneurs within the European 
Parliament.  It will also  examine how the crisis allowed the German and French 
governments, which had in the past promoted a change in the regulation of the sector, to 
reassert their long-standing priorities. However, as discussed in Section 6.5, equally 
important to explain the change in the international agenda was the impact that the 
politicization of financial regulation triggered by the crisis had in altering the incentives of 
elected politicians in the United States, the country that had vetoed this solution prior to 
the crisis. 
   
6.2 LTCM and the Emergence of the International Self-Regulatory Regime 
As argued in the introduction to this chapter, the regulation of hedge funds entered into 
the international agenda for the first time during the East Asian financial crisis. More 
specifically, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir blamed hedge funds for actively 
contributing to the currency crises in East Asia at the 1997 IMF meeting in Hong Kong. 
Following this speech, the Malaysian constituency at the Fund requested an 
investigation into the role of hedge funds in the East Asian crisis. The concerns voiced 
by Mahatir regarding the destabilizing impact of hedge funds were supported by the 
authorities in some emerging countries as well as those from industrialized countries, 
such as Australia and New Zealand, where hedge funds had been active during the 
crisis.10 Following the request of these countries, the IMF issued a report investigating 
the role of hedge funds in the crisis, which concluded both that these funds represented 
only a small portion of the broader family of investors active in the East Asian markets 
during the crisis and that their capital under management were too small to represent a 
threat to the financial system. The report concluded, “The analysis…does not suggest a 
strong case for supervisory and regulatory measures such as these targeted specifically 
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at hedge funds.”11 When the discussion over the regulation of hedge funds reached the 
agenda of the IMF Board, the Fund decided to take no further action concerning hedge 
funds.12 
The lack of international initiatives supporting the regulation of hedge funds in the 
aftermath of the East Asian crisis reflects the main interpretation of the crisis in the 
country that was not only the major stakeholder in the IMF but also the host of the large 
majority of hedge fund managers in the world, the United States. As several authors 
have acknowledged, the fact that the large majority of hedge fund managers in the world 
are based in the United States has granted US regulators significant market power in 
setting the international agenda on this issue.13   
Indeed, while the East Asian crisis raised widespread attention towards the action of 
hedge funds in the countries more directly targeted by their action, the same concerns 
did not resonate within the United State, and the crisis did not lead to significant 
discussions within the United States regarding the regulation of hedge funds. Instead, 
regulatory authorities within the United States and most other industrialized countries 
saw the role of hedge funds during the East Asian crisis as nothing more than simply 
“symptoms of a problem caused by weak national policies.”14  
However, concerns regarding the impact of hedge funds re-emerged only a few months 
later, when the long-wave of the East Asian financial crisis propelled the financial 
instability from emerging countries to the heart of Wall Street. LTCM was founded in 
1994 by John Meriwether, a famous Salomon Brothers trader, and included among its 
associates the Nobel Prize Laureates Robert Merton and Myron Scholes.15 The fund 
was extremely successful in its first years, achieving annual rates of return of around 40 
percent by the end of 1997, and its assets had grown to about $120 billion, with a capital 
base of only about $7.3 billion, an asset-to-equity ratio of over 16-to-1, which later rose 
to 25-to-1.16 
As market conditions deteriorated following the East Asian financial crisis, so too did the 
position of LTCM. In particular, the unilateral declaration of a debt moratorium by Russia 
in August 1998 and the devaluation of the ruble led to a large increase in the spreads 
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between the prices of Western government and emerging-market bonds, while LTCM 
had bet on those spreads’ narrowing. By the end of that month, the fund had lost over 
half of the capital it had at the beginning of the year, and its leverage ratio had risen to 
over 45-to-1.17 As the losses mounted and LTCM had problems meeting its obligations 
to counterparties, the Federal Reserve felt obliged to intervene to prevent LTCM’s 
failure. The intervention of the Fed was principally by the fear that letting LTCM go into 
disorderly fire-sale liquidation would cause market liquidity to dry up, impairing the US 
economy as well as those of other nations. In September 1998, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York orchestrated a bailout of LTCM consisting of a consortium of 14 
prominent banks and brokerage houses that were LTCM’s counterparties.  
Unlike what occurred after the East Asian crisis, the averted collapse of LTCM and the 
threat it had posed to the integrity of the US financial system had the impact of both 
significantly raising US public attention towards the regulation of hedge funds and 
bringing the issue into the agenda of the US Congress. The House Committee on 
Banking and Financial Services held a hearing on the issue, inviting among the others to 
testify the President of the New York Federal Reserve, William McDonough, and the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan. In front of the main regulatory 
authorities, several Congressmen questioned the decision by the Fed to intervene to 
rescue LTCM and its potential implications of public cost, whether it created an implicit 
Government guarantee of large hedge funds, and its moral hazard implications for too-
big-to-fail institutions. Rep. Sanders challenged Greenspan and McDonough to “explain 
to the Members of this committee why the global economy remains unstable, why the 
Federal Reserve has organized a $3.5 billion bailout for billionaires, why Americans 
should be worried about the gambling practices of the Wall Street elites.”18 
The Federal Reserve rejected the claim that LTCM had been “bailed out.” Instead 
McDonough defined it as “a private sector solution to a private-sector problem, involving 
an investment of new equity by Long-Term Capital’s creditors and counterparties.” He 
further argued, “No Federal Reserve official pressured anyone, and no promises were 
made. Not one penny of public money was spent or committed.”19 A similar interpretation 
was provided by Greenspan, who compared the role of the Federal Reserve in the 
rescue of LTCM to the intervention of J.P. Morgan convening the main bankers in his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Dowd 1999. 
18 US House of Representatives 1998. 
19 Dowd 1999; McDonough 1998. 
	   231 
library to plan a resolution to the financial crisis of 1907.20 
Congress also questioned regulators on the next steps they would undertake to prevent 
the need for another rescue of large hedge funds and the implications for the regulatory 
oversight of hedge funds.21 Rep. Baker declared, “When and how, for example, did the 
concept of market self-regulation fail us in this instance, which has been regulators' 
views until this point in time?…How is it that that convoluted process can be engaged in 
without regulators recognizing the credit extensions by the insured and regulated 
institutions?…I hope that we are going to be comforted that the regulators do now in fact 
have plans in place that would help to avert such unfortunate circumstances in our 
future.”22 
Greenspan responded to these criticisms arguing that it was “questionable whether 
hedge funds can be effectively regulated in the United States alone.” According to the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the fact that “most hedge funds are only a short step 
from cyberspace” would have inevitably led “any direct US regulations restricting their 
flexibility…[to] induce the more aggressive funds to emigrate from under our jurisdiction.” 
Greenspan recommended instead a different market-based approach to the regulation of 
hedge funds: “The best we can do…is what we do today: regulate them indirectly 
through the regulation of the sources of their funds.” 23 
The approach delineated by Greenspan in front of Congress was further delineated by 
US federal regulators and the US Treasury in a report entitled, “Hedge Funds, Leverage, 
and the Lessons of the LTCM,” released in April 1999 by the President’s Working Group 
on Financial Market (PWG).24 In this report, US authorities identified that the need to 
constrain excessive leverage was “the principal policy issue arising out of the events 
surrounding the near collapse of LTCM” but rejected the option of placing this task 
directly in the hands of public actors.  
The PWG Report argued that  “enforcing a meaningful regulatory capital requirement or 
leverage ratio for a wide and diverse range of investment funds would be a difficult 
undertaking,” further saying that simply imposing a cap on balance sheet leverage would 
only result in hedge fund managers “mov[ing] to off-balance sheet risk-taking strategies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Dowd 1999; Greenspan 1998. 
21 Leach 1998.  
22 US House of Representatives 1998. 
23 Greenspan 1998. Since “most hedge funds are only a short step from cyberspace”, Greenspan argued that “any direct 
US regulations restricting their flexibility will doubtless induce the more aggressive funds to emigrate from under our 
jurisdiction”.  
24 PWG 1999a. 
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such as through the use of derivatives.”25 According to the PWG, excessive leverage 
and risk-taking would be better constrained not by directly regulating hedge funds but 
rather by strengthening the discipline imposed by their already-regulated financial 
intermediaries and private counterparties, such as banks and investors.26 For the PWG, 
creditors, counterparties, and investors generated powerful economic incentives for 
hedge funds to constrain their risk-taking of hedge funds by raising the cost of credit or 
reducing availability of funds.27  
At the same time, the PWG recognized how in the case of LTCM, these market-based 
constraints had largely broken down, and creditors had continued to grant LTCM very 
generous credit terms despite the exceptional degree of risk the fund was taking.  The 
solution proposed by US authorities thus focused on strengthening market discipline by 
calling upon regulated banks that supplied credit to hedge funds to “enhance their 
practices for counterparty risk management,” for instance by developing policies to 
better collateralize their exposure to hedge funds, on the ground that this would impose 
greater discipline on hedge funds.28 
Moreover, the PWG report argued that the inadequacy of the market discipline exercised 
by investors and counterparties was also due to the fact that these actors were not 
sufficiently aware of the risk profile of LTCM, which disclosed only minimal information to 
its private counterparties.29 The PWG report urged initiatives both to ensure that more 
frequent and meaningful information on hedge funds was made public and to disclose 
greater information regarding the material exposure of financial institutions and other 
public companies to significantly leveraged institutions.  
In order to improve market discipline, the PWG report urged Congress to “enact 
legislation that authorizes mechanisms for disclosure.”30 It is important to point out that 
the PWG did not recommend enhanced disclosure of information to regulators, but 
rather “such legislation should be solely for the purpose of promoting public disclosure” 
in order to allow private counterparties to better monitor their exposures to hedge funds. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 PWG 1999a, p.24. The PWG Report stated that “For any given leverage ratio, the fragility of a portfolio depends on the 
market, credit, and liquidity risks in the portfolio”. 
26 PWG 1999a, p.26.   
27 PWG 1999a, p. 25. The PWG mentioned several arguments to justify its strong belief in the effectiveness of private 
market discipline, such the incentives and capabilities that banks and securities had in using their risk management 
practices to protect their capital, the pressures exerted by their shareholders on management to reduce excessive risk-
taking, the interest of investors to withdraw from hedge funds that are perceived to be taking excessive risks. 
28 The PWG called upon banks to “enhance their practices for counterparty risk management”, for instance by developing 
policies to better collateralize their exposure to hedge funds and regulators to “monitor and encourage improvements in 
the risk management systems of regulated entities”. 
29 PWG 1999a, p.25. 
30 PWG 1999a, p.33. 
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As Eichengreen argues, the report expressed the view that placing regulators in charge 
of analyzing the position of hedge funds on a continuous basis would have strained the 
capacity of regulators.31 
As can be seen here, the roots of the market-based regulatory approach that dominated 
at the international level emerged after the collapse of LTCM can be found in the 
preferences of US regulatory authorities and their attempt to head-off a legislative 
intervention by strengthening the market discipline provided by private counterparties.  
The market power of the United States ensured that this approach also informed the 
international approach when, shortly after the quasi-collapse of LTCM, the G7 brought 
the regulation of hedge funds back in the international agenda by requesting the newly 
created FSF to study the role of hedge funds in the emerging market crises of 1997-
1998 and to formulate an appropriate regulatory response. The analysis conducted by 
the FSF on the experiences of six small and medium economies where hedge funds had 
been active during the East Asian crisis supported the interpretation advanced by US 
authorities, highlighting the “unsettled and fragile conditions” of these countries and 
arguing that “even in the absence of HLI (highly leveraged institutions) activity, there 
would certainly have been considerable market pressure in these economies at the time 
because of vulnerabilities in their economic structures or financial systems or the size of 
external shocks they faced.”32  
The FSF discussed but ultimately rejected many of the proposals brought to the table to 
regulated hedge funds. For instance, the FSF dismissed the proposal advanced by 
Australia and Hong Kong, invited to the FSF Working Group as representatives of the 
countries where hedge funds had been more active during the crisis, to introduce 
mandatory disclosure of hedge funds’ trades and positions.33 Along the same lines, the 
FSF rejected the proposals brought to the table by France and Germany respectively to 
enhance aggregate disclosure on positions in foreign exchange markets and other key 
markets or to create an international credit register containing centralized information 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  According to the PWG, “improving transparency through enhanced disclosure to the public should help market 
participants make better, more informed judgments about market integrity and the creditworthiness of borrowers and 
counterparties”. For a discussion see Eichengreen 2003 
32 FSF 2000, p.1. The report thus concluded that: “although the Working Group was concerned about some of the 
practices of HLIs identified in the six case studies, it was not able to reach a firm conclusion on their scale and the 
implications for market integrity” P.2. According to the FSF, “the most effective defense that any economy has to 
discourage or deal with large speculative pressures against its exchange rate is the establishment and maintenance of 
credible macroeconomic, financial, supervisory and structural policies”. FSF 2000, p. 38. 
33 This solution was dismissed by the FSF on the ground that such disclosure of information would have to occur on a 
real-time basis, raising concerns about the ability of regulators to process this information, as well as it would have to be 
implemented at the same time in all the major jurisdictions where HFs operated, in order to prevent funds from evading 
them by booking their transactions offshore. Eichengreen 2003; FSF 2000. 
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regarding the exposure of all significant banks to hedge funds.34  
Most importantly, the FSF Working Group considered but ultimately rejected the case for 
directly regulating hedge funds through a “régime for their authorisation and on-going 
supervision and regulation,” and it also decided against imposing “minimum capital and 
liquidity standards, large exposure limits, minimum standards for risk management 
arrangements and other systems and controls, together with ‘fit and proper’ tests for 
senior management.”  While acknowledging that these measures could “minimize the 
risk of repetition of the market turbulence of 1998,” the FSF Report argued that this 
approach “would raise practical and philosophical problems.”35 In particular, the FSF 
discussed the risk that regulating hedge funds could create moral hazard by leading 
investors and counterparties to relax their due diligence and creating pressures to 
extend lender of last resort support to hedge funds as well. The FSF also expressed fear 
that regulation might weaken the efficiency of the markets in which hedge funds are 
active participants, in addition to creating the risk that hedge funds could move to 
offshore jurisdictions.36  
While rejecting these approaches to directly regulate hedge funds, the FSF Report 
followed closely in the footsteps of the PWG Report by presenting a series of 
recommendations to control the risks posed by hedge funds by strengthening the 
discipline imposed by their counterparties, the investors and banks upon which hedge 
funds depended for credit and prime brokerage services. The FSF urged these already-
regulated entities to improve their risk management procedures and processes, 
exposure measurement, and collateral management in their dealings with hedge funds, 
while calling upon national regulators to intensify their supervisory and regulatory 
oversight on hedge funds’ credit providers “to ensure that sound practices are pursued 
and recent improvements in practices are locked in.”37  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The FSF rejected the French proposal citing “the difficulty in obtaining compliance, the feasibility of producing the data 
in a timely manner, and the substantial costs involved”. The German proposal was rejected on the ground that it would 
have not been possible to collect comprehensive information, and information would have to be provided frequently given 
the speed in the changes of the position of hedge funds FSF 2000; Robotti 2006 p. 40 Based on the interviews conducted 
with participants to the negotiations, Robotti argues: “other FSF members argued that the proposal was ‘politically and 
technically doable and that, despite some difficulties, it could have been implemented given the current state of 
technological advance”. See Robotti 2006.  
35  FSF 2000 no. 117, p. 37. Therefore, the FSF Working Group concluded: “the Working Group is therefore not 
recommending applying a system of direct regulation to currently unregulated HLIs at this stage, though the possibility of 
establishing such a régime cannot be definitively rejected” See particularly the statement under no. 119, p. 38. 
36 See no. 117, p. 37 of the 2000 FSF Report. See p. 36-38 of the 2000 FSF Report. 
 
37  Moreover, the FSF report recommended national regulators to better scrutinize the risk-management systems of banks 
and other counterparties of hedge funds, and to “take appropriate steps to determine the extent of institutions’ compliance 
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Another important factor in consolidating the market-based approach proposed by the 
US regulatory authorities and endorsed by the FSF was the reaction of the hedge fund 
industry itself and their bank counterparties. Shortly after the averted collapse of LTCM, 
the threat of legislative intervention by Congress had immediately triggered a reaction 
from the banking industry. Twelve of the major banks and securities firms that act as 
counterparties for hedge funds created the “Counterparty Risk Management Policy 
Group” (CRMPG) in January 1999, which released a set of voluntary guidelines to 
strengthen counterparty discipline in dealing with hedge funds.38 Indeed, this group built 
directly upon the experience of the Derivatives Policy Group (see discussion in Chapter 
4), created in the aftermath of the rise Congressional interest in the regulation of 
derivatives in 1994.  
Not only were the six institutions forming the Derivatives Policy Groups also part of the 
CRMPG, but also the former co-chair of the Derivatives Policy Groups played a key role 
in mobilizing the banking industry to design a self-regulatory response. 39  Similar 
initiatives to strengthen risk management practices in dealing were developed by the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association and by the Institute of International 
Finance. 
Unlike the banking industry, the more diffuse nature of the hedge fund industry had 
represented an obstacles to its capacity to engage in the policy making process and to 
coordinate a self-regulatory response. In this case, the PWG, besides praising the self-
regulatory initiatives taken by banking industry, urged a group of hedge funds to adopt 
similar self-regulatory measures by “draft[ing] and publish[ing] a set of sound practices 
for their risk management and internal controls.”40  Following this request, a group of five 
hedge funds, including the fund managed by George Soros, emulated the example of 
the banks by drafting a set of sound practices for their risk management and internal 
controls in February 2000.41     
The support for self-regulatory improvements by the hedge fund industry and the steps 
taken by the five hedge fund managers were also endorsed at the international level by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with the Sound Practices promulgated by the Basel Committee and IOSCO (in conjunction with the recommendations of 
the CRMPG) and take action where they identify deficiencies”. See FSF 2000, p.2. 
38 Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group 1999.  
39 Faerman et al. 2001. 
40 According to the PWG report “Such a study should discuss market risk measurement and management, liquidity risk 
management, identification of concentrations, stress testing, collateral management, valuation of positions and collateral, 
segregation of duties and internal controls, and the assessment of capital needs from the perspective of hedge funds.  In 
addition, the study should consider how individual hedge funds could assess their performance against the sound 
practices for investors and counterparties”. See PWG 1999a. 
41 These “Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Managers” emphasizing that “the most effective form of oversight is self-
evaluation combined with self-discipline” (Sound Practices for HF Managers 2000). See Eichengreen 2003. 
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the FSF. In fact, the FSF Report stressed the need for hedge funds to improve their risk 
management practices and to provide greater information to their credit providers and 
trading counterparties regarding the funds’ risk profiles, encouraging an industry-driven 
solution coming from the hedge fund industry. Most importantly, the FSF “welcome[d] 
the steps taken by the hedge fund community to meet some of the concerns,” and in 
particular it endorsed the “Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Managers” that emerged 
from the five hedge funds, encouraging these kind of self-regulatory improvements to 
become standard practice in the rest of the hedge fund community as well.42 Moreover, 
four of the same hedge funds that had drafted the set of best practices participated in 
the work of the Multidisciplinary Working Group on Enhanced Disclosure,43 a group 
created by the FSF to encourage hedge funds to release more information on a 
voluntary basis and to define a voluntary framework to identify relevant information.44   
Some commentators have questioned the real impact of these voluntary initiatives, 
arguing that there is no evidence they significantly altered the conduct of the industry.45 
However, the initiatives were certainly successful in achieving another goal: reducing the 
appetite for legislation in the United States and other industrialized countries.46 
Indeed, the intervention of US regulatory authorities to solicit the emergence of a 
market-based regulatory approach and the response by hedge funds and their bank 
counterparties were important to strengthen in the eyes of Congress the case that the 
industry was sufficiently taking care of the issue, thus decreasing the appetite for further 
legislative measures. While the two bills that had been introduced within Congress in 
1999 to require hedge funds to disclose more information—the Hedge Fund Disclosure 
Act introduced by Rep. Richard Baker and the Derivatives Market Reform Act introduced 
by Congressman Edward Markey—both bills died with the end of the 106th Congress. 47  
In 2001, the Chairman of the FSF Working Group, Howard Davies, assessed the 
progress in implementing the FSF recommendations, and he noticed that progress 
towards introducing mandatory public disclosure requirements had been limited: 
“Although the US introduced proposed legislative and regulatory provisions that would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 FSF 2000, p.24. 
43 FSF 2000, p. 31; MWGED 2001. 
44 Eichengreen 2003; Robotti 2006.  
45 Robotti 2006. 
46 Robotti 2006. 
47 Robotti 2007. The “Hedge Fund Disclosure Act” required hedge funds with a capital of $3bn to report every quarter to 
Federal Reserve information regarding their total assets, total notional amount of their derivatives position, their leverage 
ratio of assets to liabilities, meaningful and comprehensive measures of market risk and any other information that 
regulators may require. The “Derivatives Market Reform Act' lowered the threshold from 3 to 1 billion dollar, but it 
proposed an amendment to the Investment Company Act in order to allow the SEC to enforce public disclosure.   
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mandate greater disclosure after the near-collapse of LTCM, US representatives 
informed the Working Group that they may reconsider whether such measures are still 
necessary in light of industry progress to increase information flows both to investors 
and to counterparties, as well as structural changes in the hedge fund industry itself.”48 
Eichengreen has also argued that “the absence of more radical measures [after LTCM] 
by the US and European governments can be understood as a response to concessions 
by hedge funds intended in part to head off this threat.”49  
However, other scholars have contested the extent of the interest of Congress towards 
regulating hedge funds in the first place. According to Robotti, one of these bills “was 
never intended to become law. Congressman Baker did not want to see HFs regulated, 
but to send a warning message to HFs and banks. Baker implicitly said to the HF 
community: ‘other people want to restrict HFs more than I do. There is pressure on the 
part of the public to do something, so it is better if you do it your way.’ ….The Congress 
did not want to tackle hedge funds but give them a change to take the self-regulatory 
route before public regulators could clump down on them.”50  
In addition, the Chairman of the House Banking and Financial Services Committee, Rep. 
James Leach, argued in the hearing on LTCM that he was “well aware the Congress is 
not the optimal institution for setting precise supervisory standards” and that it would 
have be “wiser to give discretion to establish restraints of this kind to an institution such 
as the Federal Reserve Board rather than attempt to design an arbitrary approach within 
Congress, a body that lacks the necessary sophistication on matters of this nature. But 
Congress cannot duck its oversight responsibility of those charged with supervision of 
these markets.”51 Congress also shared the concerns expressed by regulators that the 
imposition of any kind of direct regulation would have unintended consequences by 
forcing hedge funds offshore into unregulated countries.  
As we can see, in order to understand this reluctance of Congress to intervene more 
extensively in the regulation of hedge funds despite the severity of the threat to the 
financial markets posed by the averted collapse of LTCM, we certainly need to consider 
the capacity of regulators and the financial industry to respond promptly to this shock 
and to promote both nationally and internationally a market-driven solution consistent 
with the interests of the US firms active in the sector.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Davies 2001. 
49 Eichengreen 2003. 
50 Robotti 2007. 
51 Leach 1998. 
	   238 
Another important factor shaping the attitude of Congress over this period, however, was 
the degree of public attentiveness towards the regulation of hedge funds. The averted 
collapse of LTCM raised the coverage of hedge funds by the US press to an 
unprecedented level, not matched until the recent financial crisis. At the same time, 
Figure 18 illustrates how this period of high public attention around hedge funds proved 
to be extremely short-lived. An important factor in determining this level of public 
inattentiveness is the fact that the “bailout” of LTCM remained a “private” bailout, 
orchestrated by the Federal Reserve but without the use of public money.  
The low salience that characterized the national and international debates over hedge 
fund regulation in the United States are therefore important to explain not only the 
incentives for the US Congress to accept the market-based approach endorsed by 
regulators and the industry but also their reluctance to support other legislative 
proposals to regulate hedge funds that were tabled in the following years (see 
discussion in Section 6.5).   
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6.3 Hedge Funds in Europe before the Crisis 
While the report released by the FSF in 2000 and the self-regulatory initiatives launched 
by the hedge funds and their bank counterparts had the effect of solidifying a market-
based approach as the dominant approach at the international level, the regulation of 
hedge funds returned forcefully in the international agenda almost a decade after its first 
appearance in the aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis. In 2007 the G7 declared 
that “the assessment of potential systemic and operational risks associated with these 
activities has become more complex and challenging.” 52 Similarly to what occurred in 
the aftermath of the collapse of LTCM, the G7 gave the FSF the task to present 
recommendations and to update its report. 
In this case the pressures to re-open the international file over the regulation of hedge 
funds came not from the developments occurring within the United States, as with the 
case of the Congressional interest towards the industry after LTCM, but rather from 
events within Germany.  
As argued in the previous section, German officials had already opposed some of the 
market-based measures endorsed by US representatives during the negotiations within 
the FSF that followed the collapse of LTCM. The German representative had instead 
proposed the creation of an international credit register containing centralized 
information regarding the exposure of all significant banks to hedge funds. This solution 
would have allowed regulators to “identify those regulated institutions with large 
exposures to the respective HLIs and react in a timely fashion to avoid disruptive effects 
of the failure.”53 
As Robotti argues, some participants to the negotiations had talked of “an unbridgeable 
‘philosophical division’” between the United States and Germany.54 Different authors 
who have analyzed the origins of these differences have highlighted the tensions 
existing between the activities of hedge funds and the dominant economic framework in 
Germany, frequently summarized as a coordinated-market economy by the “varieties of 
capitalism” literature. From this perspective, the activism of hedge funds and their short-
term aims have been presented by various commentators as representing a threat both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 G7 2007b; FSF 2007c. 
53 FSF 2000, p.33; see also Robotti 2006. 
54 While US representatives had argued that disclosure of information regarding hedge funds’ activities should be directed 
to the markets, German delegates instead proposed the introduction of an international credit register to track 
counterparties’ exposures to hedge funds. However, US representatives opposed this proposal on the ground that it 
would have not been possible to collect comprehensive information.According to Robotti, “several FSF members argued 
that the proposal was ‘politically and technically doable’. The proposal was instead abandoned ‘without even verifying the 
claims of the private sector”. See Robotti 2006 p.1. 
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to the medium- to long-term industrial planning that characterizes the German model 
and to the established close ties between industry and the banks that represent the main 
provider of capital in Continental Europe.55 Other explanations of the position of German 
and French policymakers on the regulation of hedge funds have pointed towards the 
“deeply ingrained dislike of ‘casino capitalism,’ which was seen as serving the fortunes 
of the City of London” among the elites in Continental European countries.56 
In line with these arguments, Continental European countries have historically adopted a 
different approach towards the regulation of hedge funds from the one in place in liberal-
market economies such as the United States and UK. In fact, while in the latter group of 
countries hedge funds have been by-and-large unregulated, in Continental European 
countries hedge funds have been subject to more restrictive measures including 
registration, disclosure, and reporting requirements,57 and, in the case of Germany, they 
were prohibited until 2004.58  
At different moments throughout the 2000s, German companies and trade unions had 
also voiced their concerns regarding the growing impact that hedge funds had over 
German companies, using stakes in listed companies to agitate for change. These 
concerns were reignited in 2005 by a different kind of shock than the failure of a fund, 
such as in the case of LTCM. In January 2005, the takeover of the London Stock 
Exchange by the Deustche Böerse AG failed as a result of the interference of the 
London-based Children’s Investment Fund, and the CEO of the German group was 
forced to resign. The chairman of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange accused hedge funds of 
“ripping the heart out of the German economy.”59 
The debate this event triggered regarding the impact of hedge funds and financial 
speculation on the German economy resonated with the German public. More 
significantly, the impact of the increased level of public attention was amplified by the 
fact that the failed takeover coincided with the electoral campaign for the German federal 
elections of 2005.  
The regulation of hedge funds became an electoral issue during this campaign when 
Frank Muentefering, the leader of the German Social-Democratic Party (SPD), famously 
attacked those financial investors who “remain anonymous, have no face and descend 
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57 IOSCO 2006. 
58 Woll 2011. 
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on companies like swarms of locusts.”60 The issue was also addressed by Chancellor 
Schroeder, who during the electoral campaign announced his intention to re-open the 
discussion on the regulation of hedge funds at the G8 summit in Gleneagles, thus 
adding an international dimension to what had been so far only a German debate.61  
While the attempt of Chancellor Schroeder to push for a new international agreement 
over the regulation of hedge funds at the G7 Summit was ultimately vetoed,62 the newly-
elected Chancellor Angela Merkel also supported this commitment and announced in 
January 2007 at the World Economic Forum in Davos that Germany would used its 
chairmanship of the G7 in 2007 to re-open the discussion on how to regulate hedge 
funds.63 When the German government did bring the regulation of hedge funds back into 
the international agenda at the Finance Ministers meeting in Essen on February 10, 
2007, G7 Finance Ministers asked the FSF to review its 2000 Report on Highly 
Leveraged Institutions.64  
While the United States accepted discussing measures to enhance transparency of the 
industry, the position brought by US authorities to the international table did not depart 
from their previous support for a market-based regulatory solution. Once again, the task 
of defining of the US stance on the regulation of the hedge fund industry was taken by 
the US regulatory authorities comprising the PWG, which released a new report on 
hedge fund eight years after the first one. This report reaffirmed the commitment of US 
regulators to the indirect approach based on the “market discipline” enforced by 
counterparties and investors that had been advanced after the quasi-collapse of LTCM, 
arguing that this strategy had been successful in mitigating industry risks.65  
Resistance to the German call for an international agreement over the regulation of 
hedge funds did not come uniquely from the United States; it also came from within 
Europe. In May 2007, German Finance Minister Steinbruck used the German 
Presidency of the European Council to promote a European common position in support 
of hedge fund regulation. This request was opposed by the British authorities, which 
presided over the most important hedge fund mangers’ hub in Europe.  
The UK FSA expressed confidence in its capacity to oversee hedge fund managers, 
arguing that its regime "for hedge funds is at least as rigorous, and probably more 
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rigorous, than that in other jurisdictions."66  The statement on the issue released by 
European finance ministers in May 2007 maintained that the current system of indirect 
supervision of hedge funds by their counterparties remained adequate.67 The defense of 
the market-driven approach that emerged among European finance ministers also 
informed the position of the European Commission, which during this period rejected the 
need for greater regulation of hedge funds. 68  
While opposing an international agreement over a government-imposed solution, the 
British and US governments affirmed that that they would accept a code of conduct 
generated “spontaneously” and “voluntarily” from the hedge fund industry itself.69 In 
order to secure an international agreement, German authorities scaled back their 
ambitions and openly supported the possibility of a voluntary code from the industry. 
As a result of this mutual accommodation, the update to the FSF’s 2000 Report on 
Highly Leveraged Institutions, published on May 19, 2007, did not depart from the 
market-based approach that had dominated the previous report. The FSF praised the 
progress that had been made since the LTCM crisis by hedge funds and their 
counterparties in improving their risk management practices. Moreover, just as in the 
previous report, the FSF explicitly reached out to the hedge fund industry, requesting 
that it “review and enhance existing sound practice benchmarks for hedge fund 
managers in the light of expectations for improved practices set out by the official and 
private sectors.” 70   
Despite this approach, the intervention of public authorities in this period eventually went 
beyond simply endorsing a market-driven solution. The slow pace with which the hedge 
fund industry responded to the calls for adopting further self-regulatory measures led G7 
countries to deploy different carrots and sticks in order to “bail in” the private sector. On 
the one hand the G7 threatened the private sector with intervention by giving the FSF 
mandate to review the regulatory framework for hedge funds; on the other hand it 
directly engaged with the hedge fund industry groups and encouraged them to take the 
initiative. US and German authorities invited approximately 20 delegates of the main 
hedge fund groups to participate in meetings with deputy ministers from the G7 countries 
on the margins of the IMF/WB meeting in Washington in April 2007.71 
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In Britain, the Bank of England initiated discussions with London-based hedge funds on 
a voluntary code of conduct in February 2007.72 A former Deputy Governor of the Bank 
of England, Sir Andrew Large — at the time head of the UK fund Marshall Wace—led a 
group of 14 of London’s biggest hedge funds, including one Swedish fund and the 
London arm of a large US fund, in creating the “Hedge Fund Working Group” (HFWG). 
In January 2008 the HFWG released a report containing a set of best practices for 
hedge fund managers, describing it as an “exercise in industry-led market discipline, 
based on disclosure.73 
The main stated goal of the initiative was that of strengthening “the confidence of 
investors, lenders, regulators, and other market participants” by allowing investors to 
make well-informed decisions. However, in an attempt to convince other hedge fund 
managers to comply, the report admitted that it represented an insurance against a 
regulatory clampdown: “Failure by the industry to take the initiative now runs the serious 
risk of leaving the field open to more restrictive intervention in the future.” According to 
the report, the success of the initiative would bring two kinds of benefits. First it stated, “If 
the regime is successful, regulators are less likely to introduce external regulation of the 
industry.” Second, in the case a future scandal or collapse of a hedge fund put 
mandatory rules back at the top of the agenda, “the Standards could well be a realistic 
blueprint for external regulation and reduce the chances of a regulatory regime being 
imposed which the industry considers unpalatable.”74 
A second set of voluntary best practices emerged in parallel in the United States. In this 
case, US regulatory authorities intervened even more directly than their British 
counterparts by creating two advisory groups formed respectively by hedge fund 
managers and institutional investors with the mandate of creating and publicly releasing 
a private sector-driven set of best practices for hedge funds and their investors.75 The 
same short period saw the emergence of a flurry of other industry-driven voluntary codes 
of best practices in response to the FSF Report, including a November 2007 update of 
the “Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Managers” that had constituted the first self-
regulatory response of the hedge fund industry in 2000.76  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Spalter 2007.	  
73 The HFWG released its first consultation draft in September 2007, and it received 75 written responses. It also 
undertook 26 consultation events that involved more than 300 institutional investors, hedge fund managers, prime 
brokers, rating agencies, supervisors, lawyers, accountants, and industry associations. HFWG 2007. 
74 HFWG 2008, p.16. 
75 PWG 2007b. 
76 MFA 2007. The London-based Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA) has published in January 2008 
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These self-regulatory initiatives from hedge fund groups in the United States and UK 
were immediately welcomed by the FSF. 77 The FSF also asked the newly created 
Hedge Fund Standards Board to release regular reports on the adoption of the initiatives 
by the industry.78 G7 leaders, including the German government, also publicly endorsed 
these self-regulatory measures when they met at their Washington meeting on 19 
October 2007. This was the first governmental seal of approval for the self-regulatory 
initiative of the HFWG, describing it as “in line with our own recommendations.”79 The 
German government in particular claimed credit for having secured an international 
agreement to address the regulation of the sector and for forcing the industry into 
opening up through these self-regulatory measures. Deputy Finance Minister Thomas 
Mirow argued, “We don’t want to shout it on the roofs, but we think we have changed the 
nature of the international conversation about hedge funds.”80 
While the new international measures were used by the German government to claim 
international success in front of their domestic audience, in reality the outcome of the 
international German offensive was remarkably similar to the regulatory response that 
unfolded after the collapse of LTCM. Similarly to the regulatory response to LTCM, 
regulatory authorities limited their role to that of strengthening market discipline while 
more explicitly soliciting self-regulatory improvements from the hedge fund industry. 
To sum up, this section has discussed how the international market-based regime that 
emerged in the aftermath of LTCM came to be challenged in the years immediately 
preceding the crisis, primarily as a result of the greater politicization of the regulation of 
hedge funds in Germany during the electoral campaign of 2005. However, the bid by the 
German government to promote a more stringent regulation of the hedge fund industry 
was vetoed at the international level by the United States and at the European level by 
the UK, both of which over this period continued to defend the continuation of a market-
based approach. 
   
6.4. The Regulation of Hedge Funds in Europe during the Crisis 
The previous section provided an explanation for the origins and resilience of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
investors to explain what elements should be considered before investing into a HF, and to head off concerns of smaller 
pension funds that had invested in HFs. See AIMA 2008b. 
77  FSF 2007a. The FSF also stated that the draft best practice standards presented by the UK-based HFWG and its 
“comply or explain” system was “a notable step towards improved transparency and discipline and a recognition by the 
sector of its responsibilities as a significant force in the financial system”. See FSF 2007b. 
78 FSF 2008a. 
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international self-regulatory regime that governed hedge funds starting in the late 1990s. 
This section will explain what factors led the international regulatory response to the 
financial crisis of 2007-10 to reverse this approach and to endorse the direct regulation 
of hedge fund managers. This section will focus on developments over this period in 
Europe, while the next will focus instead on what occurred in the United States. 
After the collapse of LTCM, different commentators predicted that the next large financial 
crisis would likely emerge from the unregulated hedge funds. Contrary to these 
expectations, the crisis seemed to emerge in the very core of the financial system—the 
“regulated” banking system. While the experience of LTCM had demonstrated the risk 
that the banking system could be impaired by the failure of a large hedge fund to repay 
its borrowing, during the crisis it was instead hedge funds who suffered the most from 
the market turmoil originated in the banking sector.  
The panic in the credit markets triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers caused an 
implosion of the hedge fund industry, whose size halved from a peak of around $2 trillion 
worth of assets under management in the summer of 2008 to around $1 trillion at the 
beginning of 2009. Between 1500 and 2000 funds were forced out of business in 2008. 
81 It was only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 that many 
regulators and commentators acknowledged that hedge funds’ attempts to quickly 
unwind positions in order to meet significant requests for redemption by investors and 
collateral requirements from banks had further depressed prices and amplified the 
consequences of the crisis.82  
Most international regulatory bodies accepted this interpretation of hedge funds as 
victims rather than culprit of the crisis. When the FSF met for the first time since the 
beginning of the crisis on 25-26 September 2007, it argued that “the hedge fund sector 
has not been the primary source of recent market turmoil” and welcomed the industry-
driven self-regulatory initiatives described in the previous section.83 Moreover, when the 
FSF delineated the first internationally coordinated regulatory response to the crisis in 
April 2008, hedge funds were mentioned only indirectly. The FSF recommended that the 
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supervisory guidance on counterparty exposure to hedge funds to be extended to 
exposure to other high leveraged counterparties.84   
The first year since the beginning of the financial crisis was characterized by a 
strengthening of the international self-regulatory architecture emerged in late-1990s and 
confirmed by the FSF in the immediate wake of the crisis. When hedge funds reached 
the international agenda for the first time in the middle of the crisis at the G20 
Washington Summit in November 2008, G20 leaders once again reached out to the 
industry. The statement released by the G20 leaders asked the hedge fund bodies that 
had already developed codes of best practices to “bring forward proposals for a set of 
unified best practices.” The role of public authorities as envisioned by the G20 was 
limited to “assess[ing] the adequacy of these proposals, drawing upon the analysis of 
regulators, the expanded FSF, and other relevant bodies.”85   
Even before they entered formally into the international regulatory agenda, the main 
hedge fund associations had reacted to the potential threat to their regulatory status 
posed by the market turmoil by updating their self-regulatory codes of conduct or drafting 
new ones. Besides individually updating their individual self-regulatory initiatives,86 the 
most important hedge fund associations, in particular the Washington-based Managed 
Funds Associations (MFA) and the London-based Alternative Investment Management 
Association (AIMA), took steps to meet regulators’ demand for a unified set of best 
practices as requested by the G20 leaders.87 In November 2008 these hedge fund 
groups, together with the International Organization of Securities Commissions, also 
created a website with the voluntary codes of conduct for the hedge fund industry, 
described as a first step towards harmonization of existing hedge fund industry sound 
practices.88   As was seen with the cases of OTC derivatives and rating agencies 
described in the previous chapters, the initial international regulatory response did not 
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86 MFA updated its “Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Managers” originally drafted in 2000 in the aftermath of the collapse 
of LTCM in order to incorporate the recommendations provided in the final President’s Working Group’s. See MFA 2009c. 
In the UK the Hedge Fund Standards Board, created at the outset of the crisis in response to the FSF 2007 Report, has 
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88 The website is named “Hedge Fund Matrix” (www.hedgefundmatrix.com). This initiative followed a request from the 
European Parliament. 
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alter the division of regulatory responsibilities between public and private actors but 
rather continued to rely on market-based regulatory solutions. 
The resilience of the market-based approach to the regulation of hedge funds can be 
found not only in the initial international regulatory response to the crisis but also in that 
of Europe, where this approach was more contested before the crisis.  
Within the European policymaking context, the continuation of a self-regulatory regime 
over this period found its biggest and most outspoken sponsor in the European 
Commission. At the beginning of the crisis, Commissioner McCreevy claimed to be 
relieved to have resisted the pressure for more stringent regulation in the period prior to 
the crisis: “This time 15 months ago I nearly had to go to an ear nose and throat 
specialist for a check up because I feared my ear drums were getting bruised in Brussels 
by the army of pro-regulation junkies and lobbyist who wanted me to ‘tackle’ private 
equity, hedge funds, and sovereign wealth funds for what they considered was the 
damage they could do to the European economy. I determinedly resisted this pressure—
as I have resisted much other pressure for more regulation.”89  
According to McCreevy, the crisis had revealed hedge funds to be “savours…in the 
current market turmoil” rather than “demons” jeopardizing the European economy, while 
the roots of the crisis were sown in regulated sectors such as banks rather than in the 
unregulated hedge funds.90 When pressures to regulate hedge funds started to re-
emerge during the crisis, McCreevy praised the measures being taken by hedge fund 
associations, arguing that the role of public authorities “should be to monitor closely 
these and other developments in the market and be ready to respond if and when 
necessary.”91 
The origins of the crisis outside of the hedge fund industry strengthened the support for 
the continuation of a market-based approach from the European Commission. However, 
the growing public attention triggered by the crisis towards finance and financial 
regulation gave momentum to different policy entrepreneurs who had challenged this 
approach before the crisis to renew their calls for a more direct regulation of the sector in 
Europe. It is important to identify two sets of actors pushing for a change in the 
regulation of hedge funds: the European Parliament and the alliance between the 
French and German government. 
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The regulation of hedge funds had entered the agenda of the European Parliament 
different times before the crisis. This had primarily been the product activism from a key 
policy entrepreneur, President of the Party of European Socialists Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen. Rasmussen took advantage of the crisis within Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Committee of the European Parliament to present a measure requesting the 
Commission to present a regulatory proposal on hedge funds based.92 This proposal 
was largely based on a report he had presented in April 2007, only a few months before 
the crisis. This report denounced the risks posed by hedge funds to financial stability, as 
well as the effects on long-term growth of the firms and industries in which they invested, 
and it advocated for a rethinking of the dominant approach of indirect regulation of 
hedge funds through their bank counterparties.93  
During the same post-crisis period, MEP Klaus-Heiner Lehne presented a second report 
requesting the European Commission to introduce new rules to enhance transparency in 
the investment policies of hedge funds and private equity funds.94 
In the past, similar initiatives had failed to garner sufficient support within the European 
Parliament. However, the intensification of the crisis in the second half of 2008 altered 
the political climate in a manner more favorable to the claims advanced by Rasmussen. 
Watered-down versions of both reports were thus approved on September 23, 2008 by a 
very large majority of members of the European Parliament.95 While the regulatory 
frameworks suggested in these two reports were not binding, the vote by the European 
Parliament forced the European Commission to present a legislative proposal within 
three months to regulate hedge funds in Europe. In response to this initiative, on 
December 1, 2008, the European Commission launched a public consultation on risks 
attached to hedge funds and the appropriate level of oversight in order to meet the 
requests coming from the European Parliament.96  
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Moreover, when Commissioner McCreevy was appearing to drag his feet in presenting a 
regulatory framework for hedge funds as requested by the European Parliament, 
Rasmussen and influential members of the Party of European Socialists directly lobbied 
the president of the Commission, Manuel Barroso. In a letter dated December 16, 2008, 
Rasmussen and other socialist members wrote to “express [their] dismay at the 
increasingly obvious fact that Commissioner McCreevy is trying to avoid implementing 
the demands of the European Parliament for regulation covering all financial players.”97 
Rasmussen described the conduct of McCreevy as “more appropriate for a paid lobbyist 
of the finance industry than a European Commissioner”.98 
The influence of the European Parliament over the conduct of the Commission was also 
due to the fact that Barroso was seeking re-election, which was conditional on the 
support of the European Parliament, where Rasmussen’s party controlled 184 MEP, 
25% of the total. Ramussen explicitly criticized the conduct of Barroso, arguing that if he 
were up for re-election as Commission president, he would have "an ambition level a bit 
higher."99  
The demands from the European Parliament during this period were not the only political 
pressures exercised on the European Commission in favor of directly regulating hedge 
funds. In fact, similar resolutions adopted by the European Parliament in the past (15 
January 2004, 27 April 2006, 11 July 2007, 13 December 2007) had failed to bring the 
European Commission to adopt a regulation of the industry.100 Indeed, to explain post-
crisis policy outcomes, it is also important to analyze the influence of the major 
European governments on the European Commission regarding the regulation of hedge 
funds in Europe.  
As argued in the previous section, the support for a market-based approach that 
informed the position of the European Commission in the years before the crisis 
reflected both the equilibrium among European governments within the European 
Council and the veto posed by the British government to the German attempt to promote 
European regulation of the sector.101 The beginning of the crisis did not alter this 
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equilibrium. On the contrary, at the end of January 2008 German Chancellor Merkel and 
French President Sarkozy joined the British government in welcoming a set of voluntary 
best practice standards presented by a group of 14 of London-based biggest hedge 
funds.102  
However, the apparent convergence of preferences among European governments in 
favor of self-regulation broke down during the second half of 2008. Starting in 
September 2008, Chancellor Merkel publicly criticized the US and the UK governments 
for having vetoed the previous attempts by the German government to introduce closer 
supervision over the hedge fund industry within the G8 and for placing excessive 
confidence in the capacity of financial markets to regulate themselves.103  
Merkel claimed that she would not repeat the error made in the past of not pushing 
through regulation of hedge funds on an international level. When the first G20 Leaders’ 
Summit was convened in November 2008 to discuss international financial regulation, 
Angela Merkel called to introduce regulations to abolish “blind spots” in international 
financial markets, such as off-balance sheet vehicles and hedge funds.104 The German 
priority of the regulating hedge funds was immediately supported by French President 
Nicholas Sarkozy, who intervened in person to re-introduce the regulation of hedge 
funds into the international agenda, claiming that “no financial institution should escape 
regulation and supervision.”105 In addition, Italian Finance Minister Tremonti argued that 
the rewriting of financial market rules should target "absolutely crazy bodies, like hedge 
funds which have nothing to do with capitalism," and that policymakers should launch a 
discussion about the need to ban them.106 
A British diplomat has compared the behavior of France and Germany to a pugilist in a 
bar brawl, saying, “You wait until a fight breaks out and then take a swing at the guy you 
have always wanted to hit…whether or not he had anything to do with starting the fight is 
not the point.”107 However, while it is true that the crisis has created an opportunity for 
the two governments to bring back into the agenda their long-standing priority of 
regulating hedge funds, it also significantly increased the incentives for these political 
actors to do this.  
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The coordinated attempt of France and Germany to restart the conversation on 
regulating hedge funds did not coincide with the beginning of the international regulatory 
response to the crisis but rather with the intensification of the crisis from a primarily US-
centric shock to a transatlantic crisis in September 2008. The increased public attention 
towards financial regulatory issues and the greater sensitivity of the electorate in these 
two countries towards the activities of hedge funds reinforced the incentives for the 
French and German governments to intervene in this area despite hedge funds having 
not represented key actors in the ongoing financial turmoil. This is particularly the case 
in Germany, where the Chancellor Angela Merkel faced federal elections in September 
2009, but electoral incentives also played an important role in shaping the French 
regulatory response. As Woll argues, “French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in turn, sought 
to capitalize on the financial crisis to become the founding father of a new financial 
architecture he intended to push under the French presidency of the EU in the second 
half of 2008, and later under the French presidency of the G20 from 2010 to 2011, just 
months before his upcoming election.” 108  During this period the French regulatory 
priorities came to be heavily influenced by the political leadership, and French 
government representatives received instructions from Sarkozy and the highest levels of 
the government to support the German position.109 
The initial demands advanced by Sarkozy and Merkel were crucial to bring hedge funds 
back in the agenda of the G20 at the 2008 Washington Summit. At the same time, it is 
important to recognize that the international agreement still reflected the preference for a 
market-based approach brought to the table by UK and US policymakers.  
Despite this failure, the Franco-German bid to secure an international agreement over 
the regulation of hedge funds continued at the beginning of 2009. In particular, in 
February 2009 the French Finance Minister, Christine Lagarde, proposed a compulsory 
registration of hedge funds with supervisory authorities in the country where they are 
marketed,110 and this proposal immediately met the support of German Finance Minister 
Steinbrueck.111 The breakthrough came ten days later at a summit hosted by Merkel in 
Berlin in order to forge a common European stance. In this circumstance, the leaders of 
France, Germany, UK, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands agreed that “all financial 
markets, products and participants—including hedge funds and other private pools of 
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capital which may pose a systemic risk—must be subjected to appropriate oversight or 
regulation.”112 This rebalancing in the position of main European countries paved the 
way for an agreement at the international level within the G20 Leaders’ Summit. The 
language adopted by G20 finance ministers and central bankers in March 2009 and by 
G20 leaders in London in April largely mirrored that used by European leaders one 
month before. 
This agreement represented a reversal of the compromise that had emerged among 
European government at the beginning of the crisis in favor of status quo, and it was 
portrayed as a Franco-German success in overcoming the resistance of the British 
government to the introduction of greater regulation of hedge funds in Europe.   
However, this account neglects the significant the shift in the position of the British 
government during the last quarter of 2008 and the beginning of 2009. During the initial 
phase of the crisis, British regulatory authorities had opposed calls for bringing hedge 
funds into the European agenda. In fact, the FSA repeatedly defended the adequacy of 
the regulatory framework in place in England where the FSA already authorized and 
directly monitored the largest UK domiciled hedge fund managers more extensively than 
other regulatory authorities, collecting aggregate information on their exposures and 
targeting outliers by regularly surveying their prime brokers.113 According to FSA, it was 
the rest of global regulatory community that had to catch up with the UK.114 Moreover, 
British regulators also sought to deflect calls for regulating hedge funds by praising the 
self-regulatory steps taken by the same hedge funds. 115  In particular the Bank of 
England had played an important part in bringing together the main London-based 
hedge funds that constitute the HFSB, while the FSA announced its intention to take 
compliance with these standards into account in its oversight of hedge fund 
managers.116 
However, the intensification of the financial crisis in the fall of 2008 raised the public 
profile of hedge funds in the UK as well. Hedge funds were accused in the mainstream 
media of having taken significant short selling positions in the shares of British banks 
that later came to demand public support.117 The temporary ban on shorting of financial 
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stocks imposed by the UK Financial Services Authority in September 2008 was seen as 
mostly directed towards hedge funds. The Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, justified this 
action in public by singling out hedge funds and arguing, “The interests of savers and 
homeowners and mortgage holders came before the interests of a few hedge funds.”118  
The criticisms towards short selling by hedge funds did not come uniquely from the 
government. A prominent critique came for instance from the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
who publicly attacked hedge funds, "Given that the risk to social stability overall in these 
processes has been shown to be so enormous, it is no use pretending that the financial 
world can maintain indefinitely the degree of exemption from scrutiny and regulation that 
it has got used to."119  
The role played by hedge fund in the intensification of the market turmoil in the fall of 
2008 .also brought them into the agenda of the British Parliament, where the 
Parliamentary Treasury Select Committee hosted a hearing focused on questioning the 
role of hedge funds in the crisis. Here, different MPs questioned the reliance on industry-
codes of best practices by hedge funds, denouncing the limited success of the Bank of 
England-sponsored Hedge Fund Standards Board in gaining acceptance within 
London’s hedge fund community. In the words of MP McFall, “Out of 1,000 potential 
members, you've only got 34.…Of the 34, 14 were those who drew it up in the first place. 
If I were a recruitment manager with a record like that, I'd be sacked".120 The head of the 
Liberal Democrats, Vince Cable, called for the creation of a hedge fund regulatory body 
in charge of monitoring hedge funds and their activities.121 
The increasing backlash against the financial sector within the UK in 2009 made it 
politically unpopular for UK politicians to stand up for the City of London and continue to 
defend the pre-crisis model of “light-touch” regulation as the most appropriate approach 
for finance. This paradigm change also affected the position of British regulators, as 
highlighted by the publication of the “Turner Review” in March 2009. This report, drafted 
by the FSA, announced a radical shift from the pre-crisis regulatory philosophy, and it 
discussed under what conditions hedge funds may pose a systemic threat and therefore 
be regulated as banks.122   
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The domestic pressures to take action against financial speculation in the middle of the 
crisis were reinforced by an external constraint: the desire of the British government to 
deliver significant commitments at the forthcoming London G20 Summit. Agreement on 
the regulation of hedge funds represented one of the key “diplomatic side-payments”123 
made by the British Prime Minister Brown to his European counterparts within the G20 in 
return for their consent on other issues, such as endowing the IMF with more resources 
and participation in a “global New Deal,” a measure described by Buller and Lindstrom 
as “crucial to Labour’s electoral prospects in 2010.”124 
In sum, changed domestic and international conditions during the crisis forced a shift in 
the position of the British government, which removed its previous veto to an agreement 
over the regulation of hedge fund managers at the European and international level.  
The change in the British position and its support for regulation of the industry thus 
deprived the European Commission of the main political supporter for the continuation of 
the existing self-regulatory approach. In February 2009, the European Commission 
announcement that it would be bringing forward new rules to regulate the hedge fund 
industry. While discussing this step, Commissioner McCreevy reaffirmed his belief that 
hedge funds were “easy scapegoats for more deep-rooted problems” but claimed that 
the crisis had “profoundly altered the economic and political context in which decisions 
on the regulation of hedge funds and private equity will be made. The ground has shifted 
in this debate. Closer, direct regulatory and supervisory oversight of hedge funds and 
private equity is inevitable.” 125  The Commission presented its proposal to directly 
regulate hedge funds in April, a record time given the breadth and complexity of the 
proposal.126  
The Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) Directive was based around the 
principle that hedge fund managers should be subject to the direct oversight of 
regulatory authorities and should comply with an extensive and detailed set of regulatory 
requirements regarding elements such as their level of leverage, their internal 
governance, and their use of custodians and valuators. 
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The publication of the Directive provoked a strong reaction by the hedge fund 
community. The London-based AIMA claimed that the drafting of the Directive had “been 
rushed through in a very tight timeframe without anything like the usual standards of 
consultation that we expect from the Commission,” and it had “been subjected to undue 
political pressure. There has been much rhetoric from various political organisations on 
the directive, most of which appears designed to satisfy domestic audiences ahead of 
the forthcoming European elections rather than to secure an effective and sensible 
solution to identified problems.”127  
British hedge funds have launched an intense campaign to denounce the costs imposed 
by these regulatory requirements upon their activities and upon London’s position as the 
world’s number two hub for hedge funds. A few hedge funds even threatened to relocate 
to more friendly jurisdictions such as Switzerland if the British government was not 
successful in toning down the most stringent elements of the Directive. 128  AIMA 
welcomed a report highlighting that the tax revenue already coming from the UK hedge 
fund and private equity industries was “enough to pay for more than 200,000 nurses, 
45,000 hospital consultants or 165,000 teachers.”129  
Moreover, the opposition to different aspects of the Directive also extended to important 
clients of hedge funds. In England, the UK National Association of Pension Funds,130 
and a coalition of charitable foundations—including the Church of England—denounced 
how “the Directive as currently drafted will significantly restrict our ability to generate 
funds to pursue our charitable missions and thus reduce our impact for public good.”131 
The opposition to the directive coming from a large range of interest groups in the UK 
led the British government to increase its involvement in the European arena, seeking to 
steer the content of the emerging regulatory framework as close as possible to the 
regulatory framework in place in Britain.  
While British authorities sought to limit the extent of the Directive, the French and 
German government sought to strengthen the regulation. German Finance Minister Peer 
Steinbrueck declared that the plan didn’t “go far enough,”132 adding that he would “not let 
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this directive be adopted in this state,” 133  while his French counterpart, Christine 
Lagarde, called for a “maximalist” regulation.134  
The discussion above has highlighted how the Franco-German attempt to bring the 
regulation of hedge funds into the European and international agenda was significantly 
influenced by public opinion. At the same time, their position over the details of the 
Directive during the lengthy negotiation that followed publication of the initial text also 
reflected the contours of traditional interest group politics. For instance, the position of 
the French government has been described by Woll as heavily influenced by an attempt 
to protect the retail mutual funds (UCITS) located in France from the competition of less 
regulated funds, pushing the pursuit of a regulatory framework similar to the one that 
had sustained this industry.135 While the German government did not have the same 
stake in protecting its domestic fund industry, German policymakers sought to defend 
their corporate model by promoting measures restricting the capacity of private equity 
funds to buy a company with the intention to sell some of its assets (so-called “asset 
stripping”).136    
The negotiations over the details of the Directive triggered the re-emergence of the two 
coalitions that had characterized the politics of hedge funds regulation in Europe before 
the crisis. However, British policymakers were successful in winning the support on 
various issues of some smaller European countries such as Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Finland, Czech Republic, Malta, Cyprus, Sweden, thus creating a blocking minority 
capable of stalling the process of the Directive.137  The mobilization of pension fund 
associations, such as the Dutch and Irish national associations and the pan-EU 
European Federation for Retirement Provision, denouncing the loss of returns caused by 
the Directive also extended the opposition to the Directive to parties without a significant 
hedge fund base.138  
Nevertheless, after a long “trialogue” between the European Parliament, European 
Council, and European Commission, the British authorities found themselves isolated 
and outvoted within the European Council. 139  By this time, though, the British 
government had achieved significant success in narrowing down the gap between its 
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own regulatory regime and the initial draft presented by the Commission.  For instance, 
the initial draft of the AIFM Directive presented by the European Commission in April 
2009 gave the Commission the power to set broad-brush restrictions to the level of 
leverage hedge fund managers could employ, a measure opposed both by hedge funds 
and the British government. The final text of the Directive, approved in November 2010, 
empowered domestic financial regulatory authorities to impose limits on leverage only on 
a temporary basis during exceptional circumstances.140  
British authorities also successfully challenged some of the most burdensome draft 
provisions regarding the regulation of valuators, depositories, and custodians, all of 
which have subsequently been significantly watered down.141  
Most importantly, the British government was able to win important concessions 
regarding the capacity of third country hedge funds and managers to market in 
Europe. 142  The initial proposal presented by the European Commission allowed 
managers domiciled in non-EU countries to market their services throughout Europe for 
only three years after the new rules took effect and only if their home countries met 
standards “equivalent” to the stringent conditions set out in the Directive.143 The difficulty 
for a third country to meet these conditions led the main international hedge fund 
associations to oppose the directive on the ground that it would have restricted access to 
EU markets for non-EU funds.144 
These measures were also criticized by the British government for threatening the status 
of London as the main hedge fund hub in Europe and the City’s capacity to attract funds 
based in the many British Crown dependencies that act as offshore financial centers. 
The diplomatic offensive by the British government thus focused on preventing what the 
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Minister for the City, Lord Myners, called the “building of a wall around Europe.”145 British 
authorities were able to safeguard the capacity of London-based managers to market 
non-EU funds in individual European countries through their national placement regime, 
and, through the inclusion in the Directive of a “third country passport,”, to market 
throughout Europe after a period of three years.146  
This represented a significant shift in the content of the Directive, whose initial draft had 
been perceived as burdensome for the British hedge fund industry and described by 
Lord Myners as an attempt of “other European countries to make political capital out of 
demanding intrusive regulation of an industry of which they have little or no direct 
experience.”147 Instead, as Myners acknowledged in May 2010 before the final approval 
of the Directive, "There isn't anything left in this directive which will threaten the viability 
of the UK hedge fund industry or the long-term position of London as the centre of that 
activity…We worked hard to stop the worst excesses of this directive."148 
 
6.5 The Regulation of Hedge Funds in the United States During the Crisis 
The capacity of the French and German governments to win support from the British 
government over the regulation of hedge funds and the shifting consensus within Europe 
away from self-regulation are certainly an important component of the agreement within 
the G20 in favor of more direct intervention. However, the developments triggered by the 
crisis in Europe cannot by themselves explain this shift in the international agenda. 
As the analysis of the pre-crisis period has demonstrated, previous attempts by these 
governments to challenge the international market-based regime emerged after LTCM 
but were vetoed by the UK and especially the United States. This section will therefore 
seek to explain why US policymakers came to accept an international agreement 
bringing hedge fund managers under the oversight of public authorities at the G20 
London Summit. This section will discuss how this decision did not represent a 
capitulation to the diplomatic offensive from Continental European countries, but rather it 
has emerged as a result of the impact that the crisis had over the domestic policymaking 
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context in the United States.  
The principle that hedge fund managers should register with their national securities 
regulator emerged within the United States long before the crisis in response to the 
growing investor protection concerns associated with hedge fund markets. The report 
presented by the PWG after the collapse of LTCM focused uniquely on the systemic risk 
posed by hedge funds and downplayed investor protection concerns, stating that “these 
vehicles generally have not been associated with traditional investor protection 
issues.”149 The rationale presented to justify this neglect is that the investor base for 
hedge funds usually comprised “sophisticated investors,” that is, high net worth 
individuals and institutional investors that are regarded as sufficiently capable of 
understanding the risks implicit in investing in hedge funds and to absorb the loss in the 
case of a hedge fund failure. 
These defining characteristics of the hedge fund industry have progressively come to an 
end in the years following the collapse of LTCM. In these years, the growth in the 
investor base of hedge funds in the United States has been boosted no just by high net 
worth individuals but also increasingly by the inflow of pension funds, university 
endowments, and other institutional investors seeking alternatives and more profitable 
strategies in the wake of the bursting of the equity bubble in 2000.150    
The increased “retailization” of the hedge fund industry made hedge funds available to a 
broader range of investors than had ever been intended by regulators. This occurred 
either directly through funds or indirectly through pension funds, leading the SEC to 
increase their scrutiny of the hedge fund industry in the years preceding the crisis.  From 
2001, the SEC devoted large efforts to detect cases of insider trading, fraud, conflict of 
interest, misleading disclosure, and faulty asset valuation. In 2004, 400 hedge funds and 
at least 87 hedge fund advisers were under investigation by the SEC.151 
The greater attention towards investor protection issues raised by hedge funds has 
created strong incentives for the SEC to take action to bring hedge fund advisers more 
directly under its oversight. To achieve this goal, the SEC eliminated in October 2004 the 
exemption in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 that allowed hedge fund advisers to 
avoid registering with the SEC and exempted them from periodic SEC examinations, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149  PWG 1999a, p. B-13. 
150 FSF 2007c While the share of high-net-worth individials has declined from 61% in 1997 to 40% in 2006 penson funds’ 
share of HF capital has grown threeforld, from 5% in 1996 to 15% in 2004 Danielsson 2004; MacHarg 2004.  
151 Robotti 2007. 
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well as compliance with reporting, record keeping, and disclosure requirements.152 
This measure was highly contested within the SEC, as demonstrated by the opposition 
of two SEC Commissioners, Paul Atkins and Cynthia A. Glassman. The two 
Commissioners argued that requiring hedge fund advisers to register would spread SEC 
inspection resources too thin without sufficient cause, and it would give investors an 
undeserved sense of security about investing in registered hedge funds. 153  Most 
importantly, this initiative by the SEC was opposed by the majority of hedge fund 
managers, who were concerned with the cost of compliance, as well as with the 
possibility that this would be the first step of broader regulation of the industry.154  
Ultimately, hedge funds were successful in deflecting this regulatory threat. Philip 
Goldstein, manager of the New York fund Bulldog Investors, took exception to the 
regulation and filed a lawsuit to challenge its enforcement. In June 2006, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled in “Goldstein vs. SEC” that the 
SEC’s hedge fund rule was going beyond the statutory authority of the SEC and that it 
was arbitrary in the absence of a clearer mandate by Congress to require the registration 
of hedge funds.155  
After the “Goldstein vs. SEC” case, no further effort was made by federal authorities to 
directly regulate hedge funds. The SEC did not appeal the decision, believing that hedge 
funds would nevertheless register on a voluntary basis.156 The reluctance of the SEC to 
demand the authority to regulate hedge funds from Congress also reflected the broader 
climate on the issue of the period and the anticipation of limited interest from Congress 
to fill the legislative vacuum. 
Nevertheless, different legislative proposals were indeed introduced in Congress after 
the “Goldstein vs. SEC” ruling. Rep. Barney Frank introduced the Securities and 
Exchange Commission Authority Restoration Act of 2006 in June to amend the definition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 This act presented a series of regulatory measures designed to protect retail investors, such as investor redemption 
rights, application of auditing standards, asset valuation, portfolio transparency and fund governance. Hedge funds 
achieved an exemptions from these requirements by either limiting themselves to 100 total investors or permitting only 
“qualified purchasers” to invest. The SEC contested the exemption that allowed hedge fund managers to count a single 
fund with hundreds of millions under management as one “client”. The SEC redefined the term “client” used under the 
Investment Advisers Act and it required hedge fund advisers to “look through” the funds in counting the number of 
investors in the fund as clients.    
153  P. S. Atkins 2006; SEC 2004. 
154 The MFA argued that “the implementation of the SEC proposal will result in unnecessary, burdensome costs to the 
hedge fund industry, potentially causing a chilling effect on hedge fund activities that will adversely impact hedge fund 
investors and the financial system as a whole”.  See MFA 2004. 
155 Veit 2008. 
156 Robotti 2007. 
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of “client” in line with the SEC proposal. However, this bill failed to raise sufficient 
support within Congress and died in committee.157  
Shortly after, with the collapse in September 2006 of Amaranth Advisors, a hedge fund 
that lost $6.5 billion in its bets on natural gas, Sen. Charles Grassley presented another 
legislative initiative to mandate registration of hedge fund advisers. Grassley denounced 
how “tens of millions of Americans are exposed to the risk of hedge funds through 
intermediaries such as pension funds, endowments, and other investment pools.”158 
Grassley declared it was up to Congress to act in order to create greater transparency 
for hedge funds, as “the average Joe has a stake as pension funds are invested in 
hedge funds.”159  
However, similarly to the legislative proposal presented by Rep. Frank, the Hedge Fund 
Registration Act introduced by Sen. Grassley in May 2007 was referred to the Senate 
Committee on Banking but never brought up for consideration.160 
This episode shows how despite the idea that hedge fund managers should register with 
securities regulators originated in the United States and entered the Congressional 
agenda before the crisis, it failed to receive adequate support from US politicians. The 
lack of significant and widespread losses caused to investors and taxpayers by hedge 
funds and the aversion to alienating the support of one of the major sources of campaign 
contributions made it unpopular for most Congressmen to support this regulatory 
intervention.  
This kind of support instead emerged during the global financial crisis of 2007-2010. 
Similarly to what occurred in Europe, this shift did not occur during the initial regulatory 
response to the crisis. Hedge funds regained the headlines on the mainstream US press 
almost a decade after the collapse of LTCM when, in June 2007, two funds established 
by the US investment bank Bear Stearns ran into trouble. Although not particularly large, 
these two hedge funds were heavily invested in complex financial instruments tied to 
subprime mortgages. When the market for US subprime mortgages rapidly declined in 
the summer of 2007, the two funds lost nearly all of their value, and Bear Stearns, as 
their parent bank, was forced to bail them out. The two managers were later arrested on 
charges of securities fraud and conspiracy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Ruane & Seitzinger 2010. The text of the bill is available here: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr5712	  
158 S. C. Grassley 2006. 
159  Together with Sen. Max Baucus, Grassley has also asked in March 2007 the General Accountability Office to 
investigate the scope of public and private pension plan investments in hedge funds, and what returns and risks are likely 
for workers' retirement funds.1 March 2007. See Baucus & Grassley 2007.	  
160 C. Grassley 2008.	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This event signaled to the US media the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis and 
refocused attention towards financial issues. At the same time, the public salience of 
hedge funds was rather short-lived, and the attention of the US media shifted quickly 
away from hedge funds and towards other financial sectors. 
As a result, the outbreak of the crisis in the summer of 2007 did not lead to a return of 
hedge funds in the Congressional agenda, nor did it undermine the support for the 
“indirect” regulatory approach that had emerged after the collapse of LTCM. On the 
contrary, as argued above, in September 2007 the PWG intervened directly to foster the 
emergence of a more effective self-regulatory regime by creating two advisory groups, 
one composed of investors in hedge funds and the other composed of hedge funds 
managers, with the mandate of creating and publicly releasing a private sector-driven set 
of best practices for HFs and their investors.161 
However, the level of public attention towards hedge funds increased significantly in the 
second half of 2008. Two developments explain this change. The first is the panic that 
unfolded in the markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and 
the subsequent use of public money to bailout financial institutions. Hedge funds did not 
directly benefit from the use of public funding in support of Wall Street, but they did not 
remain unscathed from the political repercussions of these bailouts, which significantly 
politicized financial regulatory politics across the board (see Figure 19).  
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Figure 19 - Hedge Funds in the US Press (1994-2011) 
 
 
The second event that brought hedge funds back in the headlines was the Madoff 
scandal. In December 2008, US investment manager and stockbroker Bernard Madoff 
was arrested for conducting what has been described as the largest Ponzi scheme in 
history. Madoff was not a hedge fund manager; rather, he executed trades for other 
“feeder funds” through his brokerage firms. Although Madoff was registered with the 
SEC, the scandal provoked a backlash against the lack of oversight of hedge fund 
managers. 
The increased public attention towards hedge funds had the effect of increasing the 
involvement of Congress in this area, as illustrated by Figure 20. In November 2008, the 
House Oversight Committee launched a series of hearings in which it questioned the 
actors that were regarded as most directly responsible for the crisis, such as credit rating 
agencies, bankers, and regulatory authorities. During one of these hearings, five of the 
most highly compensated hedge fund managers were questioned by lawmakers about 
the risks their firms posed to the stability of the financial system and the need for 
regulatory reforms.162  
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Figure 20 - Number of Publications Mentioning "Hedge Funds"in "Congressional 
Documents and Publications"163  
 
 
The response of the hedge fund industry in the United States over this period focused on 
proving the innocence of the industry to the growing market turmoil. As hedge funds 
frequently claimed, it was the main investment and commercial banks who had designed 
the products at the core of the crisis and who were operating with significantly higher 
leverage than the supposedly “highly-leveraged” hedge funds.  Meanwhile, they argued, 
the assets managed by the entire hedge fund industry (estimated at $1.5-2 trillion) were 
smaller than the balance sheets of some individual banks involved in the crisis.164  
Moreover, hedge fund managers have often argued that they had “not required, nor 
sought, federal assistance despite the fact that our industry, and our investors, have 
suffered mightily as a result of the instability in our financial system and the broader 
economic downturn.”165   
However, the lobbying from the hedge fund industry over this period was not sufficient to 
forestall the introduction of legislative proposals to bring hedge funds under the direct 
oversight of regulators. On the same day that Madoff was arrested, Congress began to 
legislate on the regulation of hedge funds.  Sen. Dorgan introduced the Derivatives and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 The “Congressional Documents and Publications” a wide variety of documents concerning the activity of US Congress, 
including legislative proposals, transcript of hearings, and press releases from individual Congressmen. It has been 
accessed through Factiva. 
164 The average leverage ration for the hedge fund industry was only 1.7 times in 2007 and it fell to 1.4 in 2008, and to 
1.15 at the beginning of 2009 (although the leverage changes significantly across fund types), thus well below that of 
banks. See IMF 2008 p. 41.  
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Hedge Fund Regulatory Improvement Act of 2008, which requested federal regulators to 
extend the requirements governing the safety and soundness of the financial system 
applicable to mutual funds to hedge funds.166 While this bill died with the end of the 110th 
Congress at the end of 2008, the 111th Congress immediately demonstrated a greater 
assertiveness in legislating the regulation of hedge fund industry. 
In January 2009, Sen. Grassley reintroduced his 2007 legislative proposal to close the 
loophole previously used by hedge funds to escape the definition of an “investment 
company” under the Investment Company Act of 1940, allowing avoidance of 
registration with the SEC. As Grassley argued, “There was not much of an appetite for 
this sort of common sense legislation when I first introduced it before the financial crisis 
erupted.  Hopefully, attitudes have changed given all that has happened since the 
collapse of Bear Stearns last March.”167 The co-sponsor of the bill, Sen. Carl Levin, 
argued in his floor statement, “History has proven time and again that markets are not 
self-policing. Today’s financial crisis is due in part to the government’s failure to regulate 
key market participants, including hedge funds that have become unregulated financial 
heavyweights in the U.S. economy.”168 
Grassley’s initiative was not the only bill introduced in Congress to regulate hedge funds. 
Another bipartisan bill was introduced in the House of Representatives at the end of the 
same month by Republican Mike Castle and Democrat Mike Capuano.169 Unlike the 
Grassley-Levin Bill, the Castle-Capuano bill sought to eliminate the exemption from 
registration for hedge fund managers with fewer than 15 clients contained in the 
Investment Advisers Act. The principle of hedge fund advisers’ registration also informed 
other legislative drafts presented within Congress, such as the Private Fund Investment 
Advisers Registration Act of 2009 introduced by Rep. Kanjorski and the Private Fund 
Transparency Act of 2009 introduced by Sen. John Reed.  
As argued above, the introduction of legislative proposals to bring hedge funds under the 
purview of the SEC was not unprecedented. However, while only two years before 
Congress had been reluctant to endorse hedge fund manager registration with securities 
regulators, the changed political climate triggered by crisis brought the majority of 
Congressmen to support this regulatory solution. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 The text of the bill is available at: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s3739 
167 C. Grassley 2009; US Senate 2009.	  
168  Levin 2009. 
169  The text of the Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act of 2009 is available at: 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr711 
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The changed consensus within Congress in favor of directly regulating hedge funds was 
further solidified by the election of President Barack Obama. This led to an immediate 
change at the helm of the SEC and a reversal of the position held by the organization. 
Following the elections and criticism addressed towards the SEC for having failed to 
detect the $65 billion Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Madoff,170 the new nominee to head 
the SEC, Mary Schapiro, immediately supported the registration of hedge fund 
managers in January 2009.171  
Also the new Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner, departed from the support for the 
indirect approach to the regulation of hedge funds that had informed the position of the 
US Treasury under the previous administration. On the contrary, the legislative proposal 
delivered to Capitol Hill by the US Treasury fell largely in line with the previous 
Congressional proposals and required all hedge funds above a minimum threshold to 
register with the SEC, while at the same time adding a second tier of regulatory 
requirements for those funds deemed to be systemically relevant.172  
The changed political climate within Congress and the increasing consensus around 
bringing hedge funds under the purview of the SEC forced hedge funds to alter their 
position as well. In the past, hedge funds had opposed any proposal that would force 
them to register with the SEC and to be subject to its oversight, on the ground that this 
would result in burdensome costs to the industry.173 At the beginning of 2009, the main 
US hedge funds association, the Managed Funds Association, changed its position and 
threw its weight behind the proposals to force hedge funds to register with the SEC and 
their associated disclosure requirements.174 
The shift in the position of hedge funds from their strenuous defense of self-regulation to 
their support for direct regulation centered on the principle of the registration of hedge 
fund managers represented in part a response to change in the political climate. In 
particular, hedge fund managers expressed concerns that the public outrage that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 SEC Office of Inspector General 2009. 
171 During a confirmation hearing the nominee to head of the SEC, Mary Schapiro declared in January 2009 that she 
would consider requiring hedge fund managers to register with the SEC so that they would required to open up their 
books for periodic inspections in an effort to “bring transparency and accountability to all corners of the marketplace” 
Labaton 2009; Aguilar 2009. 
172 US Treasury 2009a, 2009c. 
173 MFA 2004. 
174 MFA 2009d. According to the MFA, a “smart” regulatory approach would be based on the coexistence of industry best 
practices with the registration of hedge fund managers. MFA 2009e. MFA 2009a Also the London-based AIMA 
abandoned its opposition to direct regulation and it announced in February 2009 a new policy platform, supporting “a 
global manager-authorisation and supervision template based on the UK’s FSA model” and the “principle of full 
transparency and supervisory disclosure of systemically significant positions and risk exposures by hedge fund managers 
to their national regulators”. AIMA 2009a; 2009. fAIMA also supported the US legislation. See AIMA 2009d. 
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followed the collapse of Lehman and the bailout of AIG, and the need for Congress and 
other policymakers to respond to pressure from voters could also trigger restrictive 
legislative actions towards hedge funds.  
Throughout the course of the crisis, hedge funds became increasingly aware that 
escaping closer scrutiny from regulators was no longer tenable. As a hedge fund 
manager put it, “It was inevitable that this would happen. From the time Congress had 
the industry’s top hedge fund managers testify late last year, we knew something was 
coming.”175 While only 8% of the hedge fund managers surveyed by a consultancy firm 
at the beginning of 2008 expected increased regulation of the hedge fund industry, in 
February 2009 this percentage had risen to 98%.176   
As hedge funds came to perceive the introduction of some sort of official regulation as 
inevitable after Lehman, they decided to publicly put their weight behind the form of 
public regulatory oversight that they regarded as most acceptable for the industry, that 
is, some form of registration of hedge fund managers. In fact, according to a report 
presented by the Government Accountability Office in 2008, 1,991 hedge fund advisers, 
including 49 of the largest US hedge fund advisers accounting for one-third of the hedge 
funds’ assets under management in the United States, were already voluntary registered 
with the SEC.177 The costs posed by this registration and the associated regulatory 
requirements were estimated as significant for some smaller funds. However, the 
regulatory burden was more manageable for the larger funds, which usually already had 
compliance officers in place, for instance.   
The strategy pursued by hedge fund associations of endorsing hedge fund adviser 
registration as a way to forestall the imposition of more intrusive forms of regulation was 
successful. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
removed the exemption for hedge fund managers from the requirement to register with 
the SEC.  
Besides the registration requirement, the legislation required hedge fund managers to 
comply with a number of recordkeeping and reporting requirements concerning the 
identity of their funds, their internal governance arrangements, and key service 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Herbst-Bayliss 2009; Mackintosh 2009.	  
176 According to the same survey, in April 2008 96% of senior partners of US-based firms did not think regulation would 
increase in 2008. In November 2008, 98% of hedge fund managers expected tigher regulation under an Obama 
administration. As Roger Hollingsworth, managing director of MFA, argued in February 2009, Congress could be 
“aggressive” in 2009 responding to pressure from voters “to find out who to blame” for the financial crisis. Rothstein Kass 
2009. 
177 GAO 2008. 	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providers, as well as their trading activities.178 While before the crisis these disclosure 
requirements were directed towards the markets in order to enhance market discipline, 
these disclosure requirements were now designed to assist the SEC in policing hedge 
funds and identifying market abuses (e.g. insider trading and market manipulation). 
Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the SEC to share certain systemic-risk data 
with the Financial Stability Oversight Council in order to permit an informed assessment 
of whether any fund has become so large, leveraged, or interconnected that it requires 
regulation for financial stability purposes.  
However, as contemplated by the Dodd-Frank Act, under normal circumstances the 
action of regulators would not interfere with the investment and trading strategies of a 
hedge fund, nor would it seek to extend to hedge funds prudential regulatory 
requirements similar to those designed for banks. Similarly to the pre-crisis approach, 
the new regulatory framework continued to rely on the discipline imposed by bank 
counterparties as the primary strategy to restrict their risk-taking and the use of leverage. 
Overall, the US approach towards the regulation of the hedge fund industry has been 
described as more akin to “enhanced oversight” of hedge funds managers than a 
“granular approach” to closely regulate and constrain their investment activities.179 
While the US legislation did not seek to limit the risk taking of hedge funds in normal 
circumstances, it introduced a second layer for those funds deemed to pose a threat to 
the stability of the financial markets.180 In the case the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council determines that a single hedge fund or collectively a group of hedge funds pose 
systemic risk, these funds would be subject to prudential regulatory requirements that 
could increase leverage restrictions, capital requirements, or place restrictions upon their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178  This included the amount of assets under management, counterparty credit risk exposures, their trading and 
investment positions, the level of leverage, valuation policies and practices, types of assets held, and any other 
information that regulator may deem necessary. 
179 Richard Baker, president of the Managed Funds Association, quoted Gordon 2009. 
180 According to the US legislation, the SEC would share the information received on a confidential basis by the hedge 
funds regarding their trades with the Federal Reserve and the newly created Financial Services Oversight Council. In the 
case the Council determined that the size, leverage, and interconnectedness of a hedge funds or a group of funds could 
pose a threat to financial stability, they would be identified as “Tier 1 FHC”, and therefore be subject to regulation and 
oversight by the Federal Reserve, which could impose requirements similar to those existing for banks, such as to place 
limits on the its activities and leverage, or impose liquidity standards. Similarly to banks, they would also be required to 
establish “living will”, that is rapid resolution plans in the case the firm was victim of severe financial distress.Once 
registered with the SEC, this regulatory agency would collect on a confidential basis information with respect to amount of 
assets under management, borrowings, off-balance sheet exposures, counterparty credit risk exposures, trading and 
investment positions, and other important information. These disclosure requirements were meant not only to police 
hedge funds but also to collect data “that would permit an informed assessment of how such funds are changing over time 
and whether any such funds have become so large, leveraged, or interconnected that they require regulation for financial 
stability purposes”. The SEC would then share this information with a systemic-risk regulator, in particular the Federal 
Reserve and the newly created Financial Services Oversight Council. See US Treasury 2009b.  
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market activities. The granting of these “emergency” powers to regulators would allow 
regulatory authorities to intervene in those situations where market discipline fails, and it 
also represented an attempt to place the unprecedented measures that had been taken 




This chapter has analyzed the evolution of the international regime governing hedge 
funds since the late 1990s, explaining in particular the shift from the market-based 
regime that emerged after the failure of LTCM in 1998 to the direct regulation regime 
that emerged during the global financial crisis.  
In particular, the first part of this chapter explored the source of the reliance on the 
indirect regulation and industry-driven codes of conduct that was codified in the first 
report released by the FSF in 2000 and would characterize the international agenda 
before 2009.  It identified the origin of this reliance in the preferences of US federal 
regulators and their attempt to satisfy the demands of Congress for a regulatory 
response in the aftermath of LTCM. During this period, the decision to leave hedge 
funds outside of the direct scrutiny of regulators market-based arrangement was 
challenged both from the outside, especially from the German and French governments, 
and from various proposals emerging from within Congress. However, the weak salience 
of hedge funds within the United States weakened the incentives for Congress to 
introduce direct regulatory measures that were opposed by the hedge fund industry. 
As the second part of this chapter discussed, the greater salience of financial regulation 
triggered by the crisis created a window of opportunity and reinforced the incentives for 
the French and German governments, as well as for policy entrepreneurs within the 
European Parliament, to reassert their long-standing priorities and to promote direct 
regulation of the industry at the international and European level. The agreement 
reached at the G20 London Summit on the regulation of hedge funds has therefore been 
interpreted as a victory of Continental European governments over the market-based 
approach endorsed by the countries where most hedge fund managers are located, the 
United States and UK.  
This chapter has demonstrated that this shift in the public-private divide in the 
international agenda also needs to be understood as the product of the changes 
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triggered by the crisis within the United States and UK. The key factor to interpret the 
shift in the international agenda and the new consensus around the principle of hedge 
fund manager registration was therefore the impact that the increase in the public 
attention towards financial regulation triggered by the crisis had in altering the incentives 
of elected officials, particularly members of Congress in the United States. 
Moreover, a closer inspection reflects how the regulatory framework that was endorsed 
at the international level, based on the registration of hedge funds or their managers and 
the disclosure of information to assess the systemic risk, reflects very closely the 
approach brought to the negotiating table by US and British authorities.  
The predominance of the preference for a relatively minimalist approach based on the 
regulation of hedge fund managers is visible not only in the content of the respective 
legislations introduced in Europe and in the United States, but also from the international 
agenda. In fact, the international standards drafted by IOSCO to inform the approach of 
its members to the regulation of hedge funds acknowledged that “some IOSCO 
Technical Committee members would favour the introduction of regulatory requirements 
at the level of the funds themselves to facilitate obtaining fund specific information and to 
get an overall picture of the risks posed by the funds.”181 However, the standards set by 
IOSCO have targeted hedge fund managers without presenting prudential regulatory 
requirements directed at the underlying funds.182  
Indeed, these findings are consistent with those of Fioretos and others arguing that the 
positions of different countries on the international stage have been influenced by the 
attempt to defend their respective domestic regulatory approaches.183 However, this 
analysis has highlighted how the differing levels of public attention towards the 
regulation of hedge funds have influenced changes in the position of policymakers 
across different “varieties of capitalism.”
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183 Fioretos 2010. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
 
7.1 Plan of the Chapter 
What explains international financial regulation’s shift towards greater direct public 
oversight of financial markets since the 2007-2010 crisis? The first chapter illustrated 
how, during the crisis, the main international regulatory institutions moved away from the 
market-based approaches that had emerged before the crisis. This analysis showed that 
international regulatory community’s response to the crisis extended oversight for market 
actors and markets that were among the main culprits of the crisis, such as OTC 
derivatives markets and rating agencies, but also actors that played a rather peripheral 
role, such as hedge funds. Moreover, this study also revealed how the outbreak of the 
crisis in the summer of 2007 initially reinforced rather than undermined the market-based 
approach that had emerged before the crisis, as the response by international 
institutions such as the FSF repeatedly turned to the same market actors and demanded 
they make self-regulatory improvements. 
In order to explain this shift in the international regulatory agenda, the previous three 
chapters traced through within-case analyses of the origins of the international 
regulatory regime governing OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds before 
and after the crisis. This concluding chapter will instead look across cases to identify 
common patterns that may explain the shift in the public-private divide triggered by the 
2007-2010 global financial crisis. The first part of this chapter (Section 7.2) will review 
the empirical evidence presented in the previous cases to explain the reliance on 
market-based governance measures that characterized the approach of international 
regulatory institutions before the crisis. Section 7.3 will then review the evidence 
presented in the three cases in order to explain the steps the international regulatory 
community took during the crisis to bring OTC derivatives markets, hedge funds, and 
rating agencies within the perimeter of public regulation.  
While these two sections discuss to what extent the empirical evidence presented in the 
three cases supports the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3, the final section 
of this chapter (Section 7.4) analyzes the implications of the argument for the broader 
literature on the politics of financial regulation. 
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7.2 “Quiet Politics” and the Pre-Crisis International Regulatory Regime 
The empirical evidence presented in the three case studies provides some significant 
insights for evaluating different theories that explain the market-based nature of many 
international financial regulatory agreements in the fifteen years prior to the crisis. 
Analyzing the origin and resilience of an international market-based approach for 
regulating OTC derivatives, hedge funds, and rating agencies cannot be adequately 
explained by those functionalist theories of regulation that have traced the origin of these 
approaches in the characteristics and evolution of the financial markets being regulated. 
On the contrary, the empirical evidence presented in the three cases provides support to 
state-centric analyses that regard the emergence of international market-based 
governance mechanisms as reflecting the preferences of those countries that exercised 
the greatest influence over the international regulatory agenda. In line with realist 
arguments reviewed in Chapter 2, the cases traced the primary source of support for 
market-based solutions that characterized the agenda of international regulatory 
institutions such as the FSF and IOSCO over this period: regulatory authority 
preferences from the country hosting the greater number of derivative dealers, rating 
agencies, and hedge fund managers: the US. US authorities were not only able to 
internationally export homegrown market-based regulatory approaches, they also to 
vetoed proposals running against their position. 
The empirical evidence presented in the three cases also provides some support to a 
number of explanations that have been presented in the literature to explain these 
national preferences. Similar to the arguments in historical institutionalist literature, US 
regulatory authorities have in different circumstances been able to form a common front 
with British authorities in opposing proposals from countries with a more extensive 
tradition of state intervention in the governance of markets. As argued by constructivist 
literature, the empirical evidence presented in the different cases confirms the 
ideological component that influenced certain regulatory authorities. The Federal 
Reserve repeatedly expressed its skepticism of what direct regulation could achieve in 
the area of derivatives and hedge funds and praised the capacity of markets to play a 
positive role in supplementing the limits of regulatory intervention. In fact, different 
regulatory authorities inside and outside these international regulatory institutions 
contested this view. German authorities called for directly regulating hedge funds and 
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the CFTC in the US attempted to directly regulate OTCM derivatives. However, the 
privileged position of the Federal Reserve – described by Foot and Walter as a “first 
among equals” within the Basel Committee over this period1 – and the market power of 
US regulators played a crucial role in vetoing these proposals and swaying the 
international approach towards market-based regulatory mechanisms.  
Moreover, in line with “regulatory capture” theorist predictions, financial industry groups’ 
lobbying and self-regulatory initiatives were among the most important factors that tilted 
the public-private divide towards greater reliance on market-based regulatory solutions. 
Transnational derivative dealers groups, hedge funds associations, and rating agencies 
benefiting substantially from avoiding a more formal regulatory regime have played a 
crucial role in deflecting calls for bringing these sectors under the direct regulatory 
oversight of public authorities. Not only have these actors directly lobbied at the 
transnational and domestic level, they also self-regulated their activities in order to 
address regulators’ concerns and demonstrate the capacity of the financial industry to 
self-police itself. The failure of rating agencies to agree with US securities regulators on 
a voluntary framework in the US contributed to Congress’ decision to reverse the 
industry’s self-regulatory status. 
International regulatory bodies’ receptiveness to calls coming from the private sector to 
leave the regulation of OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds in their hands 
was further strengthened by the dominance of ideas regarding the superiority of private 
sector expertise in the context of increasingly complex and dynamic markets, as 
stressed in the constructivist literature. International regulatory bodies such as the Basel 
Committee and IOSCO repeatedly sought out the views and expertise of financial 
industry groups. As Foot and Walter argue, since the dominant industry lobbies lost 
different battles, this could not be described as straightforward regulatory capture. 
However, these lobbies clearly exercised significant influence over the work of 
international regulatory bodies, whose regulatory policies went in the general direction 
favored by the regulated financial institutions.2 
In sum, the dominance of US regulators in international regulatory bodies, the set of 
dominant ideas regarding the limits of traditional regulatory approaches for governing 
increasingly complex markets and regarding the benefits of market mechanisms, as well 
as the preferences and self-regulatory initiatives pursued by transnational financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Foot & Walter 2010, p. 244. 
2 Foot & Walter 2010. 
	   274 
industry groups, combined to create a strong force in favor of market-based regulation 
before the crisis. The strength of these forces is demonstrated by the fact that when 
several episodes of financial instability and corporate scandals brought OTC derivatives, 
hedge funds, and rating agencies into the regulatory agenda throughout the 1990s and 
early 2000s, these events did not result in the introduction of policies to directly regulate 
these markets and institutions. Johnson and Kwak argued (about the regulation of 
derivatives in the US): “Someone familiar with the history of the financial system might 
have expected this record of disaster to lead to greater skepticism of financial innovation 
and closer oversight of the industry.  Instead the 1990s witnessed the final dismantling of 
the regulatory system constructed in the 1930s.”3 
While the case studies analyzed in this study provide strong empirical support to some 
of the main explanations presented within the IPE literature, they also point towards the 
level of public salience as a key enabling condition for the persistence of market-based 
regulatory mechanisms that this literature has neglected. The lack of sustained public 
attention towards the regulation of derivatives and hedge funds in the US has weakened 
the incentives for the US Congress to support more direct regulatory approaches 
opposed by their domestic financial industry, while increasing the incentives to defer to 
regulatory agencies, which have rather consistently supported market-based solutions 
over this period.4   
A closer analysis of different regulatory initiatives’ roots reveals the impact of this “quiet 
politics” environment on the direction of international governance arrangements. The 
initiatives, including the 1994 IOSCO and BCBS standards on derivatives published in 
1994, the 2004 IOSCO Code of Conduct for Rating Agencies, and the 1999 FSF report 
on hedge funds regulation, cemented the market-based approach towards the regulation 
of OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds in the years before the crisis.  
The roots of these international standards can be traced to different shocks that 
temporarily increased the level of public awareness over the activities of these markets 
and institutions in the US. These shocks are respectively the Orange County derivatives 
scandal of 1994, the Enron bankruptcy in 2001, and the averted bankruptcy of LTCM in 
1998. These shocks generated very a similar reaction pattern from politicians, 
regulators, and interest groups in the US that can be summarized in three steps.  
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First, heightened public attentiveness created incentives for different members of 
Congress to present legislative proposals seeking to bring these markets and institutions 
under more formal regulatory oversight. In 1994, different bills were presented to directly 
regulate derivatives markets in the US, such as the Derivatives Supervision Act of 1994 
(H.R. 3748), the Derivatives Safety and Soundness Act of 1994 (H.R. 4170), the 
Derivatives Limitations Act of 1994 (S. 2123), and the Derivatives Dealers Act of 1994 
(H.R. 475). The collapse of the hedge fund LTCM in 1998 led the House Committee on 
Banking and Financial Services to hold a hearing on the issue, questioning the president 
of the New York Federal Reserve, William McDonough, and the chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, on the implications for the regulatory oversight of 
hedge funds. Similarly, the Enron scandal had the effect of “forc[ing] a reluctant 
Congress to act” by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 5  While the scandal and 
subsequent legislation focused on corporate governance issues and auditors, the bill 
also demanded that federal regulators to study regulatory possibilities for ratings 
agencies. 
Second, the appearance of derivatives, hedge funds, and rating agencies on the 
Congressional agenda altered regulatory agencies’ incentives and forced them to take 
action in order to reassure their political controllers. However, in none of these cases did 
US regulatory agencies urge lawmakers to bring these three sectors within the perimeter 
of public regulation. On the contrary, their recommendations were directed primarily at 
the financial industry by endorsing self-regulatory steps to improve the safety of these 
markets or to solicit further measures. In the case of OTC derivatives, the major federal 
regulatory authorities, starting with Alan Greenspan, testified in front of Congress and 
endorsed the steps taken by private market actors to establish a self-regulatory 
infrastructure. These witnesses opposed calls for direct oversight. The SEC convened 
the five firms who accounted for the most derivatives business to form the Derivatives 
Policy Group. In the case of rating agencies, the SEC considered directly overseeing 
rating agencies did in the end did not ask Congress to grant it authority to do so. The 
SEC decided instead to work with the rating agencies to develop a voluntary oversight 
framework. In the case of hedge funds, the President’s Working Group in 1999 released 
a report that rejected direct industry regulation but asked hedge fund managers to draft 
codes of best practices to improve their risk management. 
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Third, the market power and prestige of US regulatory authorities during these periods 
allowed them to export their preference for a market-based approach at the international 
level when the shocks described above brought the regulation of derivatives, hedge 
funds, and rating agencies on to the agenda of the main international regulatory bodies. 
The market-based approach towards the regulation of derivatives endorsed by federal 
regulatory authorities in the aftermath of the scandals of 1994 also informed the 
approach endorsed at the international level by the Basel Committee and IOSCO later 
that year. In 1999, the Financial Stability Forum’s recommendations and its rejection of a 
direct regulatory approach closely resembled the approach presented in the US by the 
President’s Working Group. IOSCO did not recommend a government-based 
implementation for its Code of Conduct for Rating Agencies, although the same 
European regulatory authorities did endorse this market-based solution.  
In other words, the origin of the different international regulatory initiatives in the two 
decades before the crisis solidified the market-based approach to the regulation of 
derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds at the international level can be found in 
the preferences of US regulators and the measures taken at the domestic and 
international level in order to restore the confidence in these markets and reassure their 
politicians. These dynamics are compatible with Singer’s model of international 
regulatory cooperation.6 
However, we also need to consider US Congressional deference to the preferences of 
federal regulators and the financial industry in order to understand the resilience of these 
market-based approaches before the crisis. The case studies have revealed how the 
market-based solutions supported by the Federal Reserve and SEC to improve the 
regulation of derivatives and hedge funds were embraced also by Congress without 
pushing for more stringent measures.  
The different legislative proposals introduced within Congress to directly regulate 
derivatives markets in the eve of the scandals of 1994 and to regulate hedge funds in 
the eve of LTCM never left their respective Congressional committees. Moreover, while 
other legislative proposals seeking to force hedge fund managers to be subject to the 
direct oversight of securities regulators were presented within Congress in 2005-2006, 
these proposals failed to gain traction within the Congress at large.  
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The Clinton administration’s admiration of Greenspan and the weight of the financial 
sector’s contribution to federal election financing7 during this period explains Congress’ 
deference towards securities regulators’ position. 8  However, an additional factor 
explaining the attitude of Congress during this period is the fact that the different shocks 
and scandals over this period generally failed to raise the public salience of these 
sectors in a long-lasting way. Therefore, Congress had no to interfere with arrangements 
designed by the financial industry and endorsed by regulators.  
The losses provoked by the scandals involving derivatives in 1994 remained limited and 
geographically localized, failing thus to raise significant support for the introduction of 
formal regulation across the whole Congress. Similarly, while the main investment 
banks’ private bailout that prevented LTCM’s collapse from impairing US financial 
markets was orchestrated by the Federal Reserve, it did not require the use of 
taxpayers’ money.  In other words, the decision of international regulatory institutions 
over this period to delegate regulatory responsibilities to the private market actors and 
the resilience of the international self-regulatory regime governing these markets and 
institutions in the years before the crisis remained in part dependent on a certain level 
inattentiveness from the public, thus confirming Culpepper’s analysis of the politics of 
corporate governance. 
Rating agencies are the key exception in the analysis of pre-crisis years. The US 
Congress has contested the plan pursued by the SEC to create a voluntary regulatory 
framework for ratings agencies and, in 2006, it passed a bill (Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act) that ended the industry’s self-regulatory status in the US. This decision is 
puzzling when analyzed through the lens of the theoretical argument developed in this 
study. On the one hand, the Enron and Worldcom scandals increased rating agencies’ 
public salience more than any other past scandal involving rating agencies, derivatives 
or hedge funds during the pre-crisis period. At the same time, Congress’ decision to 
legislate came at a moment when the degree of public salience had decreased 
significantly. It is therefore important to consider complementary explanations for 
Congress’ decision bringing rating agencies under the SEC’s direct oversight, such as 
the fact that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act had already set in motion the legislative process, 
that the legislation raised only limited international competitiveness concerns, and that 
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the ratings agencies and securities regulators had failed to negotiate a viable self-
regulatory alternative.  
However, with the important exception of Enron, the fact that the different shocks and 
corporate scandals involving hedge funds, rating agencies, and OTC derivatives over 
this period did not generate significant negative externalities beyond the market actors 
directly involved limited the public salience of regulatory debates over these industries. 
As a result, the domestic and international debates concerning their regulation received 
very limited attention and scrutiny outside of the regulatory authorities and the market 
players more directly affected by the regulation.  
In a nutshell, this environment of domestic “quiet politics” in the dominant country – the 
US - was an important, although silent, enabling factor for the delegation of international 
regulatory responsibilities to private market actors. 
 
7.3 The Financial Crisis of 2007-2010 and the Politicization of Financial Regulation 
The global crisis of 2007-2010 undermined the domestic bases of international 
regulatory cooperation that emerged during this period of “quiet politics”. The case 
studies and media coverage analysis have highlighted how the financial crisis had 
revealed substantial market and regulatory failures not only to regulatory community and 
experts, but also to the broader public. However, the pattern of public attention to 
financial regulation has not necessarily mirrored that of the regulatory community. The 
initial breakdown of the crisis in the summer of 2007 did not significantly raise the 
salience of financial regulatory issues in the US press.  
The initial US regulatory response to the financial crisis closely resembles the dynamics 
described in the pre-crisis period. US regulatory authorities occupied the driving seat 
and, like in the pre—crisis period, their initial response to the regulatory shortcomings 
primarily relied on soliciting self-regulatory improvements from the financial industry.  
Along the same lines, numerous financial industry groups also responded to the initial 
shock by introducing different self-regulatory measures to deflect the threat of more 
stringent regulation. These measures contributed to deflecting Congress’ attention. 
During first year of the crisis, Congress largely deferred to regulators in charting its 
regulatory response and remained largely uninterested in financial regulatory issues. 
However, unlike the episodes of financial instability and corporate scandals that had 
triggered only a short-lived increase in the level of public attention, the intensification of 
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the financial crisis in 2008 contributed to a steady increase public attention towards 
financial regulatory issues. This pattern of rising public attention towards financial 
regulatory issues significantly altered the incentives for elected policymakers to get 
involved in financial regulatory debates.   
In the United States, the crisis’ overlap with the Presidential election in the summer of 
2008 made financial firms an issue during the electoral campaign. The Republican 
candidate John McCain promised to act in a decisive way against those “very greedy 
people that happen to be in Wall Street today”9, while the Democrat candidate Barack 
Obama accused his opponent of endorsing the same free-market philosophy that was at 
the origin of the crisis.10 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the passage of the Troubled 
Assets Relief Program had the effect of bringing financial regulation directly onto 
Congress’ agenda. Moreover, unlike the corporate scandals of 1994 that triggered the 
first wave of Congressional activism in the regulation of derivatives and the collapse of 
LTCM in 1998 which focused Congress’ attention on regulating hedge funds, the 
decision to bailout financial institutions using government funds represented a very 
visible socialization of the costs imposed the crisis. These costs were not concentrated 
on a single constituency, nor internalized by the financial firms involved. As the figure 
below shows, debates on the regulation of sectors for which no immediate public money 
had been disbursed (hedge funds, rating agencies) also entered prominently the 
Congressional agenda at the beginning of 2009. 
A series of Congressional hearings following the bailouts led Congress to question the 
role of different market actors in the crisis, as well as regulators in preventing this from 
happening. However, Congress’ role went beyond simply questioning regulators’ 
inaptitude in preventing the crisis. Since the fall of 2008, numerous Congressmen have 
introduced new legislative proposals to regulate derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge 
funds.  In some cases, lawmakers took advantage of the changed political climate to re-
introduce legislative proposals firstly presented during previous Congressional sessions.   
While in the past these legislative attempts had failed to gain significant support, the 
different political climate triggered by the bailouts ensured a different outcome. It 
became electorally unpopular for most members of Congress to openly oppose 
measures to extend the regulatory net over markets and institutions involved in the 
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crisis, or to support the delegation of regulatory functions to the same market actors that 
had so spectacularly failed during the crisis. As Foot and Walter argues, “in a now 
Democrat-controlled Congress, many politicians turned with a vengeance against the 
philosophy of market-based regulation that had played an increasingly influential role in 
the Greenspan years. The large public sector bailouts of leading Wall Street banks and 
the political furor over financial sector compensation practices also undermined the 
legitimacy of the Fed-money center bank coalition that was now widely seen as having 
dominated regulatory outcomes over the previous decade”.11  
In line with partisan theories of regulatory politics, the Democratic party had a larger 
capacity of reaping electoral rewards by promoting stringent reforms. Republican 
Congressmen have frequently denounced – in the words of the Republican Senator 
Gregg – the existence of “a movement in this country and in this Congress, 
unfortunately, which I call pandering populism, which just simply dislikes anything that 
has to do with Wall Street”.12  
Mainstream media coverage of the legislation’s progress in Congress has played an 
important role in driving the passage of the Dodd-Frank “Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act”. This bill completed its lengthy legislative itinerary in July 
2010, at the peak of public attention towards financial regulation, and the role of the 
public opinion in shaping the bill was acknowledged by the same Rep. Barney Frank, 
who has argued: "once public opinion got engaged, it blew away the lobbyists, the 
money, campaign contributions. Public opinion drove that bill."13 
However, the crisis’ impact for turning financial regulation into a “high issue salience” 
area has not been limited to the US. The crisis’ global reach also increased coverage of 
financial regulatory issues in Europe. Like in the US, Europe saw an initial spike in 
media coverage of financial issues followed by a weakening in the end of 2007 and a 
significant and steady increase since the second quarter of 2008. Unlike in the US, the 
mutation of the banking crisis into a sovereign debt crisis prolonged the attention of the 
media towards financial regulatory issues also after the middle of 2010. 
Moreover, unlike the previous shocks that raised the level of attention around 
derivatives, hedge funds, and rating agencies, the crisis’ intensification in the fall of 2008 
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significantly shifted elected European policymakers’ incentives both at the European and 
national levels.  
The crisis particularly enhanced policy activism in Continental European countries, that 
is those governments that in the past had been more active on the European stage in 
criticizing the lack of more stringent regulations and calling for more stringent regulations 
of rating agencies and hedge funds. More specifically, key figures such as the French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel criticized the US 
and the UK governments for having placed excessive confidence in the capacity of 
financial markets to self-regulate.14  
Not only did the crisis open a window of opportunity for these actors to bring in the 
European and international agenda positions expressed before the crisis, but financial 
regulators’ higher public salience strengthened politicians’ incentives to intervene directly 
and to be perceived as championing these measures. Moreover, the greater salience of 
regulation within Europe also altered the incentives for politicians within what had been 
in the past the main veto-player within the European Union on financial regulatory 
policies: the UK. The crisis has made it more difficult for the British government to 
maintain its traditional opposition to any attempt to regulate these sectors at the 
European level in order to defend the position of the City of London, especially after the 
British government was forced to extend an unprecedented safety net to the British 
banking system.   
In a nutshell, the unprecedented level of public attention towards financial regulatory 
issues significantly altered the conditions that had in the past led politicians in the US 
and in Europe to support market-based regulatory mechanisms. Instead, the crisis 
created strong electoral incentives for domestic elected policymakers to introduce visible 
measures to increase the regulatory oversight of financial markets. It is important to 
point out how the main mechanism through which the changed political climate triggered 
regulatory change was not primarily by favoring the emergence of new regulatory 
approaches. Rather, it was to create greater political momentum behind proposals and 
initiatives that had in many cases emerged before the crisis. From this perspective, the 
US’s leadership in the international derivative regulation does not only reflect the greater 
salience of the issue in that country, but also the fact that a debate over the regulation of 
this sector had taken place within Congress and among US regulatory agencies before 
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the crisis. Similarly, European leadership in promoting an international agreement over 
the regulation of hedge funds reflected the fact that the regulation of the sector had been 
an important issue within the European Parliament and for the German and French 
government. The impact of the greater salience of financial regulation triggered by the 
crisis has therefore been primarily of generating momentum behind these proposals by 
altering the incentives of elected politicians. 
Existing models of international regulatory cooperation in finance had focused primarily 
on periods of temporary high salience, and are therefore not relevant to these particular 
circumstances. Since 2008, elected politicians have gone beyond simply altering the 
incentives of regulatory authorities and indirectly affecting the process of international 
regulatory coordination within technocratic bodies, as described by Singer. They have 
instead designed regulatory policies that in some cases went openly against the 
preferences of regulatory authorities.  
It is important to notice how this shift in the balance of influence over the content of 
regulatory policies between elected politicians and regulators has not been limited to the 
national level, but has also extended to the international level. During the initial phase of 
the crisis transnational regulatory bodies composed by regulatory authorities operated 
largely insulated from direct political pressures. Indeed, when the G20 leaders met for 
the first time at the Leaders’ level at the Washington Summit in November 2008, their 
agenda closely resembled the one previously identified by the Financial Stability Forum, 
while their conclusions did not depart significantly from the preferences of regulators.15 
As the crisis progressed, subsequent G20 meetings interfered more significantly 
transnational technocratic bodies by defining their agendas and assigning stringent 
deadlines.16 
This dynamic also informed the regulation of the three industries analyzed in this study. 
G20 leaders meeting for the first time at leaders’ level at the Washington Summit in 
November 2008 departed from market-based approach that informed the IOSCO Code 
of Conduct for rating agencies, demanding instead that regulators work towards a 
regime based on the registration and direct oversight of rating agencies with securities 
regulators. During the next summit in London in April 2009, G20 Leaders abandoned the 
indirect approach that had characterized the regulation of hedge funds and endorsed a 
regime based on the direct regulation of hedge fund or their managers. Finally, at the 
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following summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009, G20 leaders set some stringent 
guidelines regarding the mandatory trading and central-clearing of OTC derivatives. In 
all these circumstances, the G20 leaders openly departed from the approach formally 
supported by technocratic bodies such as the FSF and IOSCO. 
This focus on the level of issue salience and the impact in shaping the incentives of 
elected politicians is important to explain two important aspects of the international 
regulatory changes that cannot be adequately explained by the other theoretical 
explanations reviewed in Chapter 2. One of these is the timing of the shift in the public-
private divide. As argued above, the outbreak of the crisis in the summer of 2007 and 
the acknowledgment of important regulatory failures did not coincide with a shift in the 
public-private divide and the initial international regulatory response was characterized 
by the continuation of the same market-based regulatory approach that had emerged 
before the crisis. This continuity with the pre-crisis period in the international approach 
across the three cases reflected the continued primacy of regulatory authorities in setting 
the parameter of the initial regulatory response to the crisis at the domestic and 
international level, before the bailouts and the intensification of the crisis in the last part 
of 2008 significantly increased the public attention towards finance.  
Moreover, the increase in the salience of finance issues across the board is important to 
explain why the international regulatory community has departed from the pre-crisis 
focus on market-based regulation in sectors that had played a rather peripheral in the 
crisis but which came to attract significant attention during the crisis. 
In sum, the impact that the varying degrees of heightened public salience of financial 
regulation had over the incentives of elected politicians in the main jurisdictions that 
dominate international financial negotiations represent a key element in explaining the 
changes in the international regulatory agenda and the reversal of the market-based 




7.4 Implications for the Literature 
The theoretical framework presented in this study and the empirical evidence presented 
the cases not only to shed light over the nature of the change in the international 
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regulatory agenda triggered by the crisis, but also have broader implications for the 
literature on the politics of international financial regulation.  
This study’s first contribution is on the domestic political foundations of international 
regulatory cooperation. As argued in Chapter 3, this is not the first study to investigate 
how domestic public opinion might influence international financial regulatory 
coordination. However, the existing literature has presented very different accounts of 
this influence. One element of disagreement is the extent to which international 
regulatory policies are constrained by public opinion. Some authors highlight how 
international regulatory policies are designed within transnational policy communities 
insulated from the broader public, while other argue that this influence may be significant 
but only in the aftermath of crises. Another element of disagreement pertains to the 
mechanisms through which public opinion will shape the content of regulatory policies, 
with some authors focusing on the way this will alter the incentives of regulators and 
others instead paying attention to the electoral incentives of their political overseers.  
This study has sought to complement this literature by illustrating the impact that 
different degrees and lengths of public salience have over the incentives of elected 
officials, and therefore on the balance of influence between bureaucratic regulatory 
agencies and their political overseers. The analysis has revealed how, during periods of 
sustained high salience, public opinion’s impact international regulatory cooperation is 
more significant than most accounts of financial regulatory politics acknowledged. It 
goes beyond simply altering the incentives of regulators as in the scenario depicted by 
Singer.17  
Instead, the empirical evidence presented in this study has demonstrated that the shift in 
the international approach towards the regulation of rating agencies, hedge funds, and 
derivatives is primarily the product of the greater activism of politicians. During a period 
of lasting high salience, politicians have not only placed constraints upon the regulators’ 
actions of regulators at the domestic level, but taken upon themselves the role of rule-
setters.  
This study has also discussed how this shift in the balance of influence between 
regulators and political masters during periods of high salience is not limited to the 
domestic level as discussed in existing accounts of international regulatory politics.  It 
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can also extend to the transnational level.18 The evidence presented in this study reveals 
how the G20 has interfered more extensively in the activities of transnational regulatory 
bodies. In sum, the degree of public salience of different financial domains represents an 
important variable influencing ideas behind the policymaking process that develops and 
implements financial rules. 
Besides representing an additional driver of change in international regulatory policies, 
regulatory policies’ salience also influences the conditional scope for some of the other 
factors identified by the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. For instance a number of 
studies have highlighted the capacity of trans-governmental regulator networks to leave 
an independent mark on international regulatory change. The evidence presented in this 
study suggests that regulatory authorities’ influence over international regulatory 
coordination is dependent on regulation’s public salience level. During periods of “quiet 
politics”, regulators will enjoy significant autonomy in setting the regulatory agenda at the 
domestic and international level. For instance, they can determine how regulatory 
policies will allocate regulatory responsibilities between public and private actors. 
However, during periods in which financial regulatory politics are highly salient, 
transnational regulatory networks’ autonomy from domestic political constraints, and the 
constraints posed by the public opinion, will decrease.  
As a result, the degree of salience conditions the influence of other elements that the 
main IPE theories have identified as shaping these institutions’ work. For instance, while 
functionalist accounts of regulatory policies describe regulators as responding to 
efficiency considerations when determining the extent of regulatory intervention, during 
periods of high salience politicians responding directly to electoral incentives may 
demand that regulators implement more extensive regulatory policies than those justified 
purely on grounds of efficiency.   
Moreover, the degree of salience will also affect the influence of the financial industry. 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, an important literature has investigated the different 
mechanisms through which the financial industry influences the regulatory process. 
While these works have highlighted numerous factors explaining this influence, they are 
less equipped to explain why financial industry groups sometimes lose. This study’s 
findings are puzzling for this literature, since the reassertion of direct regulatory oversight 
during the crisis occurred against the preferences expressed by the main derivative 
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dealers groups, hedge fund associations and rating agencies in the years before the 
crisis.  
The analysis in this study suggests that public salience conditions financial groups’ 
influence. As argued by different interest group theorists, groups seeking to defend the 
status quo will benefit from a lack of sustained public attention. This was also the case in 
areas analyzed in this paper. The main US derivative dealers, rating agencies, and 
hedge fund groups benefited from close relationships with their home-country regulators. 
But the increase in the level of public salience disrupted this pattern and increased 
politicians’ engagement in the regulatory process, politicians that were subject to strong 
electoral pressures to endorse more extensive forms of regulation.  
The change in public salience also directly affected the financial industry’ advocacy 
strategy. The case studies revealed how during periods of low salience derivative 
dealers, hedge fund groups and rating agencies have reacted to different shocks that 
threatened their regulatory status by introducing incremental adjustments on a self-
regulatory basis. The change in the level of salience has led leading financial industry 
groups to alter their lobbying strategy to this high salience environment. 
With their sector’s mishaps in the public spotlight, derivative dealers, hedge fund 
managers, and rating agencies have found it strategically counterproductive to resist 
attempts to bring their activities under the direct oversight of regulatory agencies. 
Instead, the increase in salience during the second stage of the crisis has led the main 
associations representing derivative dealers, hedge fund managers, and the same rating 
agencies to provide support for official regulatory frameworks. 19 In 1994, when different 
legislative proposals to regulate derivatives entered the Congressional agenda, a 
coalition of financial sector groups claimed that the Bill was “unnecessary” and that, if 
passed, it would increase the cost of risk management, and that market liquidity would 
decline.20 This time around, however, the changed political climate within Congress 
forced financial dealers to abandon their opposition to mandatory regulation of the 
sector. For instance, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 
immediately endorsed the legislation introduced by the US Treasury, describing it as “an 
important step toward much-needed reform of financial industry regulation.”21  
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In the beginning of 2009, the main hedge fund association – the MFA – also changed its 
position and threw its weight behind the proposals to force hedge funds to register with 
the SEC and meet disclosure requirements,22 a move that MFA had opposed during the 
crisis.23  When the regulatory clampdown started to appear inevitable, rating agencies 
endorsed the principle that their activities should fall under national authorities’ 
regulatory oversight.24 In sum, it is true that the financial industry remains the most 
important societal stakeholder in financial regulatory politics. Nonetheless, this analysis’ 
focus on issue salience suggests that its capacity to “capture” must be regarded as 
contingent on politicians’ receptiveness of to its claims. 
Finally, the analysis of the emergence and decline of the market-based approach 
towards the regulation of finance has some implications for the broader literature on 
global governance. More specifically, a number of authors have in recent years 
investigated the sources of the greater reliance on “private authorities” in the global 
economy25, or a “privatization of regulation in the world economy”26, or the rise of 
“transnational private governance”.27 While presenting different interpretations of the 
origins of this turn, most of these analyses tended to describe it as a structural shift in 
the governance of the global economy. Few authors have openly discussed and 
theorized on the possibility of a return towards more state-based forms of governance in 
the global economy.28 
The reassertion of a more state-based form of regulation in the governance of 
international financial markets comes with an important cautionary note. This study 
provides empirical support for the argument made by Culpepper at the domestic level 
regarding the importance of a certain degree of inattentiveness from the public as a 
condition for the resilience of informal or industry-based governance arrangement.29 
Most importantly, it suggests that the insights presented by Culpepper are also important 
to understand how international policies allocate regulatory functions between state-
based and market-based mechanisms. A crisis or other large-scale event that 
significantly raises the level of public salience of a certain domain in the countries that 
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dominates the international regulatory process is likely to represent an important threat 
to the resilience of other global private governance arrangements.
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